

Apostolos L. Pierris

Value and Knowledge

The Philosophy of Economy in Classical Antiquity

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CHAPTER 5

KNOWLEDGE AS THE ULTIMATE ASSET OF POWER

λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ

["Word (reason) is a great Master, who by the smallest and most invisible body, accomplishes divine works"]

Gorgias, *Laudation of Helen*, 82B11§8 DK

καὶ ὅποια ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ἦν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς

["And all things that were to be, all things that were but are not now, all things that are now or that shall be, mind formed them all"]

Anaxagoras, 59B12 DK

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδώς, πῶς οὐ δυνασέεται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν;

["And first of all, he who knows the nature of all things, how will he be unable to act correctly with regard to all things?"]

Δισσοὶ Λόγοι («Divided Theses»), 90, 8 § 2 DK

Δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τὸ μὲν σύμπαν τέχνη εἶναι οὐδεμία οὐκ ἐοῦσα
["In truth, it seems to me that quite generally there is no art (applied knowledge, reasoned craftsmanship) which is not really an art (i.e. applied knowledge capable of generating systematically repeatable results)"]

[Hippocrates], *Περὶ Τέχνης*, [«On the Art (of Medicine)»], 2

The fifth century B.C. saw the classical flourishing of ancient Greek culture, fierce hegemonial struggle within the bosom of a bipolarised Greek world, and an unprecedented high level of considerably internationalised economic activity. Developments in all three fields (intellectual and artistic, foreign relationships, economic) focused on one city-state: Athens, where meritocratic democracy and creative prosperity also took hold in a very open and eminently competitive environment.

The uncompromisingly (ant)agonistic spirit of the ancient Greek form of life erupted in the classical age in full might permeating all aspects of human activity, individual and collective, and all realms, material and mental. Within the State, *public political debates and forensic litigation* expressed what in philosophy emerged as disputativeness, even eristical controversialism; *Rhetoric* and *Sophistics* were the characteristic result -, veritable trademarks of the era. More explicit standards of rationality were consequently reached and set. A practically unregulated market system, and the *Hesiodic ἀγαθὴ ἐρις* (*beneficial strife*) operating in full sway among all economic agents, propelled the volume and rhythms of goods produced and distributed, the variety and extent of services offered, and the magnitude and operability of the financial sector, to record highs. Cultural products were now supplied for pay: poetic odes (Pindaric and Simonidean, for example) as well as works of plastic art [1], but, above all, education, knowledge, (the art of healing, of course, for example, taught or applied, but also aesthetic criticism

such as Homeric interpretation, or historical learning), especially the teaching of the arts of argumentation and persuasion, of political science and oratory [1a]. The Sophists, representatives of the new style in Philosophy, were essentially characterised by this new commercial, their opponents said mercenary, spirit [2]. Their scholarly and scientific activity covered both research and instruction in all fields of knowledge in a spirit of marked *instrumentalism* and *pragmatism*, with capital emphasis on «practical» issues, questions political and moral including economical [3]. Their teaching was divided between private instruction and public lecturing, for both of which they asked, and got, considerable/sometimes exorbitant, fees [4]. The Sophists made of the spiritual goods, knowledge and education, commodities, which they produced and exchanged freely. In fact, Antiphon argued that, if not appropriately priced, intellectual ware could be of no value: a good idea should command a high price in the market of ideas [5]. The *marketization of intellectual products* was also accompanied by enhanced movement of ideas; the teachers of the new knowledge moved freely around the Greek World, exhibiting their art and merchandise, staying where opportunity presented itself in a business-friendly environment for their line of profession. Naturally, the center of intellectual gravity was the place of freedom, innovation and power-hegemonic and democratic Athens [5a].

All human interaction involves action and counter-action, «passion» and counter-«passion». Relationships between free agents and without coercive violence naturally consist in a certain balancing between action and counter-action. Without such balancing, one or the other of the individuals will not participate and, thus, no interaction will materialise. Should such distemper in human relationships prevail, society would dissolve and man would regress into isolationism. But human nature cannot be satisfied to its fullest potential on such terms, and, hence, society is a natural necessity for man. *Human association is not the result of a social contract but the work of need.* It is for this very reason that not any form of human association is a free one. If the bond of a compact laid at the basis of society, then all forms of society would be free, as one can freely agree

to accept restrictions to his natural activity. The difference between weak and strong regulation of human life could, then, be a matter of degree and not of substance: even a system of absolute control might be free, under such a construal of the nature of human association, if endorsed by an aboriginal pact. The theory of the Social Contract, despite appearances, undercuts individual freedom: it emasculates real liberty by projecting it to the level of a speculative supposition; the theory annuls it by absolutising it.

Human association is the consequence of human need - a work of natural necessity in which freedom has no role to play. So much greater can thus be freedom's function within human association, once established. Freedom is a practical factor, not an «ideal» assumption as to the origin of human society. *An association is free, if there obtains in it a natural adjustment between action and counter-action in all human intercourse.* The spontaneous balancing of action and counter-action in human relationships is what constitutes the associational-system as a nexus of free agents. *A free system of human interaction is required to have a proper market.*

In a naturally ordered system of human coexistence every interaction between its members is a *transaction*, a *do ut des* relationship [6]. Such a natural system, if it remains uninterfered with, will be stable, since there will be evolved spontaneously a general pattern of balances between actions and counter-actions. The balance struck at each individual transaction is quickly transmuted into a general equilibrium [7]. What is required for such rapid transmutation is (a) that the singular balancing adjustments are totally free, and (b) that information concerning particular interactions moves unimpededly within the system. A system with free and well-informed agents will, after a relatively short period of spontaneous adjustment, reach a stable condition. *A free and transparent system of human association is in self-sustainable general equilibrium.* An unregulated and fully diaphanous market, i.e. a genuine market, is inherently stable.

Ancient Greek society was right from its inception market-oriented in that human intercourse was felt and conceived on the pattern of a

do ut des relationship, in which the balancing determination between action and counter-action was constitutive. The Greek view of reality is fundamentally *polarised*: what there is consists of entities (poles) with marked identities, of individual essences (natures) whose highest lawfulness is their most complete manifestation in concrete instances, and of particular individuals whose ultimate finality is the most perfect development of their intrinsic nature. Such stark *ontological individualism* was naturally correlated to an *ontological egoism* as general principle of activity in reality. Beings inherently crave for the fullest realisation of their individual nature, for maximal self-realisation. The individual's highest duty is to its most perfect fulfilment as the thing that it is, generically, specifically and particularly. Under these auspices of *sacred egoism*, the intercourse of individuals is necessarily *polarised*. Each being exercises its own activity in pursuance of *its own end (perfection)*; *the intercourse between beings is, consequently, a question of utility to each one's proper finality. The polarity in each intercourse is harmonious, complementary and conjugal if the corresponding utilities are co-ordinated.* The nexus of interrelationships is grounded on such coordination of mutual utilities, on the accurate balancing of what is offered and what received by both poles of the *do ut des* relationship. The sense of a *fine-tuning in the balance* necessary to keep the polarity of the interacting forces together in each case of intercourse was characteristic of the Greek experience of life and of the Greek world-view. It was elevated to the grand principle of Universal Cosmic *Harmony* pervading all reality. The balance was, furthermore, spontaneous; the harmony self-adjustable. *Natural adaptation* in the solitary actions of the individuals constituting the world-system reigned supreme. By the side of ontological individualism and ontological egoism, *ontological naturalism* secured the *objective* cooperation of different agents, differently constituted, differently motivated and acting differently. Ontological automation safeguarded the collective co-functioning of distinct and varied poles without their individual purposing it. *The courses of separate self-evolving individualities were made spontaneously to converge towards their*

natural integral without having to be re-directed. The world-system was in effect a cosmic whole without the endeavour of any or all of its parts to that effect. *Unity is never for the Greek mind a question of choice; it is a matter of necessity: what exists forms a natural whole* despite the fact that the individual free agent can never accept its conjugation to others as a primary priority of its existence [7a]. *Natural systems are self-regulatory. Integrations are always objective, never subjective affairs. Individuals are necessarily free. In fact, the more one interferes in the spontaneous fine-tunings and natural adaptations of a system, with a view to their improvement and towards the end of enhanced coordination among its members, the more the system's natural processes of integration are distorted, and the less, as a result, the system is unified.* The reason being that any subjective interference reduces the self-fulfilling dynamism of the individual members of the system in aggregation. For the optimal dynamic distribution of roles and functions in a system is the natural one. Furthermore, most patterns of interference aim or tend to diminish the role and function of those in particular best adapted to maximal self-fulfilment, an arrangement severely compromising the level of aggregate performance and the corresponding sum total of result in the system manipulated along such lines. Thirdly, systematic interference with the natural processes of self-regulation in a system, create endogenous instability, which is bound to erupt at the appropriate moment of time. Optimal regulation of a system is its natural self-regulation, i.e. total un-regulation with regard to arbitrary interference. *We can also derive from the ontological analysis, the general criterion of naturalness and arbitrariness: natural is the purposed maximal self-realisation of every individual member of the system; arbitrary is the inculcation in varying degrees to them of a collective ethos and the introduction in the system of institutionalised techniques aiming at the enforced inoculation into the individual make-up of the alien purpose of collectivity.*

What has been said finds its illuminating application in all departments of ancient Greek culture and all fields of that reality. For example, there has been clearly perceived in modern times how crucial

it is the problem concerning unity and multiplicity in ancient Greek experience and thought, the *One-and-Many fundamental puzzle of reality*. The solution in a nutshell was that there is cause for the objective convergence of subjectively divergent moments - understanding «subjective» in an ontological sense signifying the inner supreme law of every individual entity towards its own fullest development. The *fact* of the convergence and unification was evident to the Greek eye: reality *is* stable; it also allows for extreme self-realizations and supreme perfections. The firm belief was in a *natural order* regulating the functioning of any given system of reality, as well as of the ultimate cosmic system: reality as a whole, the World at large as the all-inclusive whole. The natural order emerges spontaneously through mutual adjustments of opposite, partial and temporary, disorders. The *polarity of being*, far from breaking up its existence, is the other side of the *harmony of being*, indeed the latter's very constitution. Opposition creates and sustains integration:

οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ συμφέρεται· παλίντονος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.

[«The many do not understand how what is being brought apart comes together with itself; (or: how being at variance it agrees with itself) there is a back-streched harmony like that of the bow and the lyre»].

In this Heracleitean formulation we find the classic expression of the idea that unity consists in the natural balance of the reaction between opposites [8]. Being is *dynamic*; existence thrives in opposition: it feeds itself on contrast. Within a thing and constitutive of it, between things, among the parts of the world, strife is the law of reality, resulting upon each individual entity's overwhelming determination to realise itself to the maximum potential of its nature. The universal antagonism of self-seeking individuals in collision courses is automatically sublated into unpurposed integrals of harmony. *Diverging, things converge*.

The ancient Greek felt, perceived and intellected the World as both an arena of opposition and a field of perfection. Things, internally and externally torn by strife, manifested (despite, and, then, because of, it)

existence's marvel of unity and glory of beauty. Ionian Philosophy deduced the unity of the World from the singleness of its principle: Monism was the cause of integralism. At the turn of the centuries, early in the fifth century B.C., Heracleitus proceeded further: opposition, not only comes from a unitary cause, not only is not inconsistent with unity, but constitutes it; strife yields harmonious wholeness and perfection [9]. *The intrinsic dynamism of being, and of its excellence, is proclaimed magisterially at the beginning of the age of Power for Greece.*

What happens in the universal system, the cosmic whole, is applicable necessarily to any system of reality whatsoever, for this has to be a subsystem of the absolute one. In particular, societal order reproduces the cosmic order [10]. Human association is an aggregation of self-seeking individuals, whose ultimate finality is each one's maximal realisation of the potentialities inherent in their natures under their individual constitutions. Thus, the projection of the cosmic order onto the societal level results, also, in the weighting of human membership according to individual merit (ability, excellence). Each entity expands, and has the right to expand, to the limits of its maximal self-realisation. But justice (i.e. conflict) sets the actual limits through the adjustments naturally reached by the simultaneous activity of all things towards their respective maximal manifestation. Thus the more capable individual in political associations has the right to exercise the deeper and broader influence as he actually does, and is bound to do, in fact. For this is what the law of justice will automatically enforce if the natural disposition of things prevails (i.e. if it is not interfered with) [11].

Strife and changeableness in the World were early conceived as multiple contrast of opposites. The *combative* character of the Greek experience of life, joined to its fierce *individualism*, readily expressed itself in a world picture where change issues from a ceaseless ongoing series of *duels* between couples or contestants. Existence is *polarised*, and herein consists the inherent dynamism of being. Viewing cosmic processes as the result of tension between various pairs of opposites led to the Pythagorean Dualism. Cosmic polarities are ultimately reduced

into some few cardinal ones, out of which all the vast field of multifarious opposition is constituted. Originally, such Dualism had a religious undertone and a logicomythical foundation, being expressed in terms of symbolic thought of high condensation and comprehension [12]. When, however, being itself emerged as the very tensionality of opposition, its constitution could not but be a certain relationship between the opposites. Two correlated factors, one speculative, the other experimental, pushed in the direction of the well-known «mathematization» of Pythagoreanism [13]. On the abstract level, all opposition was revealed as contrast between Limit and Limitlessness: on the one side of every polarity there is some definite determination, while on the other an open possibility of determination. The antithesis is between definiteness and variableness (possibility of diverse formation), as between the straight line and the curvilinear. Such construal of the nature of existence by itself underscores the doctrine of its mathematical constitution. On the most general level, the limitation of limitlessness is a *number*. Relationships between the fundamental polar opposites, or, in other words, various determinations of the indefinite, are *numbers*. Parallel to this philosophical insight, and in application of it, the concrete development of a corresponding musical theory based on a system of definite numerical ratios between opposing factors, impressively confirmed the general idea [14].

The Heracleitean dynamism of being construed, in Pythagorean fashion, as the tensionality of polarity underlying the existence of every stable formation in the real world [15], led to the idea of a certain proportionality in the mixture of elements (contrarieties of distinguishability) as determinative of the essential character of things [16]. *Reality emerges as a system of proportions (ratios)*, and *number* becomes the definitive and defining factor of beingness [17]. The comprehensibility and intelligibility of reality is tantamount to its numerical determination [18].

What was conceived to obtain universally in reality, and what was discovered to operate constitutively in music, was further sought and found as a guiding, effective, principle in all systematic endeavour and

productive activity of man. Successful human agency is a matter of *expertise*. In the handling of affairs and in the treatment of materials, in coping with situations and in meeting needs, in reasoning and persuasion, performing well means possessing a corresponding *art*. As in magic so in science: *knowledge is potent* - one can *effect* things by it. This is the case even with morality (and politics): Virtue is at bottom cognitive, it amounts to knowing how to behave and act effectively and successfully in the various categories of encounter [19]. As with what one man *does*, so with what he *makes*: there is an «*art*» behind all kinds of human workmanship and service. Every craft consists in a knowledge of how to achieve a given (type of) result [20].

True knowledge is always active and functional. The emphasis on it at the great age of Greece went hand in hand with the proof of its significance: by means of it the various occupations were becoming real *arts*. One succeeded in his business not merely as a result of long experience, some innate, acquired or trained dexterity or just good luck and a happy turn of hand, not, least, haphazardly or occasionally - but because he had penetrated into the nature of his object generally as well as, consequently, in the specific case before him. *Knowledge secured repeatable, systematic success*.

This “cognitivation” of ability and dexterity, led also, naturally, to the formation of several, separate, well-defined arts. Artisanry became artistry, i.e. knowledge-how to effect results, which involves applied knowledge-that, or rather what I have called *pragmatic knowledge*. Medicine, for instance, evolved as a distinct department of science and “technology” precisely in the vibrant fifth century [20a].

Since the structure of reality is polarised and its dynamics contrarial (as construed in the Pythagorean - Heracleitean tradition [21]), knowledge has to do with balances, symmetries and oppositional equilibria: it is always in the last resort an insight and an understanding of right mixture between constituent contraries. Thus every art (just as every science) is *mathematical* in character. This applies, e.g., to the art of statuary [22], as well as to oratory, the art of effective speech and forceful persuasion [23].

The key had been found to capture the pulsating rhythm of reality. Heraclitus proclaimed that the cosmic order is uncreated and eternal, «fire ever-living, kindled in measures and going out in measures» [24]. This order consisting in the measured progression of ultimate reality is the very Logos of being, its intrinsic law of existence. It is the pattern of connectedness and cohesion in things, their objective rhythm. The rhythm in the development of the world-substance produces the diversified patterns in the form of reality, the spatial and temporal rhythms of existence. Λόγος, as thought and expression, is anchored in the realm of being, coincides somehow in its authenticity with the principle of reality. Reason, and the reason of being and becoming, are two aspects of the same order.

The key to reality is knowledge of the right measure, number, proportion and this precisely because the constitution of being is mathematical. Reason is quintessentially *ratio*. Being and excellence of being consist in a proper measure and proportion in the mixture of opposites, or, to say the same thing in a different way, they consist in the optimal determination of a continuum of indefiniteness. Such optimal determination, or right measure and proportion, makes everything a question of high resonance. The existence, nature and perfection of things, of states, of conditions, of actions and productions, of all reality generically and specifically and individually taken - all depends on fine adjustment in a field of variation, in an appropriate coordination of contraries. So that *success* (in every sense and application of the word) as a function of «frequency» may be represented in the following schema (Fig. 1).

The category of success is meant here very abstractly as whatever has to a high degree identity, stability and power. So that, on the ontological plane it is well-defined being; in the axiological dimension it is excellence, perfection, worth, merit; in doing and making it has its proper and strict significance. Under the same heading falls the idea of *καίρος*, of the right timing, of the ripe moment, whether in natural processes or human activity.

Reality is constituted mathematically. And since «number» and measure gives determination to being, it gives intelligibility and knowl-




Fig. 1

edgeability to things. Knowledge of the right «number» unlocks the secret of existence, it penetrates to the very essence of reality. This means *power*. From magic to science, to know is to be in a position to effect results. Understanding the inner nexus of existence makes possible the formation of predictions as to the course of (future) events, accurate within the limits of the knowledge achieved. One can thus *maximise the returns* on his engagement with man and the world by acting correctly. Appropriate activity, enlightened and guided by knowledge of the past, present and future, ensures *maximal benefits*. Knowing the reality of things and their nature entails knowing what to do and what to make, how to act and how to construct, entails, in short, the way man creates his cultural edifice, his spiritual, intellectual and material universe. *Right conduct (systematic and coherent) is primarily a cognitive achievement*. Moral and political rectitude, no less than social justice and economic efficiency, just as expertise, artistry and science, consist in knowledge, and knowledge of facts - facts more basic and causal or more apparent and effectuated [25]. Values are just facts of a certain kind, such as pertain to *peaks of existence, perfections of being, intensifications of reality* [26]. It all

amounts to the most thorough formulation of the *Principle of Rationality* in all human action - and not merely in its application to economic activity. Every question regarding choice of action asks for a «*technological*», or «*technocratic*», answer: how to maximise returns (benefit) through human endeavour, given a certain set of «assets» (raw materials, means of production, level of command of goods and services, expertise) [27].

Rationality (and rationality *measurable, mathematical*, of choices *weighted* according to the nature of things) is the rudder for the direction of human action, just as it is (as principle of exquisite balance and correct proportionality, of hidden harmony) the key to understanding reality, and just because it constitutes the inner form and structure of existence.

Rationality is man's ultimate instrument and weapon; it is the fundamental source of human power. Rationality theoretical and practical knowledge of how things are and how do they evolve on the one hand, and knowledge of what to do, when and how, on the other, are the two sides of one and the same wisdom. To comprehend reality means to recognise a meaningful picture in the complex pattern of the apparently disorderly appearances. The World, for the ancient Greek mind, is not a continuous fluctuation of indefiniteness, but the orderly display of determinate dynamism. Reality is the total field compounded out of numerous fields consisting in the activity of focuses of power representing specific essences and individual natures. Seeming disorder is at bottom complicated rhythm, precise and vibrant all the same. Disharmony on the level of phenomena hides underlying multiple harmony. Outward imbalance is but intricate symmetry, in nature and art alike. The proper superposition of manifold rhythms creates an intricate pattern which may appear superficially as jarring disarray. To know is to see through this pattern, the complex «number» of things. By knowing the «numerical» identity of things interrelated, one penetrates into the weaving of history, the correlated web of their development: for change results upon the coimplication of many fields of power, each affecting all others. Thus the «numbers» and rhythms of processes of change are revealed. We

unravel the «mathematical logic» of things and flows. Then, one can chart one's course through them in life with maximal profitability, ie. with optimal self-realisation. Prudence is a corollary of knowledge — wisdom applied.

Reason and knowledge is power. The Heracleitean λόγος expresses on the ontological level the inner rhythm of reality, its measured nature, the law and pattern of existence. It is the power that moulds everything. It is, also, the power to comprehend everything: for to understand is somehow to identify with the essential core of the reality examined [28]. Λόγος for Gorgias, also, as thought - sequence and its expression, both inseparably bound together, is most potent, in its capacity of imposition upon men, as the analytical, argumentative and oratorical instrument of persuasion [29]. In fact, there was a strong tendency to subsume all fundamental cognitive expertises under a single heading, that of reasoned wisdom, in short of Reason as word - and thought - sequence unravelling the secret of reality. To know the truth of reality means pragmatically to be able to teach about the origin and nature of things, also to possess the arts of speech as well as the technique of debate, to be capable of delivering judgement as well as of exercising leadership in deliberations concerning mighty matters of state, finally to act correctly (i.e. effectively and successfully) in every encounter and under any conditions regular or extraordinary [30].

Knowledge as a reasoned representation of reality disclosing the essence of things, their *reason of being*, is the universal key to the world, and all situations within it, in which man finds himself involved. A key of understanding which is, therefore, the instrument of optimal response based on (relatively) accurate penetration into the secrets of the past and present, as well as on (relatively) safe prediction with regard to the hidden courses of the future. Knowledge is also the key to achievement and success, in making as well as in doing. It enables man to optimally cater for his needs, by the artful production of commodities and the expert offer of services apt to satisfy them. *Λόγος, reason is, thus, power.*

In the surging, upbeat philosophical tradition of the 5th century, namely the Sophistical movement, there is sharp emphasis on the supreme potency of reason. Protagoras' main work, for example, was known and referred to, by a string of titles which manifest that basic insight on the instrumentality, power and efficacy of knowledge. The names were: (1) *Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος* (*Concerning being or On what there is*); (2) *Μέγας Λόγος* (*the Great Discourse, the Mighty Reason*); (3) *Ἀλήθεια* (*Truth*); and (4) *Καταβάλλοντες* (*the Overthrowers, or Overthrowing (arguments)*) [31]. There is an inner logic binding together these variant titles. *Truth* is the very manifestation of reality, the revelation of *being* as rationality. Reason is cosmic order and principle of thought (as coherent representation of reality identifying with the objective structure) and word. The *Great Reason - Word* discloses the truth of things. And this grand revealer *overthrows* all false opinion expressed in reasons-words (or arguments) of inferior dynamism. *In principium erat Verbum, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, indeed.*

In the age of high classicism *power is the chief preoccupation* in man's mind and this applies equally to the intellectual (including the moral) realm. *The truer view and argument is the more powerful one: truth (and not only right) is might.* The Overthrowers (reasons overwhelming) establish the truth of reality. Being itself is highly tensional. The fierce antagonism of existence is naturally reproduced in the quest for truth: it is a question of settling who the *conqueror* is in the field of battling reasons, arguments, disquisitions, orations. In this arena, the winner *substantiates truth* [32]. The strongest, in principle, is the best. Nothing is more indicative of such a basic *power-oriented* attitude of the Greek way of thought and life than the grammatical fact that *ἄριστος* (*best*) and *κράτιστος* (*mightiest*) are both superlatives of *good* (*ἀγαθός*), an adjective meaning a character concretely useful, beneficial. Excellence combines the notions of superlative quality and efficacious strength: it is difficult to differentiate simply the two in the Greek language, so deeply rooted is the experience of the functionality of perfection. There is a fundamental *pragmatism* in the classical mentality.

The preoccupation with power and its functionality in achieving results and securing success, common to the intellectual atmosphere of the fifth century, led the Sophists occasionally to extreme formulations, which have to be properly understood in order to be correctly appreciated in their energetic fullness of meaning. One such climactic thesis was the doctrine *that right consists in the interest of the mightier party* [33]. Another consisted in the famous war-cry and promotion-formula for their trade, *that the true art of discourse (reasoning) can make the weaker position stronger*: τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν [34]. Such provocative statements were really banners meant on the one hand to emphasise the *legitimacy of power* in claiming the jurisdiction *naturally* belonging to it, and on the other to rally the widest possible interest in the value and efficacy of the artful wisdom (ἐντεχνος σοφία) proclaimed as teachable by the new spiritual movement [35]. Since everything - from skillful production to moral goodness, and from adequate understanding to political prudence up to religious correctness - is a question of cognitive excellence, then the grand art of life consists in knowledge that can be learnt in principle by every individual, given an environment of appropriate opportunities. One can thus duly appreciate the importance and relevance of two central questions in the Socratic critique of the «New Reason», namely those concerning the unity of the art of life and its teachability [36].

To interpret stimulating, even if excessive, formulations like the two above-mentioned as entailing some fundamental form of intellectual (and, hence, moral and political) *relativism* in the dominant high-classical spiritual and cultural movement, is a common enough error modern interpreters often commit. The fact that there are opposing arguments and theses does not mean by itself that there is no graduated approximation to the truth of reality, not even that there is no absolute (scientific) knowledge of the world. Indeed, there is necessarily absolute knowledge if reality has a determinate nature and structure. The rationality of existence anchors objectively the existence of subjective rationality, and thus safeguards *at the limit* the conformation of the absolute order of things in the

reason of thought. In the process of discovering the real order, human mind acquires knowledge of reality *relative to its own condition* (individual or collective character, age and place); but such relative knowledge is really *partial knowledge of the objective situation*. *man's complete (at any point) conditional knowledge of things is partially unconditional knowledge*. And it is in this spirit, as was well appreciated in antiquity, that we should understand the Protagorean subjectivism and relativism, encapsulated in his famous *homo-mensura* dictum: man is the measure of all things, of what is with regard to what it is, and of what it is not, with regard to what it is not [37].

The significance and overwhelming emphasis on knowledge (wisdom and art) as the veritable matrix of power in human affairs is inherent and congenial to the ancient Greek mind. *The ancient Greek always behaved on the implicit conviction that knowledge, «technological» expertise, «artistic» capability and craftsmanship, rational innovation, is the real motor of history* [38]. It is the domineering awareness of that importance which erupted, (with some concomitant, understandable and justifiable violence) in the spirit of high classicism. The phenomenon was not restricted to the intellectual milieu of the new philosophy (Sophistics), but extended over the entire cultural and historical area. Pindar the poet adopts the contestive and polemical metaphor of argumentative fights won by the superior, conquering discourse (*ὁ κρατιστεύων λόγος*) [39].

Consistent with the general cognitivism (better than intellectualism) of the Greek world- and life-experience, knowledge and rationality was identified as the fundamental source of power [40]. Power, quite generally, was apprehended as the pivot of existence. Power, implies strength and force, hence, also, *violence*. There is a certain violence manifested always where power exists and exercises itself. Since reality is polarised, and all being and life is a battling ring as in an athletic contest, there is victory and defeat in all circumstances cosmic and human. The conqueror exercises violence on the vanquished, be it in war, in games, in power-politics, or in disputations and controversies. *Λόγος* itself is meant to be a winner

and master. *There is violence in rationality*, in every harmonious order that subdues the indeterminacy of unformed subsistence. *Reality is in a permanent state of war*, according to Heracleitus, generalising from, and broadening, the common notion of military engagement.

The association of power, lawfulness or coherent order and force (violence) was felt and acknowledged in the Golden Age of Greece. At the inception of the classical Epoch, Pindar proclaimed it in magisterial strains:

Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων
ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτῃ χειρί.

[«(Cosmic) Law, the Lord of All,
mortals and immortals alike,
carrieth everything with a high hand, justifying the extreme
of (force and) violence»] [41].

The philosophical counterpart, and probable archetype, of this insight is found precisely in the sharpest statement of the Principle of Power at the very inauguration of the Age of Power for Classical Greece. The common law of all existence, proclaimed Heracleitus in oracular and prophetic tones, is the rationality of being, Reason as law of harmonious order. Following this universal law constitutes the essence of empowerment; for it rules everything, so far as it wishes to go according to its own lawfulness, with undiminished and unexpendable might:

Ἐν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁ κόσμος ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται <πάντων>.

[«Speaking with sense (lit. with mind), we should strengthen ourselves with that which is common to all (i.e. reason), as a polity (lit. a city, sc. a State, a political society) gets strengthened with the law, and much more forcibly. For all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it holds sway to the extent that it will and is sufficient for all and prevails over all»] [42].

The intensely dynamic experience of the (high classical) age will also explain the appropriation of *κρατεῖν* (excell, hold sway, prevail over, rule) by the philosophical thinking of the time as a principal, significant and frequent technical term. Starting with the «mixed» speculations of the sixth century, esp. of Orphic origin [43], the idea of power and forceful dominion as essential characteristic of the cosmic principles of reality took animated hold of the philosophical thought, and with Heracleitus [44] entered its mainstream developments: the orphic-pythagorean eclectic Empedocles [45]; the Eleatic Melissus [46]; the new Ionian School, Anaxagoras, Diogenes from Apollonia, Archelaus, the Commentator of the Derveni Papyrus [47]; all testify to the captivating prominence of that experience and idea. And similarly in fifth century Medicine: there is significantly frequent and revealing use, as explanatory tool, in the Hippocratic Collection, of the notions of *prevailing* (*ἐπικρατεῖν*) and *mastery* (*δυναστεύειν*). More than that: a character of existence (an essence, quality or whatever determination of being defining a distinct identity) is taken to consist in the potency of self-affirmation, in the power to show itself up in reality and make a well-defining difference in the world by the fact of its own dynamic existence [48].

Existence is power. Quality (determination) of being is specific power. Value is intensity of power. Perfection, excellence is optimal power, maximal functionality and efficiency. It is thus in the nature of reality that power holds sway. Moreover, at the core of power there lies rationality, intelligent order. This is why justice confirms the prerogatives of power; why Pindar glorified force. Strength is blameless. Might is right. What conduces to the efficacious exercise of power is good (i.e. beneficial) to the power, but it is also good to the weaker parties, whose unjust elevation to positions of leadership would be detrimental first and foremost to themselves, then to the entire system affected by that mishap. A reversal of the natural order of subordination creates by itself an inherent instability [49].

Everything is reduced to the power-dynamics. There is even the violence of reason. Persuasion itself consists in the mind being

compelled to see things and act in a way induced by a discourse or argument of superior force [50].

Amidst such universal prevalence of the power-dynamics in classical culture, it is only natural that a preeminent position would be held by power-politics proper, especially in the field of international relations. Questions of balance of power, spheres of interest economic, political and military, alliances and hegemonism, among others, were clearly posed and articulately answered, both in the practical and in the theoretical areas. The contemporary reality provided ample field for such elaborate positions. Obvious major examples are respectively: the equilibrium between Greek and Persian Power or between Athens and Sparta; the division of dominant trade and influence in a western Corinthian and an eastern Athenian parts; the bipolarisation of the Greek World in the Athenian and Spartan Leagues; the well-conceived, but midway faulted and finally failed, bid for hegemony by the Athenian democracy. In such fertile ground there thrived the formation of Strategic Doctrines in the foreign policy of the main players, as well as of Strategic Concepts expressing converging vital interests of States entering into strong alliances under the determinative leadership of one Great Power. The fascination with power manifest in the cultural milieu of the age, both projected the general reality of fierce antagonism then in place and guided its analytical understanding. Significant events of the far past, even those embedded and preserved in the world of myth and poetry, were treated retrospectively in accordance with the prevailing norms of realism. The War of Troy itself was interpreted in expressly geopolitical terms: the position and domineering attitude of Troy in northwestern Anatolia, by controlling the ever important Straits, as an outpost of the great "Assyrian" Empire, threatened security, stability and growth in the region of the western Aegean. In consequence of this, the Achaean Greeks (themselves following, as we know, an expansionary strategy in pursuit and support of their active international trading politics and commercial interests), declared war on Troy which resulted in the downfall of the State of Ilium [51].

But the fifth century presented the best example of power politics in action, and also a truly classical piece of corresponding strategic analysis. Athens embarked during its course into a bid for hegemony unique in that it satisfied all at the same time conditions (a) of an unprecedented intensity in economic activity, (b) in an environment of unsurpassed economic freedom, (c) with the ideology of uncompromising competitiveness (*the agonistic ideal of life*) (d) under the political framework of extreme democracy, and (e) with the strong arm of overwhelming (esp. naval) military might, which sustained an integrative process over the entire Aegean sea area directed by the values (economic and cultural) of the Athenian success. Thucydides offers a penetrating history, and a masterful analysis, of the power-political field in the age of high classicism, focusing on the dynamics of the Athenian Imperium [52]. The Athenian bid for hegemony and a unipolar order failed basically because of a pacifist, consensual and compromising change of policy midway towards its securely successful outcome, a change which was again reversed when it was already too late [53]. But, nevertheless, Athenian hegemonism ushered, supported and expressed an age characterized by an unparalleled level of cultural achievement and an exceptional degree of economic performance. The closely knit nexus of the various power-capabilities which constitute the dynamic potential of a thing's being and the actual difference that its existence makes to the world, the entity's *seal of identity*, was symbolised in the exemplary Athenian case by the *goddess Athena*, divine principle of wisdom and practical efficacy, of spiritual as well as military prowess, of intellectual grasping and immediate result, of arts creative and arts productive, all at once according to their inner law of affinity [54]. The drive to extremes of human activity, and the vibrant spirit of proud power sure of success, was represented in the Victories (Athena's deified attribute of necessary achievement accompanying the might of wisdom) which a self-conscious State devoted to its civil Goddess as thanksgiving for its triumphs [55].

