Apostolos L. Pierris

Some Comments
on Strawson's "The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates"

[Sometime in 1974]
I/ There is a clear enough distinction of subject and predicate in Grammar (I mean the ordinary, traditional Grammar, neither the depth-grammar of Wittgenstein, nor the investigations concerning the deep grammatical structures of a school of linguistics, conceived as a special Science). In a sense, you cannot even be said to understand an uttered or written sentence (of a language) if you cannot see what the grammatical subject of this sentence is. And this is so, I think, even if it is not so easy to formulate, in general terms, what a grammatical subject or predicate is. (You can do something very well, even if you cannot formulate in general terms what are you doing so well.) But, I suppose, we can give a rough characterisation of grammatical subject/predicate on the following lines:

In a declarative sentence that has only one substantive or substantival expression, this substantive or substantival expression is the subject of the sentence. What remains if we drop the subject from the sentence is the (grammatical) predicate of the sentence.

In a declarative sentence which has more than one substantives or substantival expressions and is not a compound sentence (that is, neither consisting of one main clause and one or more subordinate ones, nor consisting of two or more main clauses connected through non-subordinating conjunctions: connectives like 'and'), we may say that the substantive in the nominative or the substantival expression corresponding grammatical...
tically to a substantive in the nominative is the subject. (If it has no such substantival expression or substantive, the sentence must be a simple dependent (subordinate) clause, and then its subject can be found through certain grammatical (syntactical) laws. If it has more than one, all of them are (grammatical) subjects. We can then, accordingly, separate the predicate.

Of course grammarians have to distinguish, within this notion of predicate (which is not so fruitful for their science) verb, predicate proper, object etc. of the sentence, and so to develop a theory of sentences based on a theory of the (grammatical) parts of speech.

2/ I have mentioned the above, in order to make plain that all this and every similar enterprise is of complete indifference to philosophy (save per accidens). For obviously enough in philosophy (and primarily in Metaphysics) we are much interested in the question whether the grammatical subjects/predicates of given sentences correspond to the logical subjects/predicates of the statements made by the use of them, and, ultimately and most importantly, whether they correspond to the real form of the actual, objective, facts (of the World) stated or expressed or otherwise presented by them.

3/ Therefore, a philosophically relevant distinction of kinds of expressions used in propositions of various types, is to be based on a study of the logical forms of statements and the real forms of objective facts. Let us include the first study in a discipline called 'Theory of Statements', and the second one in Metaphysics.
But now it might be raised the question whether priority belongs to the investigation of the logical form of the statements or of the real form of facts. Roughly, whether in this respect the Theory of Statements presupposes Metaphysics or vice versa. And we can plausibly enough make the distinction between serious Linguistic Philosophy and a part of the Tradition according to the answer given to this question of priority.

(I shall not discuss the problem here. But I feel that 'Grammar' or 'Logical Grammar' or 'Informal Logic' are just ways of naming the difficulty of providing a metaphysically independent (or rather: an independent of metaphysics) base for the Theory of Statements; there seem to lurk behind the scenes, the thought "well, if Grammar does not help us in the Theory of Statements, Logical Grammar does in fact help us. And if Formal Logic is of no help special use, Informal Logic is". But I suspect (repeating an idea expressed previously in the essay on Modal Concepts) that Logical Grammar is just what is needed in order to base the Theory of Statements on Metaphysics, only translated into a new idiom, a new technical language. And this is not bad in itself. But at least misleading, I think, in its significance, if it is naively taken as the 'greatest revolution in philosophy' (or, perhaps, as Kant denied to Descartes the right to be the turning point in the history of philosophy in order to suggest that he himself is to be awarded this prize, so some contemporary philosophy may make claims to revolutionary uniqueness).

I say dogmatically here that I think, Metaphysics has the priority (as first philosophy). And I guess that Strawson also at least implies such an attitude, by attempting to base the two initially supposedly discerned asymmetries on the asymmetries of section IV—a section which I take to be a metaphysical investigation
of some of the differences between (independently) particular and general characters (in spite of the fact that it begins with isolating a class of propositions or that it speaks, consequently, of presentation; this, I think, is not essential. For the class of propositions and the presentation are such that a particular and a general character are the items presented as assigned in the propositions of this class).
4/ It is clear, I think, agreeing, with Strawson, that the asymmetry of subjects and predicates regarding negation as formulated by Anscombe and Geach cannot be taken as basic (may, I add, nor can be taken as it itself clear, as I shall argue) as of itself expounding or making clear "the nature of the distinction between subject and predicate, so that there is simply room for the question why the thesis is true". (p. 97).

5/ For let us take, firstly, Anscombe's formulation. She, prima facie, aims at distinguishing two types of linguistic expressions+ quite apart from their being used in the formation of sentences. The distinction is "that negation, attached to a predicate, yields a new predicate, but when attached to a name it does not yield any name". (p. 96)++

+ We ignore her passing from 'names' and 'expressions for predicates' to 'names' and 'predicates'.

++ Presumably she would then go on to explain 'subject of a simple declarative sentence' as the name in it, and 'predicate' as the predicate.
But:

What does 'attachment of negation to a linguistic expression' mean? An attachment of the word 'not'? But then it is clearly a matter of how actual languages are—something quite irrelevant to philosophy. For surely I can conceive a language in which a word corresponding exactly to the English 'not', is additionally used to form names by being attached to other names. In this language is there no distinction of names from predicates? (Suppose this language differs from English in only this respect. Call it 'English').

But it may be objected, it is surely entirely accidental that 'not', is used in this additional way. 'Per' might be so used. Well, yes, it might. But, we suppose, it is not. 'Not' is used in this way.

Will the objector stick to the 'accidental' above, and further say that, in this case, 'not' is used in two different ways, in two different senses, I can retort either:

a/ No, for I can conceive of English as having quite precise laws for the formation of new names (through this device of adding 'not') out of others—and such laws that have the same point (or almost the same point) as the usual negation in English. For, say, in English, 'not-Tom' (or 'Tom-not') is called the second male child of a family having only two sons, the first of whose is called 'Tom'. So that 'not-Tom' means: not Tom, the other boy; almost as 'is not red' means: is not red, it has another colour.*

* Of course the objector may, indeed he must, insist that still there is an enormous difference in the two cases. And of course there is! I only want to say that he cannot point to the difference while remaining in the linguistic circle in which he has enclosed himself. For sooner or later we shall reach a point where an answer like (b) would be at hand for me.
b/ Alright, quite true, it is used in two different senses. But what entitles you to say this? You began by noting a feature of some actual languages. You made this a principle of division (which is supposed to be philosophically important) among expressions. I objected that, in order for the distinction to be philosophical, it must not be based on just a feature of some (or even all) actual languages. And I proceeded to conceive a language not characterized by this feature. I asked: does now the distinction collapses in that language? You answer 'No'; for you object that even in this conceivable language the said feature still applies in a sense—and this is so because, there, 'not' is used in two completely different senses, and further because it is entirely accidental that it is so used. I quite agree; but, I ask, what justifies you in claiming this? Are not you really relying on the distinction between names/subjects and predicates explic- cated by, and based on, another sort of consideration than the use of 'not', in order to claim that, in this conceivable language, 'not' is used in two entirely different ways, and so the sense in which, in it, a name is negated and gives a new name is different from the (proper) sense in which a predicate is negated and gives a predicate?

It is therefore, I think, clear that at any event 'attachment of negation' must mean something more than simple addition of 'not' to an expression. It must have to do somehow with the function, the role of expressions, here of 'not'. But then, the function, the role of expressions has to be taken into account, when dividing them in a philosophically relevant and important way. And the role of the expressions of languages, at least in what presently concerns us, is to be combined to form sentences presenting facts. (For example: sentences stating statements, about facts—of facts). So some reference to facts and their form must necessarily be made in a philosophical division even of words.
6/ I presume that with Geach's account too, the aim is to distinguish sorts of expressions; that, for example, according to him, terms are just a kind of expressions (perhaps simple, non-synccategorematic expressions) and propositions a kind of sentences (say, main, declarative sentences in the indicative mood).

(Perhaps we have also to add an additional element of neutrality in respect of actual languages—I mean in the case of terms and propositions as distinct from expressions, words, phrases and sentences. And this introduces, I think, much more complication. But I shall not pursue this route now). And again here the same sort of problem presents itself as in Anscombe's case. What does 'by negating a predicate' mean? Not surely simply 'adding the word "not".' For, if so, where must it be added? Before or after the predicate expression, or somewhere in it, if the expression is complex? For obviously he cannot say that it does not matter where 'not' is added: from 'Peter is in London' we can have the negative of this proposition only by adding 'not' just after the first word of the predicate expression (taking 'is in London' as predicate)---whereas in 'Peter walks,' if 'walks' is the predicate, we have to do some drastic changes on it before obtaining the negative of the initial proposition. (And certainly even a complete description of all the variations in grammatical terms will not do for philosophy).

It is then clear, I think, (even without introducing considerations relating to conceivable languages) that we are not moving (if philosophically moving at all) in a strictly linguistic level. The role of 'not' is to be taken into account, the roles of expressions, hence, ultimately, the structure of the relevant facts of the World.
7/ I shall not linger further on this point, which is, I think, clear enough.

(Much more, indeed, can be said for this point, that is, for the thesis that in so far as one is restricted to solely and purely linguistic considerations one cannot formulate a philosophically relevant and important distinction between subject and predicate. One has to bring in the use of expressions in the fact-stating, or rather generally, in the fact-presenting function of language—and, therefore, ultimately, to base the distinction on some metaphysical considerations concerning the structure of facts, the kinds of subsisting/existing entities etc.).

