APPENDIX J

PLEASURE AS FELT RESTORATION AND AS UNIMPEDED ACTIVITY

The Disutility and Utility Factors In Human Action

*ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως ... ἀνεμπόδιστον (*sc.*εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν)*
["(pleasure is) the unimpeded activity of such a permanent disposition (in a living being) as is according to (its) nature"]

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* VII, 1153a14-5

οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη
["for no activity is perfect if it is hindered"]

Aristotle, *op.cit.* VII, 1153b16

The substance of the Platonic analysis of pleasure (gratification and satisfaction, v. *Appendix I*) is formed by the view that pleasure consists in a *process* of realisation of a state of fulfilment, and not in such a *stable* state itself. Pleasure accompanies the replenishment of a (felt) want or deficiency and not the state of plenitude and sufficiency. In the classical philosophical terminology, pleasure is fundamentally a *coming into being (γένεσις)* and not *essential being* itself *(οὐσία).* Plato, starting from this view (which he ascribes to some subtle and smart thinkness (*κομψοί*), *Philebus,* 53c), reformulates it by utilising the antithesis of means and end. There are two kinds of things, one existing in itself, the other in intrinsic reference, with an inherent aiming at, another; the former does not point essentially to anything else and, thus, stands in no need of anything else, while the latter is wanting in something of the former kind and, hence, requiring its fulfilment through it and tending to that fulfilment (*ibid.* 53c-d). This is in effect the distinction between that for the sake of which something else exists on the one hand, and that which exists for the sake of something else on the other, between, in

other words, end and means (*ibid.* 53e). A *process* of realisation (coming into being) is inherently a means, whereas a realised (stable) state (being, essence) is an end relatively to the process towards its achievement (*ibid.* 54a-b). Applying this analysis to pleasure, it is inferred that pleasure, as feeling of satisfaction concomitant upon the process of *replenishment* of a depleted state, is means and never end in itself (54c6-7). But goodness as benefit belongs necessarily to the category of end: for everything seeks its own advantage as an end in itself, and not as means towards the achievement of something else. Whence it follows that processes, i.e. things pursued for the sake of something else, cannot fall under the category of goodness (54c9-11). Pleasure, therefore, consisting essentially in a process, not only cannot be identified with *the Good* (i.e. absolute goodness), but is not allowed to stand as even *a good* (55a9-11). It is absurd (Plato holds) to take pleasure as good, because this implies that one prefers to be depleted in various respects (and feel the pain of it) just in order to feel also the satisfaction of replenishment, rather than not to be depleted at all but stay in a condition of unperturbed fulfilment (54e4-8; cf. 55a5-8).

We should carefully distinguish what is really at stake here. *The entire analysis of goods as utilities is left intact.* Plato's endeavour is solely to discredit pleasure as a candidate for absolute or relative goodness. *The Good* (*τὸ ἀγαθόν,* i.e. absolute goodness) is in its own nature that which suffices to satisfy absolutely the needs of a given kind of being, so that this latter has no need of and no use for, anything else; *ibid.* 60c: *Ὧ παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ*

τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν ["(the nature of the Good (of absolute goodness) consists in this that) if it is present permanantly, to the very end, in all respects, in some living being, this being stands never in need of anything else, possessing the power of sufficiency to the most perfect degree"]. A good is necessarily something that partakes of the nature of the Good (of absolute goodness): it is what suffices in certain respects and for a certain kind of need to the living being in question. Good is not strictly speaking the replenishment of a depleted state, but that which replenishes it, that which fills a want. For instance, thirst being the feeling of a condition of depletion with regard to liquid substance in the organism, it is *water,* as the most appropriate substance capable of replenishing that want, which is *a good and a utility - not the replenishment by water.* The stage of the replenishing process, however, does measure the degree of goodness (or, in other words, the intensity of utility) of the replenishing substance, in our example, of water, for the individual undergoing that process. So that the nearer to the natural state of liquid fulfilment one approaches, the less intensity of utility and degree of goodness water has for the recovering subject. The utility and goodness of water as such, however, remains high, proportional to the need for liquid substance of human nature in general, given its standard rate of depletion as a result of a normal exercise of the natural aggregate of life-activities.

The view that pleasure is not the (or a) good and utility - and the corresponding statement that pain is not the (or an)

evil and disutility - loses its bite once it is acknowledged that they measure (intensities of) utilities and disutilities. Moreover, there is something artificial in the contention that the operation of any power is essentially accompanied by (it causes) some corresponding depletion, and thus, is a disutility, just as goods (utilities) effect the replenishment of depleted conditions.

Both shortcomings are addressed valiantly, and restituted, by the Aristotelian distinction of *movement (κίνησις)* and *activity (ἐνέργεια)* in stricter sense. The core of the matter lies in the highly significant insight that there is another dynamic condition, besides movement, opposed to an inertly static state. As Aristotle himself formulated it, *Nicomachean Ethics,* VII, 1154b26-28: *οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει* ["For there is activism not only of movement but of immobility as well; and indeed pleasure is constituted rather in rest than in movement"]. The dynamism of being is not exhausted in movement; in fact, kinetic activism is an inferior kind of dynamism. The higher one combines the stability and self-contentment of a static state with the force and teaming vibration of a change. Both types of activism are opposed as actualities to mere potentialities or potencies. But movement (change) is a process of gradual realisation of a certain stable character whereas activity is the immediate and complete activation of such a character according to its inherent powers. For instance there is movement in the building of a house or in the learning of knowledge; but seeing or thinking and intellecting are sheer activities. The

former kind results in something beyond itself (the house or scientific knowledge in the above examples). While in the latter, nothing is essentially effected through its operation. (V. principally, *Metaphysica,* Θ, 6; esp. 1048b18-26; cf. *Ethica Nicomachea* 1094a4, 6; *Magna Moralia,* 1211b27-33). Moreover, the concrete character of a movement in its identity as the particular movement that it is, is defined by its entirety and is not present at each moment of its existence, while, on the contrary, the concrete character of an activity is wholly and perfectly present at each moment of its operation (cf. chiefly, *Ethica Nicomachea,* X, 1174a13-b9, sqq.). Pleasure relates to activity, and not to movement, since its essential character is complete and fully manifested at any moment of its existence (ibid.). It consummates the activity to which it is attached, as a sort of supervening end and perfection (*ἐπιγινόμενον τέλος*, *op.cit.* 1174b31-33; cf. 1174b23-1175a17). It represents the flourishing of an activity. In strictness, it consists in an *unimpeded activity (ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια);* v. *op.cit.* 1153a15; 1153b10, 11.