NOTES

- [1] Eminent artists did get high prices for their works. Pheidias was a conspicuous example. He did not avoid the accusation, and condemnation on charges, of embezzlement with regard to the creation of one of his masterpieces, the chryselephantine statue of Minerva in Athens; but this probably had more to do with party-politics given his intimate connection to Pericles, then starting to fall in disfavour with the people, and with the fact that he was for too long artist-in-chief for the entire programme of the Acropolis-development (building and decoration). Plato refers to Pheidias as a foil in order to give an idea of how his artistic earnings compared to those of the great Sophist Protagoras, an intellectual and educator; *Meno*, 91d: οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἓνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἡργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν [«for I know one man, Protagoras, having made more money from this wisdom (namely Sophistics) than Pheidias, who so conspicuously has produced beautiful works of art, and ten other sculptors»].

Poetic works were in the 5th century composed upon commission, and sold for money. Pindar himself contrasts, in the beginning of his second Isthmian Ode, the former times, when poets offered their effusions to their loved ones, to the practice of his contemporaries, when the Muse is fond of gain and actually hired (*Isthmia*, II, 1-11); v. esp. 6-8:

ἃ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδὴς πως τότε ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις·
οὐδ' ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖαι μελιθόγγου ποτὲ Τερψιχόρας
ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι αἰοδαί.

[«For, in those days, the Muse was not fond of gain, no,
nor yet a hireling;

οὐ γὰρ ἐργάτιν τρέφω
τὴν Μοῦσαν, ὡς ὁ Κεῖος Ὑλίου νέπους.

[«...for I do not nourish a hireling Muse,
as the Cean descendant of Hylichus (sc. Simonides)»].

Callimachus could well appear condescending to the poetic market: he was a royal pensioner in the Ptolemaic Court. For Simonides' hire cf. the (probably pseudo-Platonic) *Hipparchus*, 228c. He received payment for his compositions as a matter of course. In a story reported by Cicero (*De Oratore*, II, 86 §352), he had been asked by Scopas, a man of rank and fortune in the Thessalian Crannon, to recite a poem in his honour; when Simonides incorporated in that eulogy (by way of embellishment in the manner of the ancient poets) many particulars concerning the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux, Scopas told him that he would pay half the sum which he had agreed to give for the poem, and, should the poet wish, he might well ask the remainder from the Dioscure, whom he had equally praised. His avarice in the exercise of his art was proverbial. Aristophanes lampoons Sophocles for some gain-loving act of his old age by saying that he became Simonides (*Peace*, 697-9). Simonides himself had the wit to mock himself for his weakness: he was fond of saying that senility having deprived him from all other pleasures, good that there was left one to cherish him in the old age - avarice; v. Plutarch, *An seni respublica gerenda sit*, 786B (to which anecdote Thucydides seems to be referring in II, 44, 4). The association of old age with the desire to accumulate wealth is repeated by Terence, *Adelphi*, 834-5. It is castigated by Cicero, *de Senectute*, XVIII, §§65-6. The contemporary (slightly older) philosopher Xenophanes (c. 570 - c. 475 B.C.) satirised his passion for money, calling him κίμβιξ (niggard, skinflint); 21B21 DK. On this quality of his, Chamaeleon's work on Simonides seems to have expatiated; cf. Athenaeus 656c-e: examples are given of what was considered as base covetousness: he was traduced as niggard and sordidly greedy of gain. Stories were circulating highlighting his excessive love of money. To the question whether he deemed better for someone to become rich or wise, he answered «rich»; for, he added, he noticed that the wise attend to the wealthy men's doors, not the other way round; Aristotle, *Rhetorics*, B, 1391a8-12. In the Socratic tradition an explanation was given of this untoward - from the point of view of the philosophers - fact: the Socratic Aristippus maintained that it was so because the wise men know what they wanted, whereas the rich did not; Diogenes Laertius, II §69. Plato indignantly denied the truth of the statement, in *the natural order of*

things (*Republic*, ΣΤ, 489b). - Another characteristic story was that when Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, won the mule race in the Olympic Games, he asked Semonides to celebrate the victory with an ode specially composed for the event, as it was customary; but the poet, being dissatisfied with the payment offered by the tyrant for his production, replied that it was unfit to his genius to write poems for mules; when however the tyrant raised the amount of the remuneration, Simonides wrote the ode without mentioning the mules but calling them in a grandiose style (Simonides fr. 10 = 515 Page):

Χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θυγατρὲς ἵππων

[«Hail you daughters of storm-footed horses»]

(Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Γ, 1405b23-28; *Scholia ad loc.*, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* XXI 2 p. 174.4 Rabe; Heracleides Ponticus, *Politeiae*, 25, FHG, II, 219). - In a third and revealing anecdote, Simonides is reported to have been asked by someone to sing his praise in a laudatory ode, saying that he would be grateful; but he did not mention a payment for the work; whereupon Simonides informed him that he possessed two chests, one of favours, the other of money; when he needs something, he opens the former and finds it empty; useful is only the latter (Stobaeus, *Florilegium*, 10, 39; in a mutilated form, also *Scholia* in Aristophanes, *Pax*, 697).

In the 5th century, the poet selling his compositions was as common and normal, as the philosopher (the Sophist) receiving payment for his intellectual services. *The era of the market for the spiritual goods had arrived for good.* The poet in the business of marketing his own productions is caricatured by Aristophanes, *Birds*, 903-59; Aristophanes unleashes in his *Clouds* a vitriolic attack on the new intellectual order, wholesale. He was a populist reactionary. His violent criticisms testify to the fact that the new order had been established for good.

- [1a] Physicians salaried for instruction must have been a commonplace; v. Plato, *Protagoras*, 311b. Medicinal treatment was naturally paid for quite early, as the exercise of any other art and craft. The recompence was, in cases of eminent merit, quite handsome, as is shown by the story of Democedes from Croton in Herodotus III, 126-132. Quite apart from the astronomical munificence of the Great King, Democedes was appointed public doctor in Aegina for one talent per year, then in Athens with an annual salary of 1 2/3 talents, and the next year in Samos for two talents (*ibid.* §131). Taking the talent of 6,000 attic drachmae, the

recompense involved for his services is enormous: between \$300,000 and \$600,000 per annum.

Considerable remuneration attended instruction on the Homeric poems; teachers *ex professo* for this discipline were the Homerists, rhapsodes who recited the epics on pay; v. Xenophon, *Symposium* III, 6.

Herodotus is reported to have been recompensed for his public reading of his *Histories* in Athens, with the enormous sum of ten talents (Plutarch, *de Herodoti Malignitate*, 26).

The general expression for such sale of superior knowledge (beyond that of the various artisanship and craftsmanship) was ἐργάζομαι ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας ("earn money by exercising wisdom, by working from wisdom"); Plato, *Hippias Major*, 282d. The reference is to the Sophists, as *professors of wisdom par excellence*.

- [2] In the Socratic tradition, especially by Plato, this feature of Sophistics was raised to a crucial issue. Thus Plato, in his famous «hunting» of the Sophist, begins with five successive preliminary definitions, in all but the last of which the entrepreneurial attitude is central. *Sophist*, 231d: ...Δοκῶ μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἡνέρεθι νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής... Τὸ γὰρ δεύτερον ἔμπορος τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα... Τρίτον δὲ ἄρα οὐ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη; Ναὶ. καὶ τέταρτον γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν <ῆν>. ["For I reckon, in the first place, that he (sc. the Sophist) has been found a *paid* hunter of the young and wealthy ... And, secondly, some *merchant* (trading abroad) of spiritual goods (of knowledge in human soul) ... And, on a third count, did he not emerge as a *retail-trader* (in the internal market) of the same things (sciences)? Indeed, and, fourthly, he was to us a *vendor of his own productions* regarding the sciences"]. As a fifth definition it is offered the wealth-getting function of the art of eristic disputation (or verbal wrangling); *ibid.* 225e: ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον [«making money from private contentions»]. The Sophist is now a *mercenary eristic disputator*. For the first definition see its full formulation in 223a-b. For the following three, see, correspondingly, 224c-d; 224d; 224d-e. It is interesting to observe the successive conceptual divisions by which Plato arrives at the second definition; the full schema runs thus (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2

To this last mentioned trade of spiritual goods belongs, Socrates is made to maintain, Sophistics (*ibid.* 223b-d). Alternatively, in the third and fourth definitions, Sophistics is allocated to the τέχνη καπηλική and τέχνη αὐτοπωλική, respectively. It all depends on whether the spiritual utilities traded by the Sophist are exclusively his own production, or wares bought and sold in the internal or external market of arts and expertises. The view is recapitulated in *Protagoras*, 313c: Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὧν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται [«And thus, oh Hippocrates, the Sophist turns to be a commercialist or a retail-trader in such wares, as they provide nourishment to the soul»]. These wares are the arts and sciences (τὰ μαθήματα, the various disciplines; *ibid.*). There follows a long-drawn analogy between nourishment for the soul and nourishment for the body, whose upshot is that just as the trader in the latter kind of commodities sells his wares to anybody that is in demand of them irrespective of the state and condition in which the buyer is found, and, therefore, irrespective of whether, and to what degree, he will benefit from them or will get harmed - so the trader in spiritual wares (the Sophist) supplies his goods (his knowledge) inattentive to the appropriateness and adequacy or otherwise of the receiver, and hence indifferent to their beneficial or harmful effect on him (*ibid.* 313d-314c).

The classificatory division-schema underlying the fifth definition is the following (sc. C. Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon*, 1910, table opposite p. 1) (Fig. 3). (V. Plato, *Sophistes*, 225a-226a).

In Plato's Socratic dialogues the payment of the Sophists in exchange for their teaching is nearly a war-cry. Cf. *Laches*, 186c; *Apologia*, 19e-20c; *Protagoras*, 311b-e; 328b; 349a; *Meno*, 91b; *Gorgias*, 519c; 520c; *Cratylus*, 384b-c; 391b-c; *Theaetetus*, 167c-d; *Republic*, 337d; 493a; *Sophist*, 223a; 233b; *Alcibiades I*, 119a. No doubt the point goes back to Socrates himself, who exploited it to differentiate himself from the great Sophistic movement, to which (as Aristophanes in his *Clouds* perceptively proclaims) he naturally belonged. Socrates insisted on another main point of difference: to the learned condensation of the Sophists, armed as they were with amazing virtual omniscience, he opposed his permanently searching attitude, (often exaggerated for the sake of argument, if not of truth, to his meek confession of a self-avowed ignorance) and the irony that went with it (it should be kept in mind that εἰρωνεία in ancient Greek meant understatement, purposeful diminution of status in one's statements). Both points were elaborated and articulated by Plato within




Fig. 3

the framework of his philosophy; see, preeminently, the progress of the argument in his *Sophist*, after the preliminary discussion and the five provisional definitions of the hunted «beast of prey»: 232a sqq., interrupted (in 237a) by the philosophical discussion on the reality of non-being, and taken over again, after the resolution of the Eleatic knot regarding $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, in 264b sqq. to the end of the dialogue, where the final definition is proposed (268c-d); it bears on the ability of the Sophist to create impressions of being instead of its true representation, to concoct phantasms, and play upon human credulity to them, instead of giving the rational structure of reality. Socrates, we know from Xenophon, had argued that *the most expedient way to create impressions (to appear so-and-so) is to create realities (to really be so-and-so)*.

This, however, is Platonic interpretation. The fact of the matter is that the Sophists took money (and often extraordinary amounts of money) for their instruction, for the transmission of the knowledge which they claimed to possess and which people (including the best) accepted that the Sophists possessed.

The Platonic combination of the two characteristic traits to define Sophistics (namely, that it constitutes apparent wisdom only and that it is mercurial) is repeated by Aristotle; *Sophistici Elenchi* 165a21: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινόμενη σοφία οὐσα δ' οὐ, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινόμενης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης [«for the Sophistics is seeming wisdom, but not real; and the Sophist is one whose profession is money-getting from seeming, but not real, wisdom»]. Aristotle however is nowhere concerned to lay much stress on the point.

In the little tract *On Chase*, whose transmitted ascription to Xenophon is dubious, there appears at its end (first part of Chapter XIII) an attack on Sophistics, which is entirely out of context, and cannot stem from Xenophon for a variety of reasons. The conclusion of the offensive piece has thus (*Cynegeticus*, 13, 8-9): οἱ σοφισταὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξαπατᾶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει καὶ οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἐκάστῳ σοφιστικὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἔστιν ὄνειδος παρά γε εὖ φρονούσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίους καὶ νέους θηρῶνται, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι· τύχας δὲ ἀνδρῶν οὔτε τιμῶσιν οὔτε ἀτιμάζουσιν. [«Now the Sophists speak in order to deceive and produce their works for their own gain, while they benefit nobody in nothing; for no one from them has become wise nor is there

anyone among them wise - in fact it is enough for each one of them to be called a sophist, something that is a reproach for those that are in their right wits. So that I advise to be on guard against the precepts of the Sophists, whereas not to disrespect the reasonings of the Philosophers. For the Sophists hunt the young and the wealthy, while the Philosophers offer themselves to all in common as friends, without either honouring or disesteeming their material fortunes»]. The style is unXenophontean (indeed rhetorical) and the ideas rigid. The time must be supposed to be that of the high tide of Sophistics: for the Sophists we are told crave to be just called by this honourific name - the profession therefore must have been met with wide acceptance in the public at large. The «men in their wits», consequently, must have been few. The passage, on the whole, could be from such a figure as Aeschines the Socratic - provided we allow at the time (so early) for the sharply defined contrast between the terms Sophistics and Philosophy. For a parallel, both really oratorical and latter, v. Isocrates 15, 235.

The common opinion, of course, found nothing strange or reprehensible in the *sale of knowledge*. After all, there was consubstantial continuity for the classical mind from constructive (productive or effective) know-how (arts and crafts) to theoretical knowledge-that (science and philosophy). Philostratus expresses the common view, supplying as well one major reason for it: one appreciates more highly what is not freely available; *Vitae Sophistarum*, I, 10, 4 (= 80A2 §4 DK): τὸ δὲ μισθοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πρῶτος εὗρε, πρῶτος δὲ παρέδωκεν Ἕλλησι, πρᾶγμα οὐ μεμπτόν· ἃ γὰρ σὺν δαπάνῃ σπουδάζομεν, μᾶλλον ἀσπαζόμεθα τῶν προίκα [“and he (sc. Protagoras) was the first to conceive holding discourses for pay - and he was the first to introduce this practice among the Greeks, something not blameworthy. For we cling fondly to those things that we study at a cost, rather than to those that we get freely”].

- [3] Protagoras, the eldest Sophist, defined thus himself his task as a teacher (Plato, *Protagoras*, 318e): τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν [«and, in fact, the lesson (that I teach) is soundness of judgement with regard to things that are one's own, how, that is, one may optimally manage his household; and, also, (soundness of judgement) with regard to questions of public interest, how, that is, one may be most powerful to

handle in speech and deed State affairs»]. Notice that Pericles is characterised by Thucydides in precisely the terms of the last clause concerning political expertise (I, 139): ἀνὴρ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος [«a man (sc. Pericles) who was in that time foremost among Athenians in the power of word and action»]. Thucydides repeats also the formula regarding the effective care of things private (of the household) and public (political); (II, 40, 2): ἔτι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς (sc. ἡμῖν) οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια. When Socrates is made (in the Platonic dialogue that carries the great Sophist's name as title) to ask (319a): ἄρ', ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας [«Am I, I then responded, following your meaning? For you seem to me to refer to the political art, and to undertake (through your instruction) to form men into good citizens»], he receives the answer (*ibid.*): Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ὃ ἐπαγγέλομαι [«Well then, this is precisely, he said, oh Socrates, the profession which I profess»]. Similarly is the sophistic activity (and especially Gorgias') characterised in *Gorgias*, 520e and in *Meno*, 91a. Such was the high educative role which Protagoras proudly proclaimed for himself (Plato, *Protagoras*, 317b): ὁμολογῶ σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους [«I confess that I am a sophist, and that I educate men»]. And so Socrates, in the same dialogue, describes Protagoras' claims (348e-349a): σὺ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας, σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδείσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνησθαι [«while you by open proclamation to all Greeks drew attention to yourself, self-styled a sophist, thereby declaring yourself a teacher of learning and excellence, the first indeed to claim fees for that»]. According to Xenophon this was the aspiration of the Socratic discipline as well: Socrates endeavoured to instigate in his companions the desire for the «most beautiful and magnificent excellence, that by which States and households are in best conduct (i.g. are best managed)» (*Memorabilia*, I, 2, 64: τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ἥ πόλεις τε καὶ οἶκοι ἐν οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν). The pragmatist turn of the Sophistic learning was also shared by Socrates, an eminent sophist himself according to Aristophanes (notoriously in his *Clouds*) and, virtually, the common opinion: he looked in the youths for qualities bespeaking a desire for learning all knowledge instrumental in the establishment of good functioning in household and State, and, generally, in the good

management of men and of human affairs. Xenophon, *op.cit.*, IV, 1, 2: καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων δι' ὧν ἔστιν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι [«and to yearn for all the lessons by which it is possible to manage efficiently household and State, and, in general, to handle well (successfully) men and human matters»].

The word used no doubt by Protagoras himself to focus on the pragmatism of his theoretical knowledge is *εὐβουλία* (Plato, *Protagoras*, 318e, quoted above), *soundness of judgement in practical matters, i.e. in questions of action and the general conduct of life*. Characteristically, Thucydides often employs significantly the concept, and its opposite *ἀβουλία*; cf. I, 32, 4; 78, 4; II, 97, 6; III, 42, 1; 44, 1. Isocrates speaks of *εὐβουλία* *περὶ τὰς πράξεις* [«sound judgement with respect to actions»], *Panathenaicus*, 86. He couples *εὐβουλία* to *εὐτυχία* (good fortune, luck): the latter is the mightier thing that can happen to us not depending on our faculties; the former mightier among the things in our power; *To Demonicus*, 34: ἡγοῦ κράτιστον εἶναι μὲν τῶν θεῶν εὐτυχίαν, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εὐβουλίαν [«and consider good fortune as the mightiest thing of those that come from the gods, but of those that come from ourselves, sound judgement»]. He castigates the practice in his own time to call philosophy the study of nature in the archaic speculative way rather than in a pragmatic vein; *De permutatione bonorum*, 285: ... ἀμελήσαντες ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικούνουσιν, ὧν περ ἕνεκα καὶ πονητέον καὶ φιλοσοφητέον καὶ πάντα πρακτέον ἐστίν [«...neglecting (sc. his contemporaries) to praise those who learn and study such sciences, by means of which they will administer and manage well both the concerns of their own household and the common affairs of the State, for the sake of which end one should toil and philosophise and do everything required»].

Since the *household* included all the *property* of the family, and was considered as an *economic unit* as well, its good management referred to criteria of *economic* success as well as of excellence. Thus the Protagorean definition of the Sophist's profession in effect covered expertise in matters moral, political and economic. To this there corresponds the Aristotelian tripartite division of justice in human society, as analysed in the two previous chapters. The threads weaving the fabric of ancient Greek thought run uninterruptedly through the succeeding periods, sometimes appearing in paradoxical convolutions.

Such diachronicity is also disclosed in tracing the origins of Sophistics. Parallel to the development of speculative philosophy in the archaic period, and at its margin, there run a more pragmatic kind of reflexion on issues moral and political, with a view to improving their successful actual treatment. The mainstream theorising, born in Ionia and expanded to Magna Graecia, (at the circumference, that is, of the Greek World), was concerned with unravelling the secrets of nature, reaching at ultimate explanations of reality, and thereby understanding profoundly the phenomena of the cosmic and human order. On the other hand, the more marginal pragmatic trend was particularly cultivated (for historical reasons) at the very center of Greece, in Athens, where economic pressures, a deliberate foreign power-politics and a self-conscious Kultur-Politik combined to consolidate a way of resolving social tensions and conflicts through synthesis - a way that led eventually to the development of democratic processes and an exemplarily free and open economic system. Under such conditions, the characteristic archaic Greek *wisdom* was cultivated on a more systematic and professional way, was *theorised upon* and articulated intellectually in order to enhance its penetrative, forecasting and effective capability: it became an *art* and a *profession*. Art, in the ancient Greek acceptation of the term, meant an understanding of *how to do things*, how to effect results, an *efficient* knowledge: it was more practical than science, but more theoretical than drill and experience in performance. The beginnings of this art in things human were ascribed to Solon, the renowned statesman-poet who reflected on matters social, economic, constitutional, political and moral as he undertook the first reported experiment, on Greek soil and large scale, in conflict-resolution within a society. Mnesiphilus, just before the Persian Wars, is known as an important link in the chain of such sociopoliticoeconomic «*artists*» (*i.e. experts*): he is reported to have influenced the great Themistocles. Afterwards, with the Athenian explosion in might, economic development and culture of the 5th century, the art was infused by the *argumentative and disputative spirit of strict reasoning* that owed its origin to Eleatism and, particularly, to Zeno's negative dialectics; it was also combined with the newly developed art of persuasion (Rhetoric) whose elaboration was occasioned by the increasingly radical democratisation of the Athenian political system and the emphasis on public debate and judicial litigation that went with it. The net result of these creative interminglings was, on the intellectual level, the *sophistical* synthesis, the new form of philosophy characteristic of 5th century

dynamism. So Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 2, 6: μάλλον οὖν ἂν τις προσέχοι τοῖς Μνησιφίλου τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα τοῦ Φρεαρρίου ζηλωτὴν γενέσθαι λέγουσιν, οὔτε ρήτορος ὄντος οὔτε τῶν φυσικῶν κληθέντων φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ τὴν τότε καλουμένην σοφίαν, οὖσαν δὲ δεινότητα πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν, ἐπιτήδευμα πεποιημένου καὶ διασώζοντος ὥσπερ αἵρεσιν ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος: ἦν οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα δικανικαῖς μείξαντες τέχναις καὶ μεταγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, σοφιστὰι προσηγορεύθησαν [«One should rather pay attention (in ascertaining Themistocles' formation) to those who maintain that Themistocles became an emulator of Mnesiphilus the Phrearrian (i.e. coming from the corresponding deme, or local division, of Attica); Mnesiphilus was neither a rhetorician nor one of the so-called natural philosophers; he rather made his calling what was then (in late archaic times) termed *wisdom*, being in fact *political shrewdness and efficacious sagacity* - this calling going back to Solon and being practised by succession after him. This very wisdom is what its subsequent practitioners called *Sophistics* having mixed with it the art of litigation, and having transposed it from the plane of practical exercise in action to that of theoretical reasoning»].

To such an account of the origin and descent of Sophistics is essentially congruous what Protagoras himself claimed for his progeny. He maintains that the profession is really very old, but the practitioners of this applied wisdom (the possessors of pragmatic knowledge capable of effecting results not least in the field of human persuasion), were screening their power of reason, their scientific knowledge of reality and their power to influence the course of things, behind various coverings. They were well aware of the envy, enmity and ill-designs directed against the man endowed with the *power of knowledge*. Consequently, some of them took hiding behind poetry, other behind mystery cults, some appeared as accomplished gymnasts, or physicians or musicians. This tactics Protagoras considers counterproductive. He, in any case, proclaims that he is a *teacher of men*, that he knows more than people do in things that they believe there is nothing more to know. He has the *art* of doing things, he possesses the key to reality. This is the memorable passage from Plato's *Protagoras*, 316d-317b:

ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην
φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ
μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν

["Now I maintain that the
sophistic art is old, but its
practitioners of former times,

παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποιήσιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμωδίας, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίοις δέ τινες ἥσθηται καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστῆς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεὺς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστῆς, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί.

οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσασιν ἐχρήσαντο· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ ξυμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐ τι διαπράξασθαι ὁ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὥνπερ ἔνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἳ γε πολλοὶ ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶσαι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμε-

being afraid of the burden of indiviousness directed against it which it carries with itself, adopted a pretext and cover or other - like poetry, for instance, Homer and Hesiod and Semonides; and again initiations and vaticination, as the circle of Orpheus and Mousaeus; I perceive some to have chosen the art of athletic training, as Iccus from Taras and our contemporary Herodicus the Selymbrian, formerly Megarian, a sophist no less than anyone; music again was made a pretext and screen of wisdom by your compatriot Agathocles, a great sophist, and by Pythocleides the Cean and many others.

All these, as I say, fearing the envy (attached to in-depth knowledge of reality) used these arts as coverings. Now to all of them in this particular I do not agree. Because I believe that they failed to effect what they set out to do: namely to escape the notice of those who hold power in the States, for the sake of which all such disguises are instituted; for as far as the common people are concerned, they are inattentive to these things and only praise what they are being told to do by the men of power in the State. Now not to be able to escape while in the act of escaping, but being

νεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους. καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξαρνον εἶναι

caught in it, makes it a mighty stupid thing to attempt, while in addition necessarily causing people to be much more hostile; for they think that he who does that is on top of all else also knavish. Now I walked the entirely opposite road to all these, admitting and declaring that I am a sophist and that I am an educator of men. And I reckon this to be a better defence than that former one, namely to proclaim rather than to deny the fact”].

The pragmatism of theoretical knowledge in Sophistics, which crucially involved the cultivation of the art of right conduct based on scientific analysis, are facts well-captured by Prodicus’ own characterisation of the profession as lying in the boundaries between politics and philosophy; 84B6 DK (from Plato, *Euthydemus*, 305c): οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν μέν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἷονται δ’ εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων [«For these are, oh Criton, the men whom Prodicus described as borders between the philosopher and the politician, and who in fact claim to be wisest of all»]. Cf. the following discussion in the Platonic dialogue, esp. 306a-c. Plato argues that this very borderline nature of the sophists makes them both bad philosophers and bad politicians. The general principle is standard Platonic doctrine, the argument is very interesting, but the eminent sophist’s point is not so easily disposable. Basically Plato reasons that of two different good things, which are good for different ends, participation in both reduces the intensity of a single-minded devotion to either of them. (Only participation in two bad things can improve conditions, while participation in one good and one bad thing makes the median line better than the exclusive association with the inferior state but worse than the corresponding attachment to the superior one). The argument is exploded by both Platonic and Aristotelian theory: politics and philosophy are ultimately concerned in different ways with

the same end: human excellence. One is practical, the other theoretical; both must combine for the best result.

- [4] Private tuition was given normally in classes and involved a whole course of studies. The demand for sophistical education was such that prospective students were enrolled in lists of attendance. Plato, *Cratylus*, 428b: ἓνα τῶν μαθητῶν περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐμὲ γράφου [«write me down in the list of students for the course on word-correctness»]. Plato himself, the archenemy of Sophistics, testifies to the popularity of the enlightenment it offered: people were so enamoured to the wisdom and knowledge of great and less great Sophists, that they almost carried them around in their public appearances shoulder-high; *Republic*, I, 600c-d: ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι ἰδίᾳ ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ὥς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἱοί τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσιν τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐταῖροι [«But indeed Protagoras from Abdera and Prodicus from Ceos and very many others are able to put into the minds of those around them in the course of their private colloquies, that they will be incapable of administering and managing their own household and city-state, unless they (i.e. the Sophists) are set in charge of education; and on account of this wisdom they are so very eagerly wanted, that their companions almost carry them about on their heads»]. Notice the standing formula of what the Sophist promised to deliver: knowledge and expertise how to manage one's private and public affairs for the benefit of his household and the State (Cf. *Protagoras* 318e sqq.; *Meno*, 91a sqq.; n. [3] *supra*). (Plato treats ironically the sophistic claim. Yet, it is precisely the same claim that he makes on behalf of his true philosopher-rulers (including presumably himself): one will not be able to govern successfully, unless he is turned into a philosopher, i.e. unless he acquires in-depth knowledge and becomes possessor of truth. This is indicative of the 5th-4th philosophical relationship, mediated by the Socratic turn).

No surprise that acceptance of those high claims of Sophistics, commanded high recompense. Protagoras is reported to have been asking, and receiving, astronomical fees. Diogenes Laertius, IX, 52: οὗτος (sc. Protagoras) πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο μνᾶς ἑκατὸν [«Protagoras was the first to receive a pay of one hundred mnae»]. Obviously, the charge was for the participation in some class on an entire course of instruction.

Even so it corresponds to the order of, say, \$1,000,000 in purchasing power. Probably it was meant as an adequate recompense for the ultimate goal of education, i.e. being empowered to manage successfully household and State. Similarly Gorgias is reported to have charged such astronomical fees for, presumably, a full cycle of his courses (Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca*, XII, 53, 2 Vogel). The incredible level of payment required is explained by Gorgias' reputed decisive preeminence (by a long shoot) over the other sophists and by the fact that he is considered to have invented Rhetoric, the powerful art of persuasion (*ibid.*). The amount is therefore absolutely exceptional. In fact it is suspect when one finds in the Platonic *Alcibiades* I, 119a, that the minor sophist Zeno charged the same amount for his full courses of instruction. Considerably less than this, in fact 50 drachmae or half a mna (around \$ 5,000), was charged individually by Prodicus for, probably, a full cycle of lectures on a particular subject, correctness of names (a philosophical, grammatical and rhetorical inquiry into the nature, appropriateness and exact use of words - a field of study on which Prodicus was the acknowledged master); v. Plato, *Cratylus*, 384b: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἀκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδευθῆναι, ὥς φησιν ἐκείνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος [«If, then, I had already attended the fifty-drachmae course of Prodicus lectures - which enables one to be fully instructed on the matter in question, as he himself maintains -, nothing would hinder you to learn on the spot immediately the truth concerning correctness of words (the issue at stake)». - In the fourth century, the ordinary teachers of wisdom (rhetorical, sophistical or philosophical) asked for a much less remuneration, 3 or 4 mnae (Isocrates, *De antidosi*, 3). Isocrates himself asked at that time 10 mnae for his course of studies, though he charged only foreign students (Plutarchean *Lives of Ten Orators*, 838E-F).

There were also introductory lessons, lectures of a more popular nature. In the passage just quoted from the Platonic *Cratylus*, the fifty-drachmae course of full instruction is contrasted ironically to an one-drachma demonstration: νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν. οὐκ οἶδα πῇ ποτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν τοιούτων [«but in fact, I have attended not (the full course), but only the one-drachma instruction. Therefore I do not know the truth of the matter concerning these things»]. Single discourses were given in private houses; for instance, Protagoras read his work *Concerning Gods* (*Περὶ Θεῶν*) for the first time

(a way of publishing it) in the house of either Euripides or Megacleides (although some held that the event took place in the gymnasium Lyceion (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 54). In the Lyceion happened a memorable dialectical altercation of Prodicus with a youth who was exercising there, an event which ended with the defeat of the great Sophist (*Eryxias*, 397d). The discussions reputedly reported in the Platonic *Protagoras* took place in the house of Callias, the most wealthy man in Athens, and probably of Greece at that time: a great concourse of the most famous Sophists enjoyed Callias' hospitality on the occasion, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus (*Protagoras*, 311a; 314c). Bills of notice were issued in advance of such sophistical «demonstrations»: Hippias himself advertised a lecture which he would deliver in two days time at the (private) school of Phidostratus (Plato, *Hippias Major*, 286b).

An entrance fee was paid by the attendants (hearers) in such public recitations. Diogenes Laertius, IX, 50: οὗτοε (sc. *Πρωταγόρας*) καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος λόγους ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἡρανίζοντο [«He (Protagoras) and Prodicus from Cea read lectures and collected contributions»]. In the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochos*, 366c, Prodicus is reported to have asked for attendance to his lectures on various occasions fees of 1/2, 2 and 4 drachmae. We noticed before an entrance fee of one drachma by the same Sophist. It is big money for a single lecture: we are talking about a level of \$ 50-400.

The Sophistical fee-system was not rigid. Protagoras discloses his own practice on the question of what constituted appropriate pay (Plato, *Protagoras*, 328b-c). He charges a uniform amount; but on condition that when the pupil finished his course of study, he had the option of either paying the standard rate, or giving what he himself thought that the lessons he received were truly worth, provided that he backed his estimate by a formal oath in a sacred place to that effect. (Aristotle confirms the information, *NE*, 1164a24-6). On the other hand, there was no distinct legal obligation for a student to pay what the sophist was asking for his institution. The phenomenon of non-payment, and consequent litigation, must have been frequent enough (even if rather overplayed by the opponents of the New Learning); cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 519c-d. Playful exchange of «sophistical» arguments between Protagoras and one of his pupils (named Euathlus) regarding payment due and withheld have anecdotal value (v. Diogenes Laertius IX, 56 and, *in extenso*, Aulus Gellius, V, 10). The story is also related with reference to the Rhetorician Corax; *Zenobius*, IV, 82).

