FIRST PRINCIPLES AND THE BEGINNING
OF WORLD-FORMATION IN STOICISM

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There are two aspects of the World, one terrible, the other glorious; both awesome, hence sacred. The former is characterized by the manifested enormities of irresistible power; the latter by the shining splendour of superlative beauty. Combinations of the two elements confirm their crucial contrariety, each possessing in its own way an image of its opposite. There is certainly luminous power: but it consists in the attraction exercised by excellence and perfection; as there also exists dark beauty; but it is the constructive aspect of illimitable force. Furthermore, the differentiation of the two fundamental modes of appearances in the World should not be confused with the distinction of the hostile from the friendly to man. At the deeper experiental level there is simply blinding and suffocative darkness on the one hand, the abysmal secrecy of the World; the clarity and openness of light on the other, the visionary flowering of the World. The mystery is opposed to revelation, concealment to manifestation. Man instinctively shudders at the one, gladdens at the other. There is immediate affective response to that opposition. But often the dreadful nourishes and protects, while the exalted exposes and destroys.

The processes in the bowels of Earth and the inside of woman are occult and all-potent. Birth and Death (primal, ultimate realities of might and hiddeness, terrible visitations par excellence), are associated to the secret of the cosmic Womb. The chthonic experience emerges, as the primeval, immediate response to the fearful is thus articulated. By contrast, the workings in the clear air, above Earth and high up in the serene Sky, as well as the purposeful functioning, the excellences and achievements of man are conspicuous, transparent, lucid. Won-
drous beauty is their characteristic, rare or frequent consummation. The radiation of the World thus develops into the celestial, olympian experience.

The terrifying power of productivity belongs to the chthonic; the play of perfection to the olympian. Both are required for a stable, harmonious offspring. Left in itself the prolific fertility of the dark womb is spent in abortive malformations, in chaotic outbears of procreation and annihilation, shooting forth and reabsorbing back. It needs olympian order for a true Kósmos to be crystallized out of such lawless, blind creativity. Thus wild nature is cultivated. Earth requires the regularity of the cosmic cycles of seasons and months, of day and night, of wind and calm, rain and sunshine, in order for its fecundity to bear fruit. And similarly female fruitfulness wants male seed so that it may take form and engender a perfect new being.

Divine presence is ubiquitous in the world for the natural man. Everything lives. This implicit organicity of being makes the biological model paramount in corresponding explanations of the causal nexus in the derivation of reality from first principles. Creation is a sexual act. It thus consists in the coition of male with female.

The underlying sacral experience of the World as alternatively terrible and glorious on the one hand; and logico-mythical associations and meditations on cosmic structure, function and causality in whole and in parts along hylozoistic lines on the other; combinedly operating resulted in the conception of two principles of reality, one male, luminous, celestial, orderly, the other female, dark, chthonic, tumultuous. The two principles are not in eternal strife and segregation, but in necessary conjugation and cooperation to the best end. This is the substance of Greek speculative dualism.

Its first conceptual, systematic articulation in early Pythagoreanism employed the opposition of Πένας-Ἀρχόν to express that ultimate bipolarity. Limit and definiteness well capture the essence of the form-imposing principle; and so Indeterminateness and Infinity reveal the character of the unruly principle of productive dynamism in its turbulent agitation susceptible of multiple determination, and thus of specific progeny.

With the advent of Classicism three connected developments make themselves emphatically felt in the theory of the first principle of reality. One is an increased “scientifization” in later Pythagoreanism of the primarily symbolic mathematics of the earlier, archaic, school. The other is a certain intensification of the patriarchal feeling in Hellenism, with its biological correlative: enhancing the contribution of the male in conception to the detriment of the feminine role. The olympian and chthonic factors of reality tend to be viewed as more and more apart from each other, as less and less interconnected, which facilitates the relative undervaluation of the latter in a culture predominantly captivated by the splendour of beauty. A third, and most disorienting, is the superimposition of a Zoroastrian type of antagonistic dualism between good and evil upon the Greek collaborative one between luminous order and dynamic fertility. The second principle begins to assume an inherent colouration of badness.
All three express in effect intellectualistic rationalizing interpretations of reality; they represent corresponding magnifications of the role of Πέρας in the constitution of the World. All can be seen operating in Timaeus. 1) The second principle is conceived as space unorganised, which by being informed through elementary surfaces (two kinds of basic triangles) and the regular solids composed out of them, is rendered the ordered, dimensioned, co-ordinated and measurable mathematically-physical space of sensible World; the geometry of ordered space determines also and constitutes the elements of physical nature, fire, earth, water, air and aetherial sublimity. Aristotle indeed mentioned that one of the ways by which the pythagoreans endeavoured to construe the constitution of the primal One out of Πέρας and “Ἀπειρον was “by planes”. 2) “Matter” is really nurse to the becoming, rather than true mother. It sustains sensible being in existence. It is a receptacle of images. It is in fact mere metaphor to suggest that the mirror engenders and procreates the images it reflects. However, it is significant that in the pythagorean picture, although mathematised, the motherhood of matter is maintained: the elements are certain definite organizations of space, and are thus born from it. It is matter which, being informed, becomes definite beingsness. The mathematical model clashes irremediably with the image-model, and the Mother-picture with the Nurse-picture. In contemporary biological thinking we discover the same confusion. The male sperm is what, by being located in the womb, feeds upon the uterine fluids, and is thus transformed into a developing embryo. The offspring is more begot by a father than given birth by a mother. Motherhood is virtually reduced to pre-natal Nursecthood. The long-term implications of such shifting emphases are colossal: are we more children of a celestial Father than of a terrestrial Mother? 3) The negative features of the second principle tend to be exclusively stressed. It is recalcitrant to the imposition of order, a continuous, anomalous “shaking” that destabilizes all concrete regularity, and renders it precarious and fleeting. The World is in perpetual flux, and what there exists of stable normality pertains to general lawfulnesses and entire wholes. Matter tends to be conceived as warring against harmonious order and luminous beauty; wherein lies the fatal origination of the idea of its malignity.

With mathematics becoming first, foremost and only philosophy (as Aristotle complained regarding Old Academy) the two principles are accordingly mathematised as, first, One and, second, Indefinite Dyad, or More and Less, or Large and Small, or Many and Few etc. The bias is already found in Philebus, although the initial pythagorean formula of Πέρας - “Ἀπειρον is there retained.

Aristotle was, firstly, resolutely against the relevance of mathematical science in any philosophical discipline. Regarding the second factor, matter, as the second principle, involves potentially the form; in the presence of a thing actually determined accordingly, and if acted upon by it in the manner and circumstances appropriate in each case, form is actualized, and matter actively manifests the same content of being that inhered according to a different mode of existence (i.e. potentially) before in it. We do have a conjugation of the two principles form-in-actuality and matter, to produce a new being similar to the former, the
father of the ontological marriage; we also do find the other principle as mother, and not as mere nurse alone. But the procreative, mighty dynamism of the second principle, essential characteristic of the archaic conception, is repressed: adaptability and a certain readiness and preparedness to assume form substitute the plenipotent generativeness of the Womb of all existence and being-determination; archetypal positive power gives place to passive potentiality.

As to the third feature. It is the privation of the form, to be distinguished from what is deprived of (i.e. matter), that is bad. Upon the assumption of form the former is annihilated, while the latter is preserved in the compound, as the substrate of form. Matter is not adverse to form-actuality; on the contrary, it requires, it “desires” its own entelecheian in-formation. Matter is potentially good; actual form, as goodness at work, extinguishes the badness of privation.

The aristotelian solution of the problem of evil expresses a moderate resistance to the “Zoroastrization”, so to speak, of Greek dualism, but is also an example of the formalism which hellenistic thought was so decisively against. Matter with or without the form is just the same entity with the same intrinsic peculiarity; for if it can gain form, it may lose it, or assume some other. It is this capacity of multiple determination, this being the fruitful matrix of prolific issue, that constitutes metaphysical “feminity”. By giving birth to a child, the female becomes mother, but as actual mother she preserves the indeterminate capability of a new birth - determination just as before; in this essential character, she remains always a virgin. Privation (as absence of a specific being-determination) is just as constitutive of motherhood as of virginity. If, consequently, privation is evil, matter is intrinsically evil. And how can then evil desire or attain goodness? Nothing is therefore being really solved by the aristotelian tactical move.

In Stoicism the two principles are conceived as absolute Activity or Agency and absolute Passivity or Submissiveness (ποτούν - πάσχοι). This is a conceptual rendering of the speculative Male - Female opposition, and meant so: duplicis sexus numina esse dicuntur, ut cum in actu sunt mares sint, feminae cum patienti habent naturam. The male acts upon the female, the female suffers his action, and thus offspring is generated and things come into being. We encounter here the second thoroughly physical interpretation of the logico-mythical archetype since early Pythagoreanism. The new bipolarity is not equivalent to the aristotelian actuality - potentiality distinction. We saw just above that the second principle must keep its nature during and after in-formation; but potentiality is cancelled when actualized. Passivity on the contrary remains. Nor does the Stoic contrariety coincide with the form-matter apposition. Action for the Stoics implies pervading something and moulding it from within according to the permeator's own generative power. Stoicism explicitly rejects the constructionist and manufacturing model as external and mechanical, in divine causality and in all natural workings; this is in tune with the archaic organic conception of the World. But both the efficient and the final causes are external to their effect, though in specific senses consubstantial with it, for Aristotle; while so-called
formal cause is no proper cause at all with distinct action on its own matter in his system. However, although the Stoic construal of the ultimate opposition and conjugation satisfies better the natural requirements of organic generation as condensed in the fact that what is born comes out of the female; dynamism nonetheless is subtracted from the second principle; it is now the absolutely pliant object of the acting power.

For mathematization there can be, of course, no question in Stoicism. Nor really may one entertain notions concerning any fundamental badness and wickedness of matter. The very passivity of matter, its absolute docile yielding and submissiveness, its total lack of resistance to the plastic potency of the divine spirit, entirely exonerates it from whatever responsibility for the existence of evil in the World. Defect and depravity are due solely and unequivocally to God’s action; but they are always the necessary and unavoidable consequences of a greater good and perfection.

In one respect Stoic matter even exhibits the dynamism of the primeval second principle; it is the substance of things (οὐσία), what sustains existence, what raises being above nothingness. The power to exist is vested in matter; while the potency to exist in specific being-determinations, to be such-and-such, is founded on the active principle. Matter-substance thus corresponds to the ἐκτίσεως of Philolaus, the unknown givenness and fact of being, what is presupposed by all limiting and indefinite things in the World, and of their blending constitutive of the cosmic harmony. Plato’s dimly conceivable space-receptacle is another strained variation on the same theme. From the three features of classical dualism, Stoicism negates resolutely the first and third; but it labours under the acceptance of the second with typical boldness.

Both principles, what falls under them in each case, all being, is corporeal. Only bodies can act and be acted upon. And what is deprived of these functions is a non-being. The incorporeal is inert and idle, unparticipating in, and unparticipated by, the peculiar functions of existence. Such incorporeals are space as extension (vacuum if unoccupied, place if occupied) and time as duration. Exactly what are derived from, or secreted out, of early pythagorean "Ἀποθεοῦντα" and inhaled into the World together with spiritual Breath. In Stoicism spirit (and soul in particular) does not proceed from the Indefinite but belongs to the divine active principle, whereas space and time are incorporeals, non-beings, and thus pertain to Infinity.¹

The ultimate substance of reality in itself, the absolute datum of beingness, is corporeality as such, body without qualities but of a certain quantity and with limits; for body is finite and limited, just as the incorporeal is in itself infinite. The limit is not a body, not corporeal, it is therefore a non-being. While we thus can limit being by its opposite, it is impossible that non-being could be limited by non-being. Non-being is limited, not in itself, but as being occupied (through being filled) by a being (a process, event or thing as the case may be). The resistance or rather "contrapression" (ἀνταπαύσας) of matter is, of course, no real power of repulsion, of thwarting the fashioning operations of the active princi-
ple; it is not even inert withstanding effective in-formation. It is simply the pos-
tive aspect of matter’s passivity, that is, of its readiness to assume form. It con-
stitutes its capacity to be in-formed. Without ἄντροπος, no τόπος could have been impressed on it; it could have been substrate to nothing, it would be no matter at all. Matter without ἄντροπος is incorporeal non-being, evanescent no-
thingness.

Matter in itself is thus a qualityless body of a certain determinate quantity, which can of course occupy more or less space depending on its state and condition. But left in itself, it would be dispersed into the infinite vacuum, virtually disapparating under a chaotically progressing uncheckable and unending opera-
tion of division and segregation. The void would break it again and again; non-
being would devour being. For as the Pythagoreans discerned, it is the void that dissects corporeality from itself, emptiness that dissolves the fullness of being into nothingness.

But what was by the Pythagoreans attributable to the disorderly action of Infinity, it may not be so explained by the Stoics. For void, as incorporeal non-
being, cannot act it whatever way, cannot effect anything; in fact it is less than passivity, it cannot even suffer anything. It is therefore, on the contrary, an internal, inherent condition of matter that should lead to that self-annihilating dispension into nothingness, if not checked by the appropriate agency. And in fact it is the very nature of matter, its passivity and possibility, that involves intrinsic divisibility, which, nothing hindering, will set the process of division operating ad infinitum.

Thus Being as Substance and Substrate, Foundation or Root, requires for its preservation in existence Being as Cohesive Action. Passivity must be coupled to activity in order that substance remains unified, and thus capable of further assuming the variegated adornment of qualities, and so, finally displaying the full cosmic phantasmagoria.