The Aristotelian treatment of pleasure (*Ethica Nicomachea,* VII, 1152b1-1154b31 and X, 1172a16-1176a29) should be compared and brought into organic relationship with the Platonic analysis. Aristotle contrasts explicitly and sharply his own account to Plato's theory. So *op.cit.* VII, 1153a7-15: *ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ*

τῶν εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον ["Moreover, there has not to be something else better than pleasure, as some say that such is the end and completion of becoming. For pleasure is not becoming, nor are pleasures concomitant upon becoming, not all, but they are activities and finalities (of the nature of end and completion). Nor do they happen as we are in a process of becoming, but in the activity of using. Furthermore, it is not the case that for all pleasures there is an end external to them, but only of those that are associated with the process of one's nature developing towards its perfection. It follows that it is not well said that pleasure is felt becoming, but it should rather be said that it is the activity of the natural state of a thing, and in fact, such an activity *unimpeded,* instead of *felt*"]. (For another explicit criticism of the Platonic theory, v. *op.cit.* X, 1173b7-20. Aristotle castigates the Platonic analysis on the ground that it unwarrantedly generalises from what appears to be the case in grosser kinds of pleasure, as those accompanying nutrition). Becoming (*γένεσις*) is a technical term in Plato's *Philebus* and in Aristotle, signifying a process of formation of a stable existence, i.e. of a substantive entity with an essential identity of its own: the full expression in Philebus is *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* (e.g. 26d8), *coming into essential, and, thus, substantial, being, being constituted as a stable existent.* The *"some"* who say that there is an end and completion (*τέλος*) of becoming, and this is better than pleasure, is evidently Plato: for him

pleasure is becoming having passed the threshold of awareness, having been felt, a position that Aristotle explicitly criticises in the above passage. The introduction of this qualification into the Platonic definition of pleasure (a restitution of the natural state of *fulfilment that is being felt*) helps into acknowledging the existence of *pure* pleasures, pleasures, that is, unmixed with pain. Since for Plato pleasure consists basically into the satisfaction of a condition of want, the replenishment of a state of depletion, there is always involved in pleasure some deficiency which is in the process of being healed. But deficiencies that are not intense enough as to be felt, leave the pleasures of their elimination pure (*Philebus,* 50e sqq.; esp. 51b3-7; 51e7-52a3; 51b6-8). In fact, Plato argues that such pure pleasures are the *true* pleasures (even though not the intensest ones), since they are not contaminated by something else than themselves, and indeed by their opposite (ibid. 52c-53c).

But for Aristotle the wholeness and perfection of some, at least, pleasures (like those that Plato reckons as pure, the pleasure of seeing a well-formed geometrical shape with perfect proportions, or of hearing sounds in themselves harmonious, or the pleasure experienced in knowledge), is not a question of unfelt defects whose felt restoration constitutes these pleasures. A much more strong and positive basis for the gratification implicit, for instance, in knowledge is required, he considers. He finds that in the activation in itself of a potency, not in the process which the activation may generate. Understanding, knowing, intellecting is the activity of the rational faculty in man: as such, when operating *unimpededly* by any external obstacle

or internal difficulty, it is necessarily accompanied by natural pleasure. Similarly, when a carpenter makes a table, there is pleasure accompanying its production (and not only pain from the labour expended on it), and this is due to the professional operation of his craftmanship; in fact, if he is less than accomplished in his artisanship, he experiences pain rather than pleasure during the construction: too many problems have to be resolved for a successful outcome.

In the above examples, the actualisation of the power involved is immediate and immediately complete. Knowledge and ability are involved as wholes right from the beginning of the operations. They are not made up as one proceeds - it is the object constructed which is thus gradually constituted. If they are so made up, there is learning involved. Where there is a process of realisation of an end essentially involved in a pleasure; where, that is, there is movement towards a result to be completed in the end; where, in other words, there is determinative external finality to what is going on; even there, for Aristotle, pleasure does not consist in the process itself, nor is it associated to the condition of deficiency, but pertains to that part of the entity undergoing the process which is itself in *its* natural state of fulfilment. For instance, the pleasure felt in drinking water when thirsty is not connected to the relief felt by the suffering part or aspect of the organism as a result of *its* being in a condition of depletion and a process of replenishment; on the contrary, the gratification belongs to the rest of the animal, which is in a sound state, and can exercise its faculties to the full unhindered as far as the supply of liquid sustainance is concerned. (But see *infra* for

this assumption). Thus, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 1152b33 - 1153a2: *ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργειαι], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης* ["Moreover, since goodness applies to activity and to disposition, processes of restitution to the natural disposition are pleasurable *per accidens.* In such cases, the activity pertains to the desires of the remaining part or aspect of the disposition and nature (which persisted in a state of natural fulfilment). For there are pleasures without any admixture of pain and desire, like those of theorising, when the nature of the living being is not in a condition of want"]. Since there are unmixed pleasures, pleasure in its essential character cannot consist in the satisfaction of a want, even when it accompanies such an one. In these cases, too, it is an activity, the unimpeded activity of the remaining, *unaffected* by the deficiency, part or aspect of the nature of the thing in question. The process of restoration is pleasurable not as such, in itself, and by its nature, but because it leads to the natural state of fulfilment, like the physician's treatment which reinstates health from sickness (NE, VII, 1154b16-20). Pleasurable by nature are precisely the activities of a given nature (1154b20), i.e. of an individual living being according to its nature.

The Aristotelian construal captures indeed essential aspects of the reality of pleasure and pain. But it can complement, not substitute, the Platonic analysis. Aristotle

accepts that (natural) desire has to do with the filling up of a deficiency and want; *NE,* III, 1118b18-19: *ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία*. Cf. *Problems,* XXII, 3, 930a28: *ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἔνδεια* ["desire is want"]. Dissociating in essential terms pleasure from processes of replenishment, even though acknowledging as matter of fact their coexistence in the case of characteristic kinds of pleasure at least (cf. *NE,* X, 1173b11-13), would imply the severance of the essential ties between pleasure and desire. For the desire is of replenishment, as Plato maintained (v. *supra, Appendix I*). And in general, the desire is directed to the process of realisation of an end, it is the will which views, and is of, the end itself. The sundering, however, of desire from pleasure, not only is in itself unacceptable, it is also inconsistent with Aristotle's definitive intrinsic association of the two, encapsulated in the statement that *ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις τοῦ ἡδέος*, *desire is an appetency of the pleasurable* (V. *NE,* 1111a32; 1111b16; 1151b11; *Ethica Eudemia,* 1223a34; 1235b22; *De anima,* 414b5, 2, 12; 433a25; *Ars Rhetorica,* 1370a12; 1369b15; *De partibus Animalium,* 661a8; *Topica,* 140b27; cf. *De anima,* 434a3). In fact, Aristotle approaches substantially the Platonic anatomy of the desire - pleasure - pain complex, by recognising that desire involves pain (*μετὰ λύπης ἡ ἐπιθυμία*, *NE,* 1119a4).

Furthermore, if pleasure has nothing to do essentially with the process of restoration of the disturbed natural state of fulfilment, then how can it be that its intensity depends on the stage in which that process is in? It is the foundational fact of Marginalism that the degree of satisfaction is directly correlated to the intensity of want

and, hence, of desire. To explain this fact in terms of the Aristotelian account of pleasure, it would be necessary (though not sufficient) to postulate an increasing weariness in the unimpeded exercise of fully formed faculties of our nature with the passage of time, or, in other words, an increasing impediment to the exercise of such faculties caused by no other specific reason than the sheer passage of time. This is patently incapable of providing the required synchronization of the burden of time with the diminishing distance from the normal state of fulfilment in each case of a pleasurable process of replenishment. And besides, it stands in severe need of explanation itself. One will have to say that time weights down on activities of human nature by reason of the necessary implication in any and every *activity* of *processes* arising ultimately out of the existence of matter, the archetypal obstacle to the action of the principle of reason and intelligibility.

It is true that Aristotle discountenances any way of speaking that will allow becoming to be intrinsically associated to pure pleasures, such as the gratification arising from knowledge or from sensations of shapes and structures well formed. V. *NE,* X, 1173b13-20. There is no coming into stable (essential) being associated with such pleasures: we cannot identify some specific condition of want, whose replenishment could possibly give rise to them, as we can do in the case of, e.g., thirst-quenching. To the objection that, surely, there is a *need* for knowledge and aesthetic form in human nature satisfied by the aforementioned objects, and that the pure pleasures referred to by Aristotle represent the gratification of conditions of want such as ignorance or

ugliness, Aristotle would presumably counter that there is no *gradual* realisation of an end involved in the case where it is not a question of *learning* a body of knowledge or *acquiring* of artistic appreciation, but of pleasures associated with actually entertained knowledge and aesthetic experience. To activate knowledge or art possessed, so as to make them actually entertained by the mind, *is not a movement:* knowledge and art are realised all at once, as they, so to speak, "change" or mutate their mode of existence from potentiality to actuality.