However considerable the revenues of the Sophists and educators might have been, on the other hand, their expenses must have also been particularly high, given their cosmopolitan way of life and the international scene of their activities. Isocrates, in the next century, clearing his name in a legal process implicating the amount of his property, and using the appellation «sophist» in the old sense of signifying the possessor of knowledge and expertise in general, claims that no sophist has really accumulated great wealth out of his profession, appealing as a telling example to the case of Gorgias, the reputedly most wealthy among the famous ones. *De antidosi*, 155-6: ὁ δὲ πλείστα κτησάμενος ὧν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν, Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος, οὗτος διατρίψας μὲν περὶ Θετταλίαν, ὅτ' εὐδαιμονέστατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦσαν, πλείστον δὲ χρόνον βίους καὶ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμὸν τοῦτον γενόμενος, πόλιν δ' οὐδεμίαν καταπαγίως οἰκήσας οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ δαπανηθεὶς οὐδ' εἰσφορὰν εἰσενεγκεῖν ἀναγκασθεὶς, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις οὔτε γυναῖκα γήμας οὔτε παῖδας ποιησάμενος ἀλλ' ἀτελὴς γενόμενος καὶ ταύτης τῆς λειτουργίας τῆς ἐνδελεχέστατης, τοσοῦτον προλαβὼν πρὸς τὸ πλείω κτήσασθαι τῶν ἄλλων χιλίους μόνους στατήρας κατέλιπεν [«and even he who acquired the handsomest income among those (of the Sophists) that are in our memory, namely Gorgias from Leontini (in Sicily), he spent considerable time in Thessaly, when the Thessalians were the most prosperous Greeks; he lived a very long life during which he exercised this money-getting profession; he inhabited no single State permanently and thus he contributed nothing to public expenses, nor was he obliged to participate in levies of property-taxes; furthermore, he did not marry a woman, nor had he begotten children, but he stayed exempt even from this most uninterrupted obligatory service; he, then, with so many advantages over his co-practitioners in the art with regard to greater wealth-accumulation, left upon his death just one thousand staters»]. The value mentioned amounts to 20 mnae, on the level of \$ 200.000.

Ἐπίδειξις, exhibition, demonstration, manifestation, was the technical term for the Sophistical lectures. Cf. e.g. Plato, *Hippias Major*, 286b; *Euthydemus*, 274a; Xenophon, *Symposium*, 3, 3. The word expresses the assurance of knowledge and expertise on the part of the Sophist; he was the first truly professional in intellectual matters: he made an exhibition of his own ability and excellence as well as a manifestation of truth. He advertised audaciously and sold proudly his worthy ware — services and products of the mind.

- [5] Antiphon is reported to have argued the point very clearly in a virile attack upon Socrates during one of his debates. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, 6, 11-12: *πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοί σε δίκαιον μὲν νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττει. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὧν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβῶν. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾧ τινὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξία, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηδενὸς γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος* [«On another occasion, Antiphon, in discussion with Socrates, said: Oh Socrates, I certainly deem you a just man, but in no way a wise one; and in fact you seem to me to be aware of this yourself: at all events, you do not exact payment for your company (teaching). Although certainly, the cloak or the house or whatever of your possessions you consider to be worthy of money not only you do not give free of charge but not even for less than it is worth. It is therefore evident that if you estimated that the intercourse with you (i.e. your teaching) had some value, then for this too you would exact money not less than its value. Therefore, you would then indeed be just, in that you do not deceive people with a view to your own advantage - but in no way can you count as wise, since you know nothing of value»]. - This is a formidable attack on Socrates, exposing also his ironic stance of ignorance. Antiphon takes it at its face value; furthermore, he claims that the Socratic practice of not asking fees for his (informal) seminars is a confession of real, and not pretended, ignorance: *or, at least, an acknowledgement that his spiritual ware is of not much value.* Whereupon it follows, according to Antiphon, Socrates' *exemplary justice*: he is not asking for more than what he himself considers as right price for his inquisitive company from his interlocutors, namely nothing. His real ignorance, declared theoretically and shown in practice, proves him just.

Socrates' reply to this direct Sophistic attack consists actually in the mere invocation of old habits and aristocratic clichés (*ibid.* §§13-14). Spiritual goods, just as the blooming of youth, are not vendible things. Venal wisdom is prostitution: the sophist is an intellectual catamite. *Ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τὴν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μὲν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρ-*

νον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις ὃν ἂν γνῶ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐρα-
 στήν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν
 σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφι-
 σταὺς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῶ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα δι-
 δάσκων ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν ἂ τῷ
 καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν etc. [«Socrates, then,
 replied to these (points): oh Antiphon, the customary view in our country
 is that one can dispose of the beautiful bloom of youth and of wisdom
 similarly in a good or a shameful way. For if one sells his prime of life for
 money to whomsoever is desirous of it, they call him a prostitute; but if
 one befriends him whom he acknowledges as noble in person and in
 character, this boy we deem temperate. And, similarly, those that sell
 wisdom to him who wants it, they call sophists, that is to say prostitutes;
 but of him who befriends a young man whom he discovers naturally well-
 endowed and disposed, teaching him what good he knows, of such a man
 we believe that he acts exactly as suits the man noble in body and mind;
 etc.».]. The point is, one may sell the services and products flowing from
 all kinds of arts and expertises he may possess, but not such as are
 generated by the exercise of the supreme excellence of man, wisdom; for
 this parallels prostitution of corporeal bloom. Such an attitude is
 characteristic of a certain societal ideology, and belongs to particular
 peoples, places and times. It is a question of a given evaluative system,
 expressing a specific life-style and pertaining to the traditional apparatus
 of a certain society. But the Sophists, and Antiphon preeminently among
 them, deny precisely the universal validity of such customary and, for
 their time, already outdated codes. The repeated use of the verb *νομίζω* in
 the Xenophontean passage above quoted (... παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται ... σώ-
 φρονα νομίζομεν ... τοῦτον νομίζομεν) highlights the crux of the matter:
 Antiphon sharply distinguished what is lawful (according to the law of
 man, written and unwritten) from what is natural (according to (the law
 of) nature). V. chiefly 87 B44 DK. The former refer always to particular
 States and societal orders (*ibid.* 6-11 Hunt).

What follows in the Xenophontean relation of the Antiphon - Socrates
 altercation, emphasises the appeal to the old aristocratic sentiments and
 ways of life inherent in Socrates' rejoinder. The benefit from spiritual
 wealth, Socrates maintains, accrues from the common inquisitiveness and
 the friendly intercourse of people finding pleasure in each other, of the
 kind, if more intense than that, which one finds in an excellent horse, or a
 very special dog or a rare bird (*ibid.*, §14). We have exactly the archaic

ideal of happy life portrayed by Solon, on the borders of the transition from the old to the new era at the beginning of sixth century B.C., in the characteristic elegiac verses (Fr. 13 Diehl):

ὄλβιος, ᾧ παῖδές τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι
καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαπός.

[«Blest is he, for whom there are beloved youths and
horses with uncloven-hooves
and hounds and a guest from abroad»].

The old-style aristocratic disdain to selling one's services surfaces also in *Memorabilia*, I, 2, 6. Socrates, Xenophon tells us there, considered that his own attitude was meant to preserve his freedom. Taking fees for one's intercourse and teaching entailed the obligation to attend to them who paid the fees: exaggeratedly Socrates called thus the Sophists slave-dealers (enslavers) of themselves (ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἑαυτῶν) Cf. *ibid.* I, 5, 6. Socrates himself indeed never required money for his philosophical company (I, 2, 60); and this consisted, as we know, in veritable, searching seminars.

Strong words were used in the confrontation of Socrates with the Sophists. He was just but ignorant; they were prostitutes and slave-dealers. The Antiphon - Socrates controversy in Xenophon is a battle in the on-going war, the *Kultur-Kampf* of the fifth century. Only for Aristophanes, Socrates is on the other side as well, the arch-sophist. The chief argument used by the Xenophontean Socrates is an appeal to tradition. It seems, however, to cut too far: what about other professions, arts and expertises? Are they, being venal, similarly servile and cases of harlotry? Stark reaction would no doubt stick to the ancient mores in this respect, too. Socrates, however, wanted to differentiate the relevant issues. The wonder was, he reasoned, that men who profess virtue and are in the business of human excellence do not display trust in the efficacy of their own profession. For if they basically claimed to be able to impart higher excellence, i.e. wisdom, being themselves possessors of such excellence (which meant science); then they should, consistently to their pretension, trust that the recipients of their instruction will return the great favour done to them by a significant recompense. *Ibid.* I, 2, 7: ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πράττειτο καὶ μὴ νομίζοι τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἔξειν φίλον ἀγαθὸν κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο μὴ ὁ γινόμενος καλὸς ἀγαθὸς τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν ἔξοι [«And he (sc. Socrates) wondered how someone professing virtue and excellence exacted money for his instruction and did not believe that he

will secure maximal gain by gaining a good friend, but was afraid that he who was to become eminent in human excellence might not acknowledge the greatest obligation to his greatest benefactor»]. Socrates, on the contrary, Xenophon continues, had faith in his selected companions, trusting in the mutual benefit of their common intercourse. - With regard to this argument why wisdom and the superior art of how to manage optimally the affairs of household and State (matters private and public) are not to be offered for sale unlike all other professions and artisanships, it is interesting that the Xenophontean and Platonic picture of Socrates coincide; cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 520c-e. The reasoning, of course, in Plato is more sophisticated. The gymnastic master, for example, need to exact a fee for the training of the athlete, because he cannot rely on an active sense of justice on the part of the latter in so far as their professional relationship is concerned. He trains the pupil, say, to be a good runner in the races. But it is not swiftness of feet in which justice consists, and, consequently, people do not commit injustices by virtue of some respective slowness. The trainer may, thus, be highly competent; his training of the athlete very successful; and still he may not receive from the latter the counter-favour to which the favour shown to him by the training offered to him entitles the trainer. Hence in all cases but one goods and services have to be marketed in order for a stable equilibrium to emerge. The one exemption refers to the profession of wisdom and virtue (superior excellence): this must be practised on the model of favour and counter-favours; the receptor of favour is obligated in this case to answer with a counter-favour bestowable to his benefactor, just because the initial favour consisted exactly in the teaching of wisdom, virtue and superior excellence. The beneficiary is bound to be intensely aware of the beneficence received, and, by virtue of its imparted and cultivated wisdom, virtue and excellence, he will necessarily activate in appropriate ways his sense of gratitude. The model of favour and counter-favour should be sufficient here to create and sustain stable equilibrium in human interactions. The Gorgian passage runs thus: καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀνεμισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἶκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεὶς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδούς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῇτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία ... Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεί, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλές

ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν... Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλάς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν... περὶ δὲ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρόν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐάν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ... Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἰτιὸν ἐστίν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. [«And in fact, it is plausible that they alone (sc. the Sophists) of all people could afford to give freely and not for hire the benefice of their services and goods (sc. education and knowledge), if indeed they were saying the truth (sc. about the claims of their profession). For if someone had benefited by receiving any other benefit, (for example becoming swift through the good offices of a gymnastic master), he might perhaps deprive his benefactor from the gratitude due to him, in case that the physical trainer granted freely to him his services *and did not conclude with him an agreement regarding the fees to the effect that simultaneously with the communication of swiftness to the trainee he will receive the money stipulated*. For it is not by virtue of slowness, I reckon, that men commit injustice - but because of their injustice... Surely then, if one takes away just this, namely injustice, there is no fear that he may suffer injustice; on the contrary, he is the only one who can safely grant freely his beneficent services, provided that he would be truly able (to make good his claims and) turn men good... Hence it is for this very reason, as it seems, that nothing dishonourable happens if one gives advice on receipt of money, as for example in building or other arts... But with regard to the matter at issue, namely in what manner one may be in optimal state himself and may manage his own household or a State in the best way, it is taken as dishonourable to maintain that he will not advise (in his line of business, i.e. offer his services) unless one gives him money... For, clearly, the reason for that (discrepancy) is that this beneficial service alone renders the recipient desirous of returning the favour received; so that it seems indeed to be an accurate criterion of such a service being really granted that the benefactor receives in return a counter-favour; should this not happen, the benefice had not been actually given in the first place»]. Notice that the simultaneous interchange of a service or commodity with money is taken to constitute the essence of sale or hire.

In effect, Socrates turns the tables against Antiphon on the very logic of the latter's argument. The Sophist reasoned from the nonmercenary character of Socrates' spiritual wares to their nonexistence, or insignificance (valuelessness); contrariwise but similarly, Socrates inferred from the commercial character of Sophistic wares, their nonexistence or insignificance (valuelessness). True, however, the Sophists could accept ineffectiveness alone in their wisdom in cases of failure, something that Socrates could not plausibly maintain. In fact, it was standard sophistic doctrine that excellence depended both on sufficient predisposing conditions and proper natural endowments as well as on cultivation and teaching.

It is clear that the opposition is between an aristocratic milieu where relationships between people on the same status are conditioned by the principle of favour and counter-favour on the one hand; and the new order that has been emerged characterised by the full dominance of the market. Now, a society based on gift-exchange never existed, nor could it ever exist. Not even among nobility was it the main factor in the pattern of their meaningful economic interchange, much less in their entire economic activity. The concept is a utopian dream of some intellectuals reacting to the more vital, but also indeed harsher, realities of such a dynamic age as the 5th century B.C. And even so it is limited to the calling of higher excellences, in fact wisdom: it refers to spiritual goods and educational services alone. How this idea of an aristocratic disdain towards the marketing and sale of services and products connected to superior excellence (wisdom) and its function (restricted in extent and circumscribed in historical depth as it was) could be generalised as a principle of gift-exchange, and taken as the basis for an analysis of the entire system of ancient Greece economic activity, is something certainly worthy to wonder and ponder about. A particularly confused account of gift-exchange, «embedded» economy, politics and symbolism of exchange and the rest, «supported» by an outrageously obfuscatory handling of the ancient texts, can be found in S. von Reden, *Exchange in Ancient Greece*, 1995.

It should be noted that, after all, both according to the favour-counterfavour model and in the market, there is a question of *justice* involved regarding the transaction, something that is already explicit in the SophisticoSocratic dispute, and was finally elaborated by Aristotle as we saw in the two preceding Chapters. But (as has been emphasised above, Chapter 1, n. [3]) favour-exchange presupposes an *extraneous*

determination of value-equivalences, hence, of (relative) prices. In other words, and to reverse the fashionable talk about embeddedness, *it is the status form of exchange that is embedded in a proper economical, and indeed market, framework, rather than the other way round. As Aristotle clearly emphasised, the bond of political society is market-exchange: the market is the foundation of State-organisation, not the State the basis of market-structures.*

The Socratic repugnance to the marketing of knowledge, thought and ideas was practical: he explained that he could find whatever he wanted at any time from or through his companions. Plato's disdain was, on the other hand, a different thing: it was traditionalist, aristocratic, and, in effect, reactionary. In reality, however, it amounted to the same attitude: he, too, not only turned to his powerful or affluent friends for his mundane requirements, but also succeeded in creating *for the first time an Institute of Advanced and Basic Research and Instruction*, while also endowing it with such initial funds that secured its continuance after his death. After all, he ranked the life of one engaged in financial transactions together with that of one involved in economic management and with that of a statesman to the third grade in his hierarchy of merit, after the truly philosophical and "aesthetic" life (first grade) and that of a royal man, a ruler or a general (second grade), but above, for example, the producing life (seventh grade), the ordinary politician's and thinker's lives (eighth grade). Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248d.

Proof that the Socratic position on the matter was not ideological, is supplied by the fact that the marketing of ideas was practised by several Socratics. So, in general, Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, 2, 60, castigating the practice. Aristippus was the first to do this; Fr. 1 Giannantoni. His justification appeals to Socratic example. Fr. 3 G. The amount for his courses was fixed to 1000 or 500 drachmae; Fr. 5 G. He maintained that his easy attitude with money, was the result of his little valuing it (Fr. 17G). The price for wisdom fell, in the post high-classical time, or rather the pragmatic value of later knowledge diminished: Alexinus (of the Megaric-Socratic School) charged five mnae for his instruction; Fr. 2 Giannantoni. The amount (say, at the level of \$ 25,000) though considerable, represents a marked devaluation of knowledge from what it used to be at its heydays in High Classicism. Not a comparable competitive differential was produced now by the available higher knowledge.

[5a] In application of Antiphon's dictum (v. *supra*, n. [5]), Hippias is made by Plato to boast for this success in money-earning by his craft, superior pragmatic knowledge; Plato, *Hippias Major*, 282d-e. In particular, during his visit to Sicily, he made a handsome revenue of more than twenty mnae from a small place there (*ibid.*). The great Sophists in Athens were all foreigners. But the powerful and libertarian city attracted them, becoming the "town-hall of wisdom" for the entire hellenic world. Athens as *Πρυτανεῖον σοφίας*, Plato, *Protagoras*, 337d. in Athens there obtained *greatest freedom of speech*; Plato, *Gorgias*, 461e: οὐ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν. Exemplary in the praises of Athens in these respects is Pericles' funeracy oration as given by Thucydides.

[6] In Roman jurisprudence, not every agreement between consenting parties, with regard to the particular balancing of action and counter-action struck by them, was legally binding initially. The Roman Law (*jus Quiritium*) required the occurrence of strict formalities, of very definite specification, and punctually observed, in order to recognise an agreement, or mutual promise, as a genuine contract. Only such agreements as were accompanied by some striking and solemn formality were primarily actionable before the law. By the nature of the case, aliens could not, therefore, enter into meaningful interaction with Romans, from a legal point of view. Besides, the increase in the magnitude and intensity of transactions among the Romans themselves as well, necessitated, together with the continually expanding foreign relationships of Rome, the complementation of the *jus Quiritium* by a more practical system of contractual obligations. With the passing of time, the strict forms of ancient Roman tradition on the matter became naturally obsolete, as Rome became first the Hegemonic power in the then known and inhabited World (*οἰκουμένη*), and then was transformed together with the world into a unified Empire. For all real purposes apart from the antics of traditionalists, the complement supplanted in the end the original.

Agreements which had not received the definite forms recognised by the *jus Quiritium*, and which therefore were not perfect contracts creating full legal obligation as such, were by extension considered as contracts of sort actionable before the law in different ways. They are being called *innominate* or unnamed contracts, since they do not fall under the strict formulas of the initially recognised full contractual engagements. Innominate contracts are *formless* contracts. They consist in a bilateral

convention for *reciprocal* performances followed by execution on the part of one of the contractors. Such execution constituted the basis of the obligations on the other party created by these extended pacts between appropriate agents. The obligation was, thus, said to be imposed «*re*», as the contracts in question were held to be actionable merely in virtue of delivery (a *res*) by one party to the other. A bilateral convention followed by execution on the part of one of the contractors is therefore considered *real*. By a further natural extension, however, the binding force of a pact had to be acknowledged even in cases of non-performance on the part of both contractors. Here surfaces at last the basic notion underlying all along, that *consent is the essence of contract*; and that specific forms or partial execution are just proofs and manifestations of that essence rather than its true substance. Bilateral conventions not followed by part-execution are thus *consensual*. They are named, in that they fell into definite categories and were actionable as such under their name-titles (sale, hire, partnership, agency).

Real and consensual contracts were extended to cover practically all actual and significant interaction between agents forming a given societal system. They were applicable to man as such, i.e. pertained primarily to the *jus gentium*, and were hencefrom, introduced into Roman Law. What remained outside their gambit (owing chiefly to the Roman legalistic spirit) was considered to regard obligations arising *quasi ex contractu*. The original *formal* contracts were simple side-stepped, by reason of the necessities of a developed human intercourse, and finally discontinued. Even so, at their root lied the idea that provides the dynamic matrix of all human interaction and contractual engagement. The central, and probably oldest, form of valid agreement with legal binding force according to the strict *ius Quiritium* was *nexum* (the *bond* and *obligation* par excellence), the *negotium per aes et libram* (the transaction or dealing by means of the bronze ingot and the scales). The extent of the employment of this peculiar procedure of highest authority is revealing: *slavery, patria potestas, manus* and *ownership* fell within its competence, besides contracts and wills. «So that there is no department of the substantive law in which it fails to occupy a conspicuous place» (Hunter's *Roman Law*, p. 459, 3rd ed.). *All legal change of principal relationships in human intercourse is fundamentally a quasi-sale*; not full sale, because it is premonetary; but not still barter on the other hand, since there is the same material that always is exchanged for any commodity or service, measured by the scales. We meet here the quintessential *balancing*

involved in every orderly transaction between action and counter-action in its literal sense. This appears, too, as the fundamental form for contract and conveyance.

The sense of *reciprocity* inherent in every contract (formal, real or consensual) is explicitly formulated in a division of contractual obligations by Paulus, as follows (*Digesta*, XIX, 5, 5 pr.): aut enim de tibi ut des, aut do ut facias, aut facio ut des, aut facio ut facias: in quibus quaeritur, quae obligatio nascatur [«There may be conveyance in consideration of conveyance, or conveyance in consideration of performance, or performance in consideration of conveyance, or performance in consideration of performance. In which types the question emerges what obligation is born out of them»] (Transl. by Poste, *The Elements of Roman Law-Gaius*, 1875, p. 372). *Conveyance and performance, do and facio, refer to goods and services respectively.*

- [7] Suppose that in a singular transaction involving (kinds of) articles X and Y, X_1 is balanced to Y_1 , when it transpires between individuals A and B, while in another X_2 is balanced to Y_2 when C and D are the balancing agents. Suppose that $X_1 = X_2$, whereas $Y_1 > Y_2$. If on a third occasion individual N possessing utility X wants to enter into (X, Y)-relationship to another individual, he would prefer B as his partner rather than D; or, to be more exact, he would expect counter-action of the intensity of Y_1 rather than of Y_2 ; provided, of course, information regarding human transactions is freely moving around within the system. That expectation on the part of every prospective «buyer» of Y would tend, *ceteris paribus*, to raise its relative value up to the point where a general equivalence between X and Y will be established.
- [7a] Aristotle, *Politica*, B, 1263a15-6: ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπὸν [“and in general, to live together and associate with one another is in all human affairs a difficult thing”].
- [8] Heraclitus’ fragment is B51DK. Heraclitus represents the high development of monistic Ionian Philosophy after the dualistic Italian countermodel of Pythagoras. Monism is reaffirmed: there is one ultimate reality, the everliving fire which incorporates the law of its transformation (B30; B90). This law regulates reality’s measured progression; it constitutes both the ontological reason of things, and its intellectual conception - the common «thought of reality», to which each one

participates in various degrees of clarity according to his alertness to the truth of things (B1; B31; B2; B114). But dualism is also recognised as a pervading feature of existence. On its face value, reality is manifested as thoroughly polarised; the natural harmony of things is hidden (B123; B54; cf. B93). There is an underlying unity of opposites; polarity is the other side of oneness (cf. B61; B60; B111; B68; B88). The same principle of identity between unity and plurality applies to the cosmic whole as well (B10; B67; B41; B32). The cause of this identity lies in the very dynamism of being: existence is constituted in its identity by the tension of polarity (v. the before quoted fragment B51). An image of reality is the river: it is the same in that other and other water follows an identical course (B12; B91). Cosmic harmony emerges as the integral of particular disharmonies. The just order is a result of universal strife: war reigns supreme, and thus the balance that keeps things together is automatically maintained (B80; B53).

εἰδέναι χρή τὸν πόλεμον ἔοντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρεών (B80)

[«It is necessary to know that war is common and right is strife and that all things happen by strife and obligation»].

As Aristotle reports: καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι «ὥς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο» (= Homer, *Ilias*, 18, 107): οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων. *Ethica Eudemia*, H1, 1235a25 sqq. [«Heracleitus rebukes the author of the line «Would that strife might be destroyed from among gods and men»: for there would be no (musical) harmony unless high pitch and low pitch existed, nor living creatures without female and male, which are opposites»]. Polarity and its consequences (war, strife, antagonism) constitute and sustain the unifying tension of things (here, too, are the preliminaries of Stoic doctrines), as well as the sublime harmony of reality; B8: τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι [«the counter-thrust brings together (or, and the adverse is profitable) and from things at variance comes the most perfect harmony and all things come to pass through conflict»].

The universal order, consisting in the natural balance of polars, is self-sustainable: the harmony of the World is inviolable. For example (B94):

Ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.

according to indebtedness; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for the injustice (they commit to one another) according to the order of time, as he (sc. Anaximander) puts it in these rather poetical terms». Anaximander meant his expressions, of course, not at all «poetically», not at least in our sense of the word: What he meant was, (a) that the world-order is inviolable on the whole and self-corrective; (b) that there was an explanation for this absolute validity of the cosmic law; and (c) that time constituted the modality, and provided the field, in which the universal order maintained itself intact. This complex construal, densely expressed, can be briefly analysed as follows. Amidst the flux of phenomena there is permanence and stability. In a world of continual change, the law of reality is unalterable. Every change consists in the emergence of a new factor at a particular place and time. This new factor substitutes some other(s) that are extinguished or reduced to the extent of its (the new one's) prevalence. That the new factor takes the place of the old means that the old became the new: for being cannot disappear into nothing, nor can it come out of nothing; it can only change, i.e. become something else. The new has therefore the old within itself in some real way. Which entails that the old may *reemerge* as the characteristic factor of the situation in question. Upon such reemergence the relationship between the old and the new is reversed: the older becomes the newer new and the new becomes the old of the newer. We may schematise the Anaximandrian underlying conception thus. Suppose that A became B, $A \Rightarrow B$. In truth what happened was that a state of affairs in which A is the characterising factor and B is ontologically implicit (in temporary immersion within A), is succeeded by one in which B is the characterising factor and A is implicit (in temporary immersion within B). One may represent this so: $A(B) \Rightarrow (A)B$. Thus the reverse change $B \Rightarrow A$, is in fact of the form $(A)B \Rightarrow A(B)$. The reality underlying these changes is AB. But this *reality* cannot *appear* as such at the same subject and time. (I disregard here the complication caused by the distinction between subject and place): A and B are inconsistent in the level of phenomena (appearances) (given the polarised nature of existence, they, in the last analysis, can be taken as opposites). There can be in the World (at one place and time) either A(B) or (A)B. Since AB is the underlying reality, *A(B) is an injustice committed by A upon B; (A)B is the reverse injustice committed by B upon A*. Since AB is the underlying reality, and, consequently, both A(B) and (A)B are inherently unstable, the injustice committed by A upon B is bound to be redressed by the opposite injustice

committed by B upon A. The pendulum between A(B) and (A)B manifest, therefore, according to the succession of time the lawfulness determined by the reality AB. *Thus the cosmic order is maintained automatically by means (and not despite) of (appropriate) perpetual change.* And this is where Time enters substantially into the picture. What cannot be realised *simultaneously* (i.e. the underlying reality AB) is realised *successively* (through the pendular movement between A(B) and (A)B). Change, far from destroying the fundamental and eternal realities of things, allows them to be manifested in actuality of appearance. Thus, for instance, can the seed develop into the complete character of the full-bodied entity whose germinating, embryonic existence it constitutes; thus, can fruition in a plant occur *after*, and *from*, flowering, which in turn *succeeds*, and proceeds from, foliation. Change is, furthermore, possible because of Time. *Time is, then, the modability in which reality fully unfolds itself.* It represents the measure of such unfolding. So the necessity of overall justice established through the mutual, but opposing and balancing, particular injustices is encapsulated in the order of Time (Anaximander, B1). The existence of Time entails that coming into being, being and passing-away have a definite mode of realisation; their determinate nexus is grounded upon, and rooted in, Time. The doxography in 12 A11 §1 is very revealing: οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἔφη τῶν ὄντων φύσιν τινα τοῦ ἀπείρου, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμον. ταύτην δ' αἰδίων εἶναι καὶ ἀγήρω, ἣν καὶ πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους. λέγει δὲ χρόνον ὡς ὠρισμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς [«He (sc. Anaximander) said that the principle of beings is a certain nature (originating power) of the Limitless, from which come into being the celestial realms and the ordered World in them. This nature is eternal and unageing, and it also surrounds and controls (rules) all the worlds. On the other hand he talks of Time, in the sense that (or, as) coming-into-being, being and passing-away are determined»]. *The ultimate principle of reality is limitless, hence indeterminate; it is eternal, never-ending. Eternity goes with indeterminacy.* But *things* are limited and *determined*; they have a *definite* origin, being (kind of existence) and end: they exist, that is, *in time* and are circumscribed in nature. *Timeness goes with determinateness.* Time is the framework within which the variation in being according to distinct being-determinations (characteristic identities) is rendered possible. What is indeterminate as inconsistent - the (AB) of AB - becomes realisable *in succession*, i.e. in time, A(B) and (A)B.

The doctrine of the opposites (i.e. the view of a polarised reality) was central to the Anaximandrian speculations; v. 12A9; A10; A16 DK. He further conceived a primary secretion from the ultimate principle of reality (his *Limitless*, τὸ ἄπειρον) of the fundamental contraries constitutive of the evolved world-form. Even more, he described, for example, a primary secretion from that principle of the *procreative potency of the warm and the cold*. A10: φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αἰδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι etc. [«He (sc. Anaximander) says that from the Eternal (i.e. the Limitless) the procreative faculty of the hot and the cold was secreted at the coming into being of this world, etc.».]. *This fertility generative of the warm and the cold is precisely reality AB in the above used schema*. In latter formulation (e.g. in Classical Pythagoreanism and Platonism), it is the polarised field of variation for temperature.

- [10] This constitutes a fundamental experience of ancient Greek spirit reflecting its deep belief in man's absolute immersion in the world. The terminology of the archaic philosophers in particular is teeming with expressions of transferred (we would say) applicability from one realm of things to the other. These were not simple metaphors, but revealed the underlying congruence of structures and identity of parameters (elements and principles) in the respective fields. Thus, e.g., Anaximander utilised biological conceptions, an ἔκκρισις or ἀπόκρισις, secretion, to describe the generation, out of the Limitless, of the powers of the various basic contraries (cf. *supra*, n. [9]). What is secreted out of the first principle of reality is the γόνιμον τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, the fertile power of the warm and the cold; the expression γόνιμος is meant no doubt to parallel the γονή, animal semen. We noticed, furthermore, how Anaximander expresses the cosmic order in terms of a stable justice established by the mutual retributions correcting injustices committed against each other by the operating factors of reality.

In Heraclitus we can observe the exact parallelism between lawfulness in the world and in society. I have quoted above (n. [8]) the fragment in which Justice, through her awful ministers, the Erinyes, will find out the Sun, should he overstep the limits of his measured movement (B94). It is Justice also that will catch up with (and correct) liars and perjurers; B286: Δίκη καταλήφεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας [«Justice will catch up with those who invent lies and those who swear to them»]. Justice is the objective law of reality intrinsic to the first principle of

things; thus the general formulation of the point made particularly in the two last mentioned cases is put in terms of fire; B66: πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήφεται [«Fire coming on will discern and catch up with all things»]. Fire will deliver justice ontologically, for the law of its measured change is objective justice. And this objective justice is the balance spontaneously achieved through the oppositions of polarities (B80).

- [11] Thus Heraclitus forcefully endorses the rule of law in human society. B44: μάχεσθαι χρή τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ γε τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος [«The people must fight for the law as for the city-wall»]. In fact the law of political integration (human society organised in State) takes its substance from the divine, i.e. the cosmic, Law, the Reason of Reality. B114: ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρή τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλεις καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται [«speaking with understanding they (sc. men) must hold fast to what is common to all, as a city relies on its law, and even much more firmly. For all human laws are nourished by one law, the divine one; it prevails so far as it will and suffices for all and it ever is left over»]. Just as, although there is one common reason for all thinking subjects (and that is the law and order of reality); and although each one of them thinks by virtue of its sharing in that common reasoning principle; still each one participates to that in varying degrees of completeness; so, similarly, although there is one divine - cosmic law of structure and process; and although each human legislation (written and unwritten) is a law by virtue of its reproducing and assimilating that divine law to the extent that it does; nevertheless, human laws are determined by the divine law in varying degree. The crucial thing to notice here is that according to Heraclitus such variance is the result of the divine reason and cosmic law enforcing or withholding their full manifestation in particular cases, rather than of the relevant subjects (individuals or societal integrals correspondingly) being empowered or failing to receive their full presence. And this is as it should be with Heraclitean metaphysics (general theory of reality). For it is the Ur-substance and its internal law of order (fire endowed with reason) that generates the entire variety of things in the world of reality: It constitutes world-structure and world-process by its measured lighting and extinction, i.e. its *orderly self-affirmation or self-effacement* (B30).

The law of reality, the divine-cosmic world-order, reigns supreme. Its apparent violations, like transgressions of physical lawfulness, do confirm its validity in an appropriate long run. Violations are temporary disorders enchained in a ineluctable process of self-correction. The Law is absolute in integrals of reality. Similarly in human societies, systems of law deviating from the natural rectitude of the divine ordinances are self-curing aberrations.