Just as primary passivity is divisibility, so primary activity is unification. The principle of divisibility is matter; the principle of unification is immaterial body. It must be immaterial in order not to partake in passivity and divisibility; it must also be corporeal so that it can act upon matter and unify it. This immaterial corporeality is the quintessence of divinity.

Matter and divinity are never separated; they form together the primal divine being. Nor can they subsist separately: we saw the fate of matter if left to itself. Divinity on the other hand, as cohesive activity, cannot subsist without some-
thing on which to exercise itself; it requires a substance to work on it. Thus while matter provides the root to, and represents the mother of, real existence, divinity makes out of that qualityless material substrate something determinate and capable of an identifiable, sustained being; it therefore plays the fatherly role of the principle of order. We encounter here one aspect of the chthonic-o-
lypian, female - male archaic antithesis. We find also prefigured the neopla-
tionic distinction between being and unity or one-ness, ὄν and ἕν, ὄντα and ἕνδοςες: the substance of reality is noetically distinguished from its unification, which is a
divine operation on the substantive material ground of existence resulting into full being.

Matter and divinity are indissolubly coexisting and interpenetrated, divinity thoroughly permeating matter. There is thus in the beginning just a single divine being. Internal processes in it must account for the entire cosmic reality. 

Ionian Monism is thereby coherently juxtaposed on Pythagorean Dualism. 4

Greek Dualism has been applied thrice in the Stoic theory of first principles. First, there is the opposition between Being and Non-Being. Being is finite, Non-Being infinite, similarly to the early pythagorean construal. Moreover, space and time belong to the second principle in both systems, but spirit significantly is dissociated from it in Stoicism. This highlights their differences. To Pythagoreanism Infinity is the dark, chaotic expansive dynamism of fertility; it is the fecund principle of procreation, of extension, duration, self-movement (space, time, soul); against it Limit is static, luminous, self-centered determinateness. If power may be properly attributed to limitation, it is the circumscribing potency of identity, not the creative force of otherness and infinity. Finiteness merely controls the mighty outbursts of indeterminacy, fastens piecemeal its inexhaustible strength, impedes, so far as it is possible, its formidable destructive aspect. But for Stoicism, full dynamism belongs exclusively to being, while Infinity, as non-being, is absolute inertia and responsivelessness incapable of all action or passion. We discern here the physical interpretation of Parmenides' ontology (as against his "doxology", which is closely pythagorean) that we also find in Atomism (see notes EXCURSUS II).

But what holds together atomic being; Why is not the void penetrating into the atoms, and dissolving their fulness, as it did to Being at large? Old pre-epicurean atomism founded eventually the indivisibility of atoms on their partlessness. But that involved it in all the perplexities regarding elemental (indivisible) atomic magnitudes. The Epicurean position abandoned the idea of partless, indivisible atoms; but there is then in fact no satisfactory explanation for the initial question: the principle of sufficient reason is virtually abolished in this case. The impasse of Atomism brings us back emphatically to the fundamental difficulty: how can inert, inactive and impasse non-being threaten the integrity of being at all? (see notes EXCURSUS II).

The Stoics solved the crux by a second application of dualism. This time, being itself was distinguished into a (purely) active and a (merely) passive pole. The common speculative, primeval contrariety was once more invoked, but again transformed. The male, luminous principle of order was made the source of all meaningful change and organic development, while dark, productive chthonicity was reduced to passive availability and readiness for shaping in-formation. Form is now conceived dynamically, in spermatic fashion, as immanent efficient causality. The actuality-potentiality aristotelian apparatus looses its significance. The seed is both potential, in that the perfect development of the being has not yet been unfolded; and actual, as it is the causal source and efficient active principle of all growth and evolution. What is potentially is the cause of
its actuality, not its mere presupposition, and potency is the cause of its activity, not its mere predisposition.

The cohesive action of divinity is manifested as a τόνος holding together substance in a unified whole: a tension that, stretched throughout substance, keeps it united as an integrated continuity. It runs through it, permeating it thoroughly (see notes EXCURSUS III). Two moments are distinguishable in its functioning: on the one hand it extends to all parts and portions of the substance, leaving nothing unpervaded, constituting the magnitudes and qualities of the whole and its members; on the other, it falls back to itself, it focuses on a center, it "concentrates" founding the existence, oneness and substantiality of being. These are the two τονικαὶ κινήσεις, one outward, one inward; in this way also every thing possesses a capital, principal part, τὸ ἡγεμόνικον, as central seat of τόνος; there must needs be a salient, focal point on which the entire closely-knit network of ontological consistency is fastened. The old emphasis on a privileged, vestal point in pythagorean and orphic cosmogonies suiting their embryological patterns of world-formation, is given here a more spiritual turn; but is also retained in its pristine force: for the central principle of a thing’s being is also the beginning of its generation, its real inception. Herein lies the third application of (Pythagorean) Dualism in Stoic Fundamental Physics operating within active beeing as such itself with its opposite tentional movements, and manifested in the substance - qualification and center-whole organic polarities.

Where the Theory of Principles ends, Cosmogony begins. The two ultimate principles, absolutely active being and absolutely passive being, are never in isolation; they necessarily coalesce. What exists primarily is divine substance, their total blending. This is of course no ideal abstraction but tangible, specific, corporeal reality, the purest and most powerful form of being. For τόνος in unifying substance imparts on it a certain peculiar quality, a "suchness" (τὀνοτής); the compound is an ἰδίως ποιόν, a thing qualified to its utmost determinateness, with no unspecified generality remaining open in it. Quality is a particular way of holding together the substance, is a τόνος of such and such a description. Significantly, the principium individuationis in Stoicism is not "thisness" but (absolutely determinate) "suchness": there are no, and cannot be, individual things exactly alike, indistinguishable (ἀπαραλλάκτου). The individuality of a thing is grounded on its peculiar character. What takes so much matter, and forms it in such a particular way, is the same tonic principle holding together an identical entity.

The purest and mightiest form of being is primordial Fire, and this is the spermatic Reason of the World. Fire can consume everything, but, as vital warmth, is also the principle of life. Depending on its kind and intensity, it may reduce a thing to empyrean sublimation, and assimilate it by using it as food, or alternatively cause its growth and perfection. It transforms whatever encounters, burning it if violent, ripening it if moderate, softening it if gentle: nothing remains unaffected by it. It is the most drastic being, ultimate principle and condition of all coming into being, change and passing away.
This primal Fire corresponds to the pythagorean One (fiery too), first and mighty offspring of Πέρας and "Απειρον (the conceptual equivalent of orphic primigenitus), first harmonious adaptation of the two ultimate principles according to Philolaus. The pythagorean primal being is central fire, located at the middle of what is to become orderly World; the Stoic one is fire extending to vast regions of space, greater than the cosmic whole. Pythagoreanism stays faithful to the embryological pattern of world-creation. Limit imposes little by little more and more order on more and more extended portions of Infinity; this process constitutes the organic growth of the World, from the central fire to the entire διακόσμησις. But in Stoicism the development meets no resistance; no recalcitrance has to be overcome. The external second principle, the infinite vacuum, can neither promote nor obstruct the cosmic processes, whether actively or passively. As to the internal second principle, this pure passivity simply provides the ground for the unimpeded exercise of the divine action. Stoic cosmogony consists correspondingly in the consolidation of the primal Fire, rather than in its spreading of influence.

Primal Being is not static, but preeminently drastic. The prototype of natural activation, orderly and purposeful, is felt to reside in the seed. The Stoic cosmic fire is, therefore, like the pythagorean and the heracleitean, spermatic. Unlike the pythagorean, but like the heracleitean, it has not to cope with an external dynamic second principle which must be forcibly subdued at every moment of the ordering process. It proceeds unopposed. It involves the law as well as the matter of its development, as there is only non-being beyond it. It is protean indeed; Πρωτεύς ὁ Ζωῦς.

The seed is archetypically potent, a paradigm case of physical mighty power. With an immanent causality it irresistibly realizes the entire development of the being that comes out of it. There is absolute consistency in this process and its product, total congruity of parts and whole, complete purposefulness in the concatenation of causes and effects, perfect adaptation of means and ends towards the attainment of the best integral result. Therefore the germ is rational in nature, reason being the principle of objective coherence and teleological disposition in reality.

The primal Fire being spermatic and rational, it is demiurgic: it proceeds to the orderly formation of the World out of itself. But before it can effect that, it must assume the form of actual semen; fluidity being considered a necessary prerequisite of organic generation, as appropriately yielding and compliant substrate of in-formation, as alimentary matter for assimilation and growth. Thus in a first stage of preliminary cosmogony, the preelemental Fire, as Radiance (αὐγή) according to Chrysippus, transforms itself through Air into Water (or rather the divine τόνος in it enacts that) and finally permeates the archetypal liquid as seed in semen (σπέρμα ἐν τῷ γόνῃ). The transformation, expressed physically, is realized κυτᾶ σύντασσον, through condensation. The τόνος deflects itself, so to speak, and slackens its grip on the substance it unifies, in order to make it more resistant, and thus apt for the moulding of a fully developed Cos-
mos. This appears to have been the standard construal of such precosmogonical metamorphoses. Cleanthes on the other hand had kept closer to the imagery of real fire. According to him the primal being was flame (φλόγα), as distinct from the Chrysippian Brilliance (αὐγή). When all has been consumed by fire at the universal conflagration destroying the World, without other matter left to feed upon, fire begins to be itself extinguished, the vanishing process being carried from the cosmic center towards the periphery. Thus by degrees, gloomy air fills the universe till primeval fire has been withdrawn to its inalienable place, the aetherial confines of the World: the air, essentially cold according to the Stoics, is further condensed and thus liquefied, as is well observed in the vast subterranean caves. This fluidity, final product of fire extinction, is now offered as appropriate nutriment to the residual fire at the universal limits, which, feeding in its turn on that liquid matter, begins to aggrandize itself once more, permeating the darkened cosmic regions, proceeding methodically and congruously (δόξα καὶ συμφάνεια) to the regeneration of the World in a new cosmic-period, just as living beings evolve out of their respective seeds in repeated cycles of birth and annihilation. The difference being that whereas in the case of specific categories of things the cycles do differ among themselves as there obtain varying external circumstances of their realization; with the entire universe the cycles are necessarily identical as there is no being beyond it to influence them differently according to its differing condition or disposition.

Dio Chrysostomus reports a bold logomythus, a “wondrous tale sung by the Magians during unspeakable ceremonies in honour of Zeus”. It is a remarkable piece of Stoicism poetically expressed, with Gnostic undertones and barbaric splendour, not circumspectly but audaciously proclaimed. I shall confine myself to the cosmogonical part of it. The God, having reduced everything to itself, extends sphaerically to vast regions of the Universe. He is in utmost rarefaction (consistent with cohesion), purest, immaculate Shining (αὐγή). In this state of unsullied sanctity he conceived a desire for his Lordship over the World, and thus the motivation was stirred in him to generate the cosmic Whole (ἀφήνει τὸ γενόσι... καὶ δημιουργεῖν τὸν δᾶνα νῦν κόσμον). This impulse was a lightning, of light contaminated however with no shade of sordid darkness. Yet it constituted a pristine consolidation of the extreme sublimation of radiance into the tighter rareness of illumination. Having changed from sheer brilliance into light, he bethought of Aphrodite, of sexual union and procreation with a view to creation; he smoothened, soothed and becalmed himself, he relaxed his all-consuming severity of nature by becoming pneuma, aetherial spirit, fiery breath of a mild fire, and thus he copulated with aerial Hera, herself a further quenching condensation and cooling of his substance, whereby the cosmic semen was secreted, the seed of the Universe (ἀφήνει τὴν πάσαν ταύ παντός γονῆ). This is the sacred marriage of Zeus to Hera, celebrated by sages in ineffable rites. The semen is the liquefaction of all substance (οὐσία), the seed of everything. For the first time now, there appears some actual distinction of the divine from the material; the former, permeating the second, like the procreative
efficacy of spirit in semen, can mould and form it into a Cosmos, as it is smooth and soft and promptly yielding to the drives of the spermatic Law. This is why the primal divine Being had to be self-transformed into cosmic seed in order for the formation of the World to be able to begin.

There is no mistaking the Stoic, and indeed Chrysippean, basis and colouration of all this. The primal being as αὐγή, ultimate refinement of Splendour, was characteristic doctrine of his. He did expound at length the symbolism of the coition between Zeus and Hera in precisely cosmogonical context and pattern. He was characteristically, perhaps excessively, given to the συνοικειώσεις of multifarious mythical and poetical ideas with his theories.

With the universal semen, the hesiodean Chaos according to the Stoics, the stage is reached where Cosmogony proper can start. The cosmic cycle thus commences, which from the same seed unfolds in order, with providential predestination, the same entire finite organism of the World in the midst of infinite non-being, again and again and again, aeon for aeon, sempiternally.