But, on the other hand, Aristotle recognises that even the purest pleasures have limits of saturation in actual reality. Pure pleasures are those according to nature, and such are the activities pertaining to a given nature (*NE,* VII, 1154b15-20). Mixed pleasures are pleasures *per accidens:* some part or aspect of the system suffers pain as a result of a condition of defect in which it is found, while the rest of it acts in accordance with its nature and so feels pleasure. We associate the process of restoration in the deficient part or aspect to the pleasure felt by the non-deficient parts and aspects of the system, since process and activity (and so, pain and pleasure) happen simultaneously. But the connection is *accidental:* essentially a process in itself cannot yield pleasure. Aristotle uses medicinal language to highlight the point: the curing process is one thing, the action of the healthy parts and aspects of the organism (those, that is, unaffected by the ailing condition of the suffering part or aspect) is another. The fact that while the healing process is going on in the affected member and function, what remains healthy in the organism performs in

accordance with its nature, operates more freely on account of the ongoing restoration of the ailing member or function (at least in the sense that its activity is not *threatened* any more by an ongoing process of deterioration in the ailing part) and consequently feels the pleasure inherent in such operation, and also thereby conversely is helped to effect the restitution of health in the ailing part and aspect - this complex fact allows us to speak of the pleasures of remedies (*NE,* VII, 1154b17-19). But these are *seeming* pleasures: *δοκεῖ ἡδὺ εἶναι (ibid.);* all remedies are in themselves disagreeable, and their administering is accompanied by pain, not pleasure. Presumably Aristotle would hold that drinking water, for instance, in a condition of thirst, is essentially such a remedy and is in itself painful. For taking in more water in a state of natural fulfilment *is* disagreeable: so that what is disagreeable in the normal state of things, is agreeable in conditions of deficiency and defect, when the system is depleted (in a certain part of it and with regard to a particular substance). The pleasurableness of water is therefore *accidental,* not an essential property of it: it depends on its being delivered to a system in a condition of depletion. What is essentially and by nature pleasurable on the contrary must generate pleasure in normal states of natural fulfilment. And such are the proper activities of a given nature, when they are unimpeded. So that in the case of thirst, the pleasure felt must be in the non-thirsty part of the system and cannot be *essentially* constituted by the drinking of the water.

It follows that pure pleasures (in Platonic parlance) or pleasures according to nature (in the Aristotelian

formulation) cannot have in themselves a saturation point. For as long as a system is in its normative, natural state in whatever part or aspect of it; to the extent, that is, that the system exists as the kind of thing that is defined by its nature; to that extent there is a part or aspect of it which remains "healthy", i.e. in the natural state of fulfilment. The natural activity of the healthy disposition in the thing can thus, in principle, go on interminably, and generate an indefinitely increasing amount of pleasure. *Τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ*, *NE,* X, 1178a5-6 ["For what is properly one's own according to nature, this is what is mightiest and most pleasurable to each one"]. There is no intrinsic reason, therefore, according to the Aristotelian account, why there should be satiety in the exercise of the perfected faculties of one's own nature and in the pleasure arising therefrom.

Yet the facts testify to the contrary. There is weariness and saturation even in the supremest human activity, *intellectual theorising (νόησις).* There is increasing fatigue in the exercise of any faculty, even of those properly so called, whose actualisation is a strict activity. Human activity is tiresome, Aristotle acknowledges. Not only is it that the constant occupation of some activity with the *same* object diminishes the enjoyment of that object (the foundation of Marginalism), but it even reduces the enjoyment arising from the exercise of the apprehensive faculties or senses involved in the occupation with, and the enjoyment of, the object. Gossen, for example, has thus caught half, and the more obvious part, of the problem (*The Laws of Human Relations and the Rule of Human*

Action Derived Therefrom, tr. R.C. Blitz, 1983, p. 8): "This decline of pleasure resulting from continuous and repeated enjoyment of the same object should not be confused with the increase that anyone can achieve through the exercise of the senses of enjoyment. Exercise of the eye, ear, taste and mind increases, in general, the enjoyment of the objects serving these senses; but continued and repeated enjoyment of one and the same object is subject, nevertheless, to the process of diminution". Gossen was groping towards the full implications of the problem. But neither his formulation does justice to the complexity of the issue; nor is he alert to some causal explanation of the facts he notices. Aristotle, on the characteristic contrary, no sooner diagnoses the problem that speeds up with a rational account of it. *NE* X, 1175a3-6: *πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ* ["How is it then that one cannot feel continually pleasure? Isn't it because one gets tired? For everything human is incapable of acting continually. And so neither pleasure can last continually; for it is consequent upon activity"]. In intellection, as in visual perception, mental attention is most intensely exerted in the beginning of a novel operation, but as time goes by, the activity tends to be more and more negligently performed. To this loosening of the tone of the activity, there corresponds a fading away of the accompanying pleasure (*ibid.,* 1175a6-10).

But obviously this cannot be the end of the story. How exactly is it that what is "mightiest and most pleasurable" in human life, is also wearisome, negligently performed, jaded,

exhausting? Aristotle's answer to this crux consists in invoking a basic dualism in our constitution. The eternal element, mind, would behave, if alone, as the theory predicts; and this is actually the case with godhead, who is pure mind unmixed with material elements. But the factor of mortality, ultimately matter, has its own nature and imposes its own lawfulness: it cannot be actualised to a proper activity, but only in a process, in movement and change. Our dual nature is thus responsible for the paradox: what is natural to one part of our constitution is unnatural to the other. And thus, what is pleasure to the mind (the knowledge-field of our being), is pain to our material constitution. *NE,* VII, 1154b20-31: *οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὐθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας. καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.* ["Now the reason why nothing is always pleasant itself is the fact that our nature is not simple, but there exists in the composition something else, in so far as we are mortal; so that if one part acts (according to its nature), this is unnatural to the other nature; and when there is an equilibrium between the two, the action appears to be neither painful nor pleasurable. For

if the nature of something were simple, then the same action would be most pleasurable to it. Which is the reason why God enjoys eternally one, simple pleasure (namely, that of intellection). For there is activism not only in movement, but in motionlessness as well; and pleasure exists more in rest than in movement. *Now changefulness in all things is sweet,* as the Poet would have it, *by reason of some corruption.* For just as changeable is the wicked man, so defective is the nature which stands in constant need of change; it can be neither simple nor fair"].

Notice how Aristotle on every opportunity contrasts his analysis to the Platonic one, something which brings into relief the cardinal points at issue. In the passage above, he disposes of Plato's contention that in states of natural fulfilment there is no place either for pleasure or for pain (v. *Appendix I*). On the contrary, for him, the neutral state signifies equivalence of the pleasure and pain felt by the two constituents of our composite nature respectively, and, thus, is proof of no superior condition.