I only add, that, naturally, I fullheartedly agree with what Strawson through a different route and pressure brings into focus at the end of section II of his essay.
8/ I shall now draw attention to what I think constitutes a major and central point, though even Strawson does not pay, it seems to me, due consideration to it. To speak very roughly, I would like to argue that the essay fails (provided of course that what I think of as failures, are really failures) in just the places where, and in so far as, the point has bearing on the argument.

9/ The point I have in mind, is the tendency of some contemporary philosophers to divide, philosophically, a sentence into two parts or factors, to neglect everything else, and to work under the presupposition that this is the fundamental and important division.

10/ I would like to challenge this presupposition from a more classical and traditional, an Aristotelian point of view. But on the present occasion I cannot but be content with making just a few comments drawing from my as yet highly unaccomplished and provisional work on the subject.
In essay II, part C, I have worked, extremely sketchily, towards a distinction of different types of linguistic expressions, on the base of what, I think, is involved in every determination.

So, given that in a certain (objective) determination (conceived as a whole (a)) we have the determined thing (b), the determinant (c), the determination (as a tie) qua determination (d) and the determination qua effected through the determining (of the determined) by the determinant (e)—-

then, in a proposition presenting this fact, we can distinguish the presentingly used sentence (a'), the referringly used expression of the proposition (b'), the determinately used expression (c'), the copulatively (or assertively) in a strict sense used expression (d'), and the predicatively used expression (e').

(For example: if 'a is P' is used to present the fact that a is P, then 'a' is the referringly used expression, 'P' is the determinately used expression, 'is' is the copulatively used one, and 'is P' is the predicatively used expression).

(I omit some complications here).

(And, if we want, we can continue by saying that:

a referring expression (considered in itself) is an expression which always or mostly or primarily is used referringly in acts of presenting, etc.).
therefore, I think, we can and
must distinguish more than two important factors in a
proposition. (The problem, at this level, is just a question
of distinction in thought. We do not embark, as yet, on the
question of which is more fundamental than which, or to
the question of their separate subsistence etc.).

But now, if we take seriously
this multiple division, it seems to me that it does not
remain a problem even to begin with—at least without
important modifications of formulation.

For take 'a is P' and its contradictory
'a is not P'. Here we have a proposition and its negative.
(We must not forget that this is the primary use of 'negation'; propositions are positive or negative). Now if we
are asked the question (which is not quite clear or does
not have a quite clear point): "And to what part of the
proposition is the 'not' attached, with what part of it
goes the negation?" we have better to answer: the negation
is taken with the whole proposition (the 'not' is attached
to the whole sentence) in order to give a resulting pro-
position which is the contradictory of the first (p, ¬p).
If the other insists obsessed with the 'part', the second
after the best answer is to say that 'not' is attached
to 'is' (the copulatively used expression of the proposi-
tion)—and only the third answer would be that negation
goes with 'is P' (with the predicate, if you want). And
even this can be conceded only in case that the derivati-
ve, secondary sense in which 'not' attaches to the predi-
cate is acknowledged: it is so attached because it attaches
in some sense (perhaps even here we differ from the pri-
mary sense) to 'is'—the copula.

We shall see that the above
points recur again and again in one way or another, and with
serious repercussions, in the subsequent development
of Strawson's essay.
I5/ Strawson in section IV of his essay, discern two new asymmetries. These asymmetries "require for their description a more extended terminology than that of formal logic alone" (p. 101). Indeed, the asymmetries require the terminology of Metaphysics (particulars, general characters etc.) — though, perhaps, informal logic is meant by Strawson in view of the italicization of 'formal'. But I prefer to speak of Metaphysics, at least because 'informal logic' seems to be just a fashionable novelty.

I6/ The new asymmetries are also described as 'underlining' (p. 101). And indeed they are underlying at least because they are fundamental. Strawson thinks that they are also underlying because they are, or at any rate imply, "harmonising reasons" for the initially considered asymmetries. And I also think that this is 'grosso modo' correct, though I would like to modify both the formulation of the first couple of asymmetries (taking into account what I have written in C above), and, consequently, the 'explanation' of those asymmetries in terms of the fundamental ones.
I7/ The new asymmetries are clearly metaphysical ones in that they are formulated as asymmetries between particulars and general characters of particulars.

When a particular is characterised by a general character we can say that the particular and the general character are assigned to each other.

I8/ Strawson's 'assignment' corresponds to my 'determination', and the kind of assignment involved in characterisations of particulars by general characters corresponds to my "proper predication." The correspondence, nevertheless, is not coincidence. For:

1/ the terms which I have chosen, incorporate essentially direction of fit (as Strawson puts it). While Strawson explicitly says that he has chosen 'assignment' "because asymmetries of direction of fit do not here concern us".

(I suppose that asymmetries of direction of fit would be asymmetries like the one, for example, that the individual particular exemplifies or instantiates the general character and not vice versa, or that the general character is (objectively) predicated of the particular and not vice versa).

II/ I presume that Strawson would include in the studied kind of assignments facts of the form:

\[
a \text{is} \ (a) \ U
\]

(say: 'Peter is (a) man')

whereas, I think, that they constitute a different kind of facts. That is, I am inclined to claim that man is not a general character, but something different, a (second) substance.

(Clearly I have in mind Aristotle.)

The correspondences are:
proper predication

predication of the form: a is (a)U.

But I have to emphasize that my way of taking Aristotle's doctrine in respect of the position of determined, runs counter to the almost unanimous interpretation by the Greek commentators.

Anyway the differences are not, I think, such as to destroy the identification of Strawson's (independent) individual particulars and general characters with my concrete things and abstract things or determinants, correspondingly.

\[19/\] Strawson's two fundamental asymmetries correspond closely to points (VII) and (VI) of my essay I. Indeed my points seem, prima facie, to cover a subclass of the cases covered by Strawson's asymmetries; and this seems to be due to my formulation of the points in terms of something corresponding to the hierarchy of species and genera of concrete things: the determinate-determi
tenable 'relation'.

\[1/\] In respect of the first asymmetry.

(Corresponding to point (VII)). I have remarked that 'a is P' and 'a is Q' are inconsistent in case that P-ness and Q-ness are (abstract) things of the same kind. But the incompatibility ranges of determinants are not limited to cases of incompatibility of determinants of the same kind (i.e. belonging to the same proximate determinable determinant). For take, for example, 'a is (a) father' and 'a is female'. Clearly the determinations are inconsistent,
and yet not do fathership and femaleness not belong to
the same kind (to the same determinable), but, indeed, they
belong to different categories; the one is a relation, the oth-
er a quality.

11/ The same remarks apply to the
second asymmetry and my point (VI). Strawson speaks of
necessary and sufficient conditions (ultimately of entail-
ment, involvement) and is thereby able to cover cases like
"a is (a) father" and "a is male". I speak on the other
hand of the determinate-determinable 'relation' within
determinants and, it seems, I cannot take account of, or
accommodate, such a case.

20/ It is, I think, clear that
Strawson's formulation covers what ought to be covered.
But I think that one can accommodate all such cases
within the framework of the determinate-determinable
'relation' among determinants, along, perhaps, the following
lines. (And further, I am inclined to hold, that this accom-
modation exhibits the fundamental (ontological, if you
want) 'reason' of the correctness of Strawson's formu-
lation).

The proximate determinable of father-
ship is parenthood. Now parenthood has two proximate
determinate determinants: fathership and motherhood. And
the differentiae of these are maleness and femaleness
correspondingly. (In this case we have words for the
differentiae; in the case, say, of colours, we have not.
The difference is in respect of language, and has not, ne-
necessarily, a bearing in respect of the World, and of
any kind of reality, save linguistic 'reality').

Therefore the incompatibility between
"a is (a) father" and "a is female", even if not the incompat-
ibility of possessing both of two determinants of the
same kind (with the proximate determinable), is, neverthe-
less, based on it, or rather, it is based on, and presupposes, the determinable-determinate 'relation', just as the incompatibility between 'a is (a)man' and 'a is irrational' is based on, and presupposes, the genus-species-differentia scheme.

And, mutatis mutandis, the same holds for involvement (entailment), that is, in respect of Strawson's second fundamental asymmetry.

But now, before proceeding further, let us notice the following distinction. It is, as I think, a very important distinction, which, nevertheless, is not explicitly used by Strawson.

What are incompatible, inconsistent, (involved) or entailed are statements or facts. That is, at the level on which we are working, it is the possessions of general characters by particulars (or the determinations of concrete things by abstract things) that are incompatible or members of the entailment- 'relation'. In the same way, necessary/sufficient conditions are necessary/sufficient conditions of possessions of general characters by particulars (i.e. of facts of a certain kind), and are, themselves such possessions (facts of that general kind). But the general characters themselves (conceived apart from their actual characterisation of particulars) are not incompatible, or members in an entailment- 'relation' save homonymously, or, at any rate, dependently (\( \forall \alpha \forall \beta [\alpha \beta] \)). Things, entities in themselves (qua things, entities), either concrete or abstract, cannot entail one another or be incompatible with one another— at

+ Or, alternatively, we can speak of statements in place of facts.
least, not in the sense in which statements or facts do so:}

22/ But of course, on the other hand, there is something intrinsic in the things in themselves, which makes certain determinations or certain 'combinations' of them incompatible or connected with the entailment—'relation'. And this something is, I submit, as far as abstract things are concerned, that they are structured through the determinate-determinable 'relation'.