NOTES

1. EXCURSUS I: MATTER, BODY, INCORPOREALS AND CONCEPTS

Substantiality for Stoicism consists in materiality. The substance of things is that which sustains them in existence, their substrate; that out of which they are made, their matter. The substance of the World is prime matter, the ultimate substrate, the passive principle. SVF I. 85 (τὸ μὲν οὖν πάτους ἐίναι τὴν ἀκούον ὄδοιαν τῆς ἄλγης); I 87: ὄδοιαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων πράγματος ἄλγην, τιμὴν δὲ τὰ χώραν ἀδόκης ετο. II 316; 317; 318; 323; 380 (τὴν μὲν ὄδοιαν καὶ τὴν ἄλγην ὄτε ταῖς ποιήτησι; 599(ὄδοιαν το γὰρ τοις γυναικεῖοι λέξεσται δέ, παρακόησιν ἀναδείξει τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας). Very clearly Chalcidius Comm. In Tim. 288 Mullach (=SVF I 86): Silvam quippe dicit (sc. plerique ut Zeno et Chrysippos) esse id quod subest his omnibus quae habent qualitates, essentiam vero primam rerum omnium silvam vel antiquissimum fundamentum earum, suapte natura sine vultu et informe: ut putas, aerum, ferrum et caetera huius modi silva est eorum, quae ex isdem fabrefiunt, non tamen essentia. At vero quod tam his quam ceteris ut sint causa est, ipsum esse substantiam. Cf. Ibid. 290 M (=SVF I 88): deinde Zeno hanc ipsum essentiam ... unamque eam communem omnium quae sunt esse substantiam. §289M: essentiam quidem operis esse fundamentum, ut numdii esse merito dicatur, atque existimeatur, essentia. §287M: Quorum (sc. all specific matters in the World) tamen exordium esse unam quando antiquiores commune omnium silvam... (every matter) habere dicunt subjectam praeceutem substantiam, quam esse corpus cohaerens sine qualitate, patibile totum et commutabile, quod silvam simul et essentiam appellant, haecentes definienses. Essentia et silva est quod subjacet corpori cuncto; vel ex quo cuncta sunt corpora; vel in quo proveniunt rerum sensibilium commutationes, ipso statu proprio manente. Item, quod subditum est corporibus qualitates habentibus, ipsum ex natura propria sine qualitate.

Stoic οὐσία corresponds to, and ultimately stems from the Philolaean ὑλή. It is in both cases that to which the existence of things is due, the fact of their existentiality, what makes being stand up (ὑπόστασιν) in existence (Cf. the διάρμα τῆς ὑποστάσεως; Simplicius In Phys. 109.32 = FV 308 B 10). Significantly 'Εστία was associated to the Dyaou in the Pythagorean 'Ιδρός λύτος (Nicomachus
The substance of being (of which it is), ἑίροντα τοῦ ὅντος, consists in its material substrate, in that which grounds and establishes its existence. Correspondingly beingness consists in corporeality. All being, including the Principles of Being (ὁ ποιόν and τὸ πάντα), is corporeal. Thus for matter and the passive principle: SVF II 359 ταὐτόν σάμα καὶ ὁσίων δρεμένου (this is not exactly correct in that there exists immaterial corporeality, that of the divine principle. But on the other hand all existence is substantive and material, it is πεπυκτημένον δέσμεα, as the two principles cannot exist separately). II 326 τὸ ἀνοικόν σάμα τὴν πρασίνην ὕλην. Cf. II 305; 309; 310; 315; 387 (πάν τὸ κινούμενον σάμα). — Equally corporeal is the active principle: II 44 πάν γὰρ τὸ ποιόν σάμα ἔστιν (also III Antipater 16; Archelaus 6); II 363; 387: πάν γὰρ τὸ δρᾶν ἢ καὶ ποιόν σάμα, πάν τὸ κινούμενον καί ἐνυγγολός σάμα ἔστιν. II. 336 Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰτέν μὲ καὶ σάμα. Also I 89. Cf. I 146 (Augustinus Contra Acad. III, 17, 38 nihilique in eo (sc. mundo) agi nisi corpore). I. 313 τὸν θεόν ἔρχην ὅντα σάμα νοερόν; II 1028-1035. — What acts and what is acted upon can only be body; I 90 nec vero aut quod efficere aliquid aut quod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus. V. esp. I 98: ἄρχει θεὸς ὕλην καὶ θεοῦ ἄλλος σώματος (sc. ζητούμεν) ἀμοιβή σώματος σάμαν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ποιόν καὶ τὸ πάντα. — In Diogenes Laertius VII 134 we should evidently read ἀλλὰ καὶ σάματα εἶναι τοις ἄρχοσι καὶ ἀμοιβῶσιν with the ms. contra the ἀλλὰ καὶ σώματοι of Suidas s.v. ἄρχος (Cf. H.J. Krämer, Platonicismus und hellenistische Philosophie p. 108 n. 3). — Beingness consists in corporeality (II 329 ὅν τοῦ κατὰ ζωμάτων μᾶκα κέρατον, Cf. II 319; 320). The reason being that only bodies can act or be acted upon; II 525: ὅντα γὰρ μόνον τὰ σώματα καλοῦσι, ἐπειδὴ ὅντος τὸ ποιόν τι καὶ πάσχειν. II 363: τὸ αἰτεμένος καὶ ἀλλοίους ὃτι ποιεῖν τι πᾶσχεν ὃτι σάμα. It is the old provisional platic definition of beingness in Sophistes taken seriously (247 δ-ε γένε ὃ καὶ ὅπως εἰκόνισαν τινα εκτελέσεις δύναμιν ἔτει καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἄνευν προρίζος ἐτεί εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ ἀμοιβής τὁ ψεύδω ντα ὑπὸ τοῦ φυσικοῦ, κἂν εἰ μὸνον εἰς ἄλλα. κἂν τούτῳ ὅντος εἶναι τῆς ὑπὸ δόξαν ὁρίζεται τὸ ὅντα ὡς ὅστεν ὁδὸν τὸ πλήρως ὄντος. The origin of the proposed definition lies in archaic modalities of thinking, especially in connection with the hippocratian teaching; cf. Phaedrus 270 c-d. — The Stoic theory of causality is succinctly put by Sextus Empiricus SVF II 341 (πᾶν ἄτομα σώματα σώματα σώματος δυσμάτων τὸν ἀλοχόν γίνομαι) etc. (V. II 336, I 89; cf. II 345; 349 Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. III 14; οἱ μὲν προφητηριαν ἄτομα εἶναι τὸ τῶν φάσκοντες, ὧν τῶν μεῖοι, οἱ δὲ καταφημιζόμενοι, ὧν τοῖς χειρισθέν. — There can be no real relationship between bodies and incorporeals, not even contact or separation; SVF I 518 (οὐδὲν ἄσωμα γεμίζει σώματι οὐδὲ σώματος σώμα, ἀλλὰ σώμα σώματι) II 792; 790 οὐδὲν ἄσωμα ἀπὸ σώματος χειρίζεται οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπαξται σώματος ἄσωματον.

Being is corporeal and the incorporeal is non-being. But both, as concrete realities, are something (ὑπὸ). Whatness is predicated of both being (body) and non-being (incorporeality). SVF II 329; 334. But common entities, as logical constants of general notions (universals), are neither corporeal beings, nor (incorporeal) non-beings; they are not-somethings (όντα), as they are not fully determinate concrete realities. SVF II 329 κινούμενον igitur in II 278 = φαντάσματα διανοεικ (intellectual imaginaries) in I 65; they correspond to imaginary pseudo-entities, II 332. They also comprise the meaning (as distinct from the reference) of proper names, i.e. that which the speakers of a certain language, but not the non-speakers, understand on hearing the name (SVF II 166), namely the not absolutely determinate content of the imagination which is formed in mind in the absence of a concrete being when we think of it. The same holds a fortiori in the case of (general) concepts. Of course the thought of it, as a modification of the mind, is fully determinate and concrete. (Seneca Ep. 58, 15 seems to represent a less accurate and rigid formulation of Stoic theory tending to virtually confound the real non-being of specific incorporeals with the general unreality of φάσκον and ἄσωμα, of universals and imaginary conceptions. All these are then considered to be ἄσωματα by contrast to true bodily being). The following scheme apparently represents the stricter Stoic division of what can be thought:
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[What can be thought is hardly nameable \textit{realiter} since it may be \textit{non-some-thing}, although it is not (absolute) \textit{nothing}. Some referred to this abstraction as oneness (Ev, SVF II 329); but genuine one-ness pertains to the cohesion of real being alone.]

The εννόημα is really non-what, οὐδὲν, but quasi-something, διώκει τί (I 65; esp. Diogenes Laertius VII 61). — It all breaks down to the relation between λεκτόν and εννόημα. In strict sense they are distinct (cf. SVF II 168). "Sayable" (λεκτόν) is what subsists as object of a \textit{logical} imagination, i.e. of an imagination that can be expressed in (complete or incomplete, i.e. full blown or merely predicational without subject determination) propositional form; SVF 187 (= Sextus adv. math. VIII 70): λεκτόν δὲ ἐπιστήμην φασί τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑποθέτοντος λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἑν τὸ φαντασθῆναι ἕστι λόγῳ παραστάσιμον. Also II 181. Cf. II 87: νοσίζει δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν εἶνα, ὡς τά λεκτά, καὶ τὸ τόπος. Accordingly, there are two kinds of λεκτά, αὐτο-ταλή (what is said in complete λόγοι) and ἀλλατή (what is said in elliptical or deficient λόγοι): the distinction corresponds to that between full propositional forms esp. of the simple subject-predicate — type (Socrates runs) and incomplete propositions or predicates (e.g. runs). SVF 181-188; 488 etc. Cf. esp. Diogenes Laertius VII 63 sqq. Substrate, matter, substance on the one hand; quality and the fully determinate concrete being (ἰδίως ποιόν) on the other; are real bodies, i.e. genuine beings. But while whiteness and prudence are bodies (as they consist in spirit being modified in certain ways and in substance being modified accordingly), being \textit{white} or \textit{prudent}, or that \textit{Socrates is white or prudent} are not beings, although they essentially relate to beings, i.e. to Socrates, Socrates’ whiteness and prudence. They are analytical reasonings — out of an ἰδίως ποιόν into its constituents, whether by reference specifically to it (in the latter case) or not (in the former). Such logical unfoldings (complete or partial) are true or applicable when there \textit{obtains} (ταυτακίστως, II 166) a corresponding unified physical being, just as space, e.g., is filled up when occupied by physical body. The λεκτά are thus \textit{incorporeal} but \textit{something}s. In contradistinction to the λεκτόν, the εννόημα is the content of mental imagination, of a mental grasping, \textit{not} yet \textit{considered} in the concatenation of a λόγος; SVF I 65 (εννόημα is the ἰδέα, the common content of what is subsumed under a universal), characteristically Diogenes Laertius VII, 61: εννόημα δὲ ἐπὶ φάντασμα διανοών, οὐδὲ τί ἐν ὀνόμα ποιόν, ὅσοι δὲ τί ἐν καὶ φασινεί ποιόν, οὐκ γίνεται ἀνάπτυξι ἢπου καὶ μὴ παρόντος. Brief of the determining propositional concatenation concepts in isolation become indefinite by loosen their expressed or implied tie to a specific full corporeal being; they thus are rendered non-somethings. We may therefore distinguish: 1) whiteness as a quality and therefore a bodily existence; 2) being white or that it (A) is white, which are incorporeal \textit{obtainabilities} so to speak, occupied by corresponding corporeal beings when there \textit{obtains} that they are white; 3) the spoken or written expressions “whiteness”, “is white” etc., which are bodies; 4) thoughts of whiteness, or of that (it) is white, or of being white, or of the corresponding expressions, which as mind actually modified in specific ways, are really bodies, 5) and finally the logical \textit{content} of such thoughts, i.e. the corresponding concepts, which are neither bodies, nor even incorporeals, in that they are less than the aforementioned obtainabilities, and more distant from concrete and substantive existentials. The logical content of such mental grasplings, the meaning intended, is a universal as such. On the other hand such mental grasplings can occur, in beings endowed with the faculty of reason; SVF II 83: ἐστὶ δ’ εννόημα φάντασμα διανοών λογικῆς ἐναντίον τὸ γὰρ φάντασμα, ἐπειδὴ λογικῆς προσπέπτη σωτῆρ, τότε εννόημα καλεῖται, εἰς ἡπτὸς κοινο−
Are there four kinds of Stoic incorporeals: sayables, void, place and time. SVF II 331 (= Sextus adv. math. X 218): τῶν γὰρ τινῶν φασι τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἄσωματα, τὰν δὲ ἄσωμάτων κόσμως ἔλθη καταρτιζομένως ὡς λεκτά καὶ κενόν καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον — ὁ λεκτά cf. also I 132; 170; 335. As they are σώματα, they cannot act on our mind when they are logically imagined by us; on the contrary it is our ἡγεμονικόν which so to speak εἰκονίζεται ἑαυτῷ them, τὸν ἡγεμονικόν ἐπὶ ἀυτοῦ ἑγεμονικόν καὶ υἱὸς ἐπὶ ἀυτῶν, ὡς ἤτοι τὰ σώματα λεκτά. — And in general, SVF II: τὰ ἄσωμα τὰ σώματα ὡς ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα ἄσωμα ἤμειξις ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνων ἑγεμονικών. V. Sextus Empiricus adv. math. 406-410. — For the distinction ἄσωμα τὸ κενόν I 95; II 534 (= Diogenes Laertius VII 140); II 535; 541: 'Ἀναγκαίων ἄσωμα τίνα ἔστω ἀπόστασιν κενόν. Ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἄπολοι καὶ τῶν ἄσωμάτων τὸ κενόν, τὸ κατὰ ἄνωφρον ὄντος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔνωσις ἁμαρτιώματος, καὶ ὡς τὸ πάσχοντος ὑπὸ ἐνυπότητος, ἀπόλοι τῷ κενῷ δὲ τῷ ὄντι δύσκευεν ὑπὸ τούτων. There is sharp distinction in Stoicism between matter (pure passivity) and space (incorporeality as absolute inactivity and impassivity). The Platonic Timaeus model is totally inapplicable. — Time is incorporeal. II 331; 520; 521 (Proclus in Pl. Tim. p. 271 Diehl: ἐν γὰρ ἐν τῶν παρ' ἄυτος ἰδουμάτων ὁ χρόνος, ἢ δὴ καταλείπονται παρ' ἠναντίων ὑπὸ ἐνεργείας ἤμειξις: 335. — An isolated Stoic voice (οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην) negated the reality of incorporeals; SVF III p. 268.7 = Sextus Emp. adv. math. VIII 258: δὲ δὲ ἐν τοις τίνις ὁναγκαίης τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἄσωμάτων τούτων, καὶ ὡς ἐπερόθοι καὶ μένον, οὐκ δὲ ἐπικορύοιτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στοικοὶ, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, ὡς δέδουλα μηδὲν εἶναι ἄσωματον. But this is extremely uncharacteristic, although there were available various ways of reducing the quasi-beingness of the Stoic ἄσωμα into more solid existences (thoughts, attributes of bodies, celestial or general movement).