It is clear from the Aristotelian explanation in the passage above, that matter's gravitation is a burden to man's intellectual activities by way of matter's mobility and changefulness. Thus, despite Aristotle's reluctance to associate becoming with activity in the case of pure natural, pleasures, he finally endorses, as he has to, the view that it is *processes* proper to the material principle that cause the gradual weariness in the *activities* of the mental principle, something which shows itself up as a diminution of the pleasure intrinsic to such activities. Now this reintroduces in an essential way processes of becoming into the field of

activities, and, thus, appears to validate the analysis of pleasure in terms of want and replenishment of deficiency. For instance, if the exercise of the builder's craftmanship (which is, partly, an activity as the actuality of the building art, i.e. of building knowledge) is wearied down and, finally, worn out and stopped *because* of the impediments inherent in the various processes (internal and external to the builder) with which it is as a matter of fact associated, then its connection to movement must be inherent and essential. *The crucial question is: How does movement impinge upon activity so as to reduce, and eventually annihilate, the pleasure associated with the latter?*

The Aristotelian explanation delineated above in relationship to the passage concluding NE Book VII, *will not do as a final account.* The schema propounded there would require simply that the pleasure arising out of the operation of an intellectual faculty remains unalterable, while the discomfort originating in matter's alienation from such activities increases with the passage of time, so that at a given point the latter becomes equal to the former, which defines the level of satiety of the given pleasure-in-activity under the constraints that matter imposes. But this is inadequate for anything more than a first approximation to the full understanding of the matter. It is formalistic, not giving the detailed mechanism of the interaction between matter and activity. And why is the pain increasing? Presumably the pain is due to the obstruction offered to the material processes by the mental activity. Then increasing pain would require increasing obstruction; and how is this to be accounted? More importantly, how can the material

processes not thwart the intellectual activity, thus *lessening* its concomitant pleasure. Finally, pleasures and pains do not cancel out themselves mutually leaving the remainder as plus or minus feeling. In fact, they can coexist and, if anything they are rather enhanced in apparent intensity by the presence of their opposite. All in all, a more intimate interrelationship of movement and activity is needed to account adequately to both the observable phenomena and the exigencies of the doctrine of pleasure as *unimpeded* activity.

Movement, in the classical scheme of things, is never a random process of change but, *primarily,* a process of realisation of (of coming into) stable (i.e. essential) being, and, *secondarily,* a process of gradual destabilization of, of moving away from, stable being. In either case, movement presupposes a condition of removal from the natural state of fulfilment, a condition improving or aggravating respectively. We may now say that such removal afflicting the general disposition of a thing in some part or respect of it, presents an *obstacle* to the complete and perfect activity of its nature, constitutes a constraint to the full play of its powers and capacities. As a result, a thing suffering from that kind of removal, has the activity of the sound part or aspect of its nature *impeded* to a corresponding extent. *Since it is of the essence of pain according to Aristotle that an activity encounters obstacles in its operation,* we have in the case under consideration the Aristotelian explanation for that admixture of pain and pleasure which is to be found in all activities involving intrinsically movement, most typically in phenomena similar to thirst and hunger.

The two alternative theories are at last nicely differentiated here, and can thus be effectively tested. In the case of a positive movement, i.e. a process of consolidation or restitution of the natural state, the Aristotelian account would require a continual diminution of pain coupled with a continual augmentation in net pleasure. (We cannot net out pleasures and pains belonging to different parts and faculties, but, let us assume, we may do it with feelings of the same proximate subject). For as the condition of the thing approaches its natural state of fulfilment, the obstacle presented by the distance between the two, in the part or aspect of the thing suffering deficiency, is gradually being eliminated, with the result that pain is decreasing towards zero. On the other hand, the activity of the sound part or aspect of the thing becoming less and less impeded, gives an increasing pleasure. (It is as if from the constant gross pleasure of the activity as such, less and less pain due to obstacles is subtracted). This means that at the final point of the process, when the natural state has been established, pleasure is maximal. But such prediction is disproved by the experience of reality, in the case of the "satiable" desires (to use Marshall's expression) that we are considering. By contrast the Platonic account fits exactly with the facts of the matter (v. *Appendix I*). Pleasure at satiety point is nil.

As soon as we try to give specific substance to the idea that matter and its inherent changefulness are responsible for the burden on activities which makes wearisome and exhausting the exercise of the faculties proper to human nature, the Aristotelian account of pleasure runs into insurmountable difficulties. There can be no doubt that the

Platonic analysis captures the reality of the issue, at least with regard to wants involving bodily parameters ("satiable" wants). Want, desire and pleasure are indeed essentially associated to processes of depletion and replenishment, to deficiencies and fulfilments. But, on the other hand, the Aristotelian insight of pleasure supervening upon the free, unhindered exercise of powers belonging to the nature of man, is also preciously significant. The problem is to construct a *unified theory* of pleasure applicable to both fields of cases, satiable wants involving processes of movement and insatiable gratification from activities.

Insatiable wants is, of course, *a contradiction in terms.* Wants are limited by the condition of deficiency which they express. Deficiency is always determined with reference to the normal, natural state of fulfilment. Since this latter is intrinsically definite, the distance from it of any condition of deficiency is necessarily finite and definite. Want being limited, pain, desire and pleasure are limited. (All this has been already established in *Appendix I* within a different content). It is for this very reason that Aristotle emphasises that in the case of the pleasures felt at the unimpeded exercise of certain characteristic powers essentially inherent to human nature, there is no corresponding want satisfied. (Cf. the already quoted passage *NE,* X, 1173b16-20). This fact would enable such pleasures to run, in principle, indefinitely.

To be exact, as has been already observed, what does not exist in these cases is not a corresponding want tout-court, but a want which can only be satisfied by a process of gradual realisation of the state of fulfilment, i.e. by a

movement (of becoming). For instance when one does not possess knowledge, then (assuming that knowledge is the natural fulfilment of the thinking part or faculty in man) he is in want of it, and can acquire it by the process of learning - a becoming to the state of knowledge. When, on the other hand, he does have the knowledge but happens not to exercise it actually at a given moment of time, then he may be also said to be in want of it, but this is something radically different from what the same expression means in the former case. His want can now be satisfied instantaneously, by the activation of the power of knowledge which he possesses. The logic of distance from a natural state of fulfilment is inapplicable here: in a certain sense, one is already in that state if he has the knowledge, even when he happens not to actually exercise it (think it). On the other hand there is no pleasure associated with the possession of knowledge as unexercised power, state and permanent condition; while great pleasure accompanies its activation in the actual thinking of it.

The potentiality of reason (of valid thinking) definitive of human nature can be turned into the actual power (faculty) of fully developed (perfected) reason through a process of evolution, by a movement of becoming. And so with every art and science. Once reason (art, science, knowledge) is being possessed, it can be turned into a second order actuality, into the activity of thinking and knowing, wholly and *immediately,* without any movement. The gradualism in the former transition indicates *expenditure of effort in overcoming obstacles;* the immediateness of the latter, signify an *effortless* shift with no internal obstacles.

In both types of case, however, what is common is the realisation of a natural state of fulfilment: human nature attains its proper perfections, satisfies its intrinsic demand for optimal self-realisaiton. In the case of all mental excellencies (intellectual and moral *virtues,* i.e. emivent abilities), everywhere, that is, where thinking and knowledge are involved essentially, the realisation of the inherent requirements of human nature is twofold and double-phased. First the corresponding power is constituted, and then activity can follow as the exercise of that power. In all other cases of perfection, i.e. of attaining the natural state of fulfilment in some part or respect, or, in still other words to the same effect, of realising the intrinsic requirements for the full manifestation of human nature in its specific and individual identity, in all such cases other than those involving thinking and knowledge, the bifurcation of the realisation of what constitutes human nature into acquiring a power and, distinctly, exercising it, is nonexistent. Just as you cannot have, e.g., the fire without the continuous operation of its capacity to warm, so by quenching thirst, one *simultaneously* obtains the state of sufficiency regarding the quantity of liquid substance (basically, for the ancient mind, water) proper to human nature and necessary for its well-being, and the consequences of that state, that is, the effects of it on all other parameters of the organism. By securing adequate liquidity to the body, one *ipso facto* ensures the continuous action of that liquidity on all corporeal members and functions. No doubt, one may construct mechanisms of retarding the influence of such action from taking place in

some respects; however, this is not a genuine case of withholding and postponing the exercise of the action, but rather of countering it by some opposite action with a zero net result: the power acts all along according to its nature.