The divinely sanctioned societal order (reproducing the cosmic code of Reason) is *weighted* according to the individual value of its members. Thus, in case of man of superlative excellence, the (right) law is to submit the effective control of affairs to him; B33: νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἐνὸς [«it is law, also, to obey the counsel of one (man)»]. For (B49): εἰς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾖ [«One man is (of the value of) ten thousand for me, if he is the best»]. Heracleitus used to inveigh against the croud; Timon from Phlia surnamed him ὀχλολοῖδορον, mob-reviler (Fr. 817 *Supplementum Hellenisticum*, p. 383). The mass of mankind have no real understanding, not even right wit. B104: τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δῆμων αἰδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρεῖωνται ὁμίλῳ οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί [«What intelligence or wit do they have? They put their trust in (wandering) folk bards and take the collective body as their teacher, not knowing that the many are worthless, and only few are good»]. Heracleitus gives examples of his meritocratic pronouncements. B39: ἐν Πριήνῃ Βίας ἐγένετο ὁ Τευτάμεω, οὐ πλέων λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων [«In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutames, who is of more account than the rest»]. In fierce language he condemns his compatriots for causing the exile of Hermodorus, the ablest and most beneficial among them. It is important to notice and highlight the precision of Heracleitus' construal of such self-harming behaviour on the part of the Ephesians: nobody should excel, even, yes, nobody should be of greatest advantage. B121: ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνέβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες Ἐρμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἐω-υτῶν ὀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μὴδὲ εἰς ὀνήιστος ἔστω· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλη τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων [«What the Ephesians deserve is to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to unfledged boys; for they drove out Hermodorus, the most useful (the ablest) man among them, saying: Let no one be the best (the most useful - or let no one excel) among us; and if he is, let him be so elsewhere and among others»].

- [12] V. my analysis on the genesis of Pythagoreanism and its prime character in A.L. Pierris, *Origin and Nature of Early Pythagorean Cosmogony*, from K. Boudouris (ed.), *Pythagorean Philosophy*, 1992, pp. 126-162.
- [13] For an account of the transition from a more symbolic to a more mathematical construal of Pythagoreanism, v. my Excursus I: *On the Hybris of Limitation and Order*, A. *Symbolic and Mathematical Pythagoreanism: Early History*, from A.L. Pierris, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Continuity and Reaction in an Oecumenical Age*, in K. Boudouris (ed.), *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1993, pp. 144-7.
- [14] It had naturally been a striking discovery that simple ratios in the length or thickness of chords constitute the objective basis of consonance in the sounds of stringed instruments. Furthermore, it was quickly sensed that out of such simple ratios the entire system of musical harmony can be readily constructed. The fundamentals of the corresponding theory probably reached back to the 6th century B.C. A pitch relationship of 2:1 gives the octave; of 3:2 the fifth; and of 4:3 the fourth. Thus, the simplest ratios give the basic consonances - and in fact the simpler the ratio is, the more consonant is the harmony. The interval by which the fifth exceeds the fourth is specifically the tone; it follows that it is constituted by a ratio of 9:8. Putting two tones in succession within the fourth, we get a remainder of

$$\frac{256}{243},$$

this, therefore, is the value of a «semitone», which is not exactly half a tone. (To divide exactly into two the interval 9:8, one must find an x satisfying the condition

$$\frac{9}{x} = \frac{x}{8}.$$

Hence

$$x = 3\sqrt{8}$$

and the mathematical semitone is

$$\frac{3}{\sqrt{8}} \cong 1.060660172.$$

But

$$\frac{256}{243} = 1.053497942,$$

slightly less than half a tone). Out of the three simple ratios, and the resulting ones of 9:8 and 256:243, the whole natural octave is constructed, as well as all the ancient and modern modes and scales.

According to the Pythagoreans, this discovery was of paramount importance, for three main reasons.

a) The fact itself of the numerical constitution of harmony, as supplying the objective foundation of sound sensation. (This fact, *given the general speculative and conceptual framework mentioned in the main text above*, was extrapolated to the structure of reality in its entirety).

b) In the constitution of the system of natural harmony there enter primarily the three simple ratios, and, secondarily, by implication, two specific other ratios, one of relative simplicity, the other very complex. The fact that out of the innumerable possible complexities (and corresponding dissonances), just one is required to complete the system of harmony exemplified, for the Pythagoreans, a crucial point in the structure of reality: that certain specific anomalies enter into the lawfulness of being, and these are derivative upon natural regularities.

c) The necessary irregularities in the system of musical harmony (and, generally, in the world of existence conceived as a system of cosmic harmony) are «rational» (i.e. are represented by ratios of integers however complex). It was of the uttermost significance for the Pythagoreans, that not the «irrational» (i.e. incommensurate) mathematical half-tone

$$\left(\frac{3}{\sqrt{8}} \right)$$

was playing a role in the construction of the system of natural harmony, but rather a definite «rational» ratio, however complex (256:243). The full transparency, and thorough knowledgeability of reality was thus secured. For, to the ancient mind, such intelligibility involved sharp contours of things and absolute definition of being, a limitation expressed in terms of *finite «constructive» steps*. With the Pythagorean cosmogony we have the genesis, and the metaphysical foundation, of the idea *that knowledge implies ability to create*.

The full expression of the fundamental harmonic theory as above outlined occurs already in a fragment of Philolaus, the prominent

Pythagorean of the early fifth century (Fr. 6a Huffman, pp. 145-165; cf. 44B6 DK). As early as Xenocrates (4th century B.C.) at least, the basic conception was ascribed to Pythagoras himself (Xenocrates Fr. 9 Heinze). Collateral evidence also points in the same direction. For the theory of the three basic "means" was considered to be Pythagoras' discovery, to whom the introduction of the more «hidden» harmonic mean was specifically assigned. (Cf. e.g. Philolaus, Testimonium A24 Huffman p. 167). They are: a) the arithmetical means, where the last term exceeds the middle by the same amount as the middle exceeds the first (e.g. 2-4-6), b) the geometrical means, where the last term is to the middle as the middle is to the first (e.g. 2-4-8), c) the harmonic means, where the part of the last term by which it exceeds the middle is the same as the part of the first by which it is exceeded by the middle (e.g. 3-4-6). The octave, construed as a system of overlapping fifths and fourths, is completed by the introduction of the harmonic mean, as is shown in the following schema (Fig. 4).




Fig. 4

6 - 9 - 12 gives an arithmetical mean;
 6 - 8 - 12 gives a harmonic mean;
 [(3) - 6 - 12 gives the geometrical mean].

- [15] The amalgamation of early Pythagoreanism and Heracleitianism was most probably the work of the enigmatic Hippasus, a sort of «second founder» for the Pythagorean current of Philosophy. V. for the character and significance of his position, A.L. Pierris, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Continuity and Reaction in an Oecumenical Age*, Excursus I A: *Symbolic and Mathematical Pythagoreanism: Early History*, in K. Boudouris (ed.),

Hellenistic Philosophy, vol. I, 1993, pp. 145-7; and A.L. Pierris, *The Origin of Stoic Fatalism*, in *Chypre et Les Origines du Stoicisme*, Actes du Colloque Paris 12-13 Mai 1995, 1996, pp. 21-30 esp. p. 30.

- [16] In the Empedoclean, e.g., theory, everything is a mixture of the root-elements (31B8 DK). A particular mixture defines the nature of a corresponding substance, as, for instance, of bones (31B96 DK) or blood and flesh (31B98 DK): it is a question of determinate proportion.
- [17] Number is the reality out of which the world is constituted (58B22 = vol. I p. 456.35 DK. Cf. 58B9). The cosmic whole and the nature of things is constituted by number (58B38). The universe exists by reason of numbers and numerical ratios (esp. the three basic means); 44B22 (this is a genuine Philolaean fragment, despite DK's verdict). Numbers are the causes of essence and existence (45A3 = vol. I p. 420. 13 DK). Earliest Atomism (Leucippus) adhered to the view (67A15 = vol. II p. 75.36 DK). There is a «number» for every existing substance, for man, horse, plant (45A2; 3 DK); for fire, water, the sun, the moon, each animal etc. (58B27 = vol. I p. 457.27 sqq.). Qualities or attributes of number define the nature of justice, opportune time, soul, intelligence, opinion, daring, blending etc. (58B4 = vol. I p. 452.4 sqq. DK; 58B22 = vol. I p. 456.23 sqq.). As Gorgias put it in a rhetorical context, number is «*the guardian of things in their utility*», i.e. the determinative factor of things as definite substances capable of being grasped, conceived, handled and employed; ἀριθμὸς χρημάτων φύλαξ (82B11a §30 = vol. II p. 302.1 DK). *Number is equally determinative of essential character and constitutive of results in human action and production* (44B11 = vol. I p. 412.5 sqq.). Epicharmus had expressed poetically the idea (23B56 DK):

ὁ βίος ἀνθρώποις λογισμοῦ κἀριθμοῦ δέϊται πάνν·
ζῶμεν [δὲ] ἀριθμῷ καὶ λογισμῷ· ταῦτα γὰρ σώζει βροτοὺς.
[«Human life needs throughout calculation and number.
We live by reason of number and calculation; for these are
that keeps mortals in existence»].

Similarly, on the cosmic plane, number is «*the overpowering and self-generated holding together of the eternal continuance of things worldly*» according to Philolaus 44B23 (again a genuine passage in meaning if not in vocabulary): Φιλόλαος δὲ φησιν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῆς τῶν κοσμικῶν αἰωνίας διαμονῆς κρατιστεύουσιν καὶ αὐτογενῇ συνοχῇ. As for presentation so for generation: number according to Hippiasus is the

archetype in cosmic creation (18A11) or, alternatively, and to the same effect, an instrument of distinction in cosmic creation (*ibid.*). *The nature of things and structure of the world are, in other words, defined by number.* The empire of number is universal, permeating all spheres of reality, and ruling both cosmic processes and human activity; 44B11: ἴδοις δέ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντᾶ καὶ κατὰ τὰς δημιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας καὶ κατὰ τὰν μουσικάν [«You can see the nature of number and its power prevailing not only in realities superior and divine, but also everywhere in all human works and words, in all the arts of the craftsman and in music»]. By number the soul is tied to the body (44B 22). In fact, the nature of the soul is consubstantial to that of number (18A 11): *the intelligibility of things is a matter of their subjection to numerical determination.*

- [18] The Pythagorean Philolaus gives here, too, succinct formulations. 44B4 DK: καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου [«And indeed all the things that are known have number. For it is not possible that anything whatsoever be intellected or known without this»]. And more amply, B11 DK (which is, no doubt, genuine, in sense anyway, *pace* Huffman, *Philolaus of Croton*, p. 349): γνωμικὰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἡγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικά τῷ ἀπορουμένῳ παντὸς καὶ ἀγνωστομένου παντί· οὐ γὰρ ἥς δῆλον οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε ἄλλω πρὸς ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ ἥς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἡ τούτῳ οὐσία. νῦν δὲ οὗτος καττὰν ψυχὰν ἀρμόζων αἰσθήσει πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλάλοις κατὰ γνώμονος φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται συνάπτων (Newbold; σωματῶν Böckh, from the manuscript σωμάτων) καὶ σχίζων τοὺς λόγους χωρὶς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν περαινόντων [«For the nature of number is judgemental and authoritative and didactic in every matter and for everyone, where there is confusion or ignorance. For none of the existing things would be clear to anyone either in relation to themselves or in relation to one another, if number and its essence did not exist. But as it is, number fitting together in the soul all things to perception makes them known and agreeable with one another according to the nature of the gnomon, joining together and separating the proportions of things, each separately, both of things unlimited and of limiting things»].

- [19] For a sustained analysis of this position v. A.L. Pierris, *Roads to Excellence: the Metaphysics of Education in Plato and Contemporary Reality: Is Optimal Self-Realization metaphysically neutral?* in: J. D. Gericke and P. J. Maritz (eds.), *Plato's Philosophy of Education and its Relevance to Contemporary Society*, and *Education in the Ancient World*, Proceedings of the First International Conference of the South African Society of Greek Philosophy and the Humanities 29 April - 6 May 1997, Pretoria, 1998, vol. II pp. 329-373, cf. esp. n. 48, pp. 368-372.
- [20] A tract of the 5th century B.C. belonging to the Hippocratic Corpus argues for the existence of «artistry» in the various disciplines and professions, in particular in the medical practice. The work entitled *Περὶ Τέχνης* («On Art») represents thus, so to speak, an apology of the physician's art as a scientific discipline capable of systematically effecting the relevant desired results. (V. Th. Gomperz' critical and commented edition of the piece under the title *Die Apologie der Heilkunst, Eine Griechische Sophistenrede des Fünften Vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts*, 1910². He reasons correctly that it stems from the grand sophistical movement of the golden age in classical Greece).
- [20a] Celsus, *de Medicina*, prooemium §7: Hippocrates ... a studio sapientiae disciplinam hanc separavit ["Hippocrates separated this (sc. medicinal) discipline from the (general) study of wisdom"]. *Sapientia* here means both the philosophical theory of reality and the more primitive integral lore concerning it.
- [21] Heracleitus' work *Περὶ Φύσεως* («On (the) Nature (of things)») was probably composed towards the end of the first decade of the 5th century B.C. About the same time, or little later, we should locate Hippasus' researches, connected to the great Ephesian's theory.
- [22] Proportionality emerged as the definite character of a good form. The co-functionality of the parts of an organic whole resulted to, and was manifested by, a particular system of proportions binding together all its members into a unified totality. The successful integration of the multiple constituents in a complex unity depends on their entering into the compound according to an appropriate pattern of ratios. In the end, beauty and strength are strictly coordinated conditions: what is well-built

according to its own nature is also best suited to function most effectively in the performance of its own proper work. In any case, every property of a whole which refers to its good state and condition consists ultimately and essentially in some proportionality of its structure. A thing fit, in good condition (generally or for a specific purpose), is a respectively well-tempered thing (generally or in some corresponding respect). Thus, health in a living organism is fundamentally a question of some symmetry (a certain well-balanced proportion) in the blending of its constitutive elements. While beauty reflects a due proportionality in the external configuration of the whole's members. So Chrysippus SVF III 472. As to beauty, Chrysippus invoked the testimony of Polycleitus, the greatest sculptor, together with Pheidias, of high classicism. Polycleitus, in pursuit of perfection in the bodily shape of man, made a thorough study of proportions among human members. He concluded that excellence in form consists in a definite system of ratios binding together all parts of the integral shape and rendering them all commensurable according to a specific pattern: given the unit (standardly the thickness of a finger), the entire form can be constructed which answers to the definite pattern in question. Polycleitus specified the complex system of such «ideal» proportions for the case of an athletic adolescent, and made the corresponding statue to embody that ideal: it is the famous *Δορυφόρος* («Spear-bearer») whom we know from several Roman copies. Pliny (*Historia Naturalis*, XXXIV, 55) defines the type as *viriliter puerum* [«virile-looking boy»]. Chrysippus' philosophical description of the principle of Polycleitus system of proportions for the sturdy, youthful male human figure renders the point clear. Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, V p. 449 Kuhn = pp. 425-6 Müller: τὴν μὲν ὑγίειαν τοῦ σώματος ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς καὶ ὑγροῖς συμμετρίαν εἶναι φησιν (sc. Chrysippus), ἅπερ δὴ στοιχεῖα δηλονότι τῶν σωμάτων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ κάλλος οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ τῶν μορίων συμμετρίᾳ συνίστασθαι νομίζει, δακτύλου πρὸς δάκτυλον δηλονότι καὶ συμπάντων αὐτῶν πρὸς τε μετακάρπιον καὶ καρπὸν καὶ τούτων πρὸς πῆχυν καὶ πῆχεως πρὸς βραχίονα καὶ πάντων πρὸς πάντα, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Πολυκλείτου Κανόνι γέγραπται. πάσας γὰρ ἐκδιδάξας ἡμᾶς ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συγγράματι τὰς συμμετρίας τοῦ σώματος ὁ Πολύκλειτος ἔργῳ τὸν λόγον ἐβεβαίωσε δημιουργήσας ἀνδριάντα κατὰ τὰ τοῦ λόγου προστάγματα καὶ καλέσας δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀνδριάντα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα, Κανόνα [«Bodily health he (sc. Chrysippus) maintained to be a symmetry (a due proportion) between the warm and

the cold and the dry and the liquid, what are in fact the elements of corporeal nature. Whereas beauty he considers to consist not in the symmetry of the elements, but in that of the members - in the symmetry of finger to finger, that is to say, and of all fingers to the palm and the wrist, and of those to the forearm, and of the forearm to the arm, and of all (members) to all (members), as it is laid down in Polycleitus' work entitled «The Standard». For after teaching us in that treatise all proportions of the human body, Polycleitus confirmed indeed his analysis by creating a statue according to the theoretical precepts, and naming indeed the statue, just as the book, the Standard». (By both «analysis» and «theoretical» I render «λόγος», which term covers, as the latin «ratio», both the meanings of reason and numerical proportion)].

The static analogies of the human frame have to be seen dynamically transformed when the figure is put into action. In fact this is what enlivens the dead matter by making it resemble (or imitate) the living form. Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, III, 10, 6-7) has Socrates to explain in this way the artist's success in conversation with (an otherwise unknown) sculptor Cleiton (a likely impersonation of the famous *Polycleitus*, whom Socrates admired most among the statuaries; v. Xenophon *op.cit.* I, 4, 3); Socrates asks what makes statues to appear enlivened, in what way the imitation and resemblance to the living kinds makes sculpture more lively. Οὐκοῦν τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων κατασπώμενα καὶ τὰ νασπώμενα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ τὰ συμπιεζόμενα καὶ τὰ διελκόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἐντεινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀνιέμενα ἀπεικάζων ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι; πάννυ μὲν οὖν ἔφη. [«Surely then, it is by representing the parts of the bodies that are drawn down and up as a result of the figurements (taken by the body in various postures or actions), and the parts compressed and extended, and those stretched and slackened - is it not that by representing these you make (the statues of the living beings) appear more similar to the real thing and more true to nature? Very much so, he said»].

An idea of the system of proportions regulating the (well-built) human form is given by Vitruvius, the Roman architect. He specifies some basic ratios of capital parts or characteristic details in man's body (*De Architectura*, III, 1, 2-3), which in all likelihood stem from the Polycleitean standard, albeit with modifications in the diverse symmetries involved reflecting Hellenistic norms of taste. From the case of an organic substance, the principle of the systematic proportionality and commensurability was transferred to that of man-made works. Every

artifact, in order to be well-constructed, had to «grow» according to that organic principle of integration. Vitruvius, following the Greek theory, explicitly draws the analogy in the realm of architecture, with regard to buildings, and especially, buildings *par excellence*, i.e. temples as houses of gods. He very clearly expounds the main point (*op.cit.* III, 1, 1): Aedium compositio constat ex symmetria, cuius rationem diligentissime architecti teneri debent. Ea autem paritur a proportione, quae graece ἀναλογία dicitur. Proportio est ratae partis membrorum in omni opere totoque commodulatio, ex qua ratio efficitur symmetriarum. Namque non potest aedis ulla sine symmetria atque proportione rationem habere compositionis, nisi uti [ad] hominis bene figurati membrorum habuerit exactam rationem. [«The composition (design) of a temple depends on symmetry, the principles and analysis of which must be most carefully observed by the architects. Symmetry, however, is an offspring of proportion, what is called ἀναλογία in Greek. Now proportion is a correspondence among the measures of the members of an entire work, and of the whole to a certain part functioning as standard (modulus): from this results the inner logic (the reason and principles) of the symmetries. For without symmetry and proportion there can be no logic (reason, principles) in the composition (design) of any temple; that is, if there is no precise relation between its members, as in the case of those of a well-shaped man»]. Vitruvius ascribes to the «ancients» the thorough application of the *Principle of Number* from the constitution of the living human form to the design of buildings (III, 1, 4). He repeatedly emphasises what the *Principle of Number* consists in: (a) there is an exact relationship between the measures of all members of the whole to each other and to the whole; and (b) this exact relationship is based on a commensurability of all significant measurements in the object to a common unit, an appropriate basic member of the whole. Thus, again, in III, 1, 9: Ergo si convenit ex articulis hominis numerum inventum esse et ex membris separatis ad universam corporis speciem ratae partis commensus fieri responsum, relinquitur, ut suscipiamus eos, qui etiam aedes deorum immortalium constituentes ita membra operum ordinaverunt, ut proportionibus et symmetriis separatae atque universae convenientes efficerentur eorum distributiones [«Therefore, if it is agreed that (the principle of) number (i.e. numerical order) was found out from the articulation of the human figure, and that there is a symmetrical correspondence between the members separately and the entire form of the body, in accordance with a certain part functioning as standard (unit

of measure, the *modulus*), we can but applaud those who, in constructing temples of the immortal gods, have so arranged the members of the works that both their separate and integral distribution in the design may harmonise by means of proportions and symmetries». The *exactness* and *completeness* of the relationships involved is emphasised with reference to Polycleitus' Spearbearer or *the Standard*. So Galen, *de temperamentis*, I, 9 p. 42.33 Helmreich: καί πού τις ἀνδριᾶς ἐπαινεῖται Πολυκλείτου Κανὼν ὀνομαζόμενος ἐκ τοῦ πάντων τῶν μορίων ἀκριβῇ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίαν ἔχειν ὀνόματος τοιούτου τυχῶν [and, in fact, a statute by Polycleitus called «the Standard» is applauded, having acquired such a name by reason of the fact that it incorporates the exact symmetry of all the members one to another»].

The inner logic defining the patterned order of an entity, natural or man-made, is *mathematical*. The articulation of this mathematical order is, on the other hand, highly *complex*. The meaningful complexity in the harmonies of an artifact constitutes its excellence. Thus Polycleitus declared (40B2 DK): τὸ εὖ παρὰ μικρὸν διὰ πολλῶν ἀριθμῶν γίνεται [«perfection is accomplished little by little by means of many numbers» (i.e. through multiple proportions, balances, harmonies)]. The invisible harmony is mightier than the obvious one (Heraclitus, 22B54 DK: ἀρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων). Such secret, integral, underlying harmony is produced as the accumulative result of many, coordinated harmonies. The emphasis in the significant *detail* implicit in the above Polycleitean statement is rendered explicit by another dictum of his (40B1 DK): χαλεπώτατον αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον, οἷς ἂν ἐν ὄνυχι ὁ πηλὸς γένηται [«the work comes to its most difficult phase when the clay-model reaches the nail stage», i.e. when the sculptor puts the finishing touches to the model with his nail]. There was a general awareness of the fact that exactness in small things make all the difference especially in grand purposes. Thus, Sextus' *Sentences* I, 9.10 Elter: μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων ἀκριβῶς βίου· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐν βίῳ τὸ «παρὰ μικρόν» [«live with precision even down to the minimal matters; for it is no small thing in life the «little by little»]. *Being and perfection*, the dynamism of existence and its fruition in excellence and success, the harmony of things, resides in, and is activated by, *acute resonances*: such sharp precision is a question of minute adjustment in the corresponding field of determination or operation. Harmony is very sharp; dissonance is blurred and indefinitely varied around the point of harmonious resonance.

Pythagoreanism provided the theoretical key to a deeper understanding of reality and, consequently, to a more thorough efficiency in man's action and production in it. The early Pythagoreans tried to evolve a successful *sacred science* of matters moral and political, the "mathematics" of human action. The endeavour met with a severe setback in the political sphere. But the results in the field of operation of man's creative impulse were definitive and lasting. *Proper art and artistry* (craftmanship endowed with knowledge, competence grounded in knowing how to do things and effect results) *was born from their insights, the applied wisdom of making things of superlative excellence, imitating natural wonders of beauty.* or, rather, and more than that, penetrating into the intrinsic essential norms of nature herself. The *Principle of Number* became the revealed secret of every art of significance. We hear that (by a symbolic coincidence) the sculptor *Pythagoras* of Rhegion (migrated in all likelihood from Samos; probably with a *floruit* at the first half of the fifth century) was the first to aim at compositional rhythm and commensurability of parts (Diogenes Laertius VIII, 47: *πρῶτον* (sc. *Pythagoras*) *δοκοῦντα ρυθμοῦ καὶ συμμετρίας ἐστοχάσθαι*). The adjective *numerosus* (of manifold numbers) became a standard critical category with application both to the representative arts and (as we shall see) oratory. Thus of Myron (a rather earlier contemporary of Polycleitus) it was said that (Plinius, *Naturalis Historia*, XXXIV, §58) *primus hic multiplicasse veritatem videtur, numerosior in arte quam Polycleitus et in symmetria diligentior* [«he seems to have been the first to extend (variegate) the representation of natural truth, making use of more numbers in his art than Polycleitus and being more diligent over proportion and symmetry»]. The painter Antidotus (a disciple of Euphranor, c. 400-330 B.C.) was reputedly (Plinius XXXV, §130): *diligentior quam numerosior et in coloribus severus* [«(he was) more diligent (in the representation of nature) than given to its mathematical articulation (i.e. employing a variety of numbers in the structuring of his work); he was also austere in his colour»].

A characteristically modern example of a sustained analysis according to the Principle of Number with regard to an ancient architectural edifice (the so-called Basilica of Paestum) brought in chronological and conceptual relation to the Pythagorean movement in southern Italy at the last quarter of 6th century B.C., is supplied by Otto Hertwig, *Über Geometrische Gestaltungsgrundlagen von Kultbauten des VI. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. zu Paestum*, 1968. The particular system of

«numbers» displayed in this work may be far-fetched, imposed and rather speculative and artificial, but something of the sort was clearly operating consciously in the art-work of the time, since the end of the 6th century B.C. A more factual example, with attention concentrating on the actual reconstruction of the inner «mathematical» form of the work is given in *Plate 4*. (Compare and contrast the biased conformism of the analysis of the same relief in the above cited work, *Tafel IV* reproduced here as *Plate 5*. It concerns the sculptural relief from a Parthenonian metope. The idea is also applied to a significant specimen of such a *calculated* system and principle of harmony (what I may call Pythagorean Art or Artistic Pythagoreanism); a metope from the Hephaesteion at the Athenian Agora (*Plate 3*). A similar analysis is given, indicatively, with regard to Polycleitus' *Canon* (*Plate 6*; cf. *Plate 7*). The *dynamic* harmony of the male human figure in *tensional* repose here, presents the natural development of the study of perfect static proportionality as exhibited, for a masterful example, by the late archaic Apollo from Peiraeus (*Plate 8*). V. the description of the Plates, *infra*, pp. 768-770. A fine architectural illustration of the great principle of complex synthesis and multiple balances integrated into a cohesive overall harmony («διὰ πολλῶν ἀριθμῶν») is supplied by the Erechtheion on the Acropolis (*Plate 16*).

- [23] It is significant that Gorgias himself, the great Sophist who first instituted rhetoric as a systematic and articulate art, was reputed to have been a pupil of Empedocles, thus incorporated into the broader Pythagorean tradition. V. *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 31A1 §§58-59 DK and 82A3 DK. In fact Satyrus (in the passage referred to) and even, before him, Aristotle (31A1 §57 DK and 31A19 DK; V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, IX Fr. 1 (48), p. 75 = Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, IX Fr. 65 p. 74 = Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*, p. 15 Fr. 1) considered Empedocles himself as the inventor of rhetoric. Cf. for the full unified account of both traditions Quintilianus III, 1, 8 (in 31A19 DK). The fact that Aristotle wrote about Empedocles in a dialogue concerned with the definition of the Sophist and the characteristic teaching of the Sophists (and perhaps entitled *The Sophist*) is also revealing of the true lineage of the movement which expressed the thinking and feeling of high classicism. Sophistics was possible when Pythagoreanism established the possibility of the knowledge, i.e. of *effective knowledge capable of predicting, effecting and making a difference in the world*. The ultimate connexion of rhetoric to Pythagoreanism was also explicitly entertained in

antiquity; cf. *Scholia in Iamblichi Vita Pythagorica*, p. 150.7-12 Deubner, also in 31A19 DK.

Heracleitus has spoken (22B 81 DK = Fr. 18 Marcovich) of someone as being *κοπίδων ἀρχηγός* ["leader in (intellectual and verbal) knifery"]. Probably both hairsplitting in reasoned analysis or presentation and inflicting wounds on the interlocutor is meant by these *cutters* (*κοπίδες*): the connotation is thus of overt ingenuity in speech, and, by implication, of deceptive persuasiveness of swindling, of bogus talk and fraudulent dexterity in argumentation. The likely object of Heracleitus' condemnation was Xenophanes, the originator of the Eleatic trend of thought. Timaeus (F.Gr.H. 566 F132) turns the tables against Heracleitus: for him neither Pythagoras nor he who was accused by Heracleitus, but pretentious Heracleitus himself is the "*leader of cutters*". We are talking about the genesis of Rhetoric. All three main final currents of late archaic philosophy dispute the disputably honourific claim of first originator: Pythagoreanism, Eleatism, Heracleiteanism. Philodemus (*Rhetorica*, I coll. 57 and 62 = Diogenes Babylonius SVF III n. 105 = 22B 81 DK) contrasts something (*τὰ μὲν*) which has been held responsible for the introduction of the art of oratorical persuasion, but is, in his opinion, unfit to provide the required machinations of deceit on which rhetorics depends; to something else (*τοῦτο*) on which all theoretical foundation of rhetorics depends. Probably *τὰ μὲν* are mathematics: hence Pythagoreanism is exempted from the accusation. The alternative possibility (the *τοῦτο*) may well refer to the Heracleitean unity of the opposites, indeed the veritable source of dialectic. In which case Philodemus would repeat Timaeus' view very appropriately in view of his Epicureanism and consequent opposition to Stoicism and Stoic predilection for Heracleitus.

Just as the early Pythagoreans discovered that audible harmony depends on an objective structured system of ratios in the pitch of the sounds and in the physical configurations producing them, so the first inventors of rhetoric understood that persuasion and the general effect of a speech depends on the utilisation of patterned constructions in an oration. Such patterned construction is codified in certain *figures* of speech and results in rhythmical forms of expression. The rhythm in the concatenated word-sequences which characterised poetry was transplanted in prose; and this was effected «scientifically» because one possessed now the *art* of speech. Speech was henceforth articulated in periods exhibiting formal patterns and thus sustaining rhythmic

movements. *Number structured the periodication of discourse.* As Aristotle said (*Ars Rhetorica*, 1409b5): ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις [«periodic diction has number»].

Discourse is conceived in its form sculpturally. Balance of contrasted moments and equipoise and symmetry constitute its shape and formal character. Speaking of word-choice and collocation (*verborum copia et eorum constructio et numerus*) Cicero (*Orator*, 37-38) explains: Datur etiam venia concinnitati sententiarum, et arguti certique et circumscripti verborum ambitus conceduntur, de industriaque non ex insidiis, sed apertae ac palam elaboratur, ut *verba verbis quasi demensa et paria respondeant ut crebro conferantur pugnancia compareruntque contraria* et ut pariter extrema terminentur eumdemque referant in cadendo sonum [«For great indulgence is shown to neatly turned sentences; and rhythmical, steady, well-circumscribed periods are always admissible. And pains are taken purposely, not disguisedly, but openly and avowedly, to *make one word answer to another as if they had been measured together and were equal to each other; so that words opposed to one another may be frequently contrasted, and contrary words compared together; and that sentences may be terminated in the same manner, and may give the same sound at their conclusion*»]. Cicero ascribes to Gorgias (and Thrasymachus, another well-known Sophist) the origin and first institution of this systematic science of composition (*ibid.* §39; and also §40, where the two are said to be the first to have bound together words by the rules of an art; *primi traduntur arte quadam verba vinxisse*). *Such balancing of equilibrated opposites* created by itself rhythm and cadence: the period appears as an orderly moving and *growing* entity closing up its development, and thus integrated, at the end. Cicero, following the Greek rhetoricians, very clearly analyses the point (*ibid.* 164-166): Nec solum componentur verba ratione, sed etiam finientur, quoniam id iudicium esse alterum aurium diximus. Sed finiuntur aut compositione ipsa aut quasi sua sponte et quodam genere verborum, in quibus ipsis concinnitas inest; quae sive casus habent in exitu similes sive paribus paria redduntur sive opponuntur contraria, suapte natura numerosa sunt, etiamsi nihil est factum de industria. In huius concinnitatis consecratione *Gorgiam* fuisse principem accepimus; quo de genere illa nostra sunt in Miloniana: «Est enim, iudices, haec non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti, sed facti, non instituti, sed imbuti sumus». Haec enim talia sunt, ut, quia referuntur ad ea, ad quae debent

referri, intelligamus non quaesitum esse numerum, sed secutum. Quod fit item in referendis contrariis, ut illa sunt, quibus non modo numerosa oratio, sed etiam versus efficitur:

Eam, quam nihil accusas, damnas

(Condemnas diceret, qui versum effugere vellet:)

Bene quam meritam esse autumnas, dicis male mereri.

Id, quod scis, prodest nihil: id, quod nescis, obest.