The distinction between corporeality and materiality, the nature of bodily existence and the intrinsically connected problem of physical resistance in real beings (ἀντιστασία) is a major crux in Stoic Physics. The principle of passivity is matter, the ἄσωμα σώματα, SVF I 85 = 493 = II 300 = III Archippus 12 = Diogenes Laertius VII, 134; III 301; 318. Cf. II 313; 1168; 309; 374 (κράτους ἐνδείκνυον ἡ ἄσωμα τῆς οἰκον. οὐκ ἐλλογή) 1161; 580: 118. Since σώματα is necessarily corporeal, matter is quality - less body, ἄσωμα σώμα, II 320; 326. In itself it is absolutely bereft of all quality, yet it is always with some quality; I, 88 (= Chalcidius Comm. in Tim. 290 Mullach): sed ut innumerablem diversarum, etiam cerearum figurarum, sic neque formam neque figuram nec ullam omnino qualitatem propriam fore censet (sc. Zeno) fundamenti rerum omnium silvae, coniunctam tamen esse semper et inseparable cohaerere alieni qualitati. — Plutarch's criticism in De Comm. Notitii 50 (1085 Β': 1068Β) directed against the compatibility of the twin Stoic doctrines regarding the qualitieslessness of matter and the corporeality of qualities, is external to the system. Materiality and corporeality do not coincide in Stoicism: the divine spiritual agency that forms Ur-matter is corporeal, yet immaterial; but it is intrinsically connected to matter, permeating it thoroughly. The alleged Stoic response (SVF II 380) to the plutarcean criticism (1086A-B), to the effect that ultimate substance is called ἄσωμα ἀλλ’ ὅτι κάποιοι ἐκ τούτων καταλέγονται, cannot be genuine. For, indeed, all qualities inher e spherically in the primal being composite of Ur-Matter and Ur-Spiritus, in the divine agency together with its substantial foundation, but not in the ὁμοίως οὐκ ἐμένη ἐνθέρμανθοι καταλέγοντος ἀλλ’ ὅτι κάποιος ἐκ τούτων καταλέγοντος, cannot be genuine. For one injects aristotelian phraseology into the Stoic position, and speaks consequently of a potential inheritance in matter of all the forms which it is capable of assuming. — Corporeality consists in tri-dimensionality; body is something extended in three dimensions (SVF II 357; 358; III Apollodorus 6: σώμα δ' ἐστι... τῷ χρήμα διαστάσεως, εἰς μήκος εἰς πλάτος εἰς βάθος. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ στερεόν σώμα καλεῖται). Ἀντιστασία belongs not to corporeal being as such, but to substance and matter, or
rather to the being composed of spirit and matter. But then body and space exhibit the same essential character, extensibility, and this consequence was precisely what was imputed to the Stoics; II 502. A verbal paradox was also drawn from it: if extension essentially characterizes both body and space, and if space is receptive of body, then dimensionality is receptive of dimensionality; II 536 p. 171. 20. In fact Chrysippus himself declared the similarity of geometrical magnitudes and time, that is of spatial and temporal extension, to corporeal nature in respect of the fundamental feature of extensibility, namely divisibility; II 482: Χρύσιππος ἔφασε τὰ σῶματα ἐς ἄκρους τομήσαι καὶ τὰ τούς σώματα προσομοίως, όλων ἕπφανονεν, γραμμὴν, τόπον, κενὸν, χρόνον. The difference lying in that substance is body with the capability of undergoing the action of another (and as a result of this is material resistance as constaturation), while divinity is body with the power to act on another (and thus it is what its essential pervasiveness effects). Space on the other hand and mathematical extensibility is body neutralized so to speak, deprived of its inherent power to act or suffer. The triple distinction among spatial non-being, corporeal being and (material) substance makes clear that it is material substance that is ἀντιτυπίας; SVF II 320 (Plotinus). This accounts for its passivity, for the power to be qualified at all. Thus it is not strictly correct when it is affirmed in II 381 (from the de qualit. incorporeis ascribed to Galen) that τοῦ σῶματος τοῦτον ὥραν ἔλατε φανεν, τὸ τρικτὸ διαστάσεως μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας. But the context makes it clear that the question is about material substance vis-à-vis qualities. As to the other similar testimony in II 501 (Sextus Empiricus adv. math. X, 12): δέ τοπο... τοῦ τρικτο ἐξουσίατες, μήκος βάθος πλάτος, χωρίος ἀντιτυπίας τοῦτο γάρ τόν ἄκρον ἐν οὐσία. But here again what is meant by σῶμα is material substance. Besides the passage X 7-12 (reproduced by von Arnim as II 501) is definitively peripatetic and has only indirect relationship to Stoicism, as can be seen even by the Aristotelian interpretation of the Hesiodic chaos (§ 11) as space-receptacle (χώσει λέγον τον χωρίστηκον των ἔλεγν τόπον). The Stoics characteristically construed Chaos as the χώσει of the fluid substance; I 103; 104; II 564; 565; 437. — Matter does not hinder the operation of the active principle; it is absolutely yielding to the formative agency of divinity. It possesses just the appropriate resistance required for the working on it of the creative force. Cf. SVF II 343: ὀμφατικας τὰ ποιοῦντα ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα πάσχον πάθημα γάρ διεξάγει καὶ ἀντιτυπις καὶ ἐπερεῖσως καὶ οὐκ ἄλλας γέγονεν. Matter without antitypo (and not held together by its opposite pole of divine tensional corporeality) would turn in to more incorporeal (inactive and impassive) space. On the other hand material resistance is due to the spiritual tension, grappling and unifying it. Matter has as much ἀντιτυπις as is determined by the way that spirit holds it together, i.e. by its proper quality. And that strength of antitypo is in each case of the degree required for the necessary realization of the overall plan of fatal cosmic lawfulness. Least resistance is offered by matter when Godhead is alone as the sole existence without shaped World; just as aetherial fire is the subllest body in the present state (διαειδομης). Least resistance implies maximal cohesive power. On this Stoic paradox cf. Excursus IV.

The passivity of being, of material existence, the ground of all change is manifested in only two ways; substance can suffer either division or confusion (whereby its distinctive character is merged with that of another into something new). Confusion refers to parts of the total substance, and presupposes a formed World. Division is primary, in that it affects in principle even primal being and the entirety of substantial being as such. II 317: ταύτην δὲ (εἰς τὴν πράγματος ἔλεγν ἄδημον, ὥστε ανάμεσαν ὅπερμανέαν, διαετράτη καὶ σύγχρονον καὶ ἀντίφασιν καὶ συγκεκεκβαίνας. II 318: δὲ ἔκλν τε μεταβλητήν καὶ δι’ ἕκλν διαετράτη λέγονταν εἶναι, καὶ κάθον ὅλον ἕκλν σάρκα συγχείμα τίνως, ἁναλετὴς μέντοι. The last clause emphasizes the actual cohesion, continuity and unification of all substance always. V. II 424; 543; 546: absolute cohesion of a continuum, total absence of void from being, universal simplicities and organic connectedness of all the parts within one whole — these three doctrines go together. — The division of corporeal being proceeds ad infinitum; II 482: Χρύσιππος ἔφασε τὰ σῶματα ἐς ἄκρους τομήσαι καὶ τὰ τοὺς σῶματα προσομοίως, ὅλων ἑπάφηναν, γραμμήν, τόπον, κενὸν, χρόνον. Ibid. (= III Apollodorus 4 = Diogenes Laertius VII, 150): καὶ καθήη δὲ λόγον (καί οὐδείν),... εἰ γάρ τε ἄρης... ὅσον δὲ τὰ γνώμενα ἐς αὐτῆς ἴλλεν. ἤνθεν κάκος ἀληθείαν (with von Arnim) ὥς τέ τομὴ ἐς ἄκρους λόγον (ἡν ζόος) ἔπειπον φήσαι ὁ Χρύσιππος (thus it should be read against von
The passivity of matter grounds its changeability. II 301: τὴν δὲ ὀλὴν πάσην τε καὶ τρίποσμα. 305: τριπτήν καὶ ἄλλοτριάτην καὶ μειμώτην (καὶ τὴν ὀλην ἐναλέω). 309: δὲ ὀλῆς τριπτῆς. 324: Τριπτὴν καὶ ἄλλοτριατήν καὶ μειμώτην καὶ ἄλλης ὀλην δὲ ἀλλής τὴν ὀλην. 1107: materiam enim return ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexiblem et commutabilem etc. — Change in being can be in general of only two basic kinds: either being suffers in the substance or alters in quality. Substance consisting in material corporeality, it is affected solely by division; while alteration in quality ultimately reposes in fusion with a different being resulting in a new characteristic. Confusion of substances and qualitative change (as well as blending) are made possible through the divisibility of matter. II 473 (Alexander Aphr. de mixtione p. 216.22 Bruns = p. 116 Todd): τὰς δὲ τινας συγχύται (σε γίνεσθαι) δὲ ὀλῆς τῶν τε οὐσίων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οὐσίας ποιητῶν συμμετρομέναν ἄλλης, ὡς γίνεσθαι φιλείν (καὶ. Chrysippus) ἐπὶ τῶν λειτουργίαν φαμέκοιν, κατὰ συμπεριλαμβάνει τῶν μυκητιαίων ἄλλω τινας ἐν αὐτῶν γεννημένων σώματος. II 471: τὴν δὲ συγχυσίαν καὶ πλείων ποιητῶν περὶ τὸ σώματα μεταβαλλει ἐν οὐσίᾳ διαφορέσχης τούτων ποιητών γένεσιν etc. This fusion of different qualities into a new one presupposes the total interpretation of the merging substances, their antiperécētaxios (mutual co-extension), whereby each pervades thoroughly the other down to every part of it know, small. II 472: Συγχύσεις δὲ διότι φθαίρει τῶν ἐς ἄρσης ποιητῶν, καὶ τῶν τῆς μεταβαλλει τοῦ σώματος, μεταβαλλει τῆς κατ᾽ ὄρθονποκίνοι τοῦ σώματος etc. Indeed such interpretation of bodies (i.e. of substances and qualities) takes place in blending as well (κρέας, μέξις), where there is no destruction of qualities and emergence of some new one, but a commingling that leaves its constituents unchanged; II 473 (Alexander Aphr. op. cit. 216.25 Bruns): τὰς δὲ τινας γίνεσθαι μείζους λέγει, δὲ ὀλῆς τῶν οὐσίων τε καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀντανακλωμένων ἄλλως μετὰ τὸ τὰς ἐς ἄρσης οὐσίας τε καὶ ποιητῆς σαφῶς ἐν τῇ μείζῃ τῇ μικρῇ, ἐν τῶν μίκην κρέας ἀλής ἐναι λέγετι etc... (217.9 Bruns) τὴν δὲ τοῦτός ἀντανακλωμένας τῶν κρέας ἀναστάτως μεταβαλλέται γίνεσθαι χαράτως δι᾽ ἄλλης τῶν κρέας ἀναστάτως οὐσίας, ὡς μικρὴ μέρος ἐν αὐτοῦς εἶναι μὴ μετατέθηκαν κάποιν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῶν μίκην κρέας μετάφηται ὑπὸ ἔργον εἰς μή πολυτέχνη κρέας ἀλλὰ παραδόθηκαν τῷ γεννημένῳ εἶναι (cf. II 471; 472). — Full corporeal interpretation was the crux of Stoic natural philosophy. Alexander Aphr. op. cit. 226.34 Bruns sqq. (SVF II 475), esp. 227.10: τοῦτο δὲ τῶν σώματος τῶν σώματος, καὶ ὅτι εἰς ἑαυτόν πᾶσας τῆς φυσικῆς ἀξίας ἀνακομίσθηται τὸ σώματος. — Such mutual co-extension of substances and body-going-through-body are possible because of matter’s infinite divisibility. Therefore all physical changefulness is reduced ultimately to the primary passivity, divisibility. And this is as it should, since the fulness of being consists in corporeality, and (tridimensional) extensionality is the essence of corporeality. — Locomotion (movement in space) is also endlessly reducible to division of matter in a system emphasizing the absolute cohesion of substance. Material divisibility is what makes possible for the divine Spirit to realize the οἰκονομικοὶ λόγοι of being.

All change, passivity itself, presupposes divisibility. We are thus led irresistibly to the central question of Stoic Physics: What keeps being together? Why is there being rather than non-Being? Why does Being not disappear into Non-Being? Infinity as the terrible womb of cosmic fertility, passing through well-defined stages (v. Excursus I to A.L. Pietri, Hellenistic Philosophy etc. in the present edition), has reached its climax of ontological negativity: it is absolute non-being, totally bereft of all quality, character and substance, something entirely inert, inactive and impasive. Despite such existential neutrality, it yet constitutes the sole danger to Being: not because of any influence exercised on it by commission or omission, but simply by reason of its capacity to accept and receive the disintegration of Being; which again is due to two factors; first, to a certain similarity
between being and non-being, between body and void: namely extensibility; and, secondly, to the passivity of the substantial aspect of being (matter).