Aristotle specifies that the distinction analysed above is between *powers without and with reason (δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, μετὰ λόγου).* V. Metaphysica, Θ, 1046b1-24; 1048a1-24. That the "rational powers" may be exercised or not he ascribes to the fact that they can work in opposite directions with regard to the same thing: for instance, medicinal science can effect both health and sickness, precisely by consisting in the knowledge of health. *Knowledge of opposites is the same,* primarily of the stable state of natural normalcy, and derivatively of any unbalanced condition deviating from the natural state of equilibrium. On the other hand "irrational powers" work always in one and the same way: heat only warms, it cannot cool. Being capable of effecting contraries, rational powers cannot be exercised continuously and automatically: for in that case, they would produce simultaneously contradictory results, which is impossible.

Knowledge in any field involves both the capacity to do the positive (the "right) thing and the "capacity" to do the negative (the "wrong") thing. *Since for the classical mind negativity is not so much a force opposing positivity but rather the lack of power to act correctly,* the "capacity" to do the negative thing is at bottom an incapacity to do the positive. So that, as Aristotle puts it with regard to rational powers (abilities, craftmanships, sciences) in *Eudemian Ethics,* 1246b32: *καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἡ ἀδυνα-*

μία ["and quite generally in power there inheres impotency"].

Interruption in the exercise of rational powers is due ultimately to the contradictoriness implicit in them. Contradictoriness inheres in them because they exist in matter. Matter is the matrix of indefiniteness, of the fact that things and states can be otherwise than they are. Contingency is due to matter. *Everything that exists in matter consumes energy, so to speak, for its continuation in existence, struggling all along against the real possibility of its being, and of its turning, at any moment, otherwise than it is. It wrestles continuously against the possibility of its cancellation, by the appearance of its opposite. There is inherent toilsomeness in material existence.* The laborious endeavour to defend one's identity renders impossible the unperturbed and ceaseless exercise of its powers. This affects both rational and irrational powers, though in different ways. The former have their action interrupted; the latter cease to exist themselves. Only absence of matter can rescue things from this predicament. According to Aristotle this means freedom from matter in the strict and proper sense, as the principle which provides the foundation for the reality of quantitative, qualitative and essential change. He admits the existence of a special type of matter which allows only for locomotion; of such a quintessential stuff are made the heavenly bodies. They go perpetually through the same regular motions in space. Their movement is unstoppable. For their action is not wearisome. *Metaphysica,* Θ, 1050b24-34: *οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἢ κί-*

νησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὖσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου. μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ· καθ' αὑτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις, ἐξ ὧν διώρισται, πᾶσαι τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς εἰσιν (τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ὧδὶ κινεῖν δύναται καὶ μὴ ὧδί), ὅσαι γε κατὰ λόγον· αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἔσονται αἱ αὐταί ["Nor do they (sc. the celestial bodies) get tired in doing this (sc. eternally acting their courses, *ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ*); for their movement does not depend on the power of contradictoriness, as is the case with things passing away, so that the continuity of movement to be toilsome. For it is substance consisting in matter and potency, not in activity, which is the cause of this. And indeed there is imitation of things incorrubtible by beings existing in the sphere of change, like earth and fire (things that are eternal elements of the world). For these, too, are always in action; because they exist in themselves (i.e. are independent of other things) and have the principle of their movement in themselves. But the other powers, from which the aforementioned are essentially distinguished, are all powers of contradictoriness, certainly to be sure those that involve reason (the rational ones); for that which is capable causing a certain movement (change), is also capable of not causing that movement. As to the irrational powers, they, too, are the same for contradictories, by being present or not present"]. The meaning of the last statement becomes clear when one notices that, e.g., the capacity not to digest properly in an organism is simply the absence (wholly or in

part) of the capacity to digest, some malfunction in the digestive system canceling or reducing the power of food-assimilation. The same power, by its existence or nonexistence in a thing, causes the appropriately opposite results.

The relative assimilation in the passage above of rational and irrational powers vis-à-vis (the celectial) powers of uniquely determined and ceaselessly actualised exercise, does not abolish the distinction between them. For irrational powers are the same for the corresponding contradictories *by being present or absent;* on the other hand, rational powers are the same for the respective contradictories *by their exercise or non-exercise while being present all along.* It is not necessary for the power of writing to be destroyed in order for somebody possessing it not to write actually. But the power of heat has to be extinguished in order for a warm body not to radiate warmth.

The actualisation of irrational and rational powers (automatic in the case of the former, depending on some ulterior cause for the latter) results in *movement,* in the classical sense of the term signifying orderly transition to a certain end and its gradual attainment. Heating, the result of the actualisation of the power of warmth, or, as Aristotle says, the actuality of that power, is a continuous process. Similarly, the actualisation of the carpenter's art (a craftmanship and power to effect things as are all arts and productive sciences, cf. *Metaphysica,* Θ, 1046b2-3) is the making of, e.g., a table, which is a process of gradual realisation of a table: one cannot effect it instantaneously, by, say, the intense application of the art. Passive powers

(*δυνάμεις τοῦ πάσχειν*, powers to undergo action, as opposed to *δυνάμεις τοῦ ποιεῖν*, powers of doing) as well, i.e. the capabilities of things to undergo certain actions so as to assume specific forms and characters of being, are actualised in movements, in the progressive constitution of such properties (determinations of being) in things.

So far we have examined in the Aristotelian schema of things power in its immediately proper sense, as principle (or cause) of change. *Metaphysica,* Θ, 1, 1046a9-11: *ὅσαι δὲ (*sc. *δυνάμεις) πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος (*sc. *λέγονται), πᾶσαι ἀρχαί τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἥ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλο* ["powers properly so called, are all certain principles, and their primary definition is that power is principle of change in something else, qua something else"]. Cf. *Metaphysica,* Δ, 1020a5. The last clause is meant to distinguish power from nature (of a thing), for the latter is also a principle of change but of change in the same thing which possesses this principle, i.e. it is a principle in a thing of self-change (Cf. De Caelo, 301b18; *Metaphysica,* 1033b8). Such are powers relating to movement (*ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν λεγομένη δύναμις*, *Met.,* Θ, 1048a25).

From this sense of power as principle of movement it is distinguished and contrasted another consisting in the potentiality of the material substrate of existence to assume specific forms, to be characterised by definite determinations of being; for instance, the potentiality of bronze to assume the spherical shape. Correspondingly, there is the actuality of a proper power, and this is movement; and there is the actuality of material

potentialities, which is form of being in existence (*Met.,* Θ, 1048b8). This latter actuality is superior to the former, in that it is *complete in itself,* and not in a process of gradual realisation. Aristotle calls this kind of actuality *activity* (*ἐνέργεια*) in its proper sense. *Movement* is sort of *incomplete activity* (*Physica,* Γ, 201b31; Met., K, 1066a20; *De anima,* B, 417a16), in that its end is beyond itself. It is, in an alternative formulation, the actuality (or activity) of what is incomplete, whereas activity proper is the actuality of what is achieved and perfected (*De anima,* Γ, 431a6). Some ambiguity appears at times in Aristotle's expressions, since he uses the same word (*ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι*) both for actuality and the stricter activity; but, if correctly understood, the ambiguity is innocuous and easily resolvable. Aristotle observes that the most immediate and palpable reality of active existence is the movement; in fact the very name of activity came from movement (*ἐν-έργεια =ἐν ἔργῳ εἶναι*): *Met.,* Θ, 1047a30-32. But the truer kind of activity is not movement. *For there is activism in quiet as well and dynamism in stability. NE,* H, 1154b27: *οὐ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας* ["there is activism not only in movement, but in motionless, too"].