Versum efficit ipsa relatio contrariorum. Id esset in oratione numerosa: «Quod scis, nihil prodest: quod nescis, multum obest». *Semper haec, quae Graeci ἀντίθετα nominant, quum contrariis opponuntur contraria, numerum oratorum necessitate ipsa efficiunt, etiam sine industria.* Hoc genere antiqui iam ante Isocratem delectabantur et maxime Gorgias, cuius in oratione plerumque efficit numerum ipsa concinnitas. Nos etiam in hoc genere frequentes, ut illa sunt in quarto accusationis: «Conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello, huius praetoris adventum cum illius imperatoris victoria, huius cohortem impuram cum illius exercitu invicto, huius libidines cum illius continentia: ab illo, qui cepit, conditas, ab hoc, qui constitutas accepit, captas dicetis Syracusas». Ergo et hi numeri sint cogniti. [«Nor is it only that one's words are to be arranged in a regular, rational system, but the terminations of the sentences must be carefully studied, since we have said that that is a second sort of judgement of the ears [beside the first one referring to the intrinsic quality of the word-sound]. But the harmonious end of a sentence depends either on the arrangement itself (of the word made on purpose) or on a spontaneous, so to speak, effect (as something produced on its own accord) and on a certain kind of words in which there inheres neat coadaptability; and whether such words have cases the terminations of which are similar, or whether one word is matched with another which resembles it, or whether contrary words are opposed to one another, they are harmonious and produce a measured effect of their own nature, even if nothing has been done on purpose. In the pursuit of this sort of neatness Gorgias is reported to have been the leader; and of this style there is an example in our speech in defence of Milo: «For this law, O judges, is not a written one, but a natural one; one which we have not learnt, or received or gathered but which we have extracted, and pressed out, and imbibed from nature itself; it is one in which we have not been educated but born; not been brought up in it, but imbued with it». For these clauses are such that, because they are referred to what they ought to be referred, we see plainly that harmonious measure was not the thing that was sought in them, but that

which followed. *And this is also the case when contraries are opposed to one another*; as those phrases are by which not only measured (prose) sentences, but even verses are made.

«Her, whom you accuse of nothing, you damn».

One would say «condemn» if he wished to avoid making a verse.

«Her, whom you esteem deserving well, you say that
she merits ill».

«That which you know, is of no help; that which you
ignore, harms».

The very relation of contraries makes a verse. That would be in *measured* prose:

«What you know, is of no avail; what you ignore, is of much harm».

These things, which the Greeks call ἀντίθετα, since in them contraries are opposed to contraries, of sheer necessity produce always oratorical measure and rhythm, and that, too, without any other specific more ado.

This was a kind of speaking in which the ancients used to take delight, even before the time of Isocrates; and especially *Gorgias*; in whose oratorical manner his very neatness generally produces measure and rhythm. We too frequently employ this style; as in the fourth book of our impeachment of Verres: «Compare this peace with that war; the arrival of this praetor with the victory of that general; the debauched retinue of this man, with the unconquerable army of the other; the lust of this man with the continence of that one; and you will say that Syracuse was founded by the man who captured it; and was stormed by this one, who received it in an ordered condition». *These then numbers (measures of speech) must be well understood* »].

The crux of the matter as regards this style is well captured by Cicero. Thus concisely in *Orator*, §175: Nam ..., paria paribus adiuncta et similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria quae sua sponte, etiamsi id non agas, cadunt plerumque numero, Gorgias primus invenit, sed iis est usus intemperantius [«For ... the principle according to which things like one another are placed side by side, as well as sentences similarly shaped are collocated, and contraries are related to contraries, which all create mostly a measured cadence of their own, even if one takes no extra pains about it, was first discovered by Gorgias; but he used it intemperately»]. Gorgias himself admitted to his predilection for this technique (*ibid.*). The art consisted in the employment of *figures* of speech, which gave it shape and form. These Gorgian σχήματα (*figures*) were the ἀντίθετα (*antithesis, opposites*), the ἰσόκωλα and πάρισα

(sentences with exactly, or almost, equal clauses), the *ὁμοιοτέλευτα* and *παρόμοια* (clauses of a sentence with the same or similar cadence or termination), the *παρονομασία* (assonance and alliteration in the word structure generally). Cf. e.g. Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica*, Γ, 1409b33 - 1410b5; Diodorus Siculus, XII, 53.

Speech and oratorical discourse were conceived spatially. The sentence was an object having members, and it was the balance and measure of its members which constituted the rhythmical harmony of the whole. An example from Gorgias' own style will vividly exemplify the idea. It is a fragment from his funeral speech in honour of Athenian war dead (82 B 6 DK). It is best set in space, displaying a prose structure parallel to poetic verse layout, the architectonics of verbal composition (Fig. 4).

Antitheses have been underlined. By themselves, as Cicero insists, they create an oratorical rhythm. The number of syllables in the fractions (*κῶμα*) and members (clauses) of the sentences (indicated in the edited text with: and / correspondingly) are as follows:

- (1) - without *τούτοις* - = (2) = 8
- (3) = (4) - without *ὧν* - = 8
- (5) - without *εἰπεῖν* - = 7
- (6) = 5
- (7) = 9
- (8) = 10
- (10) = (11) = 8
- (12a) = (12b) = 11
- (13a) - without *πολλὰ δὲ* - = (13b) = 6
- (15b) = (15c) = (15d) = (15e) = 3
- (18) = (19) = 6
- (20) = 13
- (21) = 12
- (22) = (23) = 8
- (24a) = 7
- (24c) = 6
- (25) = (26) = (27) = 8
- (28) = 6
- (30) = 7
- (31) = 9
- (32b) = (32c) = 8
- (32d) = (32e) = 9
- (33) = 11

$$(34) = 14$$

$$(35) = (36) = 11$$

$$(37) = 10$$

$$(38) = 9$$

These measurements abundantly prove the overshadowing existence of *ισόκωλα* and *πάρισα* (exact and near equality of syllables in corresponding members of the same and successive sentences). There are higher order balances as well: for example $(12) + (13) = 37 = (14) + (15) = (18) + (19) + (20) + (21)$; and $(22) + (23) = (24) = (25) + (26) = 16$ while the concluding $(27) + (28) = 15$. As Ephorus rightly observed, it is the numbers of syllables and their balance that contributes to the prose rhythm in question, and not the number of tempi (insisting, that is, on the count of long and short syllables considered in the *musical* and poetic standard relationship of two to one). So Cicero, *Orator*, 194: Ephorus vero ne spondaeum quidem, quem fugit, intelligit esse aequalem dactylo, quem probat. Syllabis enim metiendos pedes, non intervallis existimat; quod idem facit in trochaeo, qui temporibus et intervallis est par iambo [«But Ephorus will not even admit that the spondee (the measure or foot - -) which he condemns, is equivalent to the dactyl (-uu), which he approves. For he thinks that feet ought to be measured by their syllables, not by their time intervals (their quantity, their tempi); and he does the same in regard to (i.e. disapproves of) the trochee (-u), which in its quantity and *tempus* is in fact equivalent to an iambic (u-) etc.».]. And similarly Plutarch castigates Isocrates for his meticulous care lest his *ισόκωλα* would be deficient by even a single syllable (*De Gloria Atheniensium*, 350E). *Prose rhythm is syllabic and, therefore, accentual, rather than based on the succession of long and short tempi.*

[I subjoin the felicitous German rendering of Gorgias' passage in Diels-Kranz:

«Was ging denn diesen Männern ab von den Eigenschaften, die Männern zukommen sollen? Und was kam ihnen zu von denen, die nicht zukommen sollen? Konnte ich doch ausdrücken, was ich wünsche, und wünschte ich doch, was man soll, verborgen der göttlichen Vergeltung, entronnen der menschlichen Missgunst! Denn gott-voll war die Tüchtigkeit, die diese besaßen, menschlich nur die Sterblichkeit: oftmals zogen sie ja die milde Billigkeit dem schroffen Recht vor, oftmals auch der peinlichen Genauigkeit des Gesetzes die Richtigkeit der Redeweise, denn dies hielten sie für das göttlichste und all-gemeinste Gesetz, das Notwendige in notwendigen Augenblick zu sagen oder zu verschweigen,

- 1 τί γὰρ ἀπὴν τοῖς ἀνδράσι /
 1α
 2
 3 τί δὲ καὶ προσεῖν /
 4
 5
 6 δυναίμην ἄ βούλομαι, /
 7 λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θείαν νέμεσιν, /
 8
 9
 10 ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, /
 11
 12 πολλὰ μὲν δὲ τὸ πρᾶον ἐπιεικές,·
 13 πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας·
 14 τοῦτον νομίζοντες θειότατον
 15 καὶ καινότατον νόμον, /
 16 καὶ δισσὰ ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὧν δεῖ, /
 17
 18 τὴν μὲν βουλευόντες /
 19
 20 θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, /
 21
 22 αἰθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, /
- τούτοις
 εἰπεῖν
 οὔτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο:
- ὧν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσεῖναι;
 ὧν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι;
 βουλοίμην δ' ἄ δεῖ, /
 φυγὼν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον.
 ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ θνητόν, /
 τοῦ αὐθάδους δικαίου προκρίνοντας,·
 λόγων ὀρθότητα,·
 τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι· καὶ λέγειν· καὶ σιγᾶν·
 καὶ ποιεῖν· καὶ ἔαν·
 γνώμην <καὶ ρώμην>, /
 τὴν δ' ἀποτελεοῦντες, /
 κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων, /

23		εὐόργητοι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, /	
24	τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνώμης:	τὸ ἄφρον <τῆς ρώμης>, /	
25		κόσμοι εἰς τοὺς κοσμίους, /	
26		δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. /	
27		ἑαυτῶν δὲ ἀναθήματα, /	
28		οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων:	
29		οὔτε φιλοκάλου εἰρήνης,·	
30		ὅσοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, /	
31		εὐσεβεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει.	
32	οὐκ ἄπειροι:	ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν, /	
33		οὐκ ἐν ἀθανάτοις σώμασι:	
34		οὐ ζώντων.	
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Fig. 4

zu tun oder zu lassen, und Zweierlei ubten sie vor allen von dem, was not tut, Geist und Leib, jenem im Rat, diesen in der Tat, als Pfleger derer, die ungerecht Unglück erfuhren, als Züchtiger derer, die ungerecht Glück erfuhren, voll Schroffheit zugunsten des Gemeinschaft, voll Leidenschaft zugunsten der Schicklichkeit, durch die vernunft des Geistes stillend die Unvernunft <des Leibes>, gewaltätig gegen die Gewalttätigen, voll Ordnung gegen die Ordentlichen, furchtlos gegen die Furchtlosen, furchtbar in furchtbaren Lagen. Als Zeugnis dessen errichteten sie Zeichen des Sieges über die Feinde, Schmuckstücke für Zeus, Weihgeschenke von sich selbst, sie, die nicht unerfahren waren im eingeborenen Kriegertum und in der erlaubten Liebe, im Streit, dem Träger der Waffen, und im Frieden, dem Freunde der Schönheit, ehrfurchtsvoll gegen die Götter durch ihre Gerechtigkeit, fromm gegen die Eltern durch ihre Dienstwilligkeit, gerecht gegen die Mitbürger durch die Pflege der Gleichkeit, verehrungsvoll gegen die Freunde durch ihre Treue. Darum ist nun, da sie gestorben, die Sehnsucht nach ihnen nicht mitgestorben, sondern unsterblich in freilich nicht unsterblichen Leibern lebt sie fort nach ihnen, die nicht mehr leben»].

The principle of *antithetical symmetry*, so manifest in the Gorgianic style, was artfully employed in all Greek prose writing. (Cf. e.g. J.D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, pp. 60-77). It was simply later matured and nuanced, remaining always dominant, just as the straight balance in archaic sculpture developed into the complex symmetries of the classical art without disappearing. The harmony from apparent became hidden, but it was nonetheless a harmony of opposites. The overall balance was the collective effect of many, articulated, «numbers», according to the pointed Polycleitean dictum, above mentioned.

The measured progression of speech constitutes the rhythm of oration. Thus number is the essence of rhythm. Cicero, *Orator*, 67: Quidquid est enim, quod sub aurium *mensuram* aliequam cadit ... *numerus* vocatur, qui Graece *ρυθμός* dicitur. [«For whatever it is which offers the ears any regular measure ... is called number (by us), which in Greek is called rhythm»]. Cf. *ibid.* 170. This is the rhythm (as Cicero nicely elucidates) which is produced not by the deliberate introduction (sparing or abundant) of poetic feet into the prose writing or speech, especially at the termination of clauses and sentences, but by the kind of words used and their formal arrangement: observance of balances in the collocation of similars and in the contrast of opposites provides the key for such measure and rhythm. Once more Cicero, *Orator*, 220: *Formae vero quaedam sunt*

orationis, in quibus ea concinnitas est, ut sequatur numerus necessario. Nam quum aut par pari refertur aut contrarium contrario opponitur aut, quae similiter cadunt verba, verbis comparantur, quidquid ita concluditur, plerumque fit ut numerose cadat. [«For there are some forms of oratory in which there is so much neatness, that rhythm unavoidably follows. For when like is referred to like, or contrary opposed to contrary, or when words which sound alike are compared to other words, whatever sentence is wound up in that manner must usually sound rhythmically»]. In a sense this pattern of rhythm is the fundamental one in prose, the one which gives proper shape, form, light and «figure» to speech (*ibid.* 181). For (selective and variant) employment of feet characterises the peculiar rhythm of poetry (whose application to prose is the study of the last part of Cicero's *Orator*, §§204 sqq.). Such poetic embellishment of prose does not constitute, nor is it essentially involved in, the latter's *proper* excellence.

Rhythm in general is created by the punctuation, so to speak, of a given field through similarities and contrasts. A certain balance of parts and members constitutes the specific rhythm of the whole. This applies to moving entities (like speech and dance) or to static ones (like the representation of the body or an architectural design or the anatomy of an organism or the structure of a societal order and a State). A poignant philosophical formulation of this general concept of rhythm is evidenced by the atomist doctrine that the shape of the being-elements is their visible rhythm of integration. *Form is a rhythm of being*. V. for Leucippus, 67 A6 (II 72.21) DK; A28 (II 78.21); and for Democritus 68A38 (II 94.7); A44 (II 95.21); A125 (II 111.30); A33 (II 91.7) = B5i (II 138.24); with reference to the prevailing societal order and formal structure of polity, τῷ νῦν καθεστῶτι ρυθμῷ, B266 (II 200.5). See also 30A5 (I 263, 975b29).

- [24] B30 DK = 51 Marcovich: κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται· πῦρ αἰεζών, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. [«the cosmic order, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be, fire everliving with an inherent measured progression (i.e. a rhythm) of ignition and extinction»].

- [25] For the intellectual character of ancient Greek virtue, v. my paper cited *supra*, n. [19].

- [26] Refusal to categorially oppose values to facts has been termed the «*Naturalistic Fallacy*». Thereby the entire ancient moral and political philosophical tradition is indicted. But in truth, construing values as something fundamentally alien in nature to the facts of reality is a veritable *Transcendentalistic Fallacy*.
- [27] The metaphysical schism between value and fact has far-reaching noxious consequences. Such an one is the alleged categorial difference between means and ends, the fundamental bifurcation between «technology» or *technocratic* treatment of problems on the one hand, and ethics or politics on the other. The idea pervades (modern) European thought, and appears even where least expected as a speculative burden and prejudice. Weber, for instance (M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, edd. G. Roth and Cl. Wittich, vol. I, pp. 65-67), contrasts the technique of human actions to their ends as the means employed to accomplish an aim vis-a-vis the meaning and purpose of the actions itself. Rationality for him refers principally to the question of the choice of appropriate means to an end - for example, it may consist in the principle of *Least Effort*. *Economic* action, on the other hand, «is primarily oriented to the problem of choosing the end to which a thing shall be applied» (*ibid.* p. 67). Weber is obliged, reluctantly and, so to speak, against the grain, to utilise (albeit indirectly) the notion of «*economic rationality*», as concerned with whether the employment of given means to an end is «worthwhile», for instance what are the *relative merits* of different applications of the means available to different purposes, be it in market or planned-economy terms (*ibid.* p. 66).

But the merit of the employment of given means to a certain end consists ultimately in its (degree of) *profitability*, absolutely with reference to the satisfaction of the hierarchised needs of human nature (universal and individual), and relatively to the profitability of alternative expenditures of the same means in pursuit of different possible ends. So that *economical rationality* is a question of higher order «*technology*» than the one involved in the mere adaptation of means to a given end: it reflects superior (or more basic) facts concerning the *Calculus of Wants and Fulfilments* of man's nature. The pressure to acknowledge as much is there in Weber's analysis, but fails to be explicitly articulated because of the dominance of the unhappy radical opposition between means and ends, technical choice and moral (or political or economic) choice.

[28] This basic idea permeates ancient Greek experience and theory of perception and understanding, of apprehension and comprehension: it is expressed differently but congruently in the various currents of thought. As Aristotle succinctly put the point (*De Anima*, 405b13-19): διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν ὀριζόμενοι αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) ἢ στοιχείον ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν ἑνός· φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεισθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα γινώσκει, συνιστᾷσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν τινα λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχείον ἓν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τιθέασιν, οἶον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα· οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν [«Hence all who define soul by its capacity for knowledge either make it an element or derive it from the elements, being on this point with one exception, in general agreement. Like, they tell us, is known by like; and therefore, since the soul knows all things, they say it consists of all the ultimate principles. Thus, those thinkers who admit only one cause and one element, such as fire or air, assume the soul also to be one element; while those who admit a plurality of principles assume plurality also in the soul»]. The exception meant refers to Anaxagoras, and his theory of Intelligence as the ultimate principle of reality having nothing in common with any (other and derivative) reality. Aristotle questions in the sequel (405b19 sqq.) how can then the Intellect comprehend anything at all, being radically different from all.

An explicit enunciation of the doctrine that like is known by like is provided by Empedocles and Plato, as Aristotle testifies (*ibid.*, 404b8 sqq.): ὅσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων (sc. τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν), οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως (B109 DK = 523 Bollack):

γαῖη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἶδηλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργὴν, νείκος δέ τε νείκει λυγρῷ.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ *Τιμαίῳ* (34c sqq.; cf. esp. 37a-c; 45b-46c) τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι etc. [«While those who laid stress on the soul's knowledge and perception of all that exists, identified the soul with the ultimate principles, if they recognised a plurality of these making the soul these, if (they recognised) only one, (making the soul) just that one - thus Empedocles made the soul consist

of all (primary) elements, holding also that each one of these is psychic. His words are:

With earth we see earth, with water water,
with air bright air, but ravaging fire by fire,
love by love, and strife by gruesome strife.

In the same manner Plato in the *Timaeus* constructs the soul out of the elements; for similar is known by similar and things are constituted by the principles (of being).»]. Cf. also the doxography in Theophrastus, *De sensibus*, §10 (= Empedocles A86, I p. 302.19 sqq.).

Not only understanding consists in somehow identifying with the reality known. But as being consists in determinate proportionalities between opposites (even as between elements and principles antithetical if conjugative); and as the identity of every existent is marked and built by a certain «number» (rhythm, pattern or configuration in the synthesis of elements constituting it); so knowledge of a thing consists in the grasp of its constitutive *ratio*, which again is effected through the moulding in the subject of the same opposites and elements that enter into the composition of the object, according to the same «number» or proportion. So that knowledge is a sort of harmony, just as being is. The view was very widespread and characteristic of 5th (and later) Pythagoreanism. Aristotle criticises the form of it which made soul itself such a harmony. So in *De anima*, 407b27-34: *Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἥττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγον δ' ὥσπερ εὐθύνοις δεδοκυῖα καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γεγενημένοις λόγοις. ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκείσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων. καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν मिχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τ' εἶναι τούτων.* [«There is yet another view concerning soul which has come down to us, commending itself to many minds as readily as any that is put forward, although it has been criticised as before a body of judges even in the popular discussions of the present day. The soul is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is on this view a blending or combining of opposites, and the components of the body are opposites. And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining itself of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of them»]. The view of the harmony of opposites as constitutive of being is widespread. Aristotle's criticism is articulated further down: the identities of things vary, and so do their defining «harmonies»; the soul, then, would have to be many

things together, if it had to be each one of the things known. *Ibid.* 408a5 sqq. (Harmony has two main senses: it is either the composition of given elements, or the proportion subsisting between the components of a mixture. And in neither case is it (Aristotle maintains) reasonable to call soul a harmony. As for the former construal, what part is different in the synthesis of elements which makes the soul different from bodies, or what sort of peculiar constitution sets it apart?) As to the latter view, soul as *ratio*, proportion: 408a13: ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ <τὸ> τὸν λόγον τῆς μείξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἢ μείξεις τῶν στοιχείων καθ' ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ' ἣν ὅστουν· συμβήσεται οὖν πολλὰς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμειγμένων, ὁ δὲ τῆς μείξεως λόγος ἁρμονία καὶ ψυχὴ. ἀπαιτήσκει δ' ἂν τις τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν λόγῳ τινὶ φησὶν εἶναι· πότερον οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ ψυχὴ, ἢ μᾶλλον ἕτερον τι οὐσα ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέλεσιν; etc. [«But it is equally absurd to regard the soul as the proportion determining the mixture. For the elements are not mixed according to the same proportion in flesh as in bone. Thus it will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the body, if we assume that all members consist of the elements variously commingled and that the proportion determining the mixture is a harmony, that is, soul. This is a question we might ask Empedocles; who says that each of the parts is determined by a certain proportion. Is the soul, then, this proportion, or is it rather developed in the frame as something distinct. Etc.]. In Aristotle's criticism of the Empedoclean theory we find clear expression of its two basic premises: *that being's character resides in a proportion of (opposite) elements; and that knowledge (and soul and mind) is a sort of resonance to the constitutive «harmony» of the thing known.* V. further, *op.cit.* 409b23 - 410a13: λείπεται δ' ἐπισκέψασθαι πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) εἶναι. λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, ἵν' αἰσθάνηται τε τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαίνειν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ. τίθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως ἄπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἐκ τούτων. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἢ αἰσθήσεται, οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ὅστουν; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν συνθέτων· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως οὖν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθάπερ φησὶ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὅστουν (B96 DK):

ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισιν
 τῶ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἵγλης,
 τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὅστέα λευκὰ γέγοντο.

οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος ἐνεῖναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέ-
 σονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις· γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ δ' ὅστων ἡ
 τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτα ἐνέσται. τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον,
 οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσειεν εἰ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος ἢ
 ἄνθρωπος; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
 τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων [«It remains to consider what is meant by
 saying that the soul is composed of the elements. Soul, we are told, is
 composed of the elements in order that it may perceive and know each
 several thing. But this theory necessarily involves many impossibilities.
 For it is assumed that like is known by like; which implies that soul is
 identical with the things that it knows. These elements, however, are not
 all that exists: there are a great or perhaps we should say rather, an infinite
 number of other things as well, namely, those which are compounded of
 the elements. Granted, then, that it is possible for the soul to know and to
 perceive the constituent elements of all these composite things, with what
 will it know or perceive the compounds itself? I mean, what god or man
 is; what flesh or bone is; and so likewise with regard to any other
 composite thing. For it is not elements taken anyhow which constitute
 this or that thing, but only those which are united in a given proportion
 or combination, as Empedocles says of bone:

Then did the bounteous earth in broad-bosomed crucibles
 win out of eight parts two from the sheen of moisture
 and four from the fire-god; and the bones came into being
 all white.

It is therefore of no use for the elements to be in the soul, unless it (the
 soul) also contains their proportions and the mode of combining them.
 For each element will know its like, but there will be nothing to know
 bone or man, unless these also are to be present in the soul: which, I need
 hardly say, is impossible. Who would ask if stone or man resides in the
 soul? And similarly with that which is good and that which is not good:
 and so for all the rest»].

Aristotle's criticism, in fact, prepares the way for a more articulate
 formulation of the doctrine, rather than being aimed against it. All that is
 needed, «from a logical point of view», is to qualify the assertion as to the
 conformation of knowledge to the object known (the famed scholastic
adaequatio rei et intellectu), so that it is the form alone, and not the entire

substance, of reality which is carried over to its active knowledge. This is, in effect, Aristotle's own position; and, as usual, he considers the theses of earlier philosophers premonitions of his own analytical developments. I shall not here follow the (otherwise well-known) Aristotelian analyses on the matter, but rather stress the broader perspectives and mightier insights of late archaic (6th century B.C.) and high classical (5th century) philosophical speculation instead. It was, first of all, completely alien to that mentality to start (as in modern European philosophy) with the knowing subject, ontologically and categorially opposing the object known, who posits the question, and critically examines the solution, of truth and reality. On the contrary, the immediate datum was (objective) being itself, in all the plenitude of its existence and power. Being involved constitutively a principle of determinacy, which precisely gave it essence and power, made it the defined being that in each case it is. Such determinateness, consisting in limitation by «number», in measuredness and proportion, in rhythm, pattern and order, conferred upon being rationality i.e. intelligibility: the secret of existence is thus revealed by the inner necessity of being itself, and not by an extraneous (subjective, whether transcendent, transcendental or empirical) infusion of light. The manifestation of being is being's own very essential luminosity, not an alien disclosure of its mystery. The light of rationality and intelligibility comes from within being, and this radiance constitutes the realm of awareness, of perception, intellection, knowledge. The subject is, so to speak, the effulgence of the object, reality become gleaming and transparent. Mind is but the shine of being: and this shine is inherent in being as its own rationality. Intellect is being's intelligibility manifested, i.e. considered as the focal point of existence, and thus, in a sense, distinct from it. Logos is the ontological principle of reality. And so mind and intellection reason *in* being; or, better, *reason is reasoned in and within being*, as Parmenides (B8.35-36 DK) with tremendous perspicacity put it: οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ὄντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἔστιν, εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν [«For you will not find thought without being, in which it is being thought»]. *Thought is reality, the being of things, thought out in its intrinsic intelligibility.*

These are powerful insights of great explanatory might. They explain, *inter alia*, the marked absence in ancient Greek thought of qualms and reservations as to the obtainability, and indeed the actual possession, of ultimate and absolute knowledge even under full and explicit recognition of the impeding conditions of human existence and comprehension.

The view of rationality and thought as an ontological character of being took one major form in Pythagoreanism (including the Platonic Pythagoreanism of the Old Academy); here the rationality of being consists in its mathematical constitution, specification and structure. Soul and mind are, correspondingly, of a mathematical nature: so they can reproduce, imitate and identify with the «numbers» of reality. In this basic version of the theory, the principles and elements themselves whose «harmony» defines the essence of being are, ultimately, mathematical «matter»: Finitude and Infinity, for example, or the One and the Indefinite Dyad. Reality, for the Pythagorean conception of the World, is «number»: the formal aspect of things is supplied by one mathematical principle, not by «number» as such; their material aspect comes from the other, conjugate, mathematical principle, which also enters into the constitution of numbers, namely the principle of indefiniteness (infinity). If, on the other hand, one envisages an underlying substratum which provides the material content for mathematical relationships to take hold of, then one is led to the Empedoclean variation; there are four, in this particular case, root-elements, and the varied proportion with which they enter into composition with each other creates all differentiation of being, constituting the several essences of things. Still further, the fundamental insight about the inherent objectivity of understanding can work without explicit reference to the Pythagorean world-view. Then mind (as the principle of awareness, perception, comprehension, intellection, knowledge and truth) coincides with the principle of being, the ultimate cause(s) of reality. To the idea that thought is basically an attribute of being (that thought is being thought in being), there accrues naturally the notion that the principle of reality, by delivering reality to existence, knows it: it is the cause which really knows its effect. So very clearly expresses himself Aristotle in connection with Diogenes' from Apollonia theory; v. *de Anima*, 405a21-25: Διογένης δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἀέ-
ρα (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβεν εἶναι), τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέ-
στατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυ-
χήν, ἣ μὲν πρῶτόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπὰ, γινώσκειν, ἣ δὲ λε-
πτότατον, κινητικὸν εἶναι [«Diogenes, however, as also some others, identified soul with air. Air, they thought, is most fine in texture and is the first principle (of all things): and this explains the fact that the soul knows and is a cause of motion, knowing by virtue of being the primary being from which all else is derived, and causing motion by the extreme fineness of its parts»]. Cf. chiefly 64B5 DK; and B4. To be noted that

even with such physicalistic construal of existence, the *measured* structure of reality is the object of intellection and the proof of intelligent order; B3: οὐ γὰρ ἄν, φησὶν, οἷόν τε ἦν οὕτω δεδάσθαι ἄνευ νοήσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρους καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιῶν· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὐρίσκοι ἄν οὕτω διακείμενα ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα [«For, he says, it would not be possible without intelligence for it (sc. the world) so to be divided up (into things of distinct identities) that it possesses the measures of all things — of winter and of summer and night and day and rains and winds and fair weather. The other things, too, if one wishes to truly understand them, one would find disposed in the best way realisable»].

The idea of the mathematical texture of reality was a common dominator in the archaic and classical philosophy, whether in the thorough metaphysical interpretation of Pythagoreanism or conjoined with the requirement for some underlying stuff which is informed by the ordering «mathematics». Heracleitus boldly encapsulated the two moments into his absolute reality (*Ur-substance*) - fire - which involves (as its own pulsating rhythm of existence) the measures of everything into which it is transformed. V. BK 30 DK. And cf. B31 for the idea of the cosmic permanent measures consisting in proportions: πυρὸς τροπαί· πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ πρηστήρ... <γῆ> θάλασσα διαχέεται, καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ [«Fire's turnings: first sea, and of sea the half becomes sea and the other half «burner» (moist fire) ... <the earth> is again dispersed as sea, and is measured according to the same proportion as obtained before it became earth»]. Such measured transformation produces everything, ultimately according to the rhythm of lighting and extinguishing the *Ur-fire*. Thus (B90): πυρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός [«All things are an equal exchange for (so much) fire and fire for (so much of) all things, just as (concrete) utilities (goods) are (an exchange) for gold and gold for (concrete) utilities (goods)»].

Two basic insights emerge from the foregoing analysis: that to know means somehow to identify with the object known and that what is knowledgeable in reality (its «luminosity» and intellegibility) is its mathematical structure, the measure of things consisting in rhythms, patterns and proportions. The overwhelming importance of these fundamental parameters can be seen in the way they can accommodate, and even lead to, *apparently* contradictory positions. It has been seen above

how, originally (and in Empedocles very explicitly), the identification thesis was embedded in the doctrine of similar knowing similar. In Anaxagoras, however, the same really thesis is articulated in the opposite direction. The World is a mixture of everything with everything. This universal intercomposition is, of course, not chaotic, but orderly, order (the *διακόσμησις*) consisting in the *measures* of universal blending which shapes the world. The ultimate principle (*ἀρχή*) of reality, that which forms and rules (*κρατεῖ*) everything, is nothing entering into the global mixture, as this must be necessarily part of the world. The principle is simple, unmixed to everything else, pure (cf. Aristotle, *de anima*, 405a15-17: *πλὴν ἀρχὴν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται* (sc. Anaxagoras) *μάλιστα πάντων· μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἀπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν* [«yet he (sc. Anaxagoras) takes preeminently mind as his first principle; he says at any rate that mind alone of things that exist is simple, unmixed, pure»]). These attributes of Intelligence secure to it absolute dominance and knowledge of all being. Cf. *ibid.* 405a17-19; esp. 429a18-22. Here Aristotle argues that intellection must be totally impassible, yet capable of receiving the form of the object thought, and really identical with it (in form) potentially, though not actually identical with the full reality of the object itself. This is standard Aristotelian formulation, to which (as habitual) he draws together Anaxagoras' position: *ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ* (sc. the mind), *ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· ὥστε μηδ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατὸν* [«The mind, then, since it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, be unmixed with any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by intruding its own essence it hinders and obstructs that which is alien to it; hence it has no other nature than precisely this, that it is a capacity (to identify with the form of any thing)»]. Fortunately we in fact possess a relatively long fragment from Anaxagoras' work which abundantly articulates his position on the question: 59B12 DK.

Empedocles and Anaxagoras, thanks to their contradictory stand regarding the notion that similar knows the similar, evince the underlying common ground, namely that knowledge is a kind of identification with the object known. In its abstract power, the view had been expressed in Eleatism, again at about the same fertile time of the transition from late archaic to high classicism. Thus with pregnant conciseness Parmenides 28B3 DK: *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι* [«for it is the same thing

which is to be thought of as to be (literally: for it is the same thing which is available for thinking and for being)»]. Cf. B 8. 34 DK.

- [29] Gorgias in his extant *Laudation of Helen* expatiates on the power of reasoned word, spoken or written, whether in inquiries concerning the nature of things or in matters forensic and deliberative or in philosophical disputations. So 82B11 DK, §8: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι (there follows mention of the effects on man of poetry) ... §13: ὅτι δ' ἡ πειθὼν προσιοῦσα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο, χρὴ μαθεῖν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν· δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς ἀναγκαίους διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας, ἐν οἷς εἰς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε τέχνη γραφεῖς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθεῖς· τρίτον <δὲ> φιλοσόφων λόγων ἀμίλλας, ἐν αἷς δέικνυται <καὶ γλώσσης> καὶ γνώμης τάχος ὡς εὐμετάβολον ποιοῦν τὴν τῆς δόξης πίστιν. (there follows comparison of the power of artful speech over psychic order to that of medicinal substances over bodily condition) [(§8) Reasoned word (speech) is a great Lord, who effects most divine works through smallest and most invisible body (corporeal substance). For he can terminate fear and remove sorrow and produce joy and amplify compassion... (§13) And in order to appreciate that persuasion adhering to speech can inform the (recipient) soul at will, one should attend, *first*, the reasoned word (i.e. the theories) of the cosmologists, who by dislodging one belief and substituting another, make apparent to the eyes of thought things (otherwise) incredible and concealed; *secondly* (one should attend to) the battles fought by speeches of necessity in courts and assemblies, in which cases one oration, composed artfully, would please and convince a large crowd, irrespectively of its keeping to truth; and, *thirdly*, (one should attend) the contests of philosophical arguments, where the speed of tongue and thought (judgement) renders changeable the belief of opinion». In sum, Gorgias here emphasises the power of reasoned word in the three great fields of argumentative persuasion (highly cultivated in the age of classical rationalism): discourse on the structure of the world; on moral, judicial and political right; and logical controversies.