23/ So, we can translate Strawson's formulations, in terms of that fundamental, as I think, 'relation', as following:

+ Of course there are other ways in which we can indeed speak (and even, perhaps, properly do so) of incompatibility of concrete things (I have myself spoken of possible (concrete) things incompatible in existence—in essay III), or of entailment among abstract things (for example, we may stipulate that if there are entailments (in the proper sense) of the form 'x is P', 'x is Q' (holding independently of what value x takes), then we shall say that P-ness entails Q-ness). But such ways and senses are clearly either entirely unconnected with our present issue (as in the former case), or derivative and secondary (like the later)
1/ Facts, determinations 'a is P' and 'a is Q' are incompatible:

either P-ness and Q-ness are determinants of the same kind (having the same proximate determinable determinant, or even a common determinable proximate or notand being on the same level ob the scale of determinateness descending from that determinable) or

one of them is differentia constitutiva of a determinant of the same kind with the other.

ii/ Fact, determination 'a is P' entails 'a is Q':

either Q-ness is a determinable of P-ness or Q-ness is a differentia constitutiva of P-ness or of a determinable of P-ness.

* The use of 'differentia' in respect of the determinate/determinable distinction is, of course, different from the use of it in respect of the genus/species distinction. The difference must be worked out. In the meantime I rely on an analogy of conception of the former according to the latter.
24/ After the above preliminary clarifications we can approach now section V of Strawson's essay.

We consider propositions in which facts of the discussed kind are presented. Propositions, that is, in which a particular and a general character are presented as assigned. We can, certainly, say that the expression in such a proposition, which has the function of specifying the assigned particular is the (logical) subject of the proposition. (Not necessarily coinciding with the grammatical subject).

... And Strawson continues: "...the expression which... has the function of specifying the assigned general character is the predicate" (p.104). Now this can be taken, I think in the light of the previous remarks, in two ways:

1/ it may firstly be taken at its face value. Consider the proposition 'a is P'. The expression having mainly the function of specifying the assigned general character qua general character (that is considered in itself) is clearly the expression 'P' and not the expression 'is P'; for the later mainly functions in specifying the assigned general character if you like, yet it qua assigned. That is, it rather specifies the characterisation by a specified general character of an unspecified particular.
11/ and secondly it can be conceived in a way that 'is P' is the predicate, that is, meaning by 'predicate' that expression whose function is to specify the assigned general character as assigned, in its characteristic role of characterising, so to speak.

(The distinction corresponds to that between determinantly and predicatively used expressions in my essay II).

(No excessive worry is, I think, justified, in respect of propositions, within the class studied, of the form:

\[ \exists \phi - e \]

For, as Aristotle remarked, we can paraphrase them, for philosophical-metaphysical purposes, as:

\[ \phi - i n g \]

in which the abstract thing involved can be expressed by the infinitive 'to φ'.

(Notice also that, of course, in speaking in the way that I speak about abstract things or determinants, I do not mean to be committed in respect of their distinct and independent existence or subsistence. What I am saying amounts to this: I must analyse (and distinguish) in thought determination as a whole into such and such elements and components—and that is all).

25/ It seems to be the case that Strawson, by not using the above distinction, and the analysis presupposed by it, is prevented from extracting all the consequences that, I think, are implicitly contained even in his way of formulating propositions of the studied kind.

For in:

(I) ass(1 g)
I think that 'i' corresponds to my 'a', 'g' to 'P-ness' (for g is a general character), and 'ass' has the function of the copula, so that the analysis presupposed in both formulations (I) and:

(2) a is P

is, I believe, one and the same.

26/ (Digression) The above account is not connected with what Geach calls the 'two-term theory of predication' or, a fortiory, to what he
calls the 'two-name theory of predication'. (The former, at least, he
ascribes in an astonishingly superficial way, to Aristotle—though to Aristotle after his fall(!), as he puts it). For P-ness names (if at all, and in a completely differ-
ent way than 'Fido' names Fido) an abstract thing, and not
the concrete things that happen to be determined by it
of which it is predicated). Incidentally, this shows that
a theory insisting on further analysis of the 'name-verb
theory' (I mean one distinguishing within the verb a co-
pulatively and a determinately functioning element)
is not necessarily committed to a two-name theory of
predication (as this latter is rather caricatured by
Geach).

27/ We come now to Strawson's treatment of the negations of P₁ and P₂.

Considering firstly the problem on the level of the World, we note that things (for example one concrete and one abstract—in the case of facts of the
form: a is P) are either assigned or not assigned (either
one predicated of the other, or not so predicated).

This may be misleadingly put by saying that they are either positively or negatively assigned. (Misleadingly: because it seems now that a negative assignment is just a kind of assignment, whereas it clearly is a non-assignment. —- But anyway one is permitted to
choose the formulation that he thinks best suits him in the conveyance of his ideas and thoughts, which, of course, is all that matters.

Similarly, moving on the level of language, things can be presented (by us) as being assigned or as not being assigned. Or, adopting the misleading idiom (for whose adoption I can see, indeed, no reasons), they can be presented as being positively or negatively assigned to each other.

In Strawson's formula:

\[ \overline{\text{ass}(i, g)} \]

it is the copulative element which is 'negated', (which bears the function of presenting the two items as not assigned to each other) in order to have the negative of the initial ass proposition.

(Move from \( \text{ass}(i, g) \) to \( \overline{\text{ass}(i, g)} \)).

The predicative element \( \text{is P} \) can be said to be negated only because, and in so far, the copulative element is negated. The determinantly functioning expression (the predicate in the first of the senses discerned above in § 24) is left untouched by the operation of negation.

28/ But the next step is, I think, at least confounding many distinct things. Strawson in effect (p. 105) makes the transition from:

\[ \overline{\text{ass}(i, g)} \]

to:

\[ \text{ass}(i, \overline{g}) \]

And this is questionable.

29/ (Perhaps behind the scenes, there is this curious 'argumentation': negative assignment of \( i \) to \( \text{not} \).
ments are a kind of assignment (ex hypothesi having allowed this way of speaking) but the only assignments are 'really' positive (so-called) assignments (the healthy view from which the previous way of speaking is an illegitimate departure); (and now combining curiously these two, really incompatible conceptions, we conclude) therefore negative assignments must be (in the final analysis) a kind of positive assignments (!)--an assignment of it to not-g.

If there is even a shadow of this in the back of our minds, we have, perhaps, a striking example of how, inappropriate ways of talking which, nevertheless, are deemed harmless enough to be used in making (perhaps adding 'colour') some points, are proved to be very dangerous indeed, if not restricted firmly to what they are idiomatic usage, to be always governed by our intuitions --- our ultimate safeguard against philosophical error.

30/ Now the step in 28 can be taken in various different ways, in some of which may be valid, and in some not.

So, if it is taken on the level of the World, in the level of being, it is certainly, I conceive, faulty. There are no negative things---either concrete or abstract. A negative entity in general is a non-entity, a non-exist. (It may be possible, of course, but this is another matter). If redness is a quality, not-redness is nothing---neither a quality, nor a negative quality, nor anything at all. Even if there is some, however, faint, propriety in talking about non-determinations (non-facts) as if they were negative determinations (negative facts), there is, I think, absolutely nothing to incline one to posit negative things.
(It may be objected: "Why do you say so? Is unhelpfulness any less a 'thing' than helpfulness?"

I answer: it is one thing to hold that if helpfulness is an entity, indeed an abstract thing, then not-helpfulness is not an (abstract) thing, not any kind of entity; it is another thing to investigate concerning the ontological status of helpfulness (or rather of what we mean by 'helpfulness')—to consider, for example, whether it is a simple abstract thing, or a complex one, or a compound pseudo-(abstract) thing (see section F of the present essay)—and also concerning the status of un-helpfulness (as we use the term)—to inquire, among other things, whether unhelpfulness is simply the negation of helpfulness or the privation of it, and, if the latter, whether and how that fact 'explains' and justifies our feelings that something positive is included somehow even in our 'negative concepts'.

My point here is the elementary and I conceive, obvious one, to the effect that one cannot properly speak in terms of 'negated things' or 'negations of things', even in the case of abstract things,—save, if at all, in a secondary sense based on the more fundamental conception of negating the presence of an abstract thing in concrete things. And even this is no proper way of speaking because of the illegitimate mixing involved in it, of two completely different, though closely connected, strata: on the level of the World, an abstract thing is 'present' or 'absent' from a given concrete thing (the first one characterises the second, or it does not characterise it); and on the level of thought and language, that presence is either affirmed or denied.)

31/ (One can elaborate, of course, upon this straightforward, natural and fundamental intuition—not by way of adding to its perspicuity or certainty,
but of connecting it with other intuitions, though perhaps intuitions less fundamental than it. (This is in many cases very useful—removing, as it does, some stumbling stones).

So it may be said that in a certain composition, its existence and unity (it is something, and it is one something) depends on the existence and unity of its elements and on their being connected in a way so as to constitute it. Now in the case that it fails to be (and to be one something) through a failure of the elements to be connected in the way that would constitute it (and this is the important type of failure), the composite ‘thing’ (entity, item), certainly, is not simpliciter, and one cannot with propriety christen it ‘negative composition’ in the hope, so to speak, of infusing it with some degree of reality; quite true, the said composite entity does not exist, it is not simpliciter, and it might be thought that nothing but a pure negation is involved here; but still it does not exist because there is some other complex or some other complexes, involving its would-be elements, which exclude the existence of the former one; the elements do not stand in the ‘relation’ that would constitute it, because they do stand in another relation or in other relations to other elements. Therefore, in this sense, its non-existence involves a positive element, left, of course, indeterminate and unspecified, but clearly implied even in describing the present case as failure of the existing elements to form the composition which would yield the complex in question: for if really existing, the elements cannot fail to stand into other relations, to enter into other combinations.