The fundamental distinction between movement and proper activity is that the latter, but not the former, involves in itself its own end; or, in other words, that there is an external end to movement lying beyond itself, while the end of activity is in its own exercise. V. *NE,* A, 1094a4, 6; *Met.,* Θ, 1050a35, 30, 22; *Magna Moralia,* B, 1211b27-33; *NE,* H, 1153a10. In fact, the realisation of the end of movement, entails the cessation of movement itself. *The*

end (purpose) of movement is also the end (final point) of it. Not so for an activity: its end is realised every moment that the activity lasts. So that the activity is complete at any time of its duration: upon its being exercised, it also has been exercised. The homogeneity of its duration makes it impossible to determine a point in time at which it must end. But the movement is incomplete at any time of its duration, save the very last moment of attaining its end, whereupon it ceases to exist: it existed as means for the sake of its completion and end. Thus, one sees and has seen, thinks and has thought, is having knowledge and has had it. But if one is learning, one has *not* learnt; and if one is being cured, one has *not* been cured; and if one is building, one has not built, and so on (the *locus classicus* is in *Metaphysica,* Θ, 1048b18-36).

Existents are divided, therefore, according to Aristotle into *processes (movements, sequences of change)* and complete *entities which can endure without change (activities).* The former can be integrated as wholes gradually, and when they are completed, they cease to exist. The latter are wholes immediately upon their realisation, and retain their identity through the entire span, and at every moment, of their existence. Existents in general, involve matter, i.e. the principle of changefulness, as capacity to be determined thus or thus. This is evident in the case of movements, which are precisely *ordered change.* But entities also can change, come into being and pass away from existence, and this liability is due to their intrinsically involving matter. No pure form exists by itself; all need matter to sustain them into existence. They form the

material substrate into a determinate being; and, on the other hand, matter substantiates them into existence; and by so doing confers on them changefulness, the possibility of becoming and being otherwise than they are.

There is, however, one exception. For Aristotle, intellection is an activity that can exist by itself, separately from matter. In fact, godhead consists in intellection. The argument runs chiefly in the "theological" Book Λ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics.* Its basic articulation is as follows.

1) There is need for some *entity* (non-process) existing eternally. For movement (an incomplete actuality) requires an entity (a complete actuality) as a cause (cf. *Met.,* Λ, 1071a13-17). And if no entity was eternal, movement would be perishable, like everything else. But movement and time neither come into being nor pass away (*ibid.* 1071b3-11).

2) This eternal causal entity must be a *pure* activity. For if it did not by necessity act eternally, the eternity of movement would be suspended. And an entity involving matter would have the exercise of the activity in which it consists intermittent and destructible. Hence the eternal cause of movement must be activity with no material substrate (*ibid.* 1071b12-1072a18).

3) Immovable cause of movement is only the *object of intellection.* For it, by being apprehended, causes action without anything being done by it. For instance, we act in a certain way by appreciating something as valuable: it effects results without its being involved in this effectuation (*ibid.* 1072a19-1072b13).

It follows that *the first causal principle (or God)* of all entities and processes is mind, pure intellect, or, more

exactly, the bare activity of intellection uncontaminated by any material intermixture *(the Aristotelian version of the Anaxagorean idea).* Since there is no matter involved, the activity of such a mind is continuous and eternal. Pleasure is paradeigmatically and essentially this divine activity. What in us is most akin to it, although not capable of long duration, is our highest activity and pleasure. *Ibid.* 1072b13-18: *ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα.* ["From such, therefore, principle does Heaven and nature depend. And its course of existence is like the best that we attain for a short while. For that principle can be in such state eternally; but for us this is impossible. Indeed its activity is pleasure; and this is why watchfulness and alertness, perception, intellection are the most pleasurable things (in us); hopes and memories are pleasurable on account of those primary pleasures"]. Cf. also in the sequel, esp. 1072b24-30.

The complexity and high articulation of the Aristotelian theory are evident. (In fact, there are still other parameters that I have omitted from the above delineation of the fundamental scheme). And I gave it in some detail partly in order to provide an illustration of classical reason at work. On the substance of the matter, it is clear that for Aristotle pleasure is exemplarily *the joy at the intellectual apprehension of the nature of reality; at thinking the true theory of things; at knowing how things are.* Then visual perception and other sensation of the world is pleasurable as

being some first-level knowledge of reality. Other mental activities associated with apprehension are then brought in, as watchfulness. Knowledge, or expectation, of the future, and knowledge, or reminiscence, of the past come under the same heading. These form a *first tier* of pleasurable activities, being connected to the primary case.

To a *second tier,* there are collocated all *forms of being,* determinations of being constituting stable characteristics, primarily essential characters. These define the *entities* of the world-system, and, thus, also, the *ends of processes,* which ends are entities (stable existents). These forms are activities in that their existence is not in a process of being constituted: there is nothing beyond themselves towards which they move, and whose realisation removes them from existence. In the forms of living beings, and especially of man, there is, of course, a superior degree of activity, as has been explained above, which consists in the exercise of potencies inherent in their nature whose actuality is activity proper. These are the activities of the first tier, which thus are activities in the second degree; forms essentially involving them are activities in the first degree. Being and being's perfection, which is to exist in a definite form and character with stable identity of its own, is itself an activity, and, thus, pleasurable. For being is dynamic, is activism itself, although not the activism of movement. So we may appropriately speak of the delight at sheer existence. Being's dynamism is activated to a higher degree when the activities of the first tier are taking place.

There is, however, another kind of second order activation, that pertaining to the exercise of what was called

above *rational powers.* Such are all arts (craftmanships), productive sciences (ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, technology) and applied human sciences ("practical" sciences, πρακτικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, such as Rhetoric or Politics, having to do with human action, πρᾶξις, and viewing an end beyond mere theorising on reality). V. *Metaphysica,* Θ, 1046b2-4; cf. for further references regarding this equivalence Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus,* 207b4-21. Rational powers (arts and productive and practical sciences) are not pure reason, but *reason applied.* They are principles of movement in that their actualization is a *movement* constituting the production of things or the management of human affairs. But although their actuality is a movement and not an activity proper, they essentially involve knowledge and theorising on the nature of reality. Thus their exercise consists *partly* in the *activity* of intellection: *applied* sciences productive or practical presuppose their *theoretical foundation.* In this special sense the actuality of rational powers forms a *third tier* of activities and, hence, of pleasure.

For all its complex articulation, the Aristotelian theory of pleasure fails decidedly, as we have seen, in the case of the satisfaction of wants. The Platonic account, on the other hand, while presenting a compelling analysis of the mechanism of the nexus want - pain - desire - pleasure (by its schema: condition of deficiency- process of replenishment - state of fulfilment), is blatantly forced when explaining pleasures of well-being, preeminently of intellectual perfection (actual knowledge of reality).