- [30] A strikingly provocative formulation of the idea is to be found in the remarkable sophistical tract entitled *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* (*Divided or Disagreeing Theses*), 90, 8 §§1-13 DK. V. esp. §§1-2: (§1) <τῷ αὐτῷ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνης νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ <τὰν> ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάσασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ' ἤμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνης ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὥς τε ἔχει καὶ ὥς ἐγένετο, διδάσκειν. (§2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδώς, πῶς οὐ δυνασεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν; etc. [(§1) I hold to belong to the same man and to the same art the ability to conduct a dialectical debate (short and precise questions and answers), and the knowledge of the truth of things, and delivery of justice, and skill in public orations, and competence in the arts of speech, and expertise in teaching the origin and nature of all things. (§2) And first of all, he who knows the nature of everything, how will he be unable to act correctly with regard to all things? etc.].

It is remarkable, that this passage comes from the end of the tract, where the author embarks on positive statements and doctrines of his own, after expounding in the former and larger part of the work contradictory positions and arguments. The fact confirms in a minor way, my view as to the positive nature of Sophistics; the proclivity to disputational eristics evidenced by the movement, as well as standard pretensions of this school of thought (and standard accusations of their opponents correspondingly) that it can reverse the tables and make appear the worse position as the better one - or rather the point of less commanding validity as the one of superior and more effective merit -, such features were the extremer effects of the basic emphasis on the overwhelming potency of reasoned word (thought and expression), as noticed in the main text.

- [31] This major Protagorean work begun with the famous *homo-mensura* theory of truth (80B1 DK). Plato (*Theaetetus*, 161c; cf. 151e; 152a) gives it as belonging to a treatise entitled *Ἀλήθεια*. Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus Mathematicos*, VII, 60) quotes the statement in the same words as coming from the beginning of the *Καταβάλλοντες*. The *Overthrowing* (arguments) is evidently connected to the otherwise attested *Μέγας Λόγος* (*the Great Word or Reason*), a solitary fragment of which is quoted in 80B3 DK. And to the *Truth* we should further associate (probably as a part) the work *Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος* (*Concerning Being*) constituting a sustained criticism of the Eleatic Monism; v. 80 B2 DK from Porphyry.

It is not unlikely that another part of the same major work was Protagora's essay *On Gods* (*Περὶ Θεῶν*); v. 80B4 DK. The evidence for this tract comes (besides Diogenes Laertius IX, 51) from Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, XIV, 3, 7, and, hence, probably, proximately from Porphyry, just as is the case for the other piece, *Concerning Being*, with reference to which Eusebius draws explicitly from Porphyry. Protagora's criticism of geometry (from a real-figures point of view) reported by Aristotles (*Metaphysica*, 997b32 sqq.), may have also belonged to the same important work, even though it could have also been argued in the context of a general discourse on mathematics, as the corresponding title *Περὶ τῶν Μαθηματικῶν* (*Concerning Mathematics*) in Diogenes' partial list of Protagoras' works suggests (80A1 DK, II p. 255.1). That could then be another part of the great work. One may speculate whether still other titles from Diogene's list do not in effect consitute as many subdivisions of the *Truth*; for instance the dissertation entitled *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως* (*On the Origin of Human Society*), 80B8b (= A1 II p. 255.2), on which the renowned Protagora's myth in Plato's *Protagoras*, 320c sqq. is in all likelihood modelled.

- [32] The emphasis on the strength of reasoning as proof of truth is evidenced by such titles of fifth century works as Protagoras' *The Overthrowers* (οἱ Καταβάλλοντες), or Thrasymachus' *The Overpowering* (Words or Reasons), οἱ Ὑπερβάλλοντες (85B7 DK), or Diagoras' the Levellers, οἱ Ἀποπυργίζοντες (Suda s.v. Διαγόρας). The noun to which these participles are understood to be attributed is λόγος, thought expressible in words, or words expressing reasoning. The sense of Diagoras' title is fixed by the signification of πυργόω, to raise up to towering heights, to strengthen and magnify something. Cf. e.g. Bacchylides 3, 13 πυργωθέντα πλοῦτον, wealth multiplied and strengthened as tower; Aristophanes, *Ranae*, 1004; Euripides, *Troades*, 612; 844. — In the following fourth century, we find the *Κυριεύων* (sc. Λόγος) or *Master Argument* of Diodorus Cronos (Arrianus, *Epicteti Dissertationes*, II, 19, 1 sqq. = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta II 283; cf. Plutarch, *Symposiaca*, I, 1, 5 = 615A), a potent demonstration of the incompatibility of three, apparently true, fundamental propositions.

So strong was the feeling of intellectual fight in the pursuit of truth, that the terminology of wrestling (καταβάλλειν, throw down, καταπαλαίειν, overthrow) was employed in spiritual rivalry. Euripides, *Bacchae*, 201-3; *Iphigeneia in Aulidem*, 1013: ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι γε καταπαλαίουσιν

λόγους [«but words (reasons) overthrow words (reasons)»]; Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 1229 τὸν ἀκατάβλητον λόγον [«the reasoning not to be overturned»]. Cf. Democritus 68B125 DK. A particularly apposite illustration from the political controversies of fifth century Athens is given by Plutarch, *Pericles*, 8, 3: Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως πυνθανομένου πότερον αὐτὸς (sc. Thucydides, son of Melesias) ἢ Περικλῆς παλαίει βέλτιον, “Ὅταν” εἶπεν “ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαίων, ἐκείνος ἀντιλέγων, ὥς οὐ πέπτωκε, νικᾷ καὶ μεταπείθει τοὺς ὄρωντας” [«And when Archidamus the Lacedaemonian king inquired of him (Thucydides the son of Melesias, oligarchic arch-opponent of Pericles) whether he or Pericles fights (lit. wrestles) better, he replied: “When I overthrow him in the wrestling match, he wins and changes the persuasion of the very people present in the contest, by contradicting the outcome, maintaining that he did not fall down”]. The language significantly is full of wrestling metaphors.

- [33] The doctrine is ascribed by Plato (*Respublica*, 338c) to Thrasymachus: εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. (85B6a DK). Cf. *ibid.* 367c where this, as the real sense of justice, is assumed to be what is conventionally taken to be unjust, since it benefits the stronger party at the expense of the weaker one. That, moreover, conception is claimed to constitute the natural definition of justice; Plato, *Laws*, 714c: ... καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ’ οὕτω. - Πῶς; - Ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἐστίν. [«...and this is the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice. - How? - Justice is the interest of the stronger party»]. This notion was also applied to social and political justice: just is what is to the benefit of the ruling class (or individual) in a state. V. *Respublica*, 338-339b. In the oligarchic tract *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* (*The Constitution of the Athenians*), the author begins the analysis by stating unequivocally his disapproval of the (democratic) constitution that the Athenians chose to politically structure their society, while on the other hand fully acknowledging that they manage expertly the preservation of that established system of governance. I, 1: περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, ὅτι μὲν εἵλοντο τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἐπαινῶ διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ταῦθ’ ἐλόμενοι εἵλοντο τοὺς πονηροὺς ἄμεινον πράττειν ἢ τοὺς χρηστοὺς· διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινῶ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἔδοξεν οὕτως αὐτοῖς, ὥς εὖ διασώζονται τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τὰλλα διαπράττονται ἃ δοκοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνειν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, τοῦτ’ ἀποδείξω [«Indeed, as to the constitution of the Athenians, I do

not at all approve of their having chosen this form of constitution because by making this choice they have given the advantages to the vulgar people at the cost of the good. This is the reason for my disapproval, but what I want to point out is that now that they have adopted this view, they in an excellent way back up this form of constitution and manage the other matters, which the other Greeks think that they are done wrongly by them». For the contrast between this «enlightened» view of justice and the common perception of it which associates the sophistical definition to violence rather than lawfulness, v. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, 2, 40-46.

- [34] The expression may have been specifically Protagoras'. For the formula, v. 80B6b DK (cf. 80A21), from Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1402a23. Cf. Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 112 sqq.; 860 sqq. In the latter passage, the entire scene with the confrontation of two opposing arguments and discourses, one called the Just, the other the Unjust, is an exquisite caricature of the combative «*disputationes*» cultivated in the then new school of thought, and particularly associated with Protagoras, to whom the Aristophanic expression ἀντιλέγων (v. 869), contradicting, may probably refer. Protagoras was the author of a renowned two-book treatise entitled Ἀντιλογίαι or Ἀντιλογικοί (*Contradictions or Contradictory sc. statements, reasons or arguments*); 80B5 DK; A1 II p. 255.4. This should in all likelihood be identified to another title from his works, Τέχνη Ἐριστικῶν sc. λόγων (*the Art of Eristic reasons or arguments*); B6-6b; A1II p. 254.22. Protagoras was reported to have been the first to maintain systematically that there are two opposing, contradictory theses, reasons and arguments concerning every thing; B6a: πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις Cf. A20. Contradicting (ἀντιλέγειν) was viewed as a contest of arguments, an ἀγὼν λόγων, (v. Plato, *Protagoras*, 335a); cf. Euripides, *Antiope*, fr. 189:

Ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων
ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός.

[«On the occasion of everything one could institute a
battle of divided (or disagreeing arguments, if he is
wise in reasoning (speech)»].

I have already referred to the extant anonymous sophistical work entitled Δισσοὶ Λόγοι. For the ἀγῶνες λόγων cf. Diogenes Laertius IX, 52, who ascribes the fatherhood of their systematic inclusion and practice to Protagoras. Significantly, ἀγών is preeminently applied to athletic contests. The idea of combative reasoning occurs in non-

philosophical contexts - so widespread a simile the battle of arguments had been. V. Herodotus VII, 10a: γνῶμαι ἀντίαι (with reference to a disputation regarding the optimal constitution); cf. Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 1037 ἀντερεῖς; 901. Euripides, utilising much of the sophistic spirit of the age, often embarks in such contests of argumentation in his tragedies. V. *Medea* 546 (ἄμιλλα λόγων between Iason and Medea); *Orestes*, 491 sqq.; *Phoinissae*, 499 sq.; *Hiketides*, 195 sqq.; 403 sqq.; *Antiope*, fr. 183-189. In the Herodotean passage the view is explicitly expressed that by the encounter of competing, opposing opinions the best choice can be made: ὦ βασιλεῦ, μὴ λεχθισέων μὲν γνωμέων ἀντιέων ἀλλήλησι οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀμείνω αἰρεόμενον ἐλέσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ εἰρημένῃ χρᾶσθαι, λεχθισέων δὲ ἔστι etc. [«Oh king, he said, it is impossible, if no opposing opinions are uttered, to make choice of the best: a man is forced then to follow the one view that has been propounded; but if (opposite arguments) are delivered, then one can choose the best etc.»].

- [35] The public appeal of the new type of education, its wide-ranging promises all focused on the ability its possessor would wield to *overcome* every impediment and opposition, under any circumstances, in the course of life, up to, finally, the claim that the beneficiary of this novel instruction can even make an unjust thesis to overpower the just one - these features are exhibited under the clearest light in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where they are targeted by the comic poet from the point of view of the traditionalistic, indeed reactionary, old-fashioned *paedeia*. The issue is masterfully presented there in all its potent breadth and depth: it is about a basic attitude, on which simultaneously depend ways of life, cultural values, political behaviour and policy agendas. What proves the elementally combative, adversarial nature of ancient Greek mentality, is that even such fundamental issue of over-arching significance is exhibited in a neatly polarised form: a clear-cut division between the old and the new embattled in a struggle with no holds barred. The Sophistic spirit of High Classicism blows even in the most virulent attack against it which the fifth century ever produced.

- [36] Socrates belongs firmly, as Aristophanes clearly saw, to the great Sophistical movement of high classicism. His criticism had to do with *the kind of knowledge* constituting the wisdom of life: he wanted to both further moralise and intellectualise the master art in the way evidenced by the Platonic and the «lesser» Socratic schools.

- [37] The renowned statement occurred at the very beginning of Protagoras' main work the *Overthrowing (arguments)*. 80B1 DK: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. [The literal translation would be: «of all objective functionalities (i.e. of things as usables, utilities) man is the measure, of those which are beings that (or how) they are, and of those which are not beings that (or how) they are not»]. The concise utterance has given rise to an unending stream of diverging interpretations in modern times. Cf. e.g. W. Nestle, *Von Mythos zum Logos*, pp. 268-77; H. Gomperz, *Sophistic und Rhetoric*, 1912, pp. 232 sqq.; Th. Gomperz, *Die Apologie der Heilkunst, Eine Griechische Sophistenrede des Fünften Vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts*, 1910, pp. 22 sqq.; F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, 1935, pp. 32 sqq.; B. Cassin, *L' Effet Sophistique*, 1995, pp. 227-32.

Four points are chiefly in order concerning the *homo-mensura* statement. *First*, man is used to signify, as the case may be, both the species and every individual. The subject of the proposition denotes the nature of man generally, as well as any particular human constitution concretely. *Second*, instead of πράγματα (things), Protagoras used the term χρήματα (utilities, commodities, goods, things as apt to be engaged in certain uses, as capable of being used in definite ways). Χρήματα is primarily an economic term, and even means, on a second level, money, or goods valued in terms of money. *Third*, things as functional items are measured (μέτρον) according to man's general and individual nature. This is the archetype of the utility theory of value expanded to cover all cognitive relationships of subject to object as well. *Just as the value of a utility (and its monetary value) consists in its power of satisfying human (generic and particular) needs, so the quality of a thing (and its definite character) is determined by its power of affecting human (generic and particular) nature.* *Fourth*, the ὡς in the last two clauses means both *that* and *how*. The differentiation between the two interpretations, of which so much has been made in modern accounts, is fictional and depends on the sharp distinction between the existential and the predicative being, a distinction alien to the ancient patterns of thought. For that philosophical awareness, to be is to be something or other, and vice versa, to be (really) something is to exist.

Of major significance is the emphasis on *economic* terminology in expressing the ground tenet of the Protagorean world-view. The near contemporary Anaxagoras utilised the same novel term, χρήματα, even at

the beginning of his great work *Περὶ Φύσεως* (*Concerning growth and nature*, or, *concerning the origin and nature of things*) as well as elsewhere, to refer to what in the traditional philosophical manner would be denoted by *being(s)*, τὸ ὄν, τὰ ὄντα, or in an alternative rather later acceptation would be conveyed by πράγματα, things (V. 59B1 DK, II p. 32.11; B4, II p.34.7; 19; II p. 35.5; B9, II p. 36.23; B12, II p. 37.19; 21; 24; II p. 38.2; B17, II p. 40.21; II p. 41.1).

The Sophists seem to have had a predilection for this term in its ontological application. So Gorgias (82B4 DK, II p. 283.21); and Antiphon (87B 117 DK, where the broader use of the word to signify any thing, person or discourse is mentioned). It appears also in the Atomists: Leucippus (67B2 DK); and Democritus 68B182 DK. The first known occurrence in a philosophical context is in Pherecydes (7B2, I p.48.2), but here the meaning *wealth* predominates. The use in Acusilaus (10B40, I p. 60.5) is superfluous, but it draws from the old, idiomatic and poetic nonphilosophical employment as in Hesiod's, *Opera et Dies*, 344 or Homeric, *Hymn to Mercury*, 332. A similar idiomatic usage (μέγα χρήμα = something important) marks the occurrence of the word in Empedocles, 31 B 113 DK. Cf. similarly, in a sophistical context, Critias B 16.1, II p. 382.19: τὸ χρήμα;

The importance of free-market economic activity testified by the use of χρήμα to denote a being or real thing can also be observed at an even earlier stage, at the beginning of the great Golden Age, in Heraclitus' simile 22B90 DK: πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσὸς [«All things are an equivalent exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods (χρήματα) are for gold and gold for goods»].

That the value (and monetary price) of a utility expresses its power of satisfying human needs does not make it subjective in any sense implying arbitrariness or indefiniteness or lack of objective determinative foundation. The ability of something to fulfill man's wants is an inherent attribute of it dependent on its nature and structure, it is a determinate property of it capable of definite measurement. Given the stability of human nature as species (just as of any nature whatsoever) the valuation of the thing is stable around a normative determination: oscillation in the vicinity of the normal value takes account of the particular characteristics of the individuals concretely engaged in relationship with the thing in question, as well as of the particular circumstances under which this is done, but does not alter the basic objective normalcy of a stable value

possessed by the thing, which, furthermore, is expressed in the stable market-price of the commodity, other things being equal (i.e. the amount of goods and money remaining the same or changing proportionally). The price of a utility in the market does not depend ordinarily on individual traits or idiosyncracies. And this is not, as has been analysed above in an earlier chapter, a consequence of statistical averaging, but of a coordination to the constants of human nature in general.

Similarly, that the quality of an object is specified through the effect it has on the subject (human nature as species or as individual), does not render it subjective. The quality is an inherent attribute of the object which emerges to the subject's consciousness (by perception or intellection), which, in other words, *appears* to a subject constituted or conditioned, so as to be sensitive and «tuned» to that property. Different qualities of the same genus belonging to the same object may thus appear to different subjects depending on their constitutional make-up or temporary state being receptive, so to speak, of the many frequencies emitted by the object. The subject captures the message which its code-structure can decipher, but the «message» is a property of the object, just as all other messages emanating from it grasped by the several subjects. The object possesses the intrinsic property to engender all various appearances of it to the variously constituted or conditioned subjects. It is all these appearances, their sum-total, or rather it is the essential principle which may generate all its appearances. That subjects, or even a single subject, in different states may receive radically divergent, even contradictory appearances, does not invalidate this theory of *objective phenomenalism*. The message conveyed with regard to objective reality by the perception of honey-bitterness in an ailing and suffering palate is just the same with the message conveyed by the *partly* opposite perception of honey-sweetness in a healthy sense organ. To express this state of affairs by saying that the honey is both sweet and bitter is to give a misleading picture of the underlying reality, although the statement is strictly and abstractly correct.

Objects sound in a variety of frequencies, and every subject is by nature, culture and condition capable of being attuned to some of them. Such objective interpretation of Protagorean subjectivism was in place also with ancient analyses. Thus Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 216-9 (= 80 A14 DK) explains: §216: *Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας δὲ βούλεται πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τί-*

θησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω μόνῃ, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι. (§217) ... Φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὕλην ρευστὴν εἶναι, ρεούσης δὲ αὐτῆς συνεχῶς προσθέσεις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀποφορήσεων γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοσμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παρὰ τε ἡλικίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευὰς τῶν σωμάτων. (§218) λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων τῶν φαινομένων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὥς δύνασθαι τὴν ὕλην ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ πάντα εἶναι ὅσα πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν διαθέσεις· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ καταλαμβάνειν Ἀ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι φαίνεσθαι δύναται, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἂ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. (§219) καὶ ἤδη παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν διαθέσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. γίνεται τοίνυν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων κριτήριον ὁ ἀνθρώπος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἔστιν. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν ὕλην ρευστὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι δογματίζει, ἀδήλων ὄντων καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφεκτῶν [*Protagoras also holds that «man is the measure of all (functional) things, of things which are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not»; and by «measure» he means the criterion, and by «usable things» the objects, so that he is virtually asserting that «man is the criterion of all objects, of those which are that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not». And consequently he posits only what appears to each individual, and thus he introduces relativity... [this is not, however, Pyrrhonian relativism]* (§217). ... What he (sc. Protagoras) states then is this - that matter is in flux, and as it flows additions are made continuously in the place of the effluxions, and the senses are transformed and altered according to the times of life and to all other conditions of the bodies. He says also that the reasons (or, the essential forms) of all the appearances subsist in matter, so that matter, so far as depends on itself, is capable of being all those things which appear to all. And men, he says, apprehend different things at different times owing to their differing dispositions; for he who is in a natural state apprehends those qualities subsisting in matter which are able to appear to those in a natural state, and those who are in a non-natural state the qualities which can appear to those in a non-natural state. (§219) Moreover, precisely the same account applies to the variations due to age, and to the sleeping or waking state, and to each several kind of condition. Thus, according to him, man becomes the criterion of being; for all things that appear to men also exist, and things that appear to no man have no

existence either. We see, then, that he dogmatizes about the fluidity of matter and also about the subsistence therein of the «reasons» (causal explanations) of all appearances, these being nonevident matters (*according to us, Sceptics*) about which we (consequently) suspend judgement»].

Sextus' formulation of the underlying metaphysical theory to the Protagorean *homo-mensura* doctrine is couched in Aristotelian (*matter*) and Heracleitean (*flux*) terms. It would be doubtlessly more appropriate to express it in HeracleitoPythagorean framework. Being is dynamic, and its intrinsic tensional opposition is always resolved into a higher (and more hidden) harmony of polarities fine-balancing the contrarities involved. *Apprehension of one pole in a given situation means a partial awareness of the full truth on the part of the subject finding itself in a limited-viewpoint condition.*

Just as Protagorean «subjectivism» is shown on closer view to be grounded firmly in rigorous objectivism, so his «relativism» turns out to rely on strong absolutism. Opinions differ among men concerning the same matter, just as perceptions may differ regarding the same object. But such appearances differ because of the condition (permanent or temporary) of the subjects involved, which brings into apprehension the one or the other of the objective aspects characterising the reality grasped. Now the subjects are not «equal» in their apprehending faculties; none are all aspects of reality equal in revelatory power of its nature. Just as there are distinguished in perceptual situations, for example, healthier or more distempered states of the sense-organs, so the conceptual, and generally understanding, apparatus of the wise man is mightily superior to that of a weak and untrained intellect. The differences in both cases are theoretically definable and empirically checkable. To them there answer differences in truth-disclosing power among the corresponding perceptions and comprehensions. The partial manifestations of reality are structured according to the degree of approximation to the complete truth of the case. A full «opening» (revelation) of reality signifies the absolute truth. It has to be posed, at least as a limiting, normative determination.

This is the substance of the famous Apology of Protagoras in the Platonic *Theaetetus*, 166d sqq. (= 80A 21a DK):

ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν
ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ
ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε

[«For I do indeed assert that the
truth is as I have written: each one
of us is measure both of what is

ὄντων καὶ μὴ, μύριον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τούτον καὶ λέγω σοφὸν, ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακὰ, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι... οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τὰναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται, σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι - οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν - οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὥς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθὴς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἄλλοῖα, μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα ἔξις.

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδῇ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῇ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν.

and of what is not; but there is all the difference in the world between one man and another just in the very fact that what is and appears to one is different from what is and appears to the other. And as to wisdom and the wise man, I am very far from saying that they do not exist. Indeed I call wise precisely that man who can change appearances - the man who in any case where what is bad both appears and is to one of us, works a change and makes what is good (useful) appear and be to him... For instance, remember how it was put before, namely, that to the sick man the things he eats both appear and are sour, while to the healthy man they both appear and are the opposite. Now what we have to do is not to make one of these two wiser than the other - nor is it possible - nor is the sick man to be pronounced ignorant for judging as he does, or the healthy man wise, because he judges differently. What is wanted is a change to the opposite condition, because the other state is better.

And so, too, in education, a change has to be effected from a worse state into a better one; only, whereas the physician brings about the change by means of drugs, the sophist (the professional teacher) does it by

οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δο-
ξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πά-
σχη, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ'
οἶμαι πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξά-
ζοντα συγγενῇ ἐαυτῆς χρηστῇ
ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα,
ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ
ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ
δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέ-
ρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν.

καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς ... κατὰ μὲν σώ-
ματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ
φυτὰ γεωργοὺς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ
τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πο-
νηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι
αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγι-
εῖνὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς
ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε
καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ρήτορας ταῖς πόλε-
σι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν
δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ
οἶά γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια
καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι
αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. ἀλλ'
ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων
ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι
καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν

discourse. For it is never the case
that a man who previously
thought what is false is made to
think what is true (for it is neither
possible to think what is not (the
non-being), nor to think anything
other than what one , is
experiencing in relationship with
something - and all such
experiences are always true);
rather, I should say, when
someone by reason of a depraved
habitual condition of mind has
thoughts of an akin character, one
makes him, by reason of a sound
condition, think other and sound
things, which (novel) representa-
tions some people amateurishly
call true, whereas I should say that
the one kind is better than the
other, but in no way truer.

And as for the wise ... I call them,
when they have to do with the
body, physicians, and when they
have to do with plants,
husbandmen. For I maintain that
husbandmen too, when a plant is
in a sickly state, cause to be
produced in it sound and healthy
and (no less) true sensations in
place of the depraved ones; and,
similarly, moreover, that wise and
good (useful) public speakers
(politicians) make sound things
seen to be just to a city instead of
pernicious ones. For whatever
seems just and worthy to any
particular city (State, society), this

λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παι-
 δευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παι-
 दाγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος
 πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευ-
 θεῖσιν. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ
 εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς
 ψευδῇ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἔαντε
 βούλη ἔαν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι
 μέτρῳ· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ
 λόγος οὗτος.

is really so to that city, for as long
 as the city holds firm by it. But
 the wise man substitutes corrupt
 beliefs and attitudes by such ones
 as are and appear sound. And
 according to the same principle,
 the sophist being able to educate
 his pupils in this way, he is wise
 and worth the handsome fees
 which he exacts from them when
 their education has been
 accomplished.

In this way
both some men are wiser than
 others *and* no one judges what is
 false; and you, too, whether you
 like it or not, must put up with
 being a measure. For by these
 articulations my doctrine is saved
 from collapse»].

The argument is crystal-clear, yet we should assume some Platonic shifting of focus in the formulations of its expression. One should concentrate attention on the meaning and inner logic of the view expounded, not on their verbal form - exactly as Protagoras is made repeatedly to urge Socrates to do, e.g. in the midst of the very passage above quoted; 166d: τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὸν μὴ τῷ ρηματί μου δίδωκε, ἀλλ' ὥδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω [«in this statement (doctrine) again, don't set off in chase of words, but learn still more clearly by the following explanations what I mean»]. - Now the essential import of the Protagorean position is that what seems to be the case (in perception or conception) to somebody, not only *is* the case to him, but also *is* the case *simpliciter*. We saw that *truth is relative* means *truth is partial*. But partiality accepts of articulation and gradation. Thus, although all views held are true (as the Protagorean defence maintains), truth is graduated. The *better* view is not *equally* true with the worse one. The *better* representation of reality is *more complete* representation; its truth is fuller. The norm (whether one possesses it or not, and whether one is aware of its possession or rationally convinced of it) is provided by the

limit of approximations, namely total correspondence to the complexity of reality, i.e. absolute truth. Wisdom consists in fuller (in the limit, complete) knowledge. For instance, an improved scientific theory is one that incorporates less developed accounts as special cases under simplifying conditions. The degree of completeness can be more clearly evaluated in each case by the possessor of the superior (i.e. fuller) knowledge. Those on lower levels of knowledge can normally appreciate the overall *results* of variant degrees of truth: the common and general (i.e. applicable to all individuals) criterion of truth-fullness is, therefore, *pragmatic*, indeed *pragmatist*. Expertise (that is completer knowledge) makes a huge difference in the world, evident to all, in the appropriate run of time. The difference consists in the systematic success which is bound to result upon an accurate diagnosis, penetrating prognosis and skilfull handling of the means-end relationships - all consequences of fuller knowledge of reality.

Pragmatism is thus shown to be compatible with absolutism, and no substitute for it in a relativistic field. And this captures the intensely dynamic spirit of high Classicism, as it is manifested in all dimensions of human (individual and collective) existence. It is important to emphasise everywhere the *pragmatist* factor of that spirit. (With regard to the Protagorean Defence, it has been done, e.g. by F.C.S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, 1907, chap. II; id., *Plato or Protagoras*, 1908). But one should always keep in mind the holistic nature of ancient mind as well; the absolute and the pragmatic have to be kept indissolubly fused together, just as the ideal and the real, value and fact, inherent perfection and resulting success. (Cf. esp. on the latter issue, my paper referred to in nn. [19], [25]).

As a footnote to the final part of the foregoing analysis let it be noticed that what can be significantly objected to it is that I have to reinterpret the explicit denial of «Protagoras» that any statement can be truer than another one. Indeed, all apprehensions (beliefs and perceptions) are (according to the *homo-mensura* doctrine) *equally* true to the subjects apprehending them; they are even equally true ontologically, *so far as each one of them goes*. Their truth is impregnable. But some of them go *further* than others in capturing reality. We may say that fuller knowledge is not more true than the less complete one. Or, we may clarify that in the former there is *more truth* involved, and that, therefore, the more depth provided in the representation of reality makes it more of a representation, and, hence, more true, at least in a reformed notion of truth. One may

expatiate on such verbal niceties; but these barely enhance the conceptual clarification of the issue.

- [38] «Technological» is what pertains to the application of knowledge in man's life - literally, *rational artistry*. And «art» is to know how to do, act or make things. Cf. *supra*, n. [27].

- [39] One should not use words in vain. Sometimes silence is most persuasive. A conquering well-reasoned discourse, an overwhelming argument, incites battles, perchance lingering resistance, despite victory. Pindar Fr. 180 (Maehler):

μὴ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀναρρῆξαι τὸν ἀχρεῖον λόγον·

ἔσθ' ὅτε πιστόταται σιγᾶς ὁδοί·

κέντρον δὲ μάχας ὁ κρατιστεύων λόγος.

[«do not engage with everybody in futile argument;
there are times when the path of silence is most certain;
the conquering word spurs on to battling disputation»].

The point is that you argue when you are set to conquer. Useless disquisition (for example, when the combatant is insensitive to the power of reasoning, or when the argument is of inferior strength) should be avoided. In such cases, the efficacy of meaningful silence should be utilised.

- [40] It is typical the way Aristotle expresses himself (in commenting on the Anaxagorean theory of the First Principle): the Mind (*νοῦς*) must be pure and unmixed to other things, *ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γινώριζῃ* [«in order that it may master (all things), i.e. know them»], *De anima*, 429a19.

- [41] Pindar Fr. 169a1-4 (Maehler). He went on to exemplify the general pronouncement with the deeds of Hercules: *τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Ἑρακλέος* [«This I infer from the labours of Heracles»], which he on the sequel went on to describe. The Herculean labours were feats of prowess, which highhandedly imposed order, law and justice on arbitrariness and unnaturalness: they represented prime examples of beneficial violence, the violence of harmony over dissonance.

It is significant that in the Platonic *Gorgias* the Pindaric passage is appealed to by Callicles in his defence of the thesis that according to nature the better and excelling man should rule and gain more than the worse and weaker one. This reasoning falls into place with the general

viewpoint that justice serves the interest of the more powerful (better equipped, abler and more perfect) man. Callicles' argument is presented in 482c-484c. He institutes the classic distinction between nature and (human) law, and maintains that (483c-d): ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτά, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλεον ἔχει καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλεον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μύρια ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα [«But, I think, nature herself indeed declares this, that it is just for the better man to have the advantage over the worse one, and for the more powerful over the more impotent. And that it is so, is amply clear from many instances, both in the case of animals and with respect to the cities (States, societies) and clans of men, namely that justice is judged so that the superior (excelling, mightier) have the upper hand and the advantage over the inferior (the weaker party). For invoking what justice did Xerxes waged war on Greece, or his father on the Scythians? And there are innumerable other such cases one may appeal to. But I reckon, these men act in that way according to the nature of justice, and indeed, by Jove, according to the *law of nature*, even if not in the same sense according to the (positive) law that we institute»]. — There follows the Pindaric testimony, with the example of Hercules' carrying off Geryones' oxen, and the inference (484c): ὥς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἥττόνων [«as such being really the just arrangements according to nature, namely that oxen and other possessions of the worse and weaker men be all of the better and stronger one»]. And again, with capital conciseness (ibid. 488b): ...πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἥττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίῳ τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλεον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; [«...what do you and Pindar hold to be natural justice (justice according to nature)? That the superior carry off forcibly the assets of the inferiors, and that the better rule the worse, and that the more perfect have the advantage over the unfit?»]. The association of (cosmic) Law with what is according to nature is glossematised by Hesychius s.v. Νόμος· πάντων βασιλεὺς κατὰ τὴν

φύσιν [«Law; king of all according to nature»]. Socrates is there (488b sqq.) made to question the presumed identity of superiority (τὸ κρείττον), excellence (τὸ βέλτιον) and might (τὸ ἰσχυρότερον). What Plato is driving at is his own position that excellence, efficacy and force ultimately coincide in human perfection, fully functional and efficient, which consists in knowledge and wisdom. *But this offers a more careful and masterfully deepened reformulation of the quintessential Greek pragmatist insight (finding in the spirit of high classicism, and its philosophical articulation in Sophistics, its most daring and provocative proclamation) that power to effect things resides fundamentally in cognitive excellence.* Even from a less «ultimativist» and metaphysical point of view, and in the light of a more empirical approach, the parameters of superiority and power are essentially the same (whether for individuals, groups or states), although bodily strength or military might seem more appropriate linguistically to qualify the subject as *powerful*, while significant intellectual competence or high educational and cultural standards render in common acceptance it *better*, superior in excellence and perfection. But such ordinary propensities cannot hide the importance of the fact that the combination of more than one parameters registering positive status for a subject, and a greater sum of their calibrated weight, (for instance military strength and economic achievement in the case of States), enhances simultaneously its excellence and power. When, in fact the totality of relevant factors are included in the integral of capabilities, the distinction between goodness (excellence) and power (active potential of effecting things) disappears.