2. EXCURSUS II: ON THE COHESION OF BEING AND ON THE EXISTENCE OF NON-BEING

Pythagorean Dualism consisted initially in a speculative elaboration of deep pristine religious experiences concerning the antithesis between Male and Female (Heaven and Earth) as principles of reality, between the Olympian and the Chthonic as poles of existence. Vid.A.L. Pierris, *Origin and Nature of early Pythagorean Cosmogony*, in K. Boudouris (ed.) Pythagorean Philosophy, 1992 pp. 126-62. The logoscymthetical nature of that dualism tended later, in classical times, to be overshadowed by a mathematical model, which however kept more or less emphatically its symbolic undertones. The pythagorean nature of the dualism in the second part of Parmenides’ poem (288B.33-61) is clear. Cf. A.L. Pierris, *op. cit.* p. 130, nn. 27a-28. But a distinct parallel line of development was instigated when the Theory of Being conceived by pure thought in the first part of the poem was itself considered as an extreme and absolute case of Dualism. It is for this reason that the analysis of (absolute) being in the first part of Parmenides’ poem is directly connected to Atomic, Epicurean and Stoic Physics. For the crux of the argumentation lies in the emphasis on the absolute cohesion of being. And on this theme does the entire Ontology ends, with a detailed, positive description of beingness. Being as such is an absolute; there exists no more or less density of being; for neither is there non-being that would divide being from being, or prevent being from reaching being, thus creating anomalies in distribution; nor does being exist in a way that allows difference of being-concentration; for being is inviolable: nothing can be subtracted from it somewhere and be added to it elsewhere (88.44-48). As there is not more or less being here or there (no different density or rarity), being homogeneously attaches to being, and it is not severed from itself, it does not present occasion for whatever differentiation of part from part; this absolute homogeneity makes it a uniformly unified continuum (88.22-25). Being stays with itself in itself, and thus remains steadfastly firm and everlasting (88. 29-30). It is unmoved and changeless (88. 26; 38): its necessary homogeneity precludes the possibility of alteration. Being is equal to itself in every respect (and direction), and thus lies homogeneously within its limits (88.49). For a limit it has, otherwise it would stand in need of something else; but there is nothing beyond it – or, alternatively for Parmenides, there is only non-being beyond it (88.32-37). Thus we get, by rounding it all up, the famous positive image of being (88.42-44):

αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πείρας πῦματον, τετελεσμένον ἔστι
πάντοθεν, εὐκόκλους σφαιρῆς ἐναληγίην ὅγκων,
μεσοῦνιον ἴσοπαλές πάντη.

The whole argument from 88.22 to the end of the first part centers therefore round *continuity and cohesion*. Most relevantly for the Stoic position sounds the succinct formulation, in B4:

λέεις δ’ ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόρ παρεόντα βεβαιος
οὐ γὰρ ἀποτιμηθεί τὸ εἶν τοῦ ἐκ χόντος ἔχει θαύ,
ὅτε σκοτίαμεν τόν τὰ πάντας κατὰ κόσμον
οὐτε συνιστώμενον.

Mind discerns the co-presence of being with being; there can be no scattering, nor compression of being. — The inviolability (δυναμον) of Being (which comprises its unbegottenness and imperishability elaborated in the former section of the first part, 88.1-21), finds logoscymythetical expression in repeated statements of sacred Necessity, Fate, Justice prohibiting Being from being otherwise than uniform Being. *Thus* (88.37-8): τὰ γε (sc. Being) Μον(" παρέδοσαν; οὐδὲν ἀκινητὸν τ’ ἔμενα; 63 (sc. 88. 30-1): κρατερὸ γὰρ ἀναγκὴς/πεῖρας ἐν διεστίαν ἔχει, τὸ μὲν (sc. Being) ἀμφότερος ἔχει, τὸ δὲ (sc. Being) ἄμφοις ἔχει βιωτήσαντι τ’ ἐμαναίοντα ἐμὶ παρασύχθη τ’ ἔμενα; 63 (sc. 88.13-
There is emphatic use of vocabulary signifying binding, tying, fastening, shackling, bonds, fetters. The question is precisely that one confronting Stoic Physics: what keeps being together? What makes so that δόν κόσμος πελάξει (B8.25)? Parmenides answered that the necessary homogeneity of being renders it inviolable: "οὐδὲ διαφανέστατον κόσμον, ἕκαστον δαίμονον ἄμαρτον, ἄκακον ἡμέραν etc.

We must recognize that in the absence of the vacuum (cf. B8.46-7) just as the Pythagoreans admitted to be the case (567B30; καὶ τὸ κενὸν δομοίᾳ τῆς φύσεως, δὴ αὐτῶν ἄνωτερον τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμόν τοις τούς ἐμφάσεις καὶ διορίσεις...καὶ τὸ κενὸν, δομοίᾳ ἐκδόσεων ταῖς γόρασιν δὲ), although they counterbalanced this effect of Infinity by the corresponding action of Limitation. If non-being exists in whatever way, it can also allow a greater or lesser concentration of beings in different respects or places by intermingling with it. The idea was already expressed in a pythagorean setting. V. Xuthus FV 33 (= Aristotle Phys. 216b22). For Parmenides there is just (ungraded) fullness of being (nǐv ἡ ἑκκάστωσιν κόσμον B8.24), one continuum of it (ἐν, συνεχεῖς B8.6; οὖκ ἀπέλευσθαι should of course be read in 8.4). In Melissus it is found an explicit articulation of the idea that the non-existence of void (= non-being) entails immovability (in respect of locomotion) and unchangeability (in respect of condensation and rarefaction) of being, and, therefore, one absolute fullness of being (πληθὺς, πλήρες; FV 30 B7 §§ 7-10; οὐδὲ κανόνιστον ὁ οὐδὲν τὸ γερά κρωστόν οὐδὲν τὸ ὁμοιόν οὐδὲν τὸν οὐδέν εἰς τὸν οἰκήματος τὸν πληθὺς ἡ ἀκρον τὸν ἀπεκτάσατο τοῦ πλῆκτος καὶ τὸν ἀποκοροτός οὐκ ἀποκροτίσει τῆς πλῆκτος εἰ μέν τινι ὑποκάτασθαι τοῦ πλῆκτος αὐτοῦ μὴ εἰς ἁπλήματι μὴς εἰ ἀποκροτίσει της πλῆκτος. Ἀνάγκη τοῦ πλῆκτος εἰς τὸν κατὰ τόν οὐκ. If emptiness does not exist, then being is absolute fullness. Non-being is totally excluded from reality and the realm of existence, and Dualism of whatever form totally abandoned in favour of absolute Monism. — But in this determination Eleaticism remained an isolated exception (disregarding its repercussions in some minor Socratic Schools). The first part of the Parmenidean poem was normally considered as an extreme form of Dualism, and, therefore, the entire force of the question "What keeps being at all together?" was acutely felt.

Beingness for the archaic experience of reality is inseparable from corporeality. Being enjoys full physical existence; to be is to make some difference, to have some impact on the World. To make its presence felt, being must exercise some influence or at least exhibit the marks left by the operation of another existence on its face; it must respond positively or negatively, by action or passion to the surrounding cosmic environment, to the World — setting into which it takes functionally part. This response, active or passive, evidently presupposes body in the pregnant hylomorphic pre-classical sense. Body is the repository of power; disembodied existence is evanescent substanceity melting away into non-existence. The soul of man after death, according to the Homeric World-view, is a mere quivering impotent shadow of existence, unable to inflict, unable to receive some influence, unless vivified to some extent by the juice of life, body. This is the archetypal expression of the experience that was later crystallized in the Platonic suggestion and Stoic doctrine that being consists in the power to act or suffer an action.

That such understanding of beingness was underlying archaic speculation and reasoning is also evident from the Atomicist application of Eleaticism. As Aristotle diagnosed, it was thought that if Parmenidean non-being existed somehow, then being is many beings, each consisting in a full pleroma of substantiality, such as the One-Being—Absolute would be, if Non-Being did not exist. Atomic Being is indivisible now, unscatterable. But why? Why was not the operation that dispersed the plicable divisibility must stop somewhere in order for being to exist at all. But it has also been tried to answer that question with logical explanatory persuasiveness. Such a crucial attempt is the assumption of atomic partlessness. It is revealing to follow the history of this and alternative solutions to the main problem in Atomism archaic, classical and hellenistic. Thus Plutarchean Epit. 1, 16, 2 (cf. Stobaeus EcL. 1, 14, 2) = Dox. Gr. p. 315 = Democritus A 48: οἱ τῶν ἀτόμων, περὶ τὰ δημιουργικά
FIRST PRINCIPLES IN STOICISM

...
The principles of all existence are according to Atomism, the atoms (sc. οὐσία, or άτομα sc. ούσία) and the void (Diogenes Laertius IX, 44; cf. Democritus B9: νόμος γλυκός etc... ≥τέκ δέ άτομα και κενά (also B125; 117; cf. Leucippus A32). The atoms are the real φαινόμενα (B168; A58), the fullness of being (ναστόν = πλήρες = δέν = δέν = ουσία, Leucippus A8; cf. A14; 10; 11; 12; Democritus A37; 38; 40; 44; 45; 46; 47; 125 etc...). τά γάρ κενά πάντα πάλαις δέν, Aristotle de genere. et corrupt. 325a27. The antithesis of principles was that between fullness (ναστόν) and emptiness (κενόν) of being (A46), presence and absence of being. In the sense the void is the space as emptiness receptive of full being (68A37). — The return to pythagorean dualism, but in terms of Parmenidean ontology, determined the fundamental positions of Atomism. Thus Thrasybus (Diogenes Laertius XI 38) maintained the close affinity of Democritian theory to Pythagorean doctrine: δοκεῖ δέ πρώτοις γεγέννων (sc. Democritus) τοιού πυθαγόρευκαν ἀλλ` καὶ αὐτόι πυθαγόρευοι μέρισται τιθεμένων αὐτῶν εν τῷ ὁμοίωμα συγγραμματί (entitled Pυθαγόρευς, Diogenes Laert. IX 45). Πάντα δέ δοκεῖν παρά τούτου λαβέναι, καὶ αὐτό δέ αὐτό εὖ ἀκριβοῦν, εἰ μία τάς τῶν χρώνων ἔμετρα. Πάντως μένοι τοῖς πυθαγόρευκαν τινός ἀκούσαι φησιν αὐτῶν Γάλακος ο Πηγής κατά τοὺς αὐτούς χρόνους αὐτῆς γεγονός. Φημὶ δέ καὶ ἀπολλάδορος ὁ Κυκλείς: Φίλος ἀντόν συγγεγονέναι. In fact the atomistic rendering of Pythagoreanism under Parmenidean perspective is attributed to Euphrosus, 51A1-2. And note, Aristotle De coelo 303a8: τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ δόλα (sc. Leucippus and Democritus) πάντα τά ἄνω ποιοῦν δριμύους καὶ εὖ δριμύους. As is said of Euphrosus (loc. cit.): τάς γάρ πυθαγόρειας μονάδας ὀνόματο πρώτος ἀπεφέρω καταχρασίας, i.e. indivisible units of being.