There seems (as is the upshot of the foregoing development in this Appendix) no way of unifying the two

alternative theories, save by combining them *complementarily.* This means that we should in the last resort distinguish two senses of pleasure, corresponding to the distinction between movement and activity (or process and entity). There is the feeling of *satisfaction* in the movement towards ontological normalcy, towards the state of natural fulfilment, towards perfection and stability. And there is the feeling of *elation* at the state of achieved perfection, of stable, natural well-being. The former relates to the *processes* of constitution or restitution of the appropriate form of existence, of a definite determination of being which can act as the essential nucleus of an entity. The latter expresses the feelling of *being in the peak of existence,* of having realised the stability and (relative) perfection of an entity, *of being, thus, fully functional. This is the firm and quiet elation at being fit, at the acme of one's nature and development. That is the changing and hectic satisfaction at recovering.* Plato had hinted at the distinction, and the corresponding resolution of the puzzle of pleasure, by introducing a differentiation between *intensity* and *purity* of pleasure (even though giving an inadequate account of this purity). The intensest pleasures are most characteristic, but the purest are the really true ones (V. *Appendix I*).

We may call the exhilarating self-assurance of fitness *joy;* and the wild relief of healing *pleasure* proper. Which is, significantly, in substance the Stoic position, representing here the harmonious blending of the Platonic and Aristotelian insights. Pleasure is intensest at the beginning of the restorative process, and then decreases towards zero as

the progress towards the normal state of natural fulfilment unfolds itself (V. *Appendix I*). But the flush of perfection in itself, the rejoicing of a being at the peak of its existence, lasts unincreased and undiminished so long as the corresponding state of fitness lasts.

In actual reality, however, the ideal, separate types get entangled in specific ways. In every process of replenishment, there is, besides the movement towards recovery of the ailing parts, also the activity of the rest of the organism, of that part or aspect of it which is not suffering the particular deficiency in question. And conversely, every activity in the physical world (barring divine intelligence which is, in an important sense, *outside* of the world) involves processes of destabilization and restabilization in the natural frame in which the activity takes place. The coimplication of movement and activity, of process and entity, in real existence, justifies the conception of the aggregate of pleasure (pain) and joy (distress), call it gratification or delight (sorrow).

It is of primary significance for the Theory of Human Action, to determine the general form of the function of gratification over time for the various types of work. Let us begin with the case of proper activity. The pleasure consisting in its unhindered exercise is, we have seen, constant; in fact, it would extend to the infinity, in an activity of the first tier existing in separation from the matter of the physical world. But considering activities in this world, there are implicated in their exercise movements of stabilization, destabilization and restabilization, which on aggregate obstruct their operation. For as these activities are

taking place in organic association with the material substrate of existence; and as matter is the principle of changefulness, the factor of potentiality-to-be-otherwise; so, there is a *constant effort* required to prevent moment by moment that potentiality of otherness from being realised. This effort represents an impediment to the exercise of the activity. Thus the aggregate effect of the various movements going on while the activity is taking place must be painful. The pain must be increasing slowly at the start of the exercise of the activity, and, after a critical point of weariness, it should accelerate in its change of intensity. The general schema of an activity is, therefore, the following (Fig. 11).



Fig. 11

At t=T, $i_g=i_p+i_j=0$, which means that henceforth the activity becomes in actual fact painful. The intensity of i_j is *highest* with the activities of the first tier and second degree,

preeminently with knowledge, thinking and intellection. It is *various* but *sizeable* with the activities involved in the actualities of the third tier, i.e. with the exercise of rational powers. It forms the base of all delight as joy of life in the activities of the second tier and first degree, esp. in the case of the essential forms of things like being a man. On the other hand, the function of pain in real activities reaches its critical point, from which the acceleration commences, most late in the case of forms, soon with the activities involved in rational powers, and soonest with pure thinking. Notice the t=T for a form means its destruction; for instance in the case of man, it signifies the time of death, when the burden of matter cannot be overcome by the energy of form. Notice also that, in this case, i_g represents the gratification of the form in existence *as such:* it can be increased in the case of individual lives (and increased generally in the middle region) by the cultivation of second order perfections, preeminently knowledge and intellection.

Turning now from clear activities to clear movements of restoration occurring in a given nature (the Platonic primary examples of pleasurable realities), let us first consider gratification and its components as a function of the distance of the ailing condition in which the nature is being found in part or particular function from the corresponding state of natural fulfilment, of normalcy. It has been argued that the sound remainder of the system exercises then its own activities, also in connection with that which is replenished through the process of restoration (say, water in the case of thirst). The respective activity will be less and less inhibited as the process of replenishment goes

on. The obstruction will be diminished in proportion to the reduction of the condition of depletion. The initial amount of pleasure corresponds to the impediment presented by the given condition of depletion; it must be positive, as the activity is assumed to be going on even upon the starting condition of deprivation. To the joy generated by the activity, we should deduct the pain implicit in its continuance, as analysed above. But as the process of replenishment is ordinarily short, that deduction can not normally amount to much. Upon completion, the activity continues unimpeded - so far as the factor of fulfilment considered is concerned. Henceforth, its behaviour will follow the pattern of gratification established before. In addition to the behaviour of the *activity* involved, we should also take into account the sheer effect of replenishment as *movement.* This, it has been shown, varies directly with the distance from the state of fulfilment. At the beginning of the restoration process the intensity of the pleasure decreases slowly, while towards the end it falls rather sharply to zero. The combined influence of the two factors may be represented as follows (Fig. 12).

$i_{a,j}$, $i_{a,p}$ and $i_{a,g}$ are the functions of, respectively, the intensity of joy, pleasure and gratification for the activity involved in the process of rehabilitation. *In* and *fin* are indexes of the initial and final condition respectively. r_{in} is the initial distance from the state of fulfilment (=0); the movement of restoration is happening in the direction of the arrow. $i_{m,p}$ is the function of the intensity of pleasure for the movement itself of restoration. $i_g = i_{a,g} + i_{m,p}$, is the function of total gratification for the complete process of



Fig. 12

restabilisation. The form of the corresponding curve indicates a maximization of total gratification at some distance in between deprivation and fulfilment. And this is as it should be expected.

There is a further complication in this case that we may take account of. The condition of (diminishing) depletion, in the context of which the process of replenishment takes place, not only hinders the corresponding activity of the unaffected part of the system (which accounts for the ascending form of the function $i_{a,j}$ as the burden of obstruction is progressively lightened); but, also, is expressed directly as (diminishing) pain in the affected part or function of it. This pain decreases quickly near the beginning of the process, while its diminution slows down as the system tends towards its natural equilibrium. By

combining the functions of pain and pleasure coimplicated in the process of restitution (according to the Platonic model), we get the following schema (Fig. 13):



Fig. 13

Pl and *pn* are indexes of pleasure and pain involved in the process of replenishment. Assuming that the process is under way in the initial condition r_{in}, we can take $i_{m,pl,in} > i_{m,pn,in}$. The net result of feeling during the movement of restoration is given by the function $i_{m,p} = i_{m,pl} - i_{m,pn}$. The form of the corresponding curve indicates in general a maximisation of pleasure at some point between the initial and final conditions. By substituting this function to the corresponding function in Fig. 12 (i.e. by taking account of the decreasing pain inherent in the process of replenishment), the curvature of i_g will become more pronounced: *the maximisation pattern of total gratification in a process or rehabilitation is so much the sharper.*

Notice, however, that the net feeling in Fig. 2a is a theoretical aggregate and no real feeling. The subject actually feels *both* pain *and* pleasure, and *not* their sum. Indeed, in a certain sense, that is, from a purely subjective point of view, the feeling of pleasure is enhanced by its contrast with the simultaneous presence of the feeling of pain. Taking the *difference* between the intensities of pleasure and pain as *subjective intensity of pleasure* ($i_{p,sub}$), we get the following form (Fig. 14):



Fig. 14

The subjective feeling falls more abruptly with the change of the distance from the natural state of fulfilment at the beginning and the end of the process of replenishment, while its change is smoother in the median region of the movement.