Plato argues that the power of excellence is not a force of violence: deep down, the inferior accepts willingly (as being also to its best interest) the lead and ruling dominance of the superior. (Cf. e.g. *Laws*, 690b-c, where also the cognitive nature of the fundamental factor of excellence is clearly expressed; to follow the expert and wise is *natural and voluntary*, *not natural and forcible (violent)*).

As the Law in the Pindaric passage is obviously the cosmic Law, Plato's association of it with the natural is valid. Herodotus, on the other hand, writing in the midst of high Sophistics, operates on the assumption of a strict opposition between (human) law and nature, and so makes the law a human «*position*» in contradistinction to what is according to nature (III, 38, 4). Utilizing this standard dichotomy the Sophist Hippias in the Platonic *Protagoras*, claims spontaneous adaptation in the case of natural affinities, whereas (human) law, being a tyrant of men, forcefully coerces

them in violation of nature (337d). For an extreme formulation of the law - nature contrast and the preeminence of nature over law, v. Hippocrates, *de victu*, 11 (with a strong Heracleitean influence); the natural is associated to the divine order of things. On the other end, Euripides (*Hecuba*, 779-801) makes of the Law governing the Gods equally a human «position».

Pindar's imperial measures caught the mind of the ancients, so frequent is the reference to them in extant classical literature. Cf. Plato, *Laws*, 890a; 714e-715a; Chrysippus began his book *Concerning the Law* with this Pindaric quotation, Fr. 314 SVF III p. 77.34 sqq.; Aelius Aristides, *Oratio* 2, 226 (I 208 Lenz-Behr); Plutarch, *Ad Principem Ineruditum*, 780C; Demetrius, 42, 8; Dio Chrysostomus 75, 2; Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromateis*, I, 181, 4-5; II, 19, 2; Origenes *Contra Celsum* (quoting Herodotus above referred to), V, 34; Libanius, *Declamationes*, 1, 87 (V 62.11 Foerster); Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Gorgiam*, 26, 18 (p. 141.23 sqq. Westerink); Stobaeus, 4, 5, 77.

- [42] Heracleitus 22B114 DK. There is a meaningful world-play between $\xi\nu\nu\omega$ (with what is common) and $\xi\nu\nu\ \nu\omega$ (with mind, sense - rationally). The addition $\langle\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu\rangle$ is Diels' proposal, in conformity with Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, 369A, where there occurs a Heracleitean imitation. Without it, the sense of the final clause would be: «and is still left over».

The principle permeating all existence, the factor common to all, is, for Heracleitus, *reason*, rational (harmonious but contrapunctual) order. So 22B2: $\delta\iota\omicron\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \tau\omega\ \langle\xi\nu\nu\omega\rangle,\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\omega\ \langle\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\rangle\cdot\ \xi\nu\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \acute{\omicron}\ \kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma\cdot\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\ \delta'\ \acute{\epsilon}\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \xi\nu\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \zeta\acute{\omega}\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \omicron\acute{\iota}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\ \acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \acute{\iota}\delta\iota\alpha\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \phi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ [«Therefore one must follow what is $\xi\nu\nu\omicron\nu$ (common); for $\xi\nu\nu\omicron\nu$ (common) is $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omicron\nu$ (common). [The first is a dialectic variant, indeed Ionian]. But although the Logos (Reason) is common, the many live as if they had a private understanding (a private principle of comprehension)»]. The Logos is the principle of intellectionality and intelligibility of being, as analysed above; in this sense thought is common to all; 22B113: $\xi\nu\nu\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \phi\rho\omicron\nu\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\iota\nu$ [«common is to all the thought»].

The universal cosmic law of Reason, i.e. the divine law of the World, is at the root of all lawfulness. This stands in no real contradiction to the sophistic opposition between nature and («positive» human) law. What Heracleitus and Pindar formulate is the normative aspect of «legality»: man's law *should* reproduce the cosmic order; it *ought* to be natural and

not arbitrary or conventional. *In fact, maximal functionality is attained in any system whatsoever when its ordering is natural.* But, of course, Heracleitus was acutely aware of the common, habitual inability of men to follow the objective and common principle of coherence and cohesion in things. Cf. 22B2 *supra* quoted. There is the striking formulation of that painful experience of human subjectivism in 22B1: τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἑόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν εἰκόασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέσθαι κατὰ φύσιν διαίρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὖδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. [«Of this word or reason, eternally existent as it is, men prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things come to pass in accordance with this reason, men are like people ignorant (or inexperienced, of it), even when they come across and experience such words and deeds as I explain distinguishing each thing according to nature and disclosing how it is. But the rest of men fail to understand what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they dream while asleep»]. Men usually retreat from the common light of objective reality dominated by the single principle of rationality, to the dreamlike twilight of private (whether individual or collective) make-belief, imagining various separate worlds of spectral arbitrariness and illusion. Cf. 22B17; 19; 21; 89; 73. *The human paradox consists precisely in how man can miss what is never absent, but is allways before his eyes.* (22B16; cf. B72). Cf. B34; 78; 79; 83. The rarity of intelligent understanding (true wisdom) is a common theme in Heracleitus: B49; 39; 56; 70; 71; 104; 121. He even goes in this awareness to audacious extremes: B40; 42; 57; 106; 108. Heracleitus himself claims to identify his mind with the eternal reason of existence; B50.

- [43] The expression «mixed» in this employment is Aristotelian. He speaks of the «mixed» thinkers, in *Metaphysics*, 1091b8: οἳ γε μεμιγμένοι αὐτῶν [καὶ] τῷ μὴ μυθικῶς πάντα λέγειν [«the mixed ones among them (sc. among the initial speculative thinkers), in that they do not express everything mythically»]. Pherecydes is specifically mentioned as an example. Aristotle means the type of thinking which uses rational articulation in fusion with powerful symbolic signification, as when one speaks of Eros, the cosmogonic principle.

Early cosmic theorizing naturally utilised the religious idea of divine power and domination in characterising the status of the cosmogonical and cosmological principles as causes of being. An example of such emphasis in divine-cosmic omnipotence is given in an obscure Orphic text preserved on a golden lamella from the area of Sybaris in Lower Italy. The tablet, possibly of the 4th century B.C., carries a wildly corrupt text, the result (as Diels assumed, *Ein Orphischer Demeter-Hymnus*, Festschrift Theodor Gomperz, 1902, p. 1 sqq.) of a local Apulian enraver with little knowledge of the Greek (who was furthermore copying from a Greek original with various readings, Diels had to hypothesise, less persuasively). The text must come from the hey-day of Orphism, the sixth century. Diels' reconstruction, however, of the text in hexametric verses, though ingenious, is highly speculative (1B21 DK; Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, Fr. 47). Another less complete, more uncertain and equally conjectural reconstruction is Murray's in J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 1921³, pp. 664-6. For a radical criticism of any attempt at such reconstructions, v. G. Zuntz, *Persephone*, 1971, pp. 344-54; Zuntz gives also his own detailed transcript of the text, pp. 346-8; but his work has to be taken cautiously, as he is preoccupied with some very unlikely prejudicial assumptions regarding the nature of this and similar texts.

Now, whatever the degree of credible restitution attached to the edited forms of the text and even to its transcripts, it is practically certain that in it some divinity (probably Helios, the Sun) is glorified as All-Subduer, All-Confirmer, the Driver of the Thunder. So in v. 3 (of Diels reconstruction, in the second of the tablet) we read "Ἡλιε Πῦρ («Sun-Fire»), and, then, in v. 6 (fourth of the tablet): ...τὴν πάντα δαμαστά, πάντα κρατυντά, ἐλασίβροντα δὲ πάντα [...to you all are subduable, all overpowerable, they are drivable by thunder all]. To the last praise we should compare the Heracleitean (22B64): τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνὸς [«the thunderbolt steers all things»]. Again, Pindar, also, uses the compound form ἐλασίβροντα, albeit in an active sense to signify Zeus as thunder-hurling; Fr. 144: ἐλασίβροντα παῖ Πέας (for the word-formation, cf. νεφεληγερέτα). Cf. ἐλατήρ βροντᾶς for Zeus, Pindar *Olympian Odes*, 4, 1.

From a different area, also of the sixth century, Xenophanes centralised the notion of overpowering might in his theological radicalism vis-a-vis customary religious belief. There is one supreme Godhead totally unlike man both in body and in mind (21B23). This non-anthropomorphic

deity holds universal sway, without exerting himself, by the sheer power of mind; 21B26+25:

αἰεὶ δ' ἐν ταυτῷ μέμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν,
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαι μιν ἐπιτρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλη,
ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.
[«Always he remains in the same place, moving not at all;
nor is it fitting for him to go to different places at
different times,
but without toil he swings all things by the thought
of his mind»].

There is an elaboration of the Xenophanic position in the tract ascribed to Aristotle and entitled *On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias*. It is a later Peripatetic composition; but the part of it devoted to Xenophanes probably utilises material from Aristotle's lost work *Πρὸς τὰ Ξενοφάνους* (*Against Xenophanes' doctrines*); Diogenes Laertius, V, 25 (no. 99). (Evidence for this offers the fact that Theophrastus, in his doxography on the physical theories of preceding philosophers, analyses along the same lines the Xenophanean doctrines, v. *infra*). Xenophanes' monotheism (that there is one god), or, rather, henotheism (that there is one supreme god), was deduced from the definition of godhead, as that which is mightiest of all things. It is of the essence of divinity to hold sway overall and not to be overpowered by anything. The passage is very illuminating (977a23-39; in 21A 28 DK): εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστον, ἓνα φησὶν αὐτὸν προσήκειν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλείους εἶεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κράτιστον καὶ βέλτιστον αὐτὸν εἶναι πάντων. ἕκαστος γὰρ ὢν θεὸς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοίως ἂν τοιοῦτος εἴη. τοῦτο γὰρ θεὸν καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν εἶναι, κρατεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι, καὶ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι. ὥστε καθὸ μὴ κρείττων, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν. πλειόνων οὖν ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεοὺς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ τὸ θεῖον μὴ κρατεῖσθαι. ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν θεοῦ φύσιν, ὃν δεῖν εἶναι κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου. ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεός, ἓνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι ἂν ἂ βούλοιο [οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι] πλειόνων ὄντων· ἓνα ἄρα εἶναι μόνον. ἓνα δ' ὄντα ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντη, ὁρῶντα καὶ ἀκούοντα τὰς τε ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντα πάντη· εἰ γὰρ μή, κρατεῖν ἂν καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μέρη θεοῦ [ὄντα], ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. [«And if, then, god is mightiest of all things, it is appropriate, he (sc. Xenophanes) maintains, that god should be one. For if there were two or more, he would not still be strongest and most

excellent of all things; for each one of these many being god, he would be similarly such an one. For this is to be god and divine power, namely to master and not be mastered, indeed to be strongest of all. Thus to the extent that something is not stronger, to that extent it is not god. Hence (to return), in case that there are many (sc. gods), if they are in some respects stronger and in some weaker among themselves, they are not gods; for by nature divinity is not to be overcome (in any way). But if they are equal, then they do not possess the divine nature, which (by definition) consists in being mightiest; whereas what is equal is neither better nor worse from its equal. So that if there is god, and he is of such a nature, god is only one. For, were there more than one, he would not have the power to do what he will; hence he is only one. And being one, he must in all parts and respects be similar to himself, seeing and hearing and enjoying all other perceptions in all parts and respects of his. For if not, parts of god would overpower and be overpowered in turn among themselves, which is impossible]. The last inference has to do with the well-known Xenophanean view that (21B24): οὐλος ὁρᾷ, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δέ τ' ἀκούει [«All of him (sc. the god) sees, all thinks, and all hears»].

The same argumentation to that contained in the extant Peripatetic tract was also to be found in Theophrastus' philosophical history, *Φυσικῶν Δοξῶν* (*Theories of Natural Philosophy*), Fr. 5 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, pp. 480-1 = 21A31 DK, esp. I p. 121.28-30 where the substance of the matter is concisely formulated in the Simplician precis: τὸ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πᾶν τὸν θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης, ὃν ἓνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλειόνων γάρ, φησὶν, ὄντων ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον θεὸς [«this one and all-being (sc. the cosmic integral, the world as whole) Xenophanes called godhead, whom he shows to be one by his very definition, that he is mightiest of all; for, he argues, should there be more than one, to overpower and hold sway must needs essentially characterise all of them; yet god is the strongest and best of all things»].

It is interesting to note that we encounter in Xenophanes' position a first form of the so-called *ontological argument*. This argument, associated with St. Anselm of Canterbury, has been propounded as an unassailable, logical proof of the existence and uniqueness of God. (V. e.g. J. Hick - A. McGill (eds.), *The Many-Faced Argument, Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God*, 1968. A translation of the relevant Latin texts is given there, pp. 3-32). Anselm's

reasoning turns around the notion of «*something than which nothing greater (maius) can be conceived*», by which he defines godhead. The argument then proceeds basically in three steps: 1) «*something than which nothing greater can be conceived*» stands in relation to understanding (*esse in intellectu*), since we fully understand the expression; 2) then, it must also exist in reality (*esse in re*): for if it did not so exist, we could conceive of something greater, namely that same thing existing; in which case we would have conceived of something greater than «*that than which nothing greater can be conceived*», which constitutes a palpable contradiction, hence an absolute impossibility (Chapter II of Anselm's *Proslogion*); 3) finally, it not only truly exists in reality, but it also necessarily so exists as it is inconceivable that «*that than which nothing greater can be conceived*» could be conceived not to exist; for if this was conceivable, we could then conceive of it-as-existing, which would be greater than «*that than which nothing greater can be conceived*», once again a palpable impossibility (Chapter III of Anselm's *Proslogion*).

Anselm uses occasionally *melius* (better) instead of *maius* (greater), in his definition of godhead. Greatness, as superlative power, excellence and perfection clearly coincide in his understanding of the essential divine character, just as they did for the ancient mind: it is a question of *superiority*, yet with emphasis laid on its *overpowering eminence* of being.

Anselm's argument is, of course, defective. It operates on the ground of the sharp scholastic distinction between essence (*esse essendi*) and existence (*esse existendi*), taking existence as an additional perfection adjoined to the perfection of essence in order to render it existing. This is a totally inadmissible way of construing reality. *Existence is simply the fact of being, without specification of its ever-present content*: in saying that something exists, one does not say something radically different from saying that it is such and such, on the contrary one is saying the same fundamentally thing by merely mentally bracketing the such-and-such which forms a necessary part of the complete statement. Things do not move, so to speak, from thought to reality by the superaddition of a novel (fictional) attribute - existence - to them. As we have seen, thought (rationality) is the very intelligibility of being, it is nothing categorially different from it. Steps 2 and 3 of Anselm's reasoning are, therefore, vitiated.

But it is the first step which hides the gravest expression of the argument's defective construction. Mind may well understand (in, at least, the common acceptation of the word) what is impossible physically or metaphysically, or what is of uncertain possibility - say, a chimaera, a square circle or life as we know it in another planet, respectively. We may mentally entertain a host of objects of understanding whose *rational coherence* is manifestly nonexistent or doubtful. (By rational coherence I mean naturally the objective principle of order in reality, and not any «analytical» logicity in the contemporary sense).

Anselm's definition of godhead, by its very formulation, evinces uncertainty as to its real coherence, in the above sense. We cannot immediately and without argument see through the coherence of the notion "that than which nothing greater can be conceived": there may be lurking a hidden inconsistency in it. More than that, one may plausibly argue that one can always conceive of something greater than anything conceived at any given point; that the (theoretical) ascent to superiority is unlimited, that it is a movement towards infinity. Of course, no reality need, and does, apply to such constructions. They are meant to show that nothing determinate is conveyed by Anselm's fundamental notion: the argument cannot even start; there is no base for it. In fact, the strange thing is that Anselm himself appears to have a premonition of this devastating defect in his reasoning: he explicitly addresses the question how, if God (as defined by him) cannot even be conceived not to exist, the biblical fool said in his heart that there is no God (Chapter IV of Anselm's *Proslogion*). He superficially disposes of the very real crux he diagnosed, claiming that the fool conceived what he maintained in the trivial sense that he thought the words signifying the object without understanding the true sense conveyed by them. That will hardly help Anselm's argument: the problem lies in what exactly is being conceived when one thinks of «that than which nothing greater can be conceived»; is it an object coherent (satisfying the condition of objective rational coherence)? Or, to put the point in other words to the same effect: does god's definition signify something possessing objective possibility? One may perhaps grant to Anselm that if God (as defined by him) is truly an objective possibility, then He does exist, and His existence is necessary. But the premise is indefinite, hence unsupportable.

Remarkably enough, qualms pointing in the direction which I analysed, have been formulated upon the appearance of Anselm's proof. An attack on the argument was unleashed by (probably) a monk of the

Convent of Marmoutier near Tours by the name of Gaunilo (or Wenilo), in his criticism entitled *On Behalf of the Fool*. V. for instance his §5 (J. Hick - A. McGill, *op.cit.* p. 20); or §7 (*ibid.* p. 24). In a lengthy reply St. Anselm virtually expands on what he has said in the *Proslogion*. Gaunilo pushes in the direction of substituting from the indefinite «that than which nothing greater can be conceived» to the determinate «that which is greater than all things» (v. §1, *ibid.* pp. 29-30). Prejudiced by the apparent formal logicity of his steps 2 and 3, Anselm counters (Reply V, *ibid.* pp. 30-1) that the proof holds without further support only with his definition as basis, whereas there is need of collateral support if it has to be conducted on the ground of Gaunilo's formula. In concluding his reply, however, Anselm concedes that the argument is valid also in the latter case, given the truth of the following, revealing additional premise (*ibid.* p. 31): "For «that than which a greater cannot be conceived» can never be understood except as that which alone is greater than all things". This is as complete a confession of the conceptual indefiniteness of the former formula as one may wish from a scholastic. For it is obvious that the two formulations do *not mean* the same thing.

Now «that which is greater than all things» is in effect the basis of Xenophanes' argument. For that which holds sway over everything (κρατεῖν πάντων) is that which is greater than all things and vice versa. What Xenophanes' argument proves is the uniqueness of godhead (in its absolute definition as universal dominance) *given its existence*. For there may conceivably be nothing answering to that strict definition of absolute sway, as when there are two or more coordinated principles of reality. (A possibility dear to, and often realised by, Greek mentality; cf. e.g. the Pythagorean Dualism, or the Empedoclean sextuplicity of principles - the four elementary roots and the two governing causes of being). There is indeed awareness of this constraint on the validity of Xenophanes' proof, in the very formulation of his argument in the Peripatetic essay above quoted; (977a34-5): ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεός, ἓνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεόν[«So that if there is god, and he is of such a nature (sc. as defined absolutely), god is only one»]. This clear qualification will probably have to do with the commentator's interpretation, for the view is expanded in the second part of the tract, where the criticism of Xenophanes' theory occurs. I quote from it to show the subtlety and realism of ancient thought, esp. vis-à-vis the scholastic rigid and artificial formalism (977b27 - 978a3): ἔτι κράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει, τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων· οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον,

ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί. οὐκ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν. τό τε κράτιστον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐχ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν λέγεται, ὥς πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιαύτη ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ διάθεσιν, ἐπεὶ τοί γε πρὸς ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι μὴ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ ρώμῃ ὑπερέχειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀσθένειαν. θέλοι δ' ἂν οὐδεὶς οὕτω τὸν θεὸν φάναι κράτιστον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ἔχει ὥς οἶόν τε ἄριστα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει καὶ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ· ἅμα γὰρ ἴσως <οὕτως> ἔχοντι κακείνο ἂν συμβαίνοι. οὕτω δὲ διακεῖσθαι καὶ πλείους αὐτοὺς ὄντας οὐδὲν κωλύοι, ἅπαντας ὥς οἶόν τε ἄριστα διακειμένους, καὶ κρατίστους τῶν ἄλλων, οὐχ αὐτῶν ὄντας. ἔστι δ' ὥς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄλλα· κράτιστον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεόν φησι, τοῦτο δὲ τινῶν εἶναι ἀνάγκη. [Moreover, he (sc. Xenophanes) takes the godhead as mightiest, understanding this as strongest and best (most excellent); yet this does not appear to be the customary acceptation of divine essence, for gods are in various respects superior one to another (e.g. Venus is more potent than the rest in matters of attraction). Hence he did not take that attribution to godhead from what seems to be the case (in common belief). Furthermore, that god is mightiest is not said in the sense that divine nature is such in its relationship to others, but in respect to god's inner disposition; for in the opposite case, nothing would hinder that god were superior to other things not by virtue of his own dignity and strength, but because of the impotence on the part of the others. Yet nobody wants to maintain that god is mightiest in this (derogatory) sense, but in that he himself is in the best possible state, and is in want of nothing (in his perfection), and everything is well and fine (is all-right) with him; for by being so, that also (sc. dominion over other things) is perchance secured. But now nothing hinders gods from so being, even though they are many, namely that they all are in best disposition (each in himself) and strongest of the others, not of, or among, themselves. For, as it seems, there are other things, too, (besides gods); he (sc. Xenophanes) maintains that the godhead is mightiest, but this (sc. mightiest) can only be in relation to some (other) things].

It should be noted, finally, that Xenophanes (in tune with ancient Greek thoroughly pragmatist ideality) did not argue on the basis of vacuous abstractions and artificial conceptual chimaeras. His most powerful, supreme God was the World as a whole involving the law of its cohesion (cf. e.g. A.L. Pierris, *Origin and Nature of Early Pythagorean Cosmogony*, in K. Boudouris (ed.), *Pythagorean Philosophy*, 1992, pp.

126-162; v. p. 130 and nn. 18 and 19). *Therefore, god's existence was given as a matter of fact.* It was his uniqueness and other essential attributes (motionlessness, homogeneity with regard to his apprehensive faculties, etc.) that were to be deduced. Concerning them, Xenophanes' emphasis laid in the fact that nothing could compare to the cosmic whole in omnipotence and omniscience.

- [44] V. B 114 quoted above in the main text. The concomitant force and violence necessarily conjoined to superlative cosmic (and divine) potency, fully acknowledged and glorified in fifth century, is reformulated more carefully and reinterpreted more moderately when the Age of High Classicism passed to Late Classicism and the Hellenistic Epoch.

Such a titanic reconstruction of the Sophistic emphasis on the natural claims of power, (proceeding hand in hand with a thorough refashioning of Socrates and Sophistic Socratism) presents Plato's monumental work. Plato's *Republic* was said in antiquity, on particularly trustworthy evidence, to have been modelled on Protagora's *Contradicting Reasons* (*Ἀντιλογικοὶ* sc. λόγοι); so 80B5 (from Diogenes Laertius III 37; 57): (37) ...ἣν Πολιτείαν Ἀριστόξενος [fr. 33 FHG II 282] φησι πᾶσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι Ἀντιλογικοῖς ... (57) Πολιτείας ... ἣν καὶ εὕρισκεσθαι σχεδὸν ὅλην παρὰ Πρωταγόρα ἐν τοῖς Ἀντιλογικοῖς φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν Παντοδαπῆς ἱστορίας δευτέρῳ [fr. 21 FHG III 580]. Aristoxenus' testimony cannot be lightly disposed of. Naturally, Plato reconfigured everything to suit his purposes (esp. the metaphysical middle books contain thoroughly and characteristically Platonic doctrine). But the resolute cognitivism and the justification of excellence were features common to both.

The transition from the aggressively dynamic spirit of the fifth century to the cautiously restrained tonality of the late classic and post-Alexandrian era is evident in Cleanthes' imitation of the Heracleitean Logos - Fire doctrine. Heracleitus' divine empyrean Reason «dominates as far as it will». The World, according to Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, is *persuaded* by Zeus and *voluntarily* accepts the sway of the supreme God working in all things through the ever-living (1), fiery (2) thunderbolt (3), the common (4) ordering principle of all. As many as four at least distinctly characteristic Heracleitean tenets, *but with persuasion and willingness in place of force and coercion* V. 22 C4 DK = SVF I, 537.4 sqq.:

σοὶ δὲ πᾶς ὁδε κόσμος ἐλίσσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν
 πείθεται, ἥ κεν ἄγης, καὶ ἐκὼν ὑπὸ σείῳ κρατεῖται· etc.
 [«Verily by you (sc. Zeus) this entire World revolving round
 the Earth
 is persuaded to follow where you lead, and *willingly is*
dominated by you; etc.».].

Nothing can be more telling. Or rather, even more immediately revealing is the parallel transition observed in the representative arts, as we shall notice in a while.

- [45] There are six Cosmic Principles: four radical elements (fire, air, earth and water) and two causes of existence (Love, Φιλότης and Strife, Νεῖκος). V. 31B6 and B17.6-8; cf. 31A28. These are the ultimate, eternal realities; all else is a variable, temporary combination of the four inherently distinct, indestrucible elements under the interplay of the two causes of variance; change is in fact nothing but never-ending re-arrangement. Each state of the world at large and of any individual conformation within it is a question of the *prevailing* of one or other of those principles as existence unrolls itself in an identical cosmic cycle (v. for the general description of the cyclic law of change B 17.1-13). For a concise statement of the nature of the cosmic process, v. B.17.16-20; 27-29 (Empedocles is writing magisterial poetic hexametres):

δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἠϋξήθη μόνον εἶναι
 ἐκ πλεόνων, τότε δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,
 πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἥερος ἄπλετον ὕψος,
 Νεῖκος τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
 καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε·

...

ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσα τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι,
 τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἦθος ἐκάστω,
 ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο.

[«a double tale will I tell: at one time it (sc. the cosmic whole)
 grew to be one only
 from many, at another it divided again to be many from one,
 fire and water and earth and the vast height of air,
 dread Strife too, apart from these, in all respects
 equally balanced,
 and Love in their midst, equal in length and breadth;

...

For all these are equal and of like age,
but each has a different prerogative and its own character,
and in turn they *prevail* as time comes round»].

The significant last verse is repeated in B26.1, where there is given a similar picture of the immutable circle of the ever-changing existential process.

As with cosmic processes, so with human relationships. There is domineering superiority in a true discourse, and in the man who can raise himself to the apprehension of the natural order of reality. Inferior human constitutions or conditions are recalcitrant to the light of true knowledge, they are wont to disbelieve the prevailing reasons and men. B4.1:

ἀλλὰ κακοῖς μὲν κάρτα μέλει κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν
[«but good for nothing people (minds) care very much to
disbelieve the *prevailing* (arguments and men)»].

- [46] Having articulated a proof to the effect that being is only one, ungenerated, immoveable and absolutely homogenous v. esp. 30B7 DK), Melissus goes on to argue that the reasoning employed is so rigorous, that even if there were multiplicity in being, each being then would have to consist in a definite identity *unalterable* (B8): each one existent must have been, on this (impossible) hypothesis, like the One-being which really for Melissus is bound to exist. Beings then would be many, but eternal, of definite specification, and possessing strength of existence. V. B8, I p. 274.14: ...εἶναι (sc. τὰ ὄντα) πολλὰ καὶ αἰδία καὶ εἶδη τε καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα [«that beings be many and eternal and have (proper, specific) forms and strength (of their own)»]. To exist is to have a definite being-content, to possess a form of being (generic specific and particular) - and also to hold *the power to sustain oneself in existence as the determinate thing that one is*. In a thing's being there is involved the potency of self-preservation and *perseverance in its own identity*. The identity of being is full of power. Therefore, Melissus argues, if existence was divided and segregated as it appears to be, each being would have to be immutable; for its inherent power of being would resist any change to its definite identity. There is no escape from the force of this argument, according to him, by the assumption of some gradation in the definiteness and strength of being. We could then explain that being has the power to safeguard its particular identity *up to a certain degree and point*; and that, hence, it is stable to the extent that its power to withstand change (internal or

externally induced) goes. Such relativisation, however, of being - tantamount to the idea of *degrees of reality* frequent in philosophical exit strategies from logical impasses - will not go for the Eleatic absolutism. True being, i.e. genuine reality, has the absolute power of self-sustainment. As Melissus forcefully puts it: *nothing is stronger than true reality*. Genuine being has thus the might to withstand every change to its identity, including its demise. Since what we experience in the world is subject to perpetual change, generation and destruction, our perception cannot lead to true being. V. B8, I p. 275.2-8: δῆλον τοίνυν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέπιπτεν, εἰ ἀληθὴ ἦν· ἀλλ' ἦν οἷόν περ ἐδόκει ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον. τοῦ γὰρ ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ κρείσσον οὐδέν. ἦν δὲ μεταπέσῃ, τὸ μὲν ἐὼν ἀπώλετο, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὼν γέγονεν. οὕτως οὖν, εἰ πολλὰ εἴη, τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι, οἷόν περ τὸ ἓν [«It is clear, then, that all these things are many. They would not change if they were (truly) real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; *for nothing is stronger than true reality*. But if it has changed, what is has passed away and what is not has come into being (which are impossible). So then, if there were a plurality, things would have to be of just the same nature as the one»]. We have, by the way, an anticipation of the Atomistic logic in the point of B8 recapitulated in the last clause.

We discover here another important aspect of the fundamental classical experience concerning the *dynamism of being*, which has already been emphasised and analysed above in connexion esp. with the Pythagorean insight into reality. A general formulation of that experience is provided, of all ancient philosophers, by Plato, *Sophist*, 247d-e: λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὅποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἶτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἶτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, καὶ εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις [«I maintain indeed: whatever possesses any kind of power, either so as to affect another thing, or to be affected correspondingly, be it by the least thing in the most trifling way, even if once, all that I maintain to exist really; *for I pose a definition, defining being, that it is nothing else but power*»]. Plato, of course, reduces the stringency of the Eleatic conditions; there are many kinds and degrees of power - that a thing suffers defeat does not mean that it did not really exist. It is furthermore, important to notice Plato's acquiescence in, indeed endorsement of, fifth century power-mentality in this crucial metaphysical issue concerning the nature of beingness. It sheds

useful light on his external castigation of the Sophistical justifications of the prerogatives of power in other fields, social and political: it amounts to elaborate reformulations of a common underlying idea - *to be is to have power; to be in perfect condition (to be fit) and to have value is to have optimal power.*

The technical formulation of the idea regarding the virtual identification of being with power, seems to have originated in the medicinal theory of the fifth century. Plato ascribes to Hippocrates the methodical application of the idea. For it is by such inquiry into *the difference which a thing makes to the existential order* that we may approach the true (i.e. scientific) knowledge of it. So *Phaedrus*, 270c-d: *Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἄρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅτου οὖν φύσεως; πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδὲς ἐστίν, οὐ περὶ βουλευσόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοῖ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἀπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἶδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; [«And now consider intently what not only Hippocrates, but also the true reason, says concerning the nature of things. Is it not that we should think about any given nature in the following way? First, settle whether it is a simple or multiform thing that of which we will want both to have scientific (expert) knowledge ourselves and to be able to make another acquire the same. Then, if the thing is simple, consider carefully its power, what power does it have to act on what thing, or what power to undergo the action of what. But if it possesses many forms (or, is a composite quality), then, having first numbered in order all of the constituent factors, apply on each of them what was required in the case of the simple essence, what is it by its nature capable of doing in virtue of which factor, or what capable of undergoing on the part of what and in virtue of which factor»].*

- [47] 1) Anaxagoras' causal Principle is the *Noûs* (Mind, Intellect), the sole substance that can, and does, exist by itself without admixture of any other existing thing. This fact gives to it the power of dominating all other things, which, by being always commixed among themselves all with all, are holding sway and are being ruled *in turn*, according to whether they predominate or are overpowered by some other constituent contained in each particular entity. Mind thus prevails over, and rules, everything. We

thus find here an elaborate articulation of the Xenophanean requirement for godhead (i.e. the first principle of reality). An extent passage from Anaxagoras' work *Περὶ Φύσεως* (*Concerning the Nature of Things*) is strikingly clear; 59B12: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δὲ ἔστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ᾗν, ἀλλὰ τεω ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλω, μετείχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεω· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται· καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην τε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσεως τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ μικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ πλεον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλεον, καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὅποια ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ᾗν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, etc. [«All other things have a portion of everything, but Mind is infinite and self-dominated, and is mixed with nothing, but is all alone by itself. For if it was not by itself, but was mixed with anything else, it would have a share of all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as I said earlier; and the things that were mingled with it would hinder it, so that it could dominate nothing in the same way as it does now being alone by itself. For it is the finest of all things and the purest, it has all effective knowledge about everything and the greatest power; and mind dominates all things, both the greater and the smaller, that have soul (life). Mind dominated also the whole rotation, so that it began to rotate in the beginning. And it began to rotate first in a small area, but it now rotates over a wider, and will rotate over a still wider area. And the things that are mingled and secreted and divided off, all are known by Mind. And all things that were to be, all things that were but are not now, all things that are now or that shall be, Mind formed and arranged them all, etc.».]. Cf. Aristotle's comment (quoted above), *De Anima*, 429a18 (59A100, I, 29.32-4). Notice the ubiquitous presence of the expression *χρήματα*, instead of the regularly expected *ὄντα* (beings) or *πράγματα* (things). Existents are now “usables”, a thing is what is being used in some connection ontological (or human). Beings must make a difference to the order of reality, and they do so in so far as they

can be put into some use, primarily within the cosmic structure, and then also with regard to man.

