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Concerning Determinants
and
an Alleged Element in Proper Predication

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I. We have discriminated, within determination (or, more correctly, within that kind of determination which constitutes proper predication)? the following elements or constituents:

i/ the concrete thing (the determined)
ii/ the abstract thing (the determinant or the determining thing)
iii/ the determining of the determined by the determinant
iv/ the fact that the determined thing is determined by the determinant, as a whole.

2. To elucidate this analysis, I have brought in, and analysed similarly,

a/ action
b/ a whole.

That is, I have used the analogies of action and whole.

1. I must preface that the preliminary examinations required for the final establishment of the alleged element (i.e., the tie), occupy as a matter of fact (and perhaps, to a large extent, of necessity) almost the whole of the present Essay.

2. In Essay V, I have elaborated somehow a distinction between elements and aspects discerned. I shall return to this topic towards the end of this Essay.
5/ But, of course, I have used them only as analogies. I have not at all meant to say that because action and wholes are to be analysed in this and that way, therefore determination should be analysed in this and that way. I have merely stated that as action and wholes are analysable in this and that way, so determination is in a corresponding way. The analogues considered are meant to serve not as justifications of the proposed analysis of determination, but as partial and analogical elucidations of that analysis.

In this way I answer a possible objection against the procedure of preceding Essays, to the effect that determination is neither an action nor a whole. Indeed, determining is not an activity of a determinant (a proper activity), even if for the sole reason that it is not a property of determinants being not a part of what they are. And, equally, determination is rather a complex than a proper whole, at least in that it is analysable into constituents rather than into parts.

4/ Therefore, it may be meet in the following remarks to confront directly determination, avoiding any reference to the two analogues, just in order to protect ourselves from the appearance of using them to justify our conclusions regarding determination.

(Of course, the analogues may still be used as more familiar structures, structurally similar in some important respects to simple determination of the proper predication kind).

5/ I take for granted that in a simple fact (i.e. determination as a whole) of the form:

\[ x \text{ is } \Phi \]

we must distinguish something determined (the concrete thing) and an abstract determinant determining it (or characterising it or exemplified by it).
Let us also agree that the subsistence (existence in a certain mode to be further specified) of the abstract determinant in itself is taken for granted. This means, inter alia, that we are prepared to take seriously into account the separate subsistence of the abstract thing in itself—apart, that is, from the concrete things which it determines, and from its determining them.

6/ Before proceeding, let me try to unfold (or "unpack") part of what is involved in such claims associated with Metaphysical Realism.

I begin by remarking that it is quite possible that a certain abstract thing should be unexemplified in the actual World. This I take to be self-evident. But should "proof" be needed, we may observe that given any abstract thing which is as a matter of fact exemplified in the World, say F-ness, then we are certainly correct in saying that it is possible that this particular abstract thing should be (might be) unexemplified in the World. But were this possibility realised (which itself is possible) the actual World thus resulting would have to be different from "our" present actual World—indeed, in other words, a possible World would have been realised, which is different from the possible World which, as a matter of fact, has been realised. And in that other possible World which would have been realised in the examined case, one determinant, namely F-ness, is left without exemplification, ex hypothesi. Hence, the possibility of an

Or equivalently, that it is not exemplified by any existing concrete thing. I mean that there may be unexemplified determinants, and not simply that an exemplified one might be unexemplified. Though the second claim apparently entails the former, as it is contended in the sequel.

Of course the connections of this abstract thing with other members of the system of its abstract determinants would impose automatically further changes in the actual World, were this possibility realised.
unexemplified determinant(of there being such a thing) is established, if not otherwise, through the possibility of a World containing no concrete thing exemplifying a certain determinant which is, as a matter of fact, exemplified in the actual World.

Let it be reminded that, as it would seem, we (human beings) could not possibly know or refer individually to such an unexemplified determinant. To the objection that we can conceive a combination of exemplified determinants which, as a combination, is as a matter of fact unexemplified, I reply that, as we have argued in Essay IV, there are no conjunctive determinants or characters, and hence, in such a case, there is nothing concerning which the question of its exemplification or nonexemplification could be raised; determinants have a complexity when they have it, radically different from the conjunctive (and generally of the truth-functional) kind of compoundability; we may even distinguish the complexity of determinants from the compoundability.

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5. A reference by expressions like 'one of the unexemplified determinants' does not constitute individual reference.

6. For example the complexity of a determinate determinant under a certain proximate determinable, which indeed can be considered (I mean the determinate determinant as a particular mode of the first element of the complex) of 'determination' of the determinant immediately above it (the second element).

7. So different, that the 'higher' a determinant, the more simple (i.e., non-complex) it is. Perhaps only categories are really and absolutely simple in this sense; and possibly not even these. (A hint towards the neoplatonic One). If there is really an abstract thing Redness, then it is very complex indeed. Obviously the notion of complexity insisted on here, is very different from that which would render, say, yellowness a quite simple quality. One aspect of the difference is the contrast between the ontological character of our notion as opposed to the appropriateness of the other in describing the practice of constructing verbally expressed verbal definitions.
of concrete things (as comprising parts).

I also hasten to add, among other things relevant here, that I differentiate between abstract things or determinants and sortal universals.