The point is perhaps even clearer if transposed to the case interesting us. Suppose that a is not P. This may be so either because there are no things a or P-ness (in the appropriate senses) or because P-ness does not determine a. (Of course, adopting Strawson’s analy-
sis concerning the existential presuppositions of predicative statements, and adding an appropriate corresponding presupposition on the determinant part of the determination, you have not even to state the alternative; there is not really a first part of it.). Now in the second case, which interests us and is important, a is not P just because it is, say, Q and P-ness and Q-ness are so connected as to make 'a is P' and 'a is Q' incompatible. So that there is, dormant (so to speak) in 'a is not P', the clause 'but it is...', and/or 'because it is...'. In this sense the non-determination points in an unspecified way to proper (positive so called) determinations involving the same elements as the non-existing one. (At least, involving the same concrete element; and anyway, there is the possibility of the abstract thing's entering into actual determinations even if it does not actually enter to any of them - provided, of course, that it subsists, in some sense†).

Having the above in mind, in exactly this sense, admittedly a very peculiar sense, we can perhaps speak with some propriety of the non-determination as a negative determination.

† I put forward these ideas very reservedly, not being quite sure in respect of their general validity or even fruitfulness, as they anticipate what I intend to do in subsequent essays: I mean an investigation of questions on the 'being' of determinants in themselves, of their subsistence and existence (in the World). Of course, I am ready to put as little as possible into this subsistence of abstract things and so, at this stage at least, I only mean by 'a subsistent abstract thing' one that can enter into actual determinations and so exist in the World as determinant determining concrete things (as character characterising them). I leave it open, for the moment, as an important metaphysical problem whether subsisting abstract things are necessarily exemplified in the World, that is whether there may be abstract things which are not exemplified-in-the-World and yet subsist. If there could not be such things (or, perhaps, even if they are not), then the complication due to the introduction of possibility... in the above parenthesis (in the text) is dropped, and similarly it is dropped from the paragraph beginning 'And in the case...' below.
(I have adjusted the above idea of a positive hint in negative judgements from Ryle's 'Negation'. Though I do not agree completely with his analysis of negative statements.

Besides, and more generally, one can recognise in the above thoughts another aspect of what I have tried repeatedly to formulate in an adequate and clear way (not very successfully, till now, indeed), namely the idea of a certain completeness, 'ripeness' and fullness of reality, or at any rate, of existence (existent reality).

Now, clearly, nothing comparable can be discerned in the case of non-things.

For if a concrete thing does not exist, its nonexistence is absolute, pointing to no other concrete things involving the former or its elements (in the same sense as above), and whose existence is incompatible with its existence.

And in the case of a non-subsistent abstract thing its non-subsistence is absolute, pointing to no other subsisting abstract things, involving it or its possibility, or its elements, or their possibility (in the same sense of 'element', etc., as above), and whose subsistence is incompatible with its subsistence.

32/ Returning to the stop in 26, we now note that it can be taken alternatively as made on the level of language. And here we can distinguish various possibilities (somehow corresponding to the sub-levels of the linguistic level).

1/ If it consists in or involves the claim that, from a purely grammatical point of view, there are negative words or terms in most (or all) actual languages, then it is clearly correct. For surely there are such terms. For example, 'unfinished' or 'harmless' are such
words in English. But then this is an obvious fact, not standing in need of support of any kind, least of all in need of metaphysical justification—-and it is not of any philosophical relevance, save per accidens.

II/ If it consists in or involves the claim that there are negative predicative terms, in the sense of 'predicative terms' in which they are expressions functioning (at least mainly) in many propositions to specify the general character presented in them as assigned to a particular, and to specify the general character in itself—-and if the 'negative' of 'negative predicative terms' is taken with 'the general character' of the above explication of a 'predicative term' so as to yield "...to specify that negative general character presented...", then, the step is faulty, because the claim is wrong, for, simply, there are no negative general characters, no negative abstract (or for that matter concrete, too) things. In this case the claim indeed stands in need of metaphysical justification (it has philosophical relevance), but metaphysics does not support it.

III/ If on the other hand, still working with the above concept of 'predicate' (sense (i) in 24), we take 'negative predicative term' to mean 'expression functioning in propositions of the stated kind' mostly and primarily in specifying the general character presented in these as being negatively assigned (or better: presented as not being assigned) to particulars, and this they do in propositions whose grammatical form is that of affirmative propositions, then the claim is a true one, and connected with (1) above.

We must, of course, distinguish between a distinction affirmative/negative as applied to propositions from purely grammatical reasons (considered, that is, from the point of view of (surface) grammar), and a homonymous distinction on the other hand applied to propositions qua presenting positive or negative determinations (facts of the said kind)—-or better, determinations or absence of determinations.
iv/If now we use 'predicate' in sense (ii) (§ 24), we can certainly say that there are negative predicates in the sense of expressions functioning in propositions of the said kind to specify the general character which is presented in them as not assigned to particulars—and the general character qua not assigned.

v/But, again, not in the sense of expressions functioning in specifying the negative general character, that in the propositions in which they figure, is presented as assigned to particulars, qua assigned.

Thus the validity of the step depends on the level at which it is taken, and on the claim to which, by making it, we are committed.

(Besides, we are here supplied with another example of what I mean by insisting on basing a philosophical Theory of Language on Metaphysics.)

33/ Before leaving this topic, I would like to observe en passant that there are still two other presuppositions, under which alone the step in 28 has an even initial plausibility to be considered as generally valid. And these are:

1/ Strawson’s theory of the existential presuppositions of predicative statements (affirmative as well negative), on the part of the subject. For clearly if:

(I) a is not P

which is true in case that there is nothing a (as Aristotle would have it) then we cannot in general move from (I) to:

(2) a is not P

which, on that account, cannot be true unless there is a thing a (which is not P).
11/ A claim complementary to the above must be made in respect of the predicate-side of proposition (I), relating to type-restrictions. That is, it must be held that (I) can be true only if it could be false; I mean that (I) cannot, on that account, be considered true (or for that matter false) if P-ness is not the sort, the type of determinant that can characterise things like a. So that, we have to treat 'this stone is not clever' as neither true (again against, I think, Aristotle) nor, of course, false, but in some sense senseless, its lack of sense being due to violation of type restrictions (or being due to a category mistake). And we have to impose and accept this restriction, because if, on the contrary, we accept the truth of statements like (I) even in cases where P-ness cannot (in the relevant, appropriate sense) be predicated of a, then we cannot in general move from (I) to (2) – provided we agree (in what, I think, is highly plausible to hold) that (2) (implying, as I take that it does, that another character of the same kind as P-ness characterises a) is not true in case that P-ness cannot determine things like a.

(I intend to develop and elaborate further these points in subsequent essays).

NOTE It might be thought that a confusion lurks in the above discussion, in that we have to distinguish asserting "it is not the case that a is P" from not asserting that a is P. But I do not think that this distinction, correct though it undoubtedly is, affects in any important way my discussion. For, firstly, the distinction has no important consequence for the ontological level, with whose problems I am mainly concerned and where both even the notion of asserting is irrelevant and there is no third way between being the case that a is P and not being the case. And, secondly, not being interested with gnosiological problems for their own sake, I was naturally concerned, in the above discussion, only with such gnosiological distinctions as they reflect really ontological ones, examining the distinction between asserting that a is P and asserting that it is not the case that a is P, but neglecting the distinction between asserting that it is not the case that a is P and not asserting that a is P.
34/ I now turn to problems regarding 'compoundability'. And firstly, to begin with, as to section III of Strawson's paper, I shall only say that it does not seem to me that "Asymmetry regarding negation (negatability) carries with it as a consequence a certain asymmetry regarding composition (compoundability)" (p. 38). The consequence can be drawn, I think, only if further premises are used, if additional presuppositions are agreed—some of which are exploited by Strawson himself in the process of 'inference'.

(I mean premises such as that the original asymmetry thesis supply a conclusive test for distinguishing between subjects and predicates etc.

And besides, I think, it is clear that in the paragraph beginning "Of course the adherent of the asymmetry thesis..." (p. 38), the asymmetry regarding compoundability has to be introduced as, at least, partly independent of the other original asymmetry. See especially: "but they are not compound subjects either; for there are no such things as compound... (conjunctive or disjunctive) subjects. Alongside..." (p. 38).)

But, anyway, I think that the subject is susceptible, and calls for more drastic solutions. So that I intend again to question some of the presuppositions that Strawson appears to share with the persons, from whose views he starts investigating in the essay I am discussing.
35/ If I have succeeded in showing in
section E above what I have tried to make clear, the same can
also be used to shed some light in the present discussion
too,---as a regulating idea at least.

One way of formulating the theses urged for
there, is the following:

1/. There are no negative things, either abstract or concrete.