For Democritus atomic indivisibility was physical, as is clear from his postulating atoms of various sizes, and, indeed, of possibly huge dimensions. The partlessness of such physical elements consisted precisely in the fact of their elementarity, i.e. of their not being made up from lesser particles coglutinized, so to speak, together. This explained the lack of inner interstitial divisions segregating the cohesion of being within each atom (just as with the ἀναγκαία ὅγος of Heraclides Ponticus). But by the side of the assumed physical indivisibility of the atoms, their logical indivisibility was an unavoidable necessity. Extension is a continuum, and thus both pure space and extended being must be essentially divisible. If there could exist partless bodies, there should also obtain partless space, as Diogenes explicitly declared (Sextus Emp. adv. math. X 86: τὸ γάρ ἁμέρας οὐάμα οὐκέξις ἐν ἄμερει τόμη περισσώς etc.). And how can we then evade the real indivisibility of atomic being by invoking any physical indivisibility of space! Especially as the object of (true) noetic thought is (genuine) being (2883: τὸ γὰρ αὐτό νοεῖτι τοιαύτα καὶ εἰσι, thought is always of what is, since it is articulated in being (288346: ταῦτα δέ ἐστι νοεῖται τα τε καὶ οὐδέν μετά ταύτα, νομίζει. / οὔ γὰρ ἄνιον τοῦ κάκου, ἐν φαινόμενον οὐκέξις, ἐκ προσόντων οὐκέξις, ἐκ προσόντων τοιάδε τού νοεῖτο). In the thorough Aristotelian discussions concerning the existence of indivisibles (De gener. et corrupt. 315b24-317a1; Phys. Z, 231a21 - 235b5; cf. de Coelo 303a3 sqq.), there is no question of any distinction between physical and logical indivisibility in continua. There is just one real indivisibility, existing potentially or carried on and realized actually to any given degree. E.g. 315b28-30 where indivisible magnitudes (ἄδιαιρέτα μέγιθον) fall under the categories of bodies (σώματα) like the Leucippian and Democritian atoms and planes (ἐπίπλα) like the Platonic elementary triangles in Timaeus. (We should add the Xenocratean indivisible lines as the third alternative). Phys. 232a24: 'Αδύνατον εἶναι ἄτομον εἶναι τι συνεχος, μέγιθος δέ οὐκέξις ἄτομον συνεχος; 232b24: λέγω δὲ συνεχος τὸ διαίρεσθαι εὖ διαίρεται 233b31: φαινέρον οὖν δι οὐδὲν κατὰ τού περισσόν ἄμερας. In fact Aristotle refers to atomic theorists as those who (de Coelo 303a) φασί γάρ εἶναι τὰ πρώτα μέγιθον καὶ οὐκέξις μέγιθον δὲ συνεχος. — That Democritus was fully conscious of the mathematical implications of his physical theory is indicated by the fact of devoting two books on this subject, in his work entitled Περί ἀδύνατων γραμμών καὶ ναστέων (Diogenes Laertius IX 47, reporting Thrasyllos' division of the Democritian corpus in tetragogies); how there can be incommensurable lines if there are atoms, i.e. indivisible fullnesses of being? Democritus would have utilized his doctrine regarding differences in magnitude of the atomic beings, as physical datum that would account for mathematical irrationality. — Aristotle certainly includes the Atomists among his "ἐνοιον" who succumbed to both the powerful elastic arguments: first, that unless there exists the non-being, being must be one; and, second, that unless
there exist indivisible magnitudes, being will be dissolved into insubstantial nothingness (Phys. 187 al; cf. FV 29A 22; 23). — Persisting in Ekleatism, one is inevitably led ultimately into the postulation of the incorporeality of being. Thus Melissus, 30B9; for corporeality entails extendedness, and this in its turn part-possessed and divisibility. Melissus, it is true, accepted unlimitedness for true being (B2; 4), from which indeed he deduced the oneness of absolute being (B5; 6). Furthermore, he affirmed of being that it is infinite with regard to magnitude (B3: ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἔστων ἄτι, οὕτω καὶ τῷ μέγεθος ἄξιων δὲ χρῆ εἶναι). But how can being be simultaneously unlimited in magnitude and yet incorporeal? Simplicius explains (In Phys. 109.32 = 30B10): μέγεθος δὲ οὐ ἐν τῇ διάστασιν θεινῷ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἀδιάστατον τὸ δὲ διεξάγεται... ἀλλ' ἀπεριότερον τὸ διά μεγάλον ἀληθώς τῆς ἀποστάσεως. (And similarly op. cit. 109.29 = B3). But Melissus’ argumentation in B2-3, directed as it is against early Pythagorean Cosmogony (cf. A.L. Peiriss op. cit. pp. 135 sqq.), of an embryogenetic World-formation, presupposes extended infinity; the eternal cannot have an inception at this point, development in all dimensions, and such and such limit (ἀρχή, μέσον and τέλος or τελευτή according to the standard formula). Infinity is deduced from eternity. And precisely this deduction is castigated by Aristotle (Soph. Elench. 167b13; 168b35 = A10; cf. A11). Besides, Melissus Being is fullness, πλήν, stuffed so to speak up completely (B7 §§ 9-10; § 9... εἰ μὲν οὖν χωρεῖ τι να εἰσέλθηται, οὐ πλάνον εἰ δὲ μήτη χωρεῖ μητε εἰσέλθηται, πλήνοι; it cannot thus be Space. We end up thus with a Being which is infinitely extended, all-inclusive and one (ἢν B2 ad hunc ev), absolutely full and incorporeal, all at once. One universal, particleless atom is the solution of the riddle. It is incorporeal as it does not share in the essential character of corporeality, divisibility in parts. Simplicius (supra) was right to construe Melissus incorporeality as, basically, indivisibility; only he was anachronistically interpreted the magnitude involved as non-extended swelling of existence out of nothingness, ἀπειρία τῆς ἀποστάσεως. He should have spoken of the unavoidable infinite plentitude of existence.

In Epicureanism we meet a refusal to proceed to an ultimate explanation of the existence of being. What really exists is bodies and space; ad Herod. 39-40; ad Pyth. 86; Sextus adv. dogm. III, 333; Plutarch adv. Colot. 1112E. Bodies are either compositions of elementary particles or elementary bodies (ad Herod. 40). These latter are fullnesses (μεκτά § 42) indivisible and unchangeable, otherwise being would be dissolved into nothingness (ibid. 41): ταὐτί δὲ κατὰ άτομον καὶ αμαξίβατον, ἐπερ μη μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μή ἐν φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἴσχυστα ὑποκείμενα ἐν τῇ διάλειψίς τῶν αναγκηθημένων πλήρη τῆς φάσιν οὐκαίον καὶ οἷς ἔχοντα δεχθεὶς ἢ ὑπὲρ διαλείπεται, ὅτε σαρκὸς ἀμαξίβατος εὐγενεῖται εἰς καταμεῖναν φύσεις. Cf. § 54: οὗτος ἀτομοῖ σωλάς μεταβλάσθησιν, ἐπιθύμησιν δὲ τι οὐκομενίν εἰς ταῖς διάλειπσίς τῶν συγκρατήσεων στερεῶν καὶ διάλειπτων, ἡ μεσοβολώς οᾶς εἰς τὸ μή ὀνείρεσθαι ὑπερ οὗτος ἀτομοῖ κατὰ μεταξάθεσας <ιναν> etc. (cf. Lucretii 1, 551 sqq.). Division ad infinitum of bodies is negated; even a mental passing to continually less and less parts of a body is deemed impossible by Epicurus; ad Herod. 56-57. — There are minimals in sensation. These bear a resemblance to larger, compound bodies, in that one may conceive a mental passing (μεταβάσις) from one part of them to another; yet they are dissimilar to the latter, since, if we (relying in the former similarity) attempt to introduce a division within them, and segregate two parts on either side of the cut, we end up with holding in perception sensibles equal to the initial one from which we started (§ 58). — To such perceptible minimalis with unseparable, ungraspable parts, each as it were equal to the whole, there correspond the ultimate atoms of reality. These elementary particles of true being do have in a sense parts (since they do possess and vary in magnitude cf. 55-6), but such parts as cannot be grasped in themselves, and thus not quite real ones. Some among the atoms are true minimals in extension, and these constitute the limits of things and their units of measurement; but these cannot on their own form complete bodies (§ 59). They may be the genuine ἄμερα and absolute ἀμαξίβατα, if we read ἄμερα (instead of the possible ἄμερη) in 59.5 with von Arnim, and ἀμαξίβατον (in place of ἀμαξίβαλτον) in 59.8 with Usener. — Void is the incorporeal in itself, what cannot act or undergo any influence, § 67. Its only property is intangibility (intactus, Lucretius I, 454). — There must be ἄτομα if being is not to disappear into nothingness. But what holds together these indivisibles? Plutarchean Epit. I, 3, 18 = Stoaeus Ecl. I 10, 14: ἐφημα ἐν ἄτομος οὐκ ἔτι ἔστων ἐλαχήσεται, ἀλλ' ἐτι οὐ πάντας ἄμερας, ἀπαθεῖς ὁσία καὶ ἀμαξίβατος κενον. Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 231a21 (925.13 Diels), claims that Epicurus abandoned the old atomistic explanation of the indivisibility of the elementary particles in terms of partlessness, because of the
severe Aristotelian critique against that notion. — Atomic indivisibility is, therefore, for Epicurus simply a datum of reality, the simplest and most natural physical theory of first principles consistent with experience.

The infinite multi-dynamism of fertility had to be conjugated in Pythagoreanism to the principle of Finiteness in order for the World not to collapse into chaotic eruption of uncontrolled power. With Eleatism, the terrible cosmic Womb became the impotent Abyss of Nothingness. Atomism of all sorts (Old Academy as well and logically-minded Socratic Schools) rehabilitated the second principle as μῆν δὲ in existence; but they could not satisfactorily explain why being, once broken up from its absolute Osseness by reason of the existence of non-being, would not disintegrate completely into that inert Infinity. Stoicism reverted to the cohesion of all being, but discovered that non-being, even existing, cannot threaten the integrity of being from outside. Yet internal danger there lurks, because of the very corporeality of being, and, consequently, of its divisibility.

3. EXCURSUS III: ON SPIRIT AND TENSION

The substance (substrate, matter) of all being is without quality but of a definite quantity. SVF I 87: οὐδέν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ἐλην, ταύτην δὲ πάσαν ἄδειαν καὶ οὔτε πλεῖον γνωμονηθέντα σύστελεν. II 316; 317. Plotinus in II 320 assumes that the total material substance has a definite magnitude as well: διδοθεὶς δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῆς. — sc. τῇ ἐλην — ἀκούει αὐτῷ σῶμα λέγοντες καὶ μεγέθος δὲ. But this is inaccurate; the actual size of the substance depends on its condition. It is different, for example, at the beginning of the World-formation, and different in the present developed state. What the Stoics affirmed was that the quantity of matter is constant, as matter cannot be created ex nihilo, nor disappear in nothingness. So Origenes in (SVF 318) is more exact when he states: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μεγέθος ἄποντας ἀναληθούσον ξέσας (sc. matter). — The definite quantity of material substance makes it finite. I 88 (Chalcidius): Deinde Zeno haec ipsum essentiam finitam esse dicit unamque eam communem omnium quae sunt esse substantiam etc. III Antipater 32 = Apollodorus 4 = Diogenes Laertius VII, 150: σῶμα δ᾽ ἦτο κατ᾽ αὐτόν ἢ σώμα καὶ πεπερασμένη. Cf. II 323. In general, II 603: πᾶν σῶμα πεπερασμένον εἶναι λέγοντι. Chrysippus elaborated the general necessity. II 503: τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἀπεριον εἶναι λέγοντι τὸ γὰρ ἀκόω τοῦ Κόσμου τούτου εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον (i.e. space actually occupied by bodily substance) πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ δέννων σώμα ἀπεριον εἶναι, ὡς ἦλθεν τὸ ἀκόων ἀπεριον, δὲ τὸ γὰρ χρόνος ἀπεριον καὶ τὸ κενὸν. "Ὅσιν γὰρ τὸ μὴ δὲν ἔν (οὐ μὴν) τὸν ἐνόσσον (thus it should be read in the med. μὴν σάμας ἐν πληρον ἐν and the vulgar since Cantor μὴν σάμας ἐν) κατ᾽ ἄρχησαν ἀπεριον, ὡς ἦλθεν γιὰ τὸν κενὸν. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὸν ἐκπληροντος ἀπεριον κατ᾽ ἄρχησαν δὲ τὸ ἄνω ἐκπληρονόμον (i.e. when it is filled up by full corporeal substance) τὸν δὲ πληρονότου ἀράθεντος σώμας ἦλθεν αὐτῷ νοῦς ἄρχησα. The limit of corporeal being for the Stoics is not a being; the πέρας is not body; II 487. It is μὴν, II 486. It subsists only mentally (κατ᾽ ἐπιστώιν) not in rerum natura (II 488). It may be held that πέρας is not even any incorporeal existence like space or time, because these are extended, and thus akin to real being. What in reality bounds being is the non-being enveloping it; conversely what bounds non-being is being which limits non-being by occupying so much of it. Of course, strictly speaking, the void cannot limit, as it cannot act at all. The spirit in the substance unites and limits it by giving it a quality apt to occupy a certain amount of space. Under this alternative, the text above would run: διότι γὰρ τὸ μὴ δὲν ἐν ώσιν ἄρχησαν πέρας, ὡς ἦλθεν σάμας τὸ μὴ δένων, ὡς ἦλθεν τὸ κενὸν. — Exactly analogous reasoning applies to temporal extension and events occurring, or entities enduring, in it. — The archaic opposition between πέρας and ἀπεριον physically construed is recapitulated in the Stoic arch-contrariety between being and non-being. This is germane to atomistic applications of Eleatism. — A finite World engulfed in the infinity of Void: II 528; 534; 535; 536; 537; 538; 539; 543; 545; 195; 96; Diogenes Laertius VII 140; 143; 150.

This is a typical Pythagorean conception. Vid. A. L. Pierris op. cit. pp. 137-8, no. 88-98. Cf. with regard to the infinite Void engulfing the World, SVF II 94: (τὸ κενὸν) κεφαρισμένον καὶ ἄθροον καὶ καθ’ αὐτόν, πέριμεν τὸν αὐτόν, ὡς πρότερον μὲν βούτο τῶν ἀρχαίων τινῶν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτ' ὁ περὶ Ζήνου τὸν Κυνή. The ἀρχαία meant here are precisely, principally, the early Pythago-
reans, as is explicitly observed by Philo in Ar. Phys. p. 613.23 (= SVF I 96). — Cf. on the subject, SVF I 95; II 535; 538; 539; esp. 543; 619; 503; 609; etc. — There is no void in the World, only continuous corporeal fullness of being; cf. I 95; II 424; 477; 502; etc. — Thus the totality of being (the World) exists in the midst of the infinity of non-being (the Void). The Void really exists (cf. II 502) — In one sense the Universe (τὸ πᾶν) is the World, in another it is the system of the World and the encompassing Void; Apollo A 9, III p. 260, 24. Some reserved τὸ πᾶν for the latter sense, while employing “τὸ δῶλον” in the former; II 522-525.