Let us, in the sequel, consider a destabilisation-process: a movement away from the natural state of fulfilment

towards deprivation. Pain rises, slowly in the beginning, more and more rapidly as the condition of deprivation is intensifying. Simultaneously, the aggregate activity associated with the factor in course of depletion, continues in the non-affected remainder of the system, but with increasing obstruction. The intensity of generated joy will, thus, steadily decrease; while the corresponding pain will increase as in Fig. 11. (This pain is due, as has been explained, to the energy and "effort" required to sustain the continuance of the activity). The composite picture will, then, be represented by the following diagramm (Fig. 15):



Fig. 15

$i_g = i_{a,g}+i_p$. The function of total gratification to the distance from the natural state of fulfilment is falling more steeply than either of its two constituent curves. At point r*,

where $i_{a,g,r^*} = i_{p,r^*}$, the gratification curve turns negative. The process of depletion going on starts to cause, in aggregate, pain. We say that the process is then felt as pain. It is what Plato described as passing the threshold of consciousness for a process of deterioration. More accurately, it is the point where the deterioration overcomes the action of the part of the system unaffected directly by it.

The two last cases represent the two clear possibilities of *"passion" (πάθος)* in an object, i.e. its undergoing change. "Passion" can either be positive, constitutive, stabilizing, or negative, dissolving, destabilizing: it is essentially a movement either to fulfilment or deprivation.

On the other hand, and analogously, action is either an activity (as in the first case above) or a movement, as in the realisation of a rational power. In the latter (and final fourth) case, the movement resulting from the exercise of the power is (according to characteristic Aristotelian doctrine) a "passion" of the object undergoing the action of an agent, and, simultaneously, the action itself of the agent. For example, the movement of constructing a table is both a transformation in a given amount of wood and a certain pattern of successive positions for the carpenter's hands. The movement of the hands is identical with the movement of the wooden parts, as in the case of a cut: cutting and being cut is the same movement, but one is the action of an agent while the other is the "passion" of an object remaining passive during the operation, i.e. the "passion" of some material substrate involved (e.g. wood). As such the movement differs decisively from itself, so much that one aspect (active) of it is the cause of the other (passive).

The exercise of a rational power (some expertise, art and applied knowledge) results in a positive and constitutive process of formation in some object (be it physical or human material). But the energy required for this improvement comes from the agent, who must, therefore, of necessity be deplenished with regard to some pool of potential or other. Therefore, the corresponding movement of the agent involves *(a)* a negative process of depletion, whose pattern of associated feeling will have the form displayed in Fig. 15. On the other hand, there is, however, in addition *(b)* an activity going on all the while, consisting in the sheer actualisation of the knowledge which forms the intelligible content of the rational power exercised. This is an activity of the highest order, being intellectual, an activity of the mental principle. Accompanying the operation of this activity there is its proper joy, which will change with time according to the general law represented in Fig. 11. Furthermore, in the efficacious exercise of a rational power there is also involved *(c)* the activity of being well and the joy accompanying the state of fitness permitting and sustaining that exercise. This state of fitness has a component reflecting the general well-being of the system and another expressing a state of capability and preparadeness with regard to those parts and functions of the system that are directly involved in the performance of the work entailed by the exercise of the rational power in question. The gratification at this proof of fitness will, again, follow the pattern established in connection with Fig. 11: it will be diminishing as exhaustion sets in due to the depletion of the reservoir of potential required for the

exercise of the rational power considered. The diminution here will be normally sharper than that characterising the gratification due to factor *(b).* To represent the combined effect of *(a), (b)* and *(c)* we should first translate the r-coordinate in Fig. 15 (distance from natural state of fulfilment and optimal fitness) into a time-coordinate. The function r(t) in the case of moving away from the natural state of fitness (process of negative "passion") will generally have the form (Fig. 16):



Fig. 16

The stability of the natural state makes the initial rate of movement to be low (in the vicinity of zero-distance); while the further we proceed from the natural equilibrium the more rapidly the situation is aggravated with the lapse of time. It follows that $i_g(t)$ is more concave towards the horizontal coordinate than $i_g(r)$.

We can now turn to the schema for the aggregate gratification function in the case of the exercise of a rational power (Fig. 17).



Fig. 17

$i_{m,g}$ is the intensity of gratification for the process of depletion (a). $i_{a1,g}$ is the corresponding intensity for the intellectual activity involved (b). $i_{a2,g}$ is the intensity of gratification for the state of fitness required (c). Finally the total gratification for the exercise of a rational process $i_{g,tot} = i_{m,g} + i_{a1,g} + i_{a2,g}$ will have the general form shown in Fig. 17. It is considerably *steeper* than any of its constituent curves. At t=T it becomes zero, where $i_{m,g,T} + i_{a1,g,T} + i_{a2,g,T} = 0$. In general the exhaustion from the physical exertion should come more quickly than the corresponding tiredness due to intellectual contemplation or even than the weariness from the process of destabilisation going on, the draining out of the reservoir of energy involved, the relaxation of, or rather the burden on, fitness. These facts are reflected in the shape

of the curves above. They mean that the preceding equation will be satisfied when $i_{a2,g}$, or both it and $i_{m,g}$, have turned negative to a sufficient degree so as to counteract the persevering gratification from the actualisation of knowledge.

As the exercise of rational powers forms the vast majority of the directly economically significant human actions, it is important to notice the consequences of the above analysis. *First, the intellectual element is what keeps T from assuming lower values. Secondly,* a general state of *fitness* raises the curve $i_{a2,g}$ and so *postpones the onset of overall negative gratification* (distress). So does, obviously, the good condition of the parts and functions directly involved in the working of the rational power. *Thirdly,* a *well-balanced excellence* of all parts and functions in a system raises the curve of gratification in processes of depletion by *raising and levelling* $i_{a,g}$ (in Fig. 15), i.e. by improving the activity of the parts and functions unaffected by the depletion involved in the exercise of a rational power. *All in all, a robust, well-endowed and perfectly drilled system as a whole and in its parts can best cope with material burden quite generally:* it will both be slowly depleted in action and rapidly replenish its exhausted potentials due to exertion in action of whatever description. In effect, such a system possesses an *in-built capacity of speedy recovery* from the imbalances generated by any particular lines of action. *It is optimally stable,* in that it has mechanisms of resistance to destabilization, counterbalancing the destabilising tendency of matter. And then, *knowledge as intellectual capital* forms the other pillar of essential support for gratification in

human action - and of superior, very much more extensible and expansive potential. *By raising and flattening the intellectual curves, we can dramatically improve the response of overall gratification to exertion. We have actually returned through a circuitous way to the classical idea of excellence in body and mind as a pragmatic requirement for optimal human performance and maximal efficiency.*

The above analysis provides the guidelines for an adequate distinction between utility (gratifying) and disutility (distressing) factors in human action (and "passion"). Contrary to common opinion (cf. e.g. Jevon's Theory of Labour) action, even effort, is *not in actual fact* necessarily painful and sorrowful, nor, consequently, a disutility in principle. The distressing factor in human existence is, ultimately, matter's irrational mutability, which presents an omnipresent obstacle to be overcome in action. The obstacle consists in a permanently acting interference of a factor of inharmoniousness and disorganisation, of continuous change, of otherness, of "not, ever, the same" - the factor which is a necessary constituent, indeed the indispensable underlying substrate, of existence. Effort is the energy to be paid in overcoming it. *But the process weights on the positive side of gratification to an extent depending on the condition of the acting system and, finally, and crucially, to the level of knowledge implicated and realised in the course of action.*