2/. There are no negative determinations
(facts), except in the sense that some possible determinations
are not actualised. But these unactualised determinations are
not just a kind of determination, to be set side by side with the
other complementary kind, that of positive determinations.
"Determination" used in respect of a possible determination
and in respect of an actual one is used in different senses
(in the cases of \( \Sigma \delta \alpha \mu \mu \epsilon \nu \) and \( \varepsilon \nu \gamma \epsilon \rho \alpha \epsilon \lambda \) generally, \( \pi \rho \alpha \lambda \alpha \kappa \) \( \lambda ' \varepsilon \varepsilon \alpha \nu \) ).

3/. On the other hand (and level), of course
there are negative propositions, even quite apart from the
obvious but philosophically irrelevant, surface-grammatical,
linguistic fact. For we can certainly present things as not
assigned to each other, and this, of course, whether they are
assigned or not. (Though, of course, we cannot assign things
which are not assigned, nor even can we assign things which
are assigned---simply because we cannot assign things (in the
relevant sense). We can only assign words, and by doing so, present
present things as assigned or not assigned.) But the presenta-
tion of two things as not assigned to each other, is not the
presentation of one positive and one negative thing as assigned
to each other. I think this is pretty clear.

4/. We cannot even justify a certain determin-
ate asymmetry thesis regarding negatability just because
there is not one clear enough asymmetry thesis regarding ne-
gatability. Even on the level of language, it splits into
different versions, some of them being valid and others invalid,
depending on the congruence of the version in question with the
correct metaphysical analysis of the state of affairs presented
36/ Now just as 'negation', 'negative', etc., are words primarily applying to propositions and statements, and only in derivative ways to expressions (parts of propositions) on the one hand and determinations (facts) to the other (though the 'derivation' must be very cautious and careful, in order not to trespass the limits posed by metaphysics), in the same way, I conceive, 'compound', 'disjunctive', 'conjunctive', etc., are such words: primarily they apply to propositions and statements (on the level of language).

37/ Therefore if 'p' and 'q' are simple propositions, then 'p and q' is in a clear enough sense of 'compound' a compound (conjunctive) proposition. But is it a compound (disjunctive) fact that either p or q is given that either it is a fact that p or it is a fact that q? I am inclined to say that even if the answer to this question is affirmative, nonetheless, facts may be compound in a derivative sense of 'compound'. I have in mind a scheme of the following kind:

(a) a compound fact is what is presented (stated, etc.) through a compound proposition, taken (that which is presented), somehow superficially, as a whole— as a kind of entity.

(b) a compound proposition is one connected in certain ways (to be enumerated) with simple propositions.

(c) a simple proposition is one presenting a simple fact (a determination of the studied kind, in our case).

---

+ I believe that this is true in general, independently of what I take to be the correct metaphysical analysis; i.e., independently of the correctness of my analysis.

++ Of course I speak of the 'compound' that goes with 'conjunctive' and 'disjunctive'. For of course there are other senses of it, in which it does not apply primarily, indeed, it does not apply at all, to propositions and statements. See for example below.
38/ The above are little more than a programmatic announcement, though I believe they correspond to something deeply intuitive. And to match this rough suggestion with an equally rough suggestion, I think that the whole mechanics of the so-called truth-functional calculus in Logic has, at most, an epistemological rather than a metaphysical point and significance—in the last analysis. I mean that it seems to me that to speak in terms of the 'either-or' or 'and' idiom (and even, I dare say, of the 'not' idiom) is an expedient way of reporting and communicating the extent and depth of our knowledge of the World, and therefore, in the last analysis, it is more or less affected by the limitations of our knowledge of the World; and it reflects these limitations in various degrees; and further, it is either from the positive aspect of our knowledge (its extent and depth), or from the negative aspect (its limitation), or from a combination of both that the said ways of speaking get their point. (So, for example, in the 'not' idiom, it is the negative aspect that preponderates, though not to the absolute exclusion of the positive one. In the 'and' idiom, the positive aspect is perhaps exclusively present. The 'either-or' idiom is, in this respect, like a half-way house.)

39/ To give some kind of (even inconclusive) support to the above claims. On the level of the World, if it is not the case that a is P, it is not the case that a is P, and this is the end of the matter. A possible determination is not actualised. But if we want, for epistemological reasons, to stress that by knowing that it is not the case that a is P we positively know something (in other words, that the non-actualisation of a determination is something (the elusive word) that we can know), we may say that (we know that) a is not P. And then it is quite natural to think that just as when knowing that a is P, we know a fact, so here also we know a fact—only a negative fact; the fact that a is not
P; and even we can put it by saying that in such a case we know that it is the case that a is not P (instead of, the 'unexpected' formula: "that it is not the case that a is P"). In fact, in the present case we really know the non-existence of a fact (determination).

At the root of the difficulty is, I think, the quite ancient puzzle regarding 'something'. If we know something in the present case as in other unexceptionable cases, then this something has somehow to exist. So that if we know the non-existence of a fact, this nonexistent fact has to exist somehow in some way; somehow as if even nonexistence were a kind of existence—only a negative existence. It is, in effect, the absurdity of not/taking being (δ'ν) as a (sumnum) genus (and so taking it as said in one sense, not Πολλοίκακωίων, but even taking being and not-being (μή δ'ν) as, so to speak, two species of a further, really highest, vastly comprehensive genus.

40/ Similar considerations apply, I think, also to the other mentioned idioms. So that when we know two 'things', and we wish to emphasise that we know both of them, we almost naturally and constitutionally are led to say that we know some one thing, that is, that (say) it is the case that (both p and q). So we move to represent it schematically from 'it is the case that p; it is the case that q' to 'it is the case that p and it is the case that q', and then to 'it is the case that p-and-q', and so to 'the compound fact that p and q'. The case is, in a sense, even more easy for the 'either-or' idiom.

Notice that, of course, it all is all right, if this is simply meant to imply that even if the determination is unactualised, yet it is possible (given that it is), and so the nonexistent, yet possible fact can be said to exist in another, quite different sense—indeed, it exists potentially. But in the above difficulty, we seem to want for our nonexistent fact not existence in another sense of the word, but just existence in another application of the word, meant in both cases as applying in the same (at least; generically the same) sense.
41/ I wish to draw attention to the fact that I do not question here the validity of the above moves. I just notice their epistemological point.

We wish to say, to emphasise that we know some one 'thing' when we know that it is not the case that a is P, or that it is the case that p and it is the case that q, or that either it is the case that p or it is the case that q. So we are inclined to say that we know that it is the case that a is not P, or that it is the case that both p and q, or that it is the case that either p or q, correspondingly. And this is all right—in so far as uses of the expression 'it is the case' are concerned. But we then turn, to our simple cases, and think: what is the case, is a fact. Therefore, in the three cases above we know three different facts. Well then, let us christen them negative, conjunctive and disjunctive facts. The error I think, does not lie in what we are saying; the error, as usually (or always in philosophy?), lies in what we think are committed to, by saying what we say. And in the present case, we presumably are inclined to think that we are committed to the claim that the above mentioned 'types' of facts are just other kinds of facts, beside the positive, so called, ones. That they all have the same metaphysical status; that they are all facts in the same sense of 'fact'.

And what I wish to argue is that they are not. Perhaps they all have the same epistemological status; I am not here concerned to investigate whether this is correct or not; but anyway, it is, I think, certainly metaphysically irrelevant.

42/ Before leaving, in this inadequate form, the topic, let me remark that I had in mind, in the above discussion, pure truth-functional connectives. I mean connectives connecting indifferently propositions relevant or irrelevant to each other.
Of course we expect some important differences, when we concentrate on, say, 'and'. Idioms which are camouflaged, so to speak, inferences (logical or natural), for example 'a is a father and a is male'. Or when we come to study 'either-or' idioms behind which there is some (appropriate) entailments or such idioms expressing laws (logical or natural)---for example "either it rains or it does not rain".

Yet, I shall not now embark on an investigation of the differences. But I intend, to do so, when I shall have proceeded in my work enough, in order to regain a less fragmentary and unorientated view of the subject.

43/ (Just an idea: is it the case that an implicit awareness of the metaphysical irrelevance of such connectives, can account for the lack of interest and absence of serious and thorough investigation of truth-functional logic by Ancient and, in a lesser degree, Medieval Philosophy? Of course there are exceptions—for example in Stoic logic—but I speak of a general trend and attitude. And besides, I have been left with the impression, (though I am not in the position to judge whether it is correct or no, because of my insufficient acquaintance with the relevant 'sources') that in the case of some Medieval investigations, the real targets, in what can be considered as truth-functional Logic, are disguised entailments, laws etc.--- in the spirit of what I have said in 42.).

Summarising and concluding: there seem to be no properly called 'negative', 'disjunctive' or 'conjunctive' facts in the sense of 'fact' in which a proper predication (a simple determination of the kind I have studied till now) is a fact, and in the sense of 'negative', 'disjunctive' and 'conjunctive' in which we can speak properly of negative, etc., propositions.
For, after all, the proposition 'p and q' is something distinct over and above, if you like, propositions 'p' and 'q'; the first could have been formed without even the other, two, or any one of them, having been formed, and vice versa. Similarly, my knowledge of two facts is something distinct over and above the knowledge of each one of them taken separately, and even, in some indeed strained sense, it can be considered as something distinct over and above the cognitions of each of them taken conjointly (or, perhaps better, it involves an element distinct over and above everything involved in those cognitions). For the knowledge of the two facts as two facts involves awareness of their being two facts, whereas the two separate cognitions of each one of the facts known, even if taken together, do not imply awareness of the co-cognition (permit me the term) of the two facts involved separately in each of them.