Finite, unified corporeal substance in the midst of infinite empty Space; Being kept together in the midst of Non-being. Bodily fulness and substance without any intermixture of void and non-being. The aboriginal fear of what-is to be become annihilated by being dissolved in the horrible chaos of what-is-not does not in fact turn into actual realization: there obtains a cohesive power keeping being together and upholding it in existence as full substance; such is the divine Spirit. SVF II 473 (Alexander Aphor. de mixtione p. 216.14 Bruns = p. 114 Todd): ἔσται δὲ Ἡρακλείου δέξα περὶ κράτωσις ἢδε· ἡμισθία μὲν ὑποκτηθῆται τὴν ἀὑμασκου ὀσμήν, πνευμάτως τούτου διὰ κάσας αὐτῆς διάκονος, ὥς οὐ συνεχέσθη τε καὶ συμμετείχαν καὶ συμμαθής εἶστιν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν. II 533 (Produs In Plat. Tim. 138D Diehl): ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμισθίου τὴν ὀσμήν, τοπέται τὴν ὄμοιαν, σώμα ὀσμής. Αὐτὸν εἰσὶν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ’ ἡμισθία αὐτῶν τοῦ γάρ ἀναγκάζει τὴν τῶν ὀσμῶν πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπεσαν καὶ συντονών. II 544 (cf. 545). 546: φύσει ὑπ’ ὄνος τούτου συνεχομένου αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ πνευμάτος μη δι’ ὄλου δύντος συμφωνεῖ, δύο γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ὄνομα ἢ ὄνομα μεγίστα. 1013: ἡμισθία πολλά ὄνομα δ’ Κόσμος (οὐδὲ συναπαντοῦν οὓς ἡμισθίας). 447, 448 (ἔν τι συνέχεσθαι τοῦ, τὸ τε σύμφωνον Κόσμον ἄμα τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ), 470, 441 τὸ πᾶν ἡμισθία τε καὶ συνεχεῖται, πνευματικός τούτος διὰ κατοχὸς διάκονος αὐτῶν. — The idea is very clearly articulated by Cleomedes in response to Peripatetic criticism. SVF II 540 (= Cleomedes Circul. doctr. I, p. 7. Bake): Λέγεται κάκεινον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν (sc. the Peripatetics) αὐτὸν ἢ ἢ ἢν ἢν τὸν κόσμον κενών, χρεωμένοι δι’ αὐτῶν ἢ αὐτίσια, ἢν ἢ ἢν μετεχομένοις μὲν καὶ μετεχομένοις δύο αὐτίσια καὶ συντονώντας. Και τὸ μὲν περιέχει αὐτόν κενόν ὀσμὸν x (sc. being incorporeal), αὐτή δὲ ἐπερεβηλόποισιν δυνάμει χρωμένη συντρέπει ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῆς συναπαντούς καὶ συνεχεῖς. ἐντούτοις, φύσει, ὡς μιᾷ ὀσμῇ δύο τῶν αὐτόν καὶ συνεχέσθη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν περιέχει αὐτόν κενόν ὀσμὸν x (sc. being incorporeal), αὐτή δὲ ἐπερεβηλόποισιν δυνάμει χρωμένη συντρέπει ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῆς συναπαντούς καὶ συνεχείς. Καὶ τὸ μὲν περιέχει αὐτόν κενόν ὀσμὸν x (sc. being incorporeal), αὐτή δὲ ἐπερεβηλόποισιν δυνάμει χρωμένη συντρέπει ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῆς συναπαντούς καὶ συνεχείς.

The cohesive power of the divine Spirit is realized as a tension (τόνος) permeating material substance and holding it together. Just as this τόνος in general constitutes the substance into full being, so its particular disposition impresses on matter definite qualitative being-determinations. SVF II 318: ἡ γὰρ συνέχεια αὐτή (sc. τῆς ὑμετέρας) καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν ὄμοιμα ὀσμὸν μετέχοντας οὐκ εἰσὶν εἰς κατοχὸν τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν ὄμοιμα ὀσμῶν. 310: μεταξίως τὸ ὄλον ἔργον τὸν ἑαυτόν, διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διάκονος, καὶ συμμαθής καὶ συμμετείχας καὶ συμμαθής διάκονος τοῦ τρόπου (i.e. through his
pervading the passive principle). — Divinity, that is, the power of activity and causality, consists in spirituality. II 340: οβάλοντος τά τέλη θεωρητικά (perhaps we should correct with Diels to πνευματικά, adding in the following clause something like “ἐπηρεαστικά”) αὐτομάτα ἀπαθείως. I 88: non deesse ei (sc. matter) spiritum ac vigorem ex actione, qui moveat eam rationabiliter etc. I 333: haec Cleveland in spiritum congerit, quem perpetuam universitatis affirmat. II 473 (Χρυσίππου δόξα): ἡμῶνύπολείπεται τήν τούτων ὁσίους, αὐτομάτους τούς διά πάντων αὐτούς διήκοντος etc. II 441. Alexander Aph. 1 criticism in de mixtione X (223.6 - 224.27 Bruns) is directed precisely against the idea that divine causality resides in spirit. When in the course of his argumentation he objects to the derivation of spirit from fire and air (223.14 Bruns = II 422), he evidently confines what pertains to the fully developed World, and as such is created in each World-cycle (i.e. the elements) with what is eternally existent and causes cosmic formation. That the eternal divine spirit (principle of causality) is distinct from the four elements of the created Universe, or of any combination thereof, probably accounts for its identification with the aristotelian fifth element in the pneumatic medical School, as Galen reports (introd. sive medicinae IV 698 Kühn = SVF II 416): kout 59 τον Ἀθήναν στοιχεια ἀνθρώπου σφαεται ἵνα το τέσσαρα πρώτα σύμμετρα... ἄλλα ἀποκλίνεται αὐτά... δι' ἄδεια μὲν τοιοῦτο πρότεινεται, τὸν τέρμαν καὶ τὸ γυρόν, δια δὲ ἄλλα, τὸ ξηρόν καὶ τὸ υγρόν, καί πέμπτον παρειςχον κατά τοὺς Σταϋκῷς τὸ διήκον διά πάντων πνεύμα, ὡς ὅτα τοῦ πάντων συνέχεσθαι καὶ διακόεσθαι. This is typical syndeçisizing in the manner of the Middle Stoa. The genuine Stoic factor in it is the view that the celestial aether of the World is consubstantial with the primal being. But the Spirit as active Principle that forms (first) matter into primal being and aether is something distinct. Yet as the active principle transforms itself, so is the matter qualified. There is thus systematic ambiguity between spirit as Active Principle and Spirit as primal Being. Lack of sufficient awareness of that ambiguity is also betrayed (although "πνεύματον" refers to the first offspring of the two principles) in the doctrine of the δρακον καὶ πρωτόγονον πνεύμα το πνεύμα of the Galenian El ζῷον το κατα γαστρος (XIX 160 Kühn = SVF II 638): nevertheless the formulation there is rather more hyletic than the Stoic dualism would fully approve; but it stems from the medical Stoicism of the pneumatic School: Κόσμος τοῖς ζωτικάς ἡμέρας καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν μεταξύ φύσεων, <χορός> καὶ ἔκαθος καὶ ἄρης (this is how the lacuna in the text ought to be filled); between celestial, aetherial quintessence and earth there lie the other elements, fire, air and water; Cfr. for the genuine Chrıyssippian position II 527) καὶ τὸ διήκον ἔχων διά πάντων αὐτῶν ἀρχήν καὶ πρωτόγονου πνεύμα, ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦσε ποὺς φιλουσφόρουν ἣ νοείκη ἣ πανοῦδι ἢ ἀτόμον (this "Ατόμον") should not be atheized with von Arnim; the spirit of divinity as well as the entire cosmic substance it unifies is an unbreakable continuum of full being without any emptiness) ἢ πέρ ἢ ὁμανόμενος τῇ γένει αὐτοῦ τὸ πνεύμα etc. (the primeval spirit homoousia to the breaths and winds and blows and fiery, aetherial spirituals of the developed World). — Stoicism however accepted fundamentally the four-element theory of Cosmos (cf. II 417). Spirit in the existing World is aetherial substance, fiery air or breath of fire (cf. II 442). Such is also the Ur-Spirit as primal existent, divine spirit in first matter: its substance is a fiery blow. That this is not the divine principle itself is evident from the fact that it is not existing without interruption. Even momentarily it is extinguiished, when God turns its proper aetherial substance in totally liquid semen at the preparatory stages of Cosmogeny.

The divine spirit consists in a tension (τόνου). SVF II 441 (δεισιμός πνεύματος): τις γάρ καὶ ὁ τόνου τοῦ πνεύματος, ὡς ὁ συνυφάσθησα (sc. τούς σύμμακας) τήν τα συνεχής ἔχει τήν πρὸς τά ὀλίγα μέρη καὶ συνάκερται τοῖς παρασκευασίστας; 447: ὁ διήκον καὶ πνευματικός τόνος καὶ συνεχεῖ τόν Κόσμον. 546: οὔτε μὴ ὡς ἐν τούς τούς συνεχειμένους αὐτού (sc. the World) καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος μὴ δὲ διά τοῦ μού συμφύος etc. I 497: τῶν τέ τέλεον οἴον τούς μὴ παλαιουθείη. I 514: "Ἀντικρινὴς δί εἰσιν ὁ ἐν τοῖς δόξους τῶν, καὶ ἐν ψυχής ἡμῶν καὶ κράτοις ἐστιν, ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀπεφηγμένος οὐας, μεταφυσικός ἃρχος καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀλλοικὸς ἄκραθόν. I 318: ὁ σοφὸς αὕτη (sc. matter) τόνου καὶ δι᾽ τῶν κεφαλής etc. Cfr. 444, 785, 455. — Cleanthes seems to have been particularly prone in widely utilizing the notion of τόνου; v. I 563. cf I 877, II 473; II 457 etc. According to Chrıyssippus (active) being is the dynamic spirit with its two inherent tonic (tensional) movements, inward and outward (II 471): Χρύσιππος δὲ τοιοῦτον τι διεβαθαινότον εἶναι τὸ δι' ἀνάφα σύνθεσις καὶ ὡς οὕτω καὶ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ (cf. II 442 p. 146.10). II 441: τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἀνέθεται καὶ συνέχεσθαι,
First Principles in Stoicism

The Stoics held that the universe is built on principles of balance and harmony. The principle of cohesion is central to their understanding of the Cosmos. This principle is evident in the way that all things are interconnected and interdependent. The Stoics believed that the universe is a coherent whole, and that all things are part of a larger, unchanging Reality. The term "cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) is an expression of this principle. It emphasizes the individual's connection to the greater whole, and the idea that the individual is not separate from the universe. This principle is also evident in the Stoic concept of "dunamei" (possibilities), which suggests that everything has the potential to become anything else. The Stoics believed that this potential is inherent in all things, and that it is this potential that gives rise to the dynamic forces that shape the universe. The principle of cohesion is also evident in the Stoic concept of "enプレスion" (expansion). This concept suggests that the universe is constantly expanding, and that this expansion is a natural consequence of the principle of cohesion. The Stoics believed that this expansion is a way for the individual to connect with the greater whole, and to participate in the continuous process of creation.
Thus the elements essentially consist in varying degrees of condensation of prime matter. When in ἔκθερως matter has been all transformed into the fiery-aetherial substance of divinity, it occupies vast regions of space, immensely larger than the extent of the actual World-διακόσμησις. II 619; 609; 610. V. Plutarch de comm. noctis, 35, 1077 A sqq., the last part of which is in II 618 (cf. also II 744), where read: ἀλλὰ τοῦ γέ Κόσμου πλῦν (with Pohlens instead of πάλυν) τὸ πῦρ, ὁ δὲ σφέρα λέγουσιν ἐννέα, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἔκρυσθαι εἰς σφέρα μεταβαλεῖ τὸν Κόσμον ἐκ βραχύτερῷ σάμιατος καὶ ἐγκόσμων ἔχοντα πολλὰν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ προσεπλαμβάνοντα χάραν ἄπελτον ἐπικοινωνής ἡ ἀοίδης: ἐγκλεψεων δ’ ἀόυς (sc. τοῦ Κόσμου) δικορροιον τὸ μέγαθος καὶ συνουσίας ὑπὸ ἀναφερόμενας δυνάμεις καὶ συνωγομένης περὶ τὴν γένναιαν εἰς κατάν τῆς ὀλίγης. V. Philo de Aetern. Mundi 99-103; cf. SVF II 611. — And in general, II 406: the elements change to each other χώσαι τε τιμικά καὶ πλούσιον. To the compression (κλίσις) corresponds the condensation (κοσμάσις), II 413 p. 136.20 sqq. (cf. 471 p. 152.37). — That water is substance in greater consolidation than fire seems to contradict its being less active, and thus less forcibly mastered by divine spirit. The objection has thus been raised (Galien in SVF II 440) that it is absurd and contrary to common experience to consider what is hard, resistant and dense in need of cohesion; and even more absurd and repugnant to see in what is loose, soft and yielding the cause of cohesion. But the paradox is only apparent. For the more perfect penetration of the divine spirit in matter occurs when the substance is more pliable, more tenacious and elastic and thus more active; while slackness, relaxation and unstretchedness are the cause of increased resistance, and thus less compliance to the working of spirit. Cf. II 444: γὰρ μὲν γὰρ φασὶ καὶ δόξας οὕτως ἑκάτων συνεχέσθαι οὕτως ἑτερα, πνευματικῆς ἡ μετοχή καὶ πυρὸς δύναμις τὴν ἐνεργείαν διαφέρουσαν ἀεί μὲν καὶ πῦρ οὕτως τας ἐνεργείας ἐτέλεσαν τὸ κόσμον καὶ οὐσίας. II 473 p. 155.33. καὶ τῶν συναίνεσιν… τὰ δοῦ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς διέπεται τὰ διὰ τῶν καθεμαρτυρίων ἡ πνευματικὴ μετεξεργασία τῶν ἐνομισμάτων εἰς τὸν κόσμον καὶ οὐσίας, διὸ διὰ τὸν κόσμον καὶ οὐσίας. Plutarch de primo etimo, I: ἡ πνεύματος πάσας μὲν ἐκείνων πνείματος καὶ συναίνεσιν τὸν κόσμον καὶ οὐσίας. — But this can be no more tightening than that which obtains in the primal being, World-formation requires a comparative relaxation of the supreme tension, resulting in more solid and resistant beings. These are things more frangible, less spiritual. — The first change from (aetherial) fire to (fiery) air is thus described in Dio’s logicomycus (= SVF II 622): ηυθυβίλεις (sc. the pure Godhead) δὲ Ἀρσενοδότης καὶ γενέσεως ἐκπάνω καὶ ἕνδεικτη οὕτως, καὶ πόλις τοῦ φωτός ἀποστρέφει ἐκεῖνος μὲν πῦρ πυράδη τρέπεται πυρὸς ἡμῖν etc. The descent in the ladder of elements consists in gradual “molifying and relaxation” of the initial severe tension. The grosser the material substance the more resistant it is, which means, the less potent to permeate the foreign entity, act on it and assimilate it or impart an impression and character on it; thus naturally, the less mastered and stretched by divine spirit, the further from God’s own form of matter.