2) Diogenes of Apollonia (probably the Milesian foundation on the Pontus, rather than Cretan Eleutherna) reacted to his contemporary philosophical developments, by rehabilitating old Ionian «hylozoic» monism, enriched by Anaxagorean Mind-metaphysics. The very perpetual change in the world presupposes that there is a common underlying substance to all reality (64B2; cf. A7). Furthermore, there is order in the world, consisting in the observance of *due measure* in all things; and this harmonious disposition has also an inherent finality: there is optimal arrangement of everything in reality. Number and finality prove the work of rationality, i.e. intelligence in the world (B3). This is not an outgrowth, but pertains to the very nature of the common, underlying substance, from which all being is derived as from its first and only principle. The Ur-Substance is thus intrinsically intelligent as the source of intelligibility. In fact, it is that which gives life and intelligence to animals and humans (B4). This ultimate principle of reality is the air, which governs everything. It is like having anew the Anaximenean Principle in a Heracleitean structure while also satisfying the Xenophanean condition of godhead and the Anaxagorean substitution of mind and intellection in place of the Heracleitean Logos. A veritable cauldron of syncretistic fusion. For the emphasis on the universal dominion of Air, v. B5: *καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τῇν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἄηρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν· αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ὃ τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου· μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἐν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός εἰσιν* etc. [«And it seems to me that that which has intelligence is what men call air, and that all men are steered by this and that it holds sway over all things. For this very thing seems to me to be god and to have reached everywhere and to dispose all things and to be in everything. And there is no single thing that does not have a share of this; yet nothing participates in a similar way to it, one with another, but there are many fashions both of air itself and of intelligence, etc.»].

3) Archelaus pushed the eclectic tendency exhibited by the new Ionian School (excepting the groundbreaking thinking of Anaxagoras) to its extremest, with less originality. The ground-form of his system is provided by the Anaxagorean theory. The principles of reality are the «*homoimeries*» 60A5 (Anaxagoras) - absolutely homogeneous substances

- whose mixture create the multiplicity of things in the world, each thing being characterised by the «homoiomery» dominating in its constitution. Mind is mixed up right from the beginning in the chaotic medley of homoiomerics (A4 §1; cf. A10). That indefinite Ur-state of the world resembles the Indefinite (τὸ ἄπειρον) of Anaximander, but can also be called *air*, *proleptically*, because air is the dominant substance in the evolved world-system (cf. A7). Mind in fact consists in the aerial substance, A12; A17. The principle of cosmic formation from the original confusion of all homoiomerics is the opposition of hot and cold (A8; A1 §17, II p. 45.5; A4 §1), which probably was self-secreted from the original mixture (like in Anaximander). But this opposition by itself would not lead to the intelligent order of the fully developed world, if mind (= air) did not exist as a constituent in the Ur-mixture (A14; cf. A18). So Air is God is Mind, is not the World-Artificer (A12), but *dominates* the World once formed. — The Roeper-Diels addition to the text A4§3 is thus proven correct: <τὸν δ' αἶρα κρατεῖν τοῦ παντός> ἐκδεδομένον ἐκ τῆς πυρώσεως [«The air, produced by the conflagration (caused by the secretion of the hot), dominates the universe»].

4) In the crucially important Derveni-Papyrus, there is fragmentarily contained a late fifth-century philosophical commentary on early Orphic cosmogony. The system-evincing in it involves a development theory of reality out of an Ur-mixture. Central is the position of air, which, when manifested as a separate entity is equivalent to intelligence and Zeus. So Col. XIII (Merkelbach, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 47, 1982 (separate numeration after p. 300)) = Col. XVII (A. Laks - G.W. Most, *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, 1997, p. 17): πρότερον ἦν πρὶν ὀνομασθῆναι· ἔπειτα ὀνομάσθη. ἦν γὰρ καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ τὰ νῦν ἔοντα συσταθῆναι ἀὴρ καὶ ἔσται αἰεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ ἦν ... γενέσθαι δὲ ἐνομίσθη ἐπεὶ τ' ὀνομάσθη Ζεὺς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πρότερον μὴ ἔών. [«it existed before it was named. Then it was named. For air existed both before the things that are now were set together and always will exist. For it was not born, but existed... But it was thought that it was born, because it was named Zeus, just as if it did not exist previously»]. From Col. XIV (Merk.) = Col. XVIII (Laks-Most) we deduce that all things are in air which permeates all. This is the divine Intelligence or (Orphically speaking) Fate, which is the same thing with Zeus, i.e. air when segregated, and collected up, as a separate existence. *And this divine, aerial mind dominates all things as far as it wishes.* So, Col. XV (Merk.) = Col. XIX (Laks-Most): ...ἐν ἑκάστῳ κέκληται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος, Ζεὺς

πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐκλήθη· πάντα[s] γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ ἐπικρατεῖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον βούλεται... βασιλέα ἔφη εἶναι ὅτι πολλῶν <...> ὦμ μίᾳ ἀρχῇ κρατεῖ καὶ πάντα τελεῖ [«each single thing has received its name from what dominates in it. Zeus was called all things according to the same principle. *For the air dominates all things as far as it wishes...* He (sc. Orpheus) said that he (sc. Zeus) is king because (this is how we refer to the case) of many (things) having one rule prevailing in them and accomplishing everything»]. Even in this aspect of the theory, there are unmistakable affinities to Archelaus' construction. More on the philosophical system of the P. Derveni, v. on my forthcoming essay *The Phallic Helios of the Derveni Papyrus and the Origin of Greek Solar Theology*.

- [48] Starting with the philosophical foundations of medicine. Thus in the *Περὶ Φυσῶν* (*Breaths*), air is proclaimed (in the manner of Diogenes or, perhaps, Archelaus) the universal dominator; *ibid.* III 6-7 (Jones): οὗτος δὲ (sc. ὁ ἀήρ) μέγιστος ἐν τοῖσι πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης ἐστίν· ἄξιον δὲ αὐτοῦ θεήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν [«It (sc. air) is the greatest dominator of all and in all; it is worthwhile observing its power», which in the rest of the chapter the author sets out to briefly describe]. Equally with its cosmic potency, it is the key causal factor in everything pertaining to the life of the organism; *ibid.* IV 1-3: Διότι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ὁ ἀήρ ἔρρωται, εἴρηται· τοῖς δ' αὖ θνητοῖσιν οὗτος αἴτιος τοῦ τε βίου, καὶ τῶν νούσων τοῖσι νοσέουσι [«How air, then, is *strong* in the universal realm, has been said; and for mortals too this is the cause of life, and the cause of disease in the sick»]. The tract goes then on to explain the theory in some detail, concluding in XV; v. XV. 5-7: ὑπεσχόμεν δὲ τῶν νούσων τὸ αἴτιον φράσειν, ἐπέδειξα δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις πρήγμασι δυναστεῦον καὶ ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι τῶν ζώων [«I promised to declare the cause of diseases, and I have set forth how spirit is lord, not only in universal nature, but also in the bodies of living things»].

In another perspective, we find in *Περὶ Ἀρχαίης Ἱητρικῆς* (*Ancient Medicine*), the Melissean idea that each quality consists in the power to affirm itself and to effect results like itself. If the power of anything is greater, stronger than human nature, which, putting it in the reverse sense, means that if the power of a given individual human nature in a particular state or condition cannot overcome the power of the quality with which it is confronted by assimilating its nature - then harm and sickness ensues for the human organism in question. V. *ibid.* XIV (I p. 36

Jones); cf. esp. p. 36.20-26: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ξηρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τούτων ἡγησάμενοι οὐδὲν οὔτε λυμαίνεσθαι οὔτε προσδεῖσθαι οὐδενὸς τούτων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν ἐκάστου καὶ τὸ κρέσσον τῆς φύσιος τῆς ἀνθρωπείης, οὐ μὴ ἡδύνατο κρατεῖν, τοῦτο βλάπτειν ἡγήσαντο καὶ τοῦτο ἐζήτησαν ἀφαιρεῖν [«For they (sc. the physicians working experimentally and not speculatively) did not consider that the dry or the moist or the hot or the cold or anything else of the kind injures man, or that he has need of any such thing, but they considered that it is the strength of each thing, that which is stronger than the human nature, that which human nature cannot overpower, that this causes harm, and this they sought to take away»]. When on the contrary there is a balanced mixture of the various qualities with no one acutely predominating among them, man derives benefit from their compound (*ibid.* XIV); cf. XIX, esp. *ad fin.*, with a nice distinction between the really significant qualities and that pair of opposites (hot - cold), which is the darling of the speculatively preoccupied physicians.

In this connexion notice the formulation in XVI. 1-3: ψυχρότητα δ' ἐγὼ καὶ θερμότητα πασέων ἡκιστα τῶν δυναμίων νομίζω δυναστεύειν ἐν τῷ σώματι διὰ τὰς αἰτίας etc. [«And I believe that of all the powers (i.e. qualities) none holds less sway in the body than cold and heat etc.»]. All characters of being, any quality is power, the power to exhibit itself. In the philosophical language, esp. of the classical age, δύναμις is equivalent to quality, anything with a definite identity of being; applied to something, τί δύναται, means what is its power, what is it capable of, and thus, what is it, what is its nature. The preoccupation with power is so stark that not only a single factor in a mix, but even a balanced composition is said to *dominate*, *Περὶ Ἀέρων, Ὑδάτων, Τόπων* (*Airs, Waters, Places*), XII, 3: (the analysis is of the natural human character in connection to basic features of his physical environment) τὴν δὲ αὔξησιν καὶ ἡμερότητα παρέχει πλεῖστον ἀπάντων, ὁκόταν μηδὲν ἢ ἐπικρατέον βιαίως, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ἰσομοιρίῃ δυναστεύῃ [«growth and absence of wildness are most fostered when nothing is forcibly predominant, but equality of share prevails»].

There is, of course, no incompatibility between this equilibrium in the optimal constitution of a thing and the self-interested, so to speak, propensity and power of self-affirmation as noticed repeatedly above. *The balance of being is dynamic*. The harmony of equilibrium is itself highly intense and «tensioned» (Heraclitus). Balance is a question of sharp tuning, which heightens the potential of existence, by exactly determining

its content. Existence and power is a question of fine-tuning and precision-engineering so to speak.

Other examples of significant use of *δύναμις*, *δυναστεύειν*, (*ἐπι*)*κρατεῖν* in the Hippocratic corpus are numerous. (Cf. also *Aphorisms*, III, 5 = IV 488.2; 5 Littre = 122, 15 and 19 Jones; *Humours*, 14 = V 496.2; 5 Littre = 86, 22 and 88, 5 Jones). There is clearly a predilection for the applicability of the idea everywhere. V. for a further characteristic case, *Περὶ Φύσιος Ἀνθρώπου* (*On the Nature of Man*), I p. 349 Kühn (VI p. 40 Littré). Philosophical arguments and counterarguments are described in terms of combatants who prevail one or another in different circumstances. Real knowledge, it is maintained, should be the winner under any conditions: *καὶ τοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν ἀμφὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατοῦντα τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐαυτοῦ, εἴ περ ἔόντα γινώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται* [«Although it is only right that he, who professes to possess a correct knowledge of things, should show his word (discourse, reasoning, argument) always prevailing, if in fact he knows what there really is and expresses it correctly»]. In this the physician differentiates himself from the sophist; Gorgias, in a similar context, analyses the variable force of arguments in natural science, oratory and philosophy without explicit reference to the normative standard of truth (v. Gorgias' presentation in n. [50] *infra*). But as I have explained above, an appeal to the reality of things is implicit in the Sophistic position generally: *truth pertains to the strongest reason*.

- [49] The sophistical maxim according to which justice consists in the interest of the mightiest has been noticed and commented upon above. V. the Thrasymachean classic formulation, 85B 6a: *φημὶ ... ἐγὼ* (sc. Thrasymachus) *εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον*. Similarly Gorgias, *Helen's Laudation*, 82B11 §7 DK, II p. 290.1-3: *πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρείσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἥσσον ἔπεσθαι* [«for it is natural not that the mightier be impeded by the weaker, but that the weaker be ruled and directed by the mightier, and that the mightier lead, while the weaker follow»].

The doctrine was not restricted solely to the broad Sophistic movement. Democritus expresses the same idea in identical words; 68B267 DK: *φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήιον τῷ κρέσσονι* [«According to nature does rule belongs properly to the mightier»]. In fact, violation of this natural subordination of the inferior to the superior creates unbearable

resentment and inherently destabilizes any different arrangement in a system. B49: χαλεπὸν ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ χειρόνους [«it is intolerable to be ruled by a worse man»]. The very root of failing conduct in human matter, of fault always pregnant with grave, untoward consequences, is ignorance of what is mightier; B83: ἀμαρτίας αἰτία ἢ ἀμαθία τοῦ κρέσσονος [«cause of failure is ignorance of the better and stronger»]. I have expatiated above on the equivalence for the classical experience of goodness and power. *Good is the useful and beneficial, and such cannot be something impotent and weak.* Moreover, power is built on rationality (rational order); there is always a cognitive element involved one way or nother in the scale of goodness and potency. So the worse and weaker are, in human environment and resources, the feeble in understanding and the ignorant: to these, a position of command is really harmful - sooner or later. B75: κρέσσον ἄρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνοήτοισιν ἢ ἄρχειν [«it is better for the unintelligent to be ruled rather than to rule»].

- [50] Gorgias, in his extant *Laudation of Helen*, undertakes to exonerate Helen the Beautiful from her misdemeanour that caused, according to the standard mythic accounts, the Great Trojan War. He argues that she acted as she did (falling in love with the Asian Prince and following him back to his fatherland, thus dishonouring her husband Menelaus, the great Achive king) for one or other (or, perhaps, more than one) of four possible reasons and causes (82B11 §6): 1) It might have been Fortune's wheel or the preordained decree of Fate, some cosmic necessity or divine will that made her embark on that disastrous course; 2) or she could have been forcibly abducted; 3) or she might have been persuaded by moving sermons; 4) or, finally, she could just have fell in love («have been captured by love» the Greek expression tellingly has it).

The, *first*, Gorgias goes on to reason, is a case of the weaker following the direction and rule of the stronger (here we meet the characteristic passage quoted in n. [49] *supra*).

The *second* consists in the exercise of violence, the sheer employment of force (*ibid.* §7).

In the *third*, we find the working of the mighty magic, the enthralling net of poetry or rhetoric, the captivating power of arguments. «Word (reason) is a great master, who by the smallest and most invisible body, accomplishes divine works» (λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ, the already before quoted passage, *ibid.* §8). Word, discourse, speech, uttered

thought is of three kinds: a) poetic §9; b) numinously incantational (spellbinding, enchanting), §10; and c) argumentative (scientific, rhetorical or philosophical), §11. Word of any kind aims at persuasion (*passim*). But persuasion, although in name and external appearance being opposite to enforcement, is really in essence equally compelling. §12: τίς οὖν αἰτία κωλύει <νομίσαι> καὶ τὴν Ἑλένην ὑπὸ λόγους ἐλθεῖν ὁμοίως ἂν οὐχ ἑκούσαν ὥσπερ εἰ βιατῆρων βία ἡρπάσθη; τὸ γὰρ τῆς πειθοῦς ἐξ ἧν ἰδεῖν ὡς κρατεῖ, ἢ ἀνάγκης εἶδος ἔχει μὲν οὐ, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν (up to this point I follow Diels' rendering of an utterly corrupt passage). λόγος γὰρ ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας, ἣν ἔπεισεν, ἡνάγκασε καὶ πιθέσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ συναινέσαι τοῖς ποιουμένοις [«what reason is then hindering to believe that Helen also fell under the spell of words unwillingly, just as if she had been abducted violently by strongmen? For it would be possible to see how the thing we call persuasion prevails - persuasion which has indeed not the (external) form of coercion (of necessity), but possesses the same power (with it). For the word (uttered thought, speech articulate) which persuades the mind (soul), forces the mind persuaded to believe what is being said and to consent to what is being done»]. Gorgias elaborates further his analysis of the working on mind of reason, dividing category (c) of discourse in that of natural science, of oratory (forensic or political), and of philosophical disputations (*ibid.* §13). He compares the working of rational persuasion in the soul to that of medicines on the body - *both drug and enchant* (§14).

After this long disquisition, Gorgias returns to the remaining *fourth* possible cause of Helen's conduct, that he fell in love with the beauty of Paris. The qualities of things impose on us the attitude naturally appropriate to them. For instance, experiencing violent conflict, facing war and finding ourselves in situations of imminent danger, the soul is terrified to an extent that may drive the sense out of it (§§16-17). Similarly, beauty by nature creates in soul the affection of love (§19): ὃς εἰ μὲν θεὸς <ὢν ἔχει> θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν, πῶς ἂν ὁ ἥσων εἴη τοῦτον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; [«who (sc. Love), if he, being god, has the divine power of gods, how could it be come to pass that the weaker (human being) would be able to repulse and ward off him?»].

We see that the common theme in all four possibilities of explanation for Helen's action, is the natural constraint on her to act so. She was *compelled* to do what she did - and this is the plea offered on her behalf (§§20-21). Cosmic fate and divine decree, physical violence, persuasion,

and love's passion, are all behaviour-enforcing potencies. The basic point is that of *succumbing* to some power, be it of the Law of the Universe or of God, or of the strongman, or of word and argument, or of the affection caused by an objective quality. *The violence of reason typifies the philosopher's dream come true in the Age of Power.*

- [51] The analysis occurs in Plato's *Laws*, is set in a broader perspective, and has wider implications. Plato studies developments in Greece following the collapse of the Achaean (what we call Mycenaean) power and the subsequent Dorian invasion and conquest of Peloponnesus (V. *Laws*, 682d sqq.). He wants to explain the type of societal and constitutional order established then in the three principal States formed as a result of the Dorian dominance - Sparta, Argos and the Messenian kingdom. They are claimed to have been instituted on a definite plan, as a tripartite close league aimed at safeguarding external and internal security (*ibid.* 683e - 684b). The States were initially designed so as to have a common system of social, legal and political order; but this system of laws proved incapable of taking deep roots and was quickly corrupted in two of the three, leaving Sparta alone in steadfastly adhering to the initial form and purpose of the arrangement (685a).

The important thing in the present connexion is to notice the nature of that initial plan in instituting the tripartite Dorian dominion in Peloponnesus. Just before the collapse of the Achaean (= Mycenaean) Power - a power which was also centered in Peloponnesus and in fact, chiefly on the Argive and Laconian plains -, an Achaean led Greek army had destroyed Troy, the mighty and menacing power in northwestern Asia Minor, close to the ever, and all, important strategically Dardanelles. Troy was, according to Plato, drawn into the powerful orbit of the great Assyrian Empire, and thus the implications of its domineering behaviour had very much wider significance, comparable to the geostrategic consequences of the incorporation of Western Anatolia in the Persian Empire at the classical period. The sack of Troy, opened, therefore, Greece to a likely counter-offensive attempt by the not yet enfeebled Assyrian power. Thus the Dorians divided Peloponnesian rule in accordance with the Achaean pattern of power-centers in the peninsula (Mycenae, and the rest of the Argolid - Sparta - Pylos in Messenia); they instituted a sociopolitical order aimed principally at securing the highest military might for the State; and they coimplicated the three new-old states with strong ties of an effective alliance. V. *ibid.* 685b-e: οὐκοῦν ὅτι

μὲν διεννοοῦντό γε οἱ τότε τὴν κατασκευὴν ταύτην οὐ Πελοποννήσῳ
 μόνον ἔσεσθαι βοηθὸν ἱκανήν, σχεδὸν δῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν
 πᾶσι, εἴ τις τῶν βαρβάρων αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῖ, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸ Ἴλιον
 οἰκοῦντες τότε, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων δυνάμει τῇ περὶ Νίνον
 γενομένῃ, θρασυνόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἤγειρον τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν. ἦν γὰρ
 ἔτι τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης σχῆμα τὸ σωζόμενον οὐ σμικρόν· καθάπερ νῦν
 τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα φοβούμεθα ἡμεῖς, καὶ τότε ἐκείνην τὴν συσταθεῖσαν
 σύνταξιν ἐδέδισαν οἱ τότε. μέγα γὰρ ἔγκλημα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἢ τῆς Τροί-
 ας ἄλωσης τὸ δεύτερον ἐγεγόνει· τῆς ἀρχῆς γὰρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἦν μόριον.
 πρὸς δὴ ταύτ' ἦν πάντα ἢ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοῦ τότε διανεμηθεῖσα εἰς
 τρεῖς πόλεις κατασκευὴ μία ὑπὸ βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν, παίδων Ἑρακλέ-
 ουσ, καλῶς, ὥς ἐδόκει, ἀνηρυημένη καὶ κατακεκοσμημένη καὶ διαφερό-
 ντως τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀφικομένης. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τοὺς Ἑρακλεί-
 δας τῶν Πελοπιδῶν ἀμείνους ἡγοῦντο ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντας ἔχειν,
 ἔπειτ' αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀφικομένου διαφέρειν
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν· νενικηκέναι γὰρ τούτους, ἡττᾶσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκεί-
 νους, Ἀχαιοὺς ὄντας ὑπὸ Δωριῶν. ἀρ' οὐχ οὕτως οἴομεθα καὶ τινι δια-
 νοίᾳ τοιαύτῃ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοὺς τότε; [*«Can we doubt that the
 people at that time intended these institutions (then grafted in the three
 Dorian States with a dominantly military perspective) not only for the
 protection of Peloponnesus, but of all Greeks, in case they were attacked
 by the barbarians (a collective expression for non-Greeks)? For the
 inhabitants of the region about Ilium (= Troy), when they provoked by
 their insolence the Trojan war, relied upon the power of the Assyrians and
 the Empire of Ninus (legendary king of Assyria). For the then still
 remaining form and structure of that Imperium was not insignificant; just
 as we now fear the Great King (i.e. the power of the Persian Empire), so
 the people of those days were fearing the consolidated integration
 centered on the Assyrian might. And the second capture of Troy (there
 was another and previous, mythical, one reported) was a serious ground of
 offence against them (sc. the Greeks), because Troy was a part of the
 Assyrian Imperium. To meet the danger, the single army (which has
 conquered Peloponnesus overthrowing Achaean rule) was distributed
 between three states, staying in a single coordination, by the royal
 brothers, sons of Hercules, - a fair device, as it seemed, and a far better
 arrangement than the one which produced the expedition against Troy.
 For, firstly; the people of that day had, as they believed, in the Heracleidae
 better leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that
 their army was superior in valour to that which marched against Troy; for,*

although, the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves conquered by the former - Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitution of their states?». That constitution aimed, as an absolute priority, at strengthening the military capabilities of the State. As for the historical points, the Pelopids were the leaders of the victorious Achaean-led expedition against Troy, whereas the Heracleids were the leaders of the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, the centrally important part of main Greece dominated up to then by the Achaeans. More significantly, it is interesting to note that, according to Plato, it was the menacing policies of Troy which provoked the Greek expedition against it - a clear case, on this count, of preemptive strike and proleptic war.

Such is the Platonic, geostrategic interpretation of the renowned Trojan War. As to the facts of the case, so far as they seem to be known at present, the great Imperium of the East with which the Achaeans (Myceneans) came into immediate contact was the Hittite Kingdom. During the great Assyrian expansion at the beginning of the third millennium B.C., Anatolia was deeply penetrated by Assyrian commercial activity which led to the establishment of a trading colonial system with its headquarters in Kanes (modern Kültepe); this operated by the side of the political authority of local chiefs in the area. Since about the seventeenth century B.C., the Hittites emerged as a new great power in the world-scene, with their capital in Hattusa (modern Bogarköy, to the east of Ankara). The kingdom lasted for five centuries. Its end occurred round 1200 BC, about the traditional Greek date for the fall of Troy, set as follows by the corresponding sources: 1335 (Duris), 1270 (*Life of Homer* and, approximately, Herodotus), 1266 (approximately, Thucydides), 1234 (probably Timaeus), 1209 (*Marmor Parium*), 1184 (Dionysius), 1183 (Eratosthenes), 1171 (Sosibius), 1169 or 1149 (Ephorus), Phantias (1128), Callimachus (1127). The standardly accepted epoch was Eratosthenes'. The destruction of Hattusa is set at, about, 1196/4 B.C. (Fr. Cornelius, *Geschichte der Hethiter*, 1979, p. 356) or c. 1176 B.C. (Tr. Bryce, *The Kingdom of the Hittites*, 1998, p. 382). The fall of the Hittite Kingdom was the result of the universal upheaval that destabilised the late-bronze Near and Middle Eastern World, overthrowing the balance of power system, that was under increasing strain towards the end of the second millennium B.C. The tumultuous de-structuring is associated with the invasions of the famous «People of the Sea» of the Pharaonic sources, which overturned the existing order of

things in the wider area; only Egypt and, especially, Assyria came out of the general turmoil as still integral and powerful States. (On the «People of the Sea» question, v. W. Helck, *Die Beziehungen Ägyptens und Vorderasiens zur Ägäis bis ins 7. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, 1979, pp. 132-149; Tr. Bryce, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-74; 379-81).

For a few centuries before the commotions that marked the collapse of the second-millennium world-order, there is testified presence of the Achaeans in Western Anatolia, initially round the area of Miletus. The Hittite texts speak of the *Ahhija* or *Ahhijawa*, which cannot be but the Achaeans (V. Helck, *op. cit.*, p. 152). The Achaeans «were closely involved in the political and military affairs of western Anatolia» (Bryce, *op.cit.* p. 399). That involvement appears to have been expansionary, widening the Achaean control and sphere of influence in Western Asia Minor, starting with Miletus (*Milawata* in Hittite) as center. An apparently crucial direction of expansion was towards the Straits, where the realm of *Wilusa* (probably to be identified with Greek Ilion = Troy) was located, a vassal state to the Hittite kingdom. Achaean expansionary movement was both commercial and military. There must have been brisk trade going on between the Aegean world and inner Asia. When king Tudhaliya IV (c. 1237-1228 and 1227-1209) imposed economic sanctions against Assyria he attempted to enforce a trade-blockade against it; he specifically enjoined the King of Amurru (in the Mediterranean coastal area of Middle East) to intercept any ship-cargo from the land of the Achaeans with destination to the Assyrian interior. In the course however, of the thirteenth century B.C. there are simultaneously reported repeated military engagements and temporary occupations of Wilusian area by the Achaeans. To all this literary evidence, the destruction of Troy VIh fits well, as it happened at about that time. A few decades later, the final Troy VIIb was destroyed and abandoned by its population for good. The city was afterwards deserted (V. for all this Bryce, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-404). So that the Greek poetic reports of the Trojan war are a reminiscence of actual momentous events that happened at the time in which they are approximately put by the Greek historiographic tradition. The length of the Achaean expedition (it took a decade according to Homer for the Greeks to capture Troy) may well reflect the fact that the contest over Ilium was not a one-out attempt, but a long process of Achaean consolidation of an expanding power-base in western Anatolia. Shortly, however, after the final victory in Anatolia, Achaean power collapsed at its very center in mainland Greek. The new order established

there afterwards, caused an efflux of inhabitants from Greece to the islands of East Aegean and the western coast of Anatolia, a veritable wave of Greek colonisation of the area far exceeding in intensity the Mycenaean one: what were entrepôts, trading stations, or military posts big or small, were substituted by full-blown cities rapidly developing into powerful and affluent States.

The Platonic analysis, compared to the realities of the case, is remarkably within track, but for two points. *One*, the contest on the Aegean shores of Anatolia was more than as much a question of Achaean expansionism as of Hittitic imperial insolence. *But the Anatolian kingdom was a land-power, while the Achaeans were a sea-power with strong trading mentality and connections.* To such commercial states, expansionism is tantamount to safeguarding security of trade against the objective threat of an inward-looking, and more or less closed society. *Second*, for Plato the Anatolian Power involved in the struggle of western Asia Minor domination is the Assyrian Empire. In this he follows Ctesias' account, who wrote the history of Asia from the point of view of the oriental dominant power in the continent. Ctesias ascribed the foundation of the Assyrian hegemony to 2182 B.C., and he considered it to extend right from the beginning to all significantly inhabited Asia from Asia Minor to Central Asia and from Caucasus to Nilus (Fr. Gr. H. 688 F1b §22.1-5). He extended the Assyrian hegemony down to the Median rule, which he started at 876 B.C. In fact, he reported that Assyria contributed to the defence of Ilium (a vassal kingdom of the Empire) during the Trojan War by a military expedition involving a big army (688F1b §22.1-5). Ctesias mentioned that he derived this information from the royal archival annals of the Persian Empire (*ibid.* §22.5). Herodotus, writing some half century before Ctesias, restricts early Assyrian hegemony to «upper Asia» (I, 95), i.e. the interior and higher lands lying far from the sea. Similarly, and correctly, restrictive is Dionysius Halicarnasensis, *Antiquitates Romanae*, I, 2, 2. There was a bias in the annalistic tradition of the great Persian Empire to set a (chronological and articulate) framework for universal history in terms of the succession of kings in a hegemonial center such as its own. This was just an extrapolation of historiographical custom from local and regional perspective to the interconnected, inhabited world at large, to the significant and more or less integrated (at least commercially) οἰκουμένη. The sense of real integration (chiefly economic and intercultural) supported the Persian imperial ideology of a continuous succession in

universal political centralisation, whose exponents appear to have been the Babylonian chronologists and “astrologers”.

- [52] I shall cover this very important and revealing topic in the third volume of this work (cf. n. 53). For a crucial piece of power-analysis v. the famous dialogue of the Athenian ambassadors with the government of Melus; V, Thucydides, V, 84-116.

Thucydides for the (unsuccessfull) Athenian hegemonic bid and Polybius for the (successful) Roman one, are exemplary guides for an objective, realistic and powerful analysis of Great- and Super-Power strategies, respectively, in a balance of power (multipolar) and hegemonic (unipolar) world-context.

- [53] The case of the Athenain imperium will be analysed, in extenso, in the third volume of the present work, esp. from the point of view of the interrelationship between cultural, political, military and economic parameters. Meanwhile, v. (in Greek) A.L. Pierris, *Space and History, Chorological Causes of Historial Geopolitics and Geoculture*, Vol. I, *Universal Power Fields, Chorological Causes of Rhythms of Universal Integration*, 1998, pp. 158-176.

- [54] V. my book mentioned in the previous note, pp. 55-64. For the inner cohesion of the trinity *Power - Right - Justice*, v. also there pp. 51-4.

- [55] V. A.A. Thompson, *A Golden Nike from the Athenian Agora*, in *Athenian Studies (presented to William Scott Ferguson)*, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Supplementary Vol. I, 1940, pp. 183-210. One can vividly see the point, in the following pictures.

Plate 10. The Victory-Athena in question, c.435 B.C.

Plate 11. Later copy of (in all probability) Pheidias' *Athena Lemnia*, c. 450 B.C.

(Head in Bologna, torso in Dresden)

By contrast, notice the complete change in attitude and expression signalled by the Peiraeus Athena, c. 350 B.C. (*Plates 14, 15*). We observe here the visual representation of Athen's loss of imperium, and of her timid, impotent and unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct it, in a much narrower area, and on a «consensual» basis. The collapse of the Athenian Empire as a result of her crushing defeat in the Peloponnesian War, left an unremedied wound on the Athenian State and its people, cause of much aching soul-searching on the part of her intellectual elite in the following fourth century of late (and tired) classicism. On the whole, the effect was

negative; we experience much impotent lamentation and ideologizing, post-mortem condemnation. (There is a notable exception though; Isocrates' praise of the Athenian Imperium in glowing fifth-century terms: *Panegyricus*, 29-31). The usual analysis of failure is also poor: reasons are sought in the exactly opposite direction from that in which they are really to be found. The strategy of uncompromising power superiority is cited as the fundamental ground of ruin. This (Themistoclean) strategy directed indeed Athenian policies at the first half of its ascent to superpower status (c. 479-449 B.C.) and (on the whole and determinatively) the later phase, during the state of war (431-404 B.C.). But there was a crucial interval in between those periods when Pericles pursued a strategy of peace, relying on the operations of economic forces to carry almost automatically the day for Athens. But the economic factors can follow their course and effect their work only when supported by military might, political will and an appropriate cultural value-system cultivated, elaborated and manifested in a grand scale on the intellectual arena. Athens failed to the detriment of the entire associated world-field, because of unwise strategic planning rather than a loss of heart at the critical juncture. A relatively brief respite in her bid for hegemony not only lost for her the imperium, but utterly destroyed her, while simultaneously regressing the state of the whole Greek world.

A useful comparison may be further instituted of the Athenian imperial representations of Athena and Victory, to previous expressions of the spirit of Athena in early Classicism. The noble superiority of knowledge and wise action, the ideal of excellence and efficiency, can be seen there; but there is missing the stately self-affirmation of conscious superiority, the majesty of wise potency, *the loftiness of the power of mind and knowledge, the sense of overwhelming, and self-justified (because intellectually self-conscious and excelling), rightful might; all, that is, which we observe in the Athenian examples.*

Reliefs of Athena in the Temple of Aphaea, Aegina, c. 490-475 B.C.

Plate 9.

Illustration 20. Western pediment

Illustration 21. Eastern pediment

Reliefs of Athena from the temple of Zeus in Olympia c. 470-457 B.C.

Plates 12-13.

Illustr. 26. Western Metope 1

Illustr. 27. Eastern Metope 4

Illustr. 28-29. Eastern Metope 6.