But on the contrary, there is no important and relevant sense, I think, in which we may claim that a so-called compound fact is something over and above its constituents. It is true that we are inclined to say: "Now so, it is, indeed, its constituents taken jointly." But precisely this is the point: 'taken jointly' introduces the mind's selectivity, picking up, knowledge, interest and so on---in general the mind's activity. And I have repeatedly said that I do not object to the validity of the epistemological considerations in themselves, but to their relevance to metaphysics.

+ Of course, taken together not from the point of view of the knower, but, say, of a spectator, a second person. For precisely because someone may know two 'things' and, not having conceived them together, not having brought the relevant cognitions actually together, nevertheless not know (at least explicitly) that he knows both of them, is we can say that the knowledge of both of them is something distinct, over and above the cognitions of each one of the facts involved in it.
But on the contrary, there is no important and relevant sense, I think, in which we may claim that a so-called compound fact is something over and above its constituents. It is true that we are inclined to say: "How so, it is, indeed, its constituents taken jointly". But precisely this is the point: 'taken jointly' introduces the mind's selectivity, picking up, knowledge, interest and so on - in general the mind's activity. And I have repeatedly said that I do not object to the validity of the epistemological considerations in themselves, but to their relevance to metaphysics.

45| Be it as it may, if the difficulties that beset the application of the said words to facts are serious enough, at any rate it is, I think, evident that just as no negative things can be conceived, so no compound things can - either concrete or abstract. Things cannot be compounded in the way that propositions, or even, perhaps, facts, can be compounded. Indeed, this is a truism. For propositions and facts themselves consist in a kind of composition (they are ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς λεγόμενα). And further, the manner in which they can be again compounded (the truth-functional way) is clearly not independent of the kind of composition that constitutes them. Therefore, everything not capable of such composition cannot be truth-functionally compounded. But expressions and things are not so constituted and not susceptible of such composition (lest, they would be propositions and facts). Hence, etc.

46| Of course, things can be 'compounded' and be complex in or other of the following senses, not involving truth-functional complexity.

1) Both concrete and abstract things can be considered together.

ii) Concrete things can even be literally together (perhaps glued together).
iii) Concrete things have parts, being wholes.

iv) Abstract things may have components (Fathership, for example, has parenthood and maleness as such components).

v) Concrete things have 'parts' (say, the parts of the definition giving their essence).

Before being transposed to the level of language, there remains a critical, negative job to be done.

I have claimed above that things (abstract things, too, for that matter) are not compounded in a sense closely corresponding to the sense in which propositions (and perhaps facts) can be compounded. But now Strawson defines (p.108) two kinds of compound characters (abstract things). Hence, I have to show that these definitions are in one way or other incorrect, by reason of some defect in them - that is, if my claim is to gain any plausibility.

In paragraph 21-23 above, I have argued, inter alia, that it is propositions or facts that stand in entailment 'relations', and not things, concrete or abstract. But on the other hand, these entailment 'relations' hold true (in case that they do in fact hold so) just by reason of appropriate determinate - determinable 'relations' holding among the abstract things involved in them (provided that the metaphysical subjects in the relevant facts are the same).

Now the notion of necessary/sufficient conditions, as explicat in p. 102 by Strawson rests ultimately upon the notion of entailment. For it is of possessions of characters by particulars (that is, of determinations, of facts) and not of characters in themselves, that there are sufficient/necessary conditions, these being in turn themselves possessions of characters by particulars (and so determinations, facts - about the same particular of course). And so, in this way, we can restate Strawson's formulations in p.102 in terms of entailment 'relations' between such facts as follows:
We shall say that the possession by \( x \) (particular variable) of a character \( g \) is a sufficient condition of its possessing the character \( g_1 \) iff, \([\text{given that } x \text{ has the character } g_1]\), there is a character \( g \) such as that \( x \) is \( g \) entails that \( x \) is \( g_1 \). And similarly we shall say that the possession by \( x \) of a character \( g \) is a necessary condition of its possessing the character \( g_1 \) iff, \([\text{given that } x \text{ has the character } g_1]\), there is a character \( g \) such as that \( x \) is \( g_1 \) entails that \( x \) is \( g \). *

But if so, then it cannot be that characters themselves stand in necessary/sufficient-condition-relations. And hence definitions (1) and (2) on p. 108 err, by treating characters as themselves standing in such relations.

49] But this is a minor point. For the definitions can be emended to meet satisfactorily the objection. So (1), for example, will then read:

\[
(1') g_3 \text{ is the conjunctively compound character of } g_1 \text{ and } g_2 \text{ when, (for any } x), \text{ that } x \text{ is } g_1^{**} \text{ and that } x \text{ is } g_2 \text{ are jointly sufficient and singly necessary for the fact that } x \text{ is } g_3 \text{, and neither is sufficient or necessary for the other.}
\]

*Indeed I have treated the 'simplest kind of case' (p.102) exemplifying the relations in question between possessions of general characters; for, in fact, "These relations between general characters [more correct: between possessions by particulars of general characters, as I have argued] are of different degrees of complexity" (p.102). But I don't think that the more complicated cases can not, at least in principle, be reformulated through correspondingly more complicated constructions in terms of entailment.

** This way of talking is certainly, strictly speaking, in correct. If \( g \) is a general character, a concrete thing cannot be \( g \) - it can only have or possess it, or something of this sort. But I think it is harmless to speak so, sometimes, for sheer convenience.
And, recasting again, now to the entailment idiom:

(1") $g_3$ is the conjunctively compound character of $g_1$ and $g_2$ when (for any $x$) that $x$ is $g_1$ and that $x$ is $g_2$ jointly entail, and singly are entailed by, that $x$ is $g_3$, and neither of them entails the other or is entailed by it.

50) So far, perhaps so good. But then Strawson proceeds to interpret this definition as follows: "Consider any two characters, e.g. tall, bald, such that there is a class of particular individuals such that each character could, independently of the other, be consistently assigned to one and the same specified particular individual of that class. Then the definitions just given of disjunctive or conjunctive characters in general seem to provide us with the means of defining the disjunctive or conjunctive character of those two characters ..." (p.108, 'italics' mine).

He says: 'seem'. But the whole tenor of the passage seems to suggest that, lacking reasons for the contrary, he feels justified to accept this 'seeming', and therefore to hold that given any two characters $g_1$ and $g_2$ fulfilling the condition stated in the above quotation, there is a further character defined, for example, Via definition (1") the conjunctive character of those two characters.

---

"As Strawson remarks, in the case of conjunctive characters, we have to add "and they are not incompatible", as a final clause in explication (1").

**But it is also true that the quoted passage is preceded and followed by considerations on the level of language. But this is not, I think, essential. Though indeed, there is, in general, a perhaps very easy jumping from the level of language to that of the World and vice versa - but I apprehend that this is a quite modern attitude."
51] But, as I think, this is not always or necessarily the case. For the definition (1") presupposes the existence (in the appropriate sense of the word) of character $g_3$. That is, it says in effect: "If, given that there are three characters $g_3$, $g_1$, $g_2$, it is the case that... etc., then we can say that $g_3$ is the conjunctive character of $g_1$ and $g_2$". So, it is not possible to establish through the definition the existence of character $g_3$, given two other characters $g_1$, $g_2$ fulfilling certain conditions; for the definition works on the supposition that there are three characters and proceeds to license the application of a certain expression to one of them, in case that certain 'relations' hold among any possible exemplifications of these characters.

52] Approaching the same point from a slightly different angle: from the mere fact that two characters belong to a given particular it does not, in all cases, follow (in virtue solely of the above fact) that a further character belongs to it: i.e. the conjunctive character of the above said characters. And, I believe, not only it does not generally follow that the particular in question has one more character; it does not even follow that it has one (someone) character, somehow mysteriously corresponding to the two characters that it in fact has. [To cover the case of someone saying: "Well, it has one character, though, indeed, not one more, not an one to be distinguished from its having the first two".]

53] Perhaps I may negatively support a little the above (par.52) claims, by exploiting, what I think is an illegitimate but suppressedly presupposed thought, lying at the root of the matter.

I have argued in Essay II that if a concrete thing has a character, it does not follow that it has a character of having the former character. Generally, I have argued that we cannot even speak of its having a character of having a character; "have a character", and related expressions, are not to be reiterated, at
pains either of sheer ambiguity or nonsense. But if so, then, a
fortiori, one must not say in case of a thing's having two distinct
and 'compatible' characters, that it also has the distinct or indi-
stinguishable character of having the two mentioned characters,
without further examination of the case. And having this in mind,
one is not, I suppose, inclined to posit and name, in all such cases,
a character whose possession by the said thing corresponds to its
having the character of having the two characters in the way that
the possession by the thing of each of the initial characters
corresponds to its having the character of having it. And so one
has not the tendency to postulate a conjunctive character quite
generally, in every case of possession by one concrete thing of
two characters.

54] To give examples.

Characters \( \xi_3 = \) fathership, \( \xi_1 = \) parenthood, \( \xi_2 = \) maleness,
fulfil definition (1)". Fathership may be said to be a conjunctive-
ly compound character of parenthood and maleness.

But given the characters \( \xi_1 = \) redness and \( \xi_2 \) heaviness,
there is no conjunctively compound character of them.