Spirits are particular dispositions of the eternal, divine Spirit. Such spirits constituting the being of the things in the World are distinguished into (γειαί) ἔξεις, φύσεις, φυγαί, corresponding to the triple division of reality into inanimate entities, plants, animals (II 715; 716; 718; 1013). Νόος is added as a fourth item to account for beings endowed with reason, I 158: διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πε-φωτισθῆναι τὸν θάνον τιμούμενος καὶ ποι μὲν εἰναι νοῦν, καὶ δὲ φύσην, καὶ δὲ φύσιν, καὶ δὲ ξύλιν. Cf. II 459; 460; 458. “Holdings” or “grapings” (ἔξεις) are spirits keeping together substances in concrete being, II 368: ἔξεις ημών διαλεύχατο διὰ τὸ μὲν ἔξος ήμαστο διατητότων, ἐν σῶς ἔχοντος τῶν περιγείων συνεπεξεργασιῶν. Τοῖς ἔχουσι περιγείων οὕτως ὑπεράνευον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου έχοντος πέρα τῆς ἔξως ἔπειτα ἐτύπωσαν, ἐπὶ τῆς ἔξως ἐβάλες. Εἰς ἔξος καὶ συνεχῆς ἔξος διάλευχος ἐστιν. Αἱ δ’ ἔξεις ἐπηρεάζοντες τῶν ἔξωσις ὑπεράνευσαν ἔξω ἔπειτα ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξως ἐργασίας οὖσαν τῶν περιγείων διείστη τῶν ἔξω ἔπειτα τῶν περιγείων. Αἱ δ’ ἔξεις ἐπηρεάζοντες τῶν σοφίας διάλευχος ἐστιν. Again the interaction of the two opposite tensional movements. For these “holdings” that hold together the substance of things v. II 540; 473 p. 155. 29; 1013 p. 302.19; 36; 716; 474; 391 p. 129.14. The ἔξεις, as spirits; are also described as “air”; II 449: ἔξως διὰ τῶν ἔξως ἔργας ἐξισμὸς ἐργαζόμενος εἰσὶν (sc. Chrysippus) ἤστι τούτων ἔργα συνέχομεν ἐκ τῶν ἔξω ἔξω ἔπειτα ἐργασίας, τοῦτο τὸν ἔξω ἔπειτα θυμὸν ἔκτισεν ἐκ τῶν ἔξω ἔξω ἔπειτα ἔργας εἰσιν συνεχομέναις. — Strictly
speaking, the spirits and qualities are *ektē* (things that can and are being had), not ἡμικής (having), although they may be called ἡμικής, too, in the sense of "possessions" instead of "possessiones". Thus II 391, p. 129.11-12; 390 p. 128.28. The point was that spirits were substances and bodies, while holdings and havings are ἀσάματα; II 461. Another example of Stoic recherché discriminations. Arcestas’ joke in Athenaeus X 420d derives such affectations of niceties; turning to his pupil who failed to percolate the wine, observed that he, no better than himself, cannot perceive the (Stoic) good, adding: οὖ δὲ ἀπέλαθα τὰ *ektē* τρόπα, i.e. perforate what the Stoics hold, contrary to common belief and notion, to be corporeal, their famous *ektē*: i.e. an impossible thing. Cf. the proverb ἐλέγχων τρισφάν, boring the millet, said of a vain and useless occupation.

4. EXCURSUS IV: PRINCIPLES, UR-ELEMENT AND ELEMENTS

That there is a single, unified entity out of which the entire World is developed; and that there are two principles of being, activity and passivity, inseparable, constitutive of all existence; these two facts are perfectly consistent. Such *dualistic monism* characterizes Stoicism, and is reflected in the Stoic distinction between *principle* (*d&rha*) and *element* (*stwogε&v*) of being. Thus very clearly it is stated by Aristotle (S VF I 98): Στοιχεῖον εἶναι φασὶ τῶν δύναμις τὸ ἥρ, καθάπερ Ἰ. Ὁρᾶλκείος, τοῦτοι δὲ ἄρχει στίγμα καὶ θεόν, ὡς Πλάτων τὸ ἀλλ. ἀόρατον (sc. Zeno) ἄμφος σώματα φαινον εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ πνεῖον καὶ τὸ πάσον, ἐκείνου (sc. Plato) τὸ πρῶτον πνείων ἑτέρων σώματων εἰσιν λέγοντος, ἕκαστο δὲ καὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν καταγόμενους χρόνους ἐκπορευθήσατο τοις σώματα κόσμου, εἶτ' ἀδήμος πάλιν διακοσμεῖται. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πνεύμα εἰσὶν καθαράπται τῷ σώματι, τῶν πάντων ἕξω τόσος λόγος καὶ τῶς ἑκάστως τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γεγομένων καὶ τῶν ἱερωμένων etc. — Galen employs the distinction in an aristoteliansizing, syncretistic manner (*drawing probably on Pseudo-Aristotle*). Fire is an element, but its substance and quality (matter and heat) are principles (cf. II 320 p. 115.20; Plotinus: καὶ πάς ἔχουσαι ἀόρατον — sc. τὴν ἀληθήν — καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον εἰσιν); fire is not or less homogeneic with the things whose element it is, while matter and heat are categorially different from that whose principles they are (S VF II 408): ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ διηγείται στοιχεῖον ἀρχῆς, ἐν τῷ τάς μὲν ἄριστος ἀληθῆς ἀναγκῆς ἐπειδήσεως εἰσί τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀν ἐπιρροοῦν ἄρχει, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα πάντως ὁμογενῆς. Or, in other words, the element is that into which something is radically divisible, as an ultimate physically identifiable part of it, whereas principles are distinguished even within an actually indivisible entity, really indeed, but merely in thought, without any implication of genuine separability (II 409): άλλα [sc.] διὶ πράγματι ἐκτὸς φυσικῆς ἄλλης ἀποκέφαλος, τὸ μὲν ἐπερον ἐλάχιστον πάντων τοῦ δαίμονος, τὸ δὲ ἐπερον εἰς ὅ διέλευπ τις κατ' ἐπικοινωνίαν ἀπό τοῦτον <τὸν> ἀλλήλων etc. Principles, contrary to elements, cannot exist in *ei&thv* only but in combination. — The Chrysippian doctrine of the elements is clearly set out by Areius Didymus fr. 21 (Dox. Gr. pp. 458-9 = S VF II 413). It coheres with Aristotle's account, supra. There are the four elements ἐξ ὑπουργοὶ συναντάμενοι...καὶ ἐς ταύτα διάλειψε, II 413 p. 136.8. But fire is the element παρ' ἐξουσία (p. 136.11) κατ' ἑξογονίαν στοιχεῖον ἐλέγεται διὰ τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν πρόων τὰ λοιπὰ συναντάμενα κατὰ μεταβολήν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἐκχώρησαν πάντα ὑπόμενα διαλέξεις, τούτοι δὲ μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὴν εἰς ἄλλους χώρας ἄναλλον, fire being the primal existence constituted by the two inseparable principles, i.e. material substance and divine spirit. From the primal fiery being, there are formed the four cosmic elements and then the entire diaphōrōmēs, according to Stoic cosmogony; e.g. II 327 quoted infra. Chrysippus distinguishes three senses of "element", the basic one, the one according to which elements are the four empyrean διαμέτρα, and, thirdly, that of the things out of which others are made in each particular case. (I read in p. 136.33 e.g.: κατὰ τρίτον <ἐκ> (with Meineke) λόγον ἔλεγεν στοιχεῖον <ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ> ὑπερον τὰ συνίσταται. Κυρίως δὲ στοιχεῖον εἰσιν> etc.). As common factor appears the notion of real divisibility and actual division in the nature of things. But the basic meaning is given thus (p. 136.34): ἐκ τῶν συναντήσεων σύν, ἀπὸ χώραν διδόταν ἔρει αὐτῷ δόθη μέχρι τέλους, καὶ ἐς ἀκανόν τὴν ἄναλλον διέχεισα εἰς τοῦ ὑπερον δόθη (The "similar way" of constitution and resolution, of creation and destruction, points naturally to the heracleitean dictum δόθη δῶ καὶ κάπα μία καὶ δωτι). "Ο πρῶτον συναντήσεωι refers to the constitution of the Ur-Element, of the primal being, out of matter and spirit, of ἀληθῆς καὶ πνεύματος, of substance and divinity; and the following description expresses the spermatic origin and
development of the World. Cf. II 327 p. 116.36: το αἰθέριον δὲ ἐκατον πάρ, ὅφ’ ὁ δὲ φασὶ τὰ τε στοιχεῖα καὶ τὸν Κόσμον γεγονέναι. V. e.g. I 102. — For a simpler formulation of the general notion v. Π 580 p. 180.5: ὅσι ἐκ στοιχείων εἰς ὁ δὲ ῥυθμὸν γίνεται τὰ γνώμενα καὶ εἰς τὸ διόχουν διαλύεται. — The exposition of Stoic Physics (according to Diocles Magnes) in Diogenes Laertius begins with a brief statement of the theory of principles, which is followed by the distinction between ἀρχή and στοιχεῖα (VII, 134 = SVF II 299): διαφέρον δὲ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα τῇ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγεννήτους <καλ> αἰθέριους, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατα τὴν ἐκπροσώπωσιν φθείροσθαι ἄλλα καὶ σώματα (so must be evidently read) ἐναν τὰ ἀρχὰς καὶ ἀμέρυσας, τὰ δὲ μεροποιοῦν. Reference to the primal being is here implicitly included because of its consubstantiality with the aetherial fire of the actual διακόσμης. (In any case, the aboriginal fiery being is extinguished temporarily after the universal conflagration as God turns the entire substance into liquid semen). The principles are without form, as every quality is a particular disposition of being; quality appears with full, composite being, therefore first with the elements (cf. II 327 p. 116.34), and in particular with the element κατ’ ἐξοχήν, i.e. fire, the divine body. God and Spirit, strictly speaking, is the active, Principle. But God and Spirit has a material body, and this is aethereal fire. (This body is the entire substance at conflagration, while it is restricted to the celestial part of it in the state of διακάσμης. The body meant here is God’s proper body; for God as divine Spirit pervades everything at all times). As the active principle always permeates the available material substance, “God” and “Spirit” may also be called the necessary conjunction of the two principles, the primal complete being or the heavenly aether depending on the existing state of being. Thus God is Fire or fiery Artificer or Intellectual Fire. SVF II 1045: ὁ δὲ Ζεύς ἡμῶν (sc. τοῖς ἀπὸ Σταυροῦ) ὁ θεός τέσσερες ὁ δὲ Μάρτυρ πάντων. The divine spirit is firey (443). II 323 a p. 116.13: θεον πάντων. 423: θεον deum esse. I 157: Ζήνων δὲ Σωκράτης νοεῖν κόσμου πάντων (sc. θεον ἀποφήματο). I 618: τὸ ἀναστοχεῖαν τὴν διακάσμην (i.e. the former cosmic Whole) ἐλατρεύει. Cf. I 107, 512. The spiritual tension is a stroke or blow of fire (I 563, quotation from Cleanthes: πληθυνόν ὁ τόνον ἄργον). I 1027 very succinctly: Οἱ Σωκράτης νοεῖν θεον ἀποφήματο, πᾶρ τεγενεά, ὁδ’ ἐνδύον καὶ γένοις Κόσμοι, ὑμεριαληθες πάντας τοὺς σπανεκτικοὺς λόγους, καθ’ ὁμώς ἐκεῖνο καθ’ εἰμηρμηνεύν γίνεται καὶ πνεύμα μὲν ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἄνθρωποι τοῦ Κόσμου, τὰς δὲ δραστηριότητας μεταλλάγματα κατὰ τὰς τῆς ἀλής, δι’ ἑς κεχὰρικα, παραλλάξεις. Cf. 1026, 423. The divine essence is spiritual and firey, an aetherial fire (Cf. e.g. II 596 p. 184.4). I 127: θεοφάνειν μὲν καὶ πνεύμα Ζήνων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίωσιν. Aetherial Fire or living fiery Blow incorporating the Law of its development and the Reason (Λόγος) of all existence: Πᾶρ ἰδίζων ἀποδομοῦν μέτρα καὶ αὐστρώμενον μέτρα. 

A. L. PIERRIS

PATRAS
ERRATA

p. 150 l. 33 read: principles
p. 154 l. 17 read: in in place of: it
p. 156 l. 11 read: being
p. 159 l. 40 read: ἐξήγησα
p. 160 l. 6 read: what in place of: which
p. 163 l. 10 read: constituted
   l. 34 read: subtlest
   l. 36 read: III
p. 164 l. 42 read: evidently
p. 168 l. 40 read: atoms and
p. 170 l. 37 read: an in place of: any
p. 174 l. 36 read: thus, naturally,