The case of deafness and dumbness (Strauson's example)
might be thought a first sight to constitute a half-way house
between the previous examples. Yet, considering the matter on the
level of the world, it is I think, just on a par with the second
example. For, solely from the linguistic fact that a given language
in the one case has a word by means of which it is able to express
in one (grammatically one) proposition what is really two different
and logically unconnected determinations, while in the other case
it has not such a word, - from this linguistic fact we may perhaps
draw some inferences in respect of the various interests of the human
beings speaking the said language or of other suchlike things, but
certainly we cannot base upon such feeble evidence (if it is at all
evidence, however feeble and weak; for it seems to be something irre-
levent) conclusions about the metaphysical structure of the World.
[In respect of these examples, I would like to remark that, as I suspect, every example in Metaphysics must be taken, after all, as putative example, hypothetically.]

55] It is, I suppose, an advantage of the distinction drawn in par. 22 above, between on the one hand 'relations' of entailment holding among facts, determinations or possessions and on the other hand 'relations' of determinability holding among the abstract things themselves and providing the basis and the 'explanation' of the former ones. For if we reformulate Strawson's definitions (1) and (2) in terms of the determinate-determinable 'relation' (and this is the natural way to take, since, after all, it is about determinants (characters) that we want to speak in these purported definitions and not about determinations (characterizations, possessions etc.), we find clearly marked both the fact that not any combination of two chance characters is a compound character (provided of course that we choose to speak of compound characters at all) and the answer to the questions which of such combinations constitute a complex character and for what reason.

56] For take firstly definition (1). From (1") we obtain, when 'literally translating':

(1") [given three characters $e_1, e_2, e_3$], $e_3$ is the conjunctively compound character of $e_1$ and $e_2$, when: (i) one of those later characters is a determinable determinant of $e_3$, while the other is such a constitutive difference (differentia constitutiva, συστατική διαφορά) as to constitute it, in combination with the former; and (ii) $e_1$ and $e_2$ do not stand to each other either in the 'relation' in which P-ness and Q-ness are described to stand in par. 23 (ii), nor in the converse 'relation'.

Now, as far as I can see, condition (ii) is superfluous, covered by the formulation of condition (i). For if, for example, $e_1$ is the determinable and $e_2$ the appropriate constitutive difference of $e_3$. 

/. /
('appropriate' in that \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are the only 'ingredients' of \( g_3 \); but this, anyway, is a rather strict restriction, which can, I think, be removed), then neither can one of the characters \( g_1, g_2 \) be a determinable of the other, nor can \( g_2 \) be a constitutive difference of \( g_1 \) or of a determinable of \( g_1 \), nor, I suppose, can \( g_1 \) be a constitutive difference of \( g_2 \) or of a determinable of \( g_2 \).

Let us now see what happens, according to this treatment, to definition (2). Actually, I have concentrated till now on conjunctive characters, for there is a special initial plausibility in the claim of their existence, whereas the case for disjunctive characters seems, even prima facie, to be very much weaker.

\( 2'' \) would run:

\( 2'' \) \( g_3 \) is the disjunctively compound character of \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) when (for any \( x \)), (i) each of the facts that \( x \) is \( g_1 \) and that \( x \) is \( g_2 \) singly entails that \( x \) is \( g_3 \), and (ii) that \( x \) is \( g_3 \) together with the nonexistence of one of the other facts entail the other.

And recasting into the terminology of the determinable-determinate, we have (I omit some steps).

\( 2''' \) \[ given three characters \( g_1, g_2, g_3 \), \( g_3 \) is the disjunctively compound character of \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) when:

(i) \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are (different) determinate determinants of the determinable \( g_3 \) and

(ii) \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) belong to two lines of determinateness stemming from \( g_3 \), are on the same level, and the lines to which they belong are the only lines from \( g_3 \) to the level of \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \).

\[ In the above, I have made use of the principle, that the possession by a given concrete thing of a constitutive difference (of a character), does not entail the possession of the character by this thing; for the difference may also be a differentia divisionis of other determinables, besides the determinable combined with which it constitutes the said character. \]
I would like to add that in general, I am very uncertain concerning the before going analyses, at least in their detailed structure, though I am pretty sure of the correctness of the general direction. I intend to work more adequately on the Theory of Determinants later on, after working on the Theory of Substances (concrete things and their species and genera).

We conclude, therefore, that there is no sense of 'compound' exactly (or even closely enough) corresponding to the sense in which we can speak of compound propositions or, perhaps, even of compound facts, in which there are compound determinants (characters). On the other hand, there is some sense in which, indeed, there are compound determinants and this is the sense defined in (1''') and (2'''') - a very restricted sense, in effect the sense (iv) of par.45.

Passing now, summarily, to the level of language, we note, agreeably, that the conclusions are almost drawn by themselves. (A simple and trifling indeed repercussion of the general claim that the Theory of Language, in so far as it concerns philosophy, is to be based on Metaphysics).

So, working firstly with sense (i), par. 24 of 'predicate', that is conceiving as predicate that expression in a given proposition which functions in specifying the determinant presented by this proposition as assigned to a certain subject, we can distinguish the following two cases:

(i) If we understand by 'compound predicate', a word or expression in a given proposition that functions in specifying a compound determinant presented by the proposition as assigned to a certain subject, then, clearly, there are compound predicates, just in so far as there are compound characters, in the restricted sense defined in (1''') and (2'''').

(ii) If, on the other hand, we mean by 'compound predicate' an expression of one grammatically correct proposition, through the use of which characters are specified (or: functioning in specifying characters) all of which or either of which belong to a certain
particular individual—then, certainly, we can speak of 'compound predicates' even in cases where there are no compound characters. For, after all, nobody wishes to deny that there are propositions (used and understood and conveying thoughts and informations) of the type: "My hat is either brown or black". What one very much wishes to deny (and this denial in a very trivial one, indeed) is the claim that the logical form of this proposition (that is, the real form of the facts presented through it) coincides, or even corresponds very closely, with its (for philosophical purposes superficial) grammatical form.

Mutatis mutandis, we may formulate the corresponding results in respect to the second sense of predicate in par. 24.

62| We may now exhibit the results achieved in this part, in an order analogous to that of par. 34.

1) There are no compound things, except in senses (i) – (v) of par. 45, none of which is the sense intended by Strawson, for example in his definitions (i) and (2) (p. 108).

ii) I believe that there are no compound facts, but we may well posit them, for epistemological purposes, provided that they do not mislead us in Metaphysics. (This is a particularly strong and curious formulation. I put it, so to speak, experimentally).

iii) Of course there are compound propositions.

iv) We may say that there are compound predicates in a sense in which there are not compound subjects, provided we carefully discriminate this sense from others connected or unconnected (The discrimination will be regulated by the results of the relevant metaphysical investigation). The sense (or at least, one important sense) in question is clarified through definitions (1') and (2''), which, on their turn, are based on a development of sense (iv) in par. 45.
I shall not say much on this very important section VII of Strauson's essay, (not feeling myself ready to sail in such most treacherous waters), since I have not as yet undertaken an adequately detailed investigation of determinants (Theory of Determinants).

But I am inclined to think that the similarity between "a is P" and "P-ness is ...." is entirely extraneous and, on the contrary, it is the differences that are all-important: abstract things are fundamentally different from concrete things (not just another kind of things), their being is completely different, they are (simpliciter or something), in quite different senses.

I have already tried to give a partial vindication of this inclination, with regard to forms like " -ness is exemplified in x", in essay II, part D.

Strauson holds (at least by implication) that certain 'assignments' of characters of characters to characters fulfill the x/y condition, and therefore are, to this extent and in this important respect similar to assignments proper of characters to particulars. Or, if we accept, what Strauson seems to admit tacitly, that the x/y condition gives a (completely) adequate description of the difference between logical subject and predicate, then we may even hold that abstract things are subjects of certain objective facts as much and (more than this) in the same sense as particulars are subjects of other kinds of objective facts.

I would like to remark, in the first place, that it is not at all obvious that we can speak (are justified in speaking) of characters of characters or at least, that 'character' is used in the same familiar sense in both places where it occurs in 'character of character'. And if it is not so used, then it is not at all clear in what sense it is used in the first instance.
Although I shall not pursue this point further at the moment, I think that it is of much moment. For if it is correct, then we have not a clear problem even to begin with. For suppose someone says: "Take 'happiness is found in all stations in life'. The expression 'is found in all stations in life' specifies a character of characters, and the expression 'happiness' a character. Now, is not the 'relation' holding between that character of characters and this character (which supposedly is characterized by the former) like (indeed, the same as) the 'relation' holding between a character and a particular possessing it?". Our answer to this question ought to be: the formulation begs in a certain important sense the question; for we do not know whether what is specified by 'is found in all stations in life' is a character of characters, at least because it is not at all clear what is meant by 'character of characters'. Indeed this expression takes its point precisely from the supposition that there are characters of some sort (characters of characters) characterising characters of a different sort just as, and in the same way, as, there are characters exemplified in particulars.

And, more generally, we do not as yet know whether the fact(s) expressed in the initial proposition - example has (have) a form coinciding with the grammatical form of the proposition expressing it. We do not know whether we shall not succeed in 'reducing' this proposition to another exhibiting more adequately the real form of the presented fact(s). Or, at least, we do not know whether we shall not be able to see and judge that this 'reduction' is possible, indeed required, even if we do not see the exact way of actually making it. We do not as yet know whether the grammatical form of the given proposition has any philosophical significance and therefore we do not see as yet any point in

*indeed, corresponding in any way*
asking, at this stage at least, "Can not we view this proposition as comprised of two parts '...' and '...' which fulfill the x/y condition?"

67] And, after all, if the generalization of the particular/character (concrete/abstract) condition, can cover cases in respect of which we really have intuitive knowledge of, or reasons testifying to, their fundamental difference from the proper cases - then so much the worse for the generalization.

And further, if the ungeneralized condition is such that when legitimately (from a formal point of view) generalized it covers unacceptable cases, then it is inadequately representing the distinction between the concrete and the abstract. It needs to be supplemented.

The point is the simple and trivial one, that intuitions, and valid arguments based on them, must determine our claims, generalizations and theories, and not, if possible, vice versa.

68] The above points can, and must, be elaborated. I intend to treat of them in more detail in subsequent essays.

69] Still lingering for a while in this abstract plane of argumentation, before lowering to the examples themselves, let me remark that if P-ness is a general character of particulars (which, having it, are P), then it comes "in exclusiveness/involvement groups vis-à-vis individual particulars" (p.112). But as we have seen this is so because P-ness in itself stands in certain 'relations' of the determinate-determinable kind, to other abstract things. But this structure of abstract things, not in any sense shared of course by concrete things, should be expected to affect somehow the mode of combination of abstract things with their characters (provided that there are characters of characters, in a clearly enough apprehended sense) in a way that must result in some important difference between this kind of combination (if accepted at all) and the assignment of particulars to
characters, which particulars, not structured in any corresponding way, are unable to affect similarly their combination with the characters possessed by them.

70 But let us take Strawson's first example:

(a) Happiness is found in all stations in life.
First of all, we may remark, that what are mainly and familiarly found in all stations in life are men - in the quite straightforward and primary sense of the words: a station in life is 'defined' by certain characters (of the ordinary sort!) the possession of which by a given man, 'entitles' him (so to speak) to that station in life. Now, in a secondary sense, we may certainly speak of characters as found in stations in life, in case that they characterize men being in the given stations in life.

Hence, it is only too natural to take (a) as something like:

(b) Happiness is exemplified in men belonging to all stations in life and this is only another way of saying:

(c) Men who are happy [happy men] are found in all stations in life.

The result speaks for itself. (Although not as an exact rendering of (a), but as showing the direction in which one ought to work).

[I only mention, that nothing philosophically important is missed, I think, by such 'translations' or 'reductions' - apart from nuances of speech, points of emphasis, rhetorical effects etc.]

71 So, according to such an account, the only problems that remain ('only' emphemistically: these problems are most difficult) are those of the real form of the fact(s) expressed by, say, general or particular propositions, etc. (For (c) above is of such sort).

---

Essay II, part D.
A side remark: Strawson writes: "This being found in all stations in life is this way incompatible with being found in few stations in life and entails (involves) being found in most stations in life" (p.113). But in a sense the first determination entails the second, and, in a sense, is incompatible with the third. Anyway, these are simply nuances of ordinary speech - when we have made precise what is to be meant and apprehend it clearly, we see the entailments or incompatibilities involved. The rest is the most useful ambiguity and vagueness of ordinary speech.

Now Strawson offers a rather curious argument, in p.113 from "If we consider, say, happiness, misery, and bliss..." to "... and 'happiness is of short duration' is not entailed by 'Bliss is of short duration'."

The argument seems to be of this form:

(i) Happiness and misery are incompatible.

(ii) 'Happiness is found in all stations in life' is not incompatible with 'Misery is found in all stations in life'.

(iii) But characters come in exclusiveness groups vis-à-vis particulars.

(iv) Hence happiness and misery cannot be regarded as being presented as characters assigned to particulars in the above propositions.

But consider now the following 'argument' of the same form:

(i') Shortness and tallness are incompatible.

(ii') Yet 'men of whatever colour are short' is not incompatible with 'men of whatever colour are tall'.

* We have already remarked that this is, strictly speaking, incorrect, since things are not incompatible or compatible in the required sense. (Only facts or propositions are). But let us grant this way of speaking for brevity's sake.
(iii') = (iii)

(iv') Hence shortness and tallness cannot be regarded at all as being presented as characters assigned to particulars, in the above propositions.

The first 'argument' is as defective as the second. Indeed invalid.

74 Side issue: I think that it is not at all clear whether and why, granted that being blissful entails being happy, (a) "Bliss is of short duration" is not entailed by (b) "Happiness is of short duration". And the reason why these are not clear is that propositions (a) and (b) are too vague or even ambiguous, perhaps in more than one respect.

But it is extremely important to consider a reason adduced by Strawson for the contention that (b) does not entail (a), though happiness is entailed by bliss (as misleadingly is put). He writes in the footnote of p,113: "But no such relation holds in this direction either, for (c) 'Happiness is found in all stations in life' does not entail (d) 'Bliss is found in all stations in life'. . . ." The importance lies, I think, in seeing with much vividness how easy it is to take the surface grammatical form of a proposition as its real form. For the reason adduced is valid, obviously, only on the supposition that (a), (b), (c) and (d) are all of the same form: a character of characters being presented as assigned to a character in all of them.

The supposition, I think, needs only to be explicitly mentioned in order to be rejected. If on the other hand we try to uncover the real form of one of the various facts and corresponding statements, ambiguously and vaguely conveyed by each one of the above propositions, and if in so trying, we succeed to approximate not just to the real form of one of those facts and statements, but particularly to that of the preponderant one, that striking, so to speak, the dominant note of the whole inarticulately (more or less) apprehended complex and giving it its overall quality which enables
us to recognize it and misleads us into supposing that we clearly and distinctly perceive it — if we reasonably succeed in this endeavour, then we shall clearly see the detailed and articulated structure of the situation confronting us (in respect of (a), (b), (c) and (d)). Then we shall be able to see the real source and strength of our inclination to accept the entailment (b) → (a), in spite of our contrary tendency not to accept the validity of the entailment (c) → (d). [After all, even Strawson somehow recognizes the inclination to accept the former entailment, through giving as a reason for resisting it the unacceptability of the second.]

75] Just for the sake of giving an example (to be taken hypothetically) of the above suggested procedure, though an extremely rough one.

We have taken for granted that bliss 'entails' happiness. We may naturally enough interpret this, as reflecting the (supposed) fact that bliss is a kind of happiness, that is that bliss is a determinate of the determinable happiness. We may also 'translate' (a), (b), (c), (d) as follows, supposedly obtaining a closer approximation to the real form of their respective preponderant fact(s).

(a') Men are blissful, if at all, for short-time intervals.
(b') Men are happy, if at all, for short-time intervals.
(c') Happy men are found in all stations in life.
(d') Blissful men are found in all stations in life.

We can now see that (b') entails (a') though (c') does not entail (d'). And that the one entailment holds good whereas the other not, has nothing to do with whether happiness and bliss are presented as real subjects or not, but it depends on whether existential assumptions are made or not, and things like that — in short, it depends on what is precisely meant by the former set of propositions.]
[I am anxious to re-say that far from claiming that the above analyses of Strawson's examples, are adequate representations in grammatical form of their real form, I do not even hold that they are the first steps in such approximating reductions. I just wanted to exemplify what I was abstractly saying a little before, through hypothetical example-reductions.]

Striking a final note: I do not think that the ungeneralized x/y condition is an adequate representation of the difference between concrete/abstract. In fact, I am not sure that even after adding conditions corresponding to the points of difference discerned in my Essays I and II, we have taken hold of such an adequate description - 'definition' of that official difference.
To conclude then with just one or two remarks on section VIII of Strawson's Essay.

The section is, I think, rather harmlessly cramped through confusion of the different senses of 'to predicate'. Of course Strawson is aware of the fact; see his footnote 1 in p.114.

'To predicate' can be held to be systematically ambiguous, corresponding to:

(i) predication on the level of the World: abstract things are predicated of concrete things, the results being simple determinations (facts).

(ii) predication on the level of language, when considering its propositions simply from the (surface) grammatical point of view. Words are have predications of other words.

(iii) predication on the level of language, when considering its propositions as fact-presenting. Again here we may be said to predicate words and expressions of other words and expressions, but, in contradistinction with (ii), our predication here claims an exact correspondence with predication (i) in each and all uttered propositions.

So, sentences like "We could not predicate anything of happiness unless we could predicate happiness of people" (p.114) are to be reconsidered and understood in the light of pm.78. For we cannot predicate anything of happiness or of people or, for the matter of that, of anything whatever. We can only predicate words of 'happiness' and, indeed we cannot even predicate words of 'happiness' if my attitude towards section VII of Strawson's paper is justified. (Though again for different reasons from those because of which we cannot predicate something of happiness).
Various remaining possibilities of combination can be treated in the same way, (I mean combinations of the we-element, the predication (i-ii-iii) elements and the words-things-element).

80] The problem of dependent particulars (in Strawson's terminology) will be considered in later essays. But I am inclined to think:

i) Propositions (a) 'That shout was John's' and (b) 'John shouted', when duly completed, present one and the same fact or complex of facts.

ii) The real form of the presented fact(s) is better expressed by the grammatical form (b).

81] A 'historical' note: Strawson's dependent particulars, Aristotle's τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένῳ (things in subject but not said of subject) and my absolutely determinate determinants (Essay I) are, I believe, different names of one and the same kind of things. I shall work out their connection (or identity) and its implications, in due course.

82] Strawson seems to hold as 'second after the best' the dependent particulars. (The 'best' are, of course, independent particulars (Strawson), πρῶταί οὖσαί (Aristotle) or concrete things (as I term them). Aristotle on the contrary prefers second substances (species and genera of first substances) for the second place. Here we have another important problem for further investigation.