7/ It is possible, therefore, that there are exemplified determinants. And this possibility is perfectly compatible with an impossibility of our providing an example of such exemplified determinants. It is, of course, also possible, that, as a matter of fact, all subsisting determinants have been exemplified in the actual world. But even if this is so, it could be

Concrete things have parts (proper parts and not "parts"). Each part of them is a concrete thing metaphysically on a par with any other part. (I set aside questions of relative importance or interest or role etc.) This metaphysical homogeneity of the parts of a concrete thing (the non-existence of a radical ontological difference in kind among them) is also reflected in the circumstance that no part needs any other part for its being as a concrete thing (for its being the concrete thing which it is), although of course, it requires all others for its being the part which it is, i.e., the part of a certain particular concrete thing (the whole). Quite otherwise with a determinant. Its complexity may consist in a peculiar connection of two, at first analysis, "parts", which are of a very different kind, their heterogeneity exhibiting itself in the circumstance that the one may be nothing more than a modification of the other (or, at least, the ground of such modification) unable to sustain itself, even apart from the particular complex in question, but as a modification (or the ground for such modification) of the other—- which latter in its turn functions as the receptacle, or 2 "matter" for, or the subject of, the modification. But more of this in subsequent Essays.

Like king or shoemaker. Concerning this and related problems, see next Essay.
not so and this suffices for our purpose here, as it will be shown in the sequel.

10. There remains for study, as a prima facie conceivable objection to the claim above, the case in which the structure of the system of determinants is such that the exemplification of any determinant necessitates the exemplification of all others. This would be an important metaphysical law, but it can be proved to be impossible, given some elementary conditions, which, in any case, must be satisfied by the structured system of abstract things. For example, let $P$-ness be a determinable determinant proximately above the absolutely determinate determinants $Q$ $P'$-ness and $P''$-ness, and let $Q$-ness be any other determinant of whatever order and kind. Now either the exemplification of $Q$-ness does not necessitate the exemplification of any one of the determinants $P$-ness, $P'$-ness and $P''$-ness; and then the imagined case is disposed of. Or the exemplification of $Q$-ness necessitates the exemplification of some one at least of the three named determinants, but then it is not possible for it to necessitate the exemplifications of all three of them directly or indirectly. (Indirect or rather indefinite necessitation necessitating the exemplification of a determinable by necessitating the exemplification of a determinate under it). Hence there would remain at least one of the two absolutely determinate determinants, whose exemplification would be unnecessitated. (I say 'at least', because there could be that the exemplification of both $P$-ness and $P'$-ness is not necessitated by the exemplification of $Q$-ness, in case when the latter necessitates only the exemplification of $P$-ness, and hence only indifferently (indeterminately) the exemplification of one or other of $P$-ness and $P'$-ness. Indifferent "necessitation" is not a direct or even indirect necessitation, not a necessitation proper at all; it is just the consequence of a proper determination, given the validity of a certain metaphysical law—and an indeterminate consequence for that matter.

The objection might now be proposed, that the metaphysical law of incompatibility in determinateness implicitly invoked in the above argument, precludes the exemplification of both $P$-ness and $P'$-ness by the same concrete thing; so that nothing prevents the exemplification of $Q$-ness necessitating the exemplification of $P$-ness by one concrete thing and the exemplification
There may then be unexemplified determinants. If

of R'-ness by another concrete thing.

Reservedly, I reply by drawing attention to the
distinction between non-relational and relational de-
terminants. The exemplification of a monadic determinant
being necessarily effected in one concrete thing, cannot
necessitate the exemplification of another monadic
determinant in another concrete thing, in the metaphy-
sical and logical senses of 'necessitate'. The former
can apparently only naturally necessitate the latter
--because of the validity of Natural Laws--something
which is irrelevant in the present discussion, since
(to say the least) it is the exemplification of the
determinants exemplified in a World, which provides the
skeleton on and in which particular natural laws are
as it were "inscribed".

One may object to the above reply by mentioning
an apparent counterexample based on our investigation
of relations in Essay VI. For let us consider the case
in which R'-ness is a monadic determinant conjoined
with a relation R-ness in such a way that if x is R to y,
then x is R'(and, sometimes, vice versa). To use the for-
mulation of the previous Essay, R-ness is an instanced
dyadic relation-- and for such a relation there are
two possibilities open:

i/ either for x to be R to y is for x to be R'
ii/ or for x to be R to y is for x to be R' and for y to be R'.

{{ It might be thought that case (i) is really
impossible, for it would amount to a virtual identification
of a dyadic relation with a monadic determinant. Should
we think that this is so, we can amend (i) in order to
avoid even the appearance of such an identity:

i'/ for x to be R to y is for x to be R'
and R [... and R';

where R'-nesses are monadic determinants associated
in the appropriate way with R-ness. Here, because of there
being no entity (R' and R' [... and R')'-ness (as we have
try to argue in Essay IV), not even a simulacrum of
identity with R-ness could be entertained. And of course
there is no question here of a reductive analysis; for
R-ness, ex hypothesi, is a determinant, is really a determi-
nant or is a real determinant.

Still, it would seem to me, that it is not really
inconceivable that (i) itself could be shown to be

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there are, they cannot surely subsist (exist in the mode of existence

innocent of the alleged vicious identification of a relation with a monadic determinant—and shown to be so, quite independently of its transcription by (ii). This contention may be validated here by means of an example (provided of course that it proves to be successful).

As a putative example the following might serve: assume, first, love or loving to be a real relation (a dyadic one), and, second, that A loves B. Then consider a certain monadic determinant $F$-ness, whose exemplification by $x$ makes $x$ to have a certain feeling which we could roughly assume to correspond to the condition or state in which someone is, when he loves. Now consider the above assumed fact of A's being in love with B. A has a certain complex "feeling" which consists in a certain content (say, a thought or image of, generally, mental representation of B), and a certain form (corresponding, but not identical, to the mode of A's "thinking" of B or being "disposed" towards B or, generally, being related to B). This particular feeling is an instance of $F$-ness—more precisely, an instance of the determinate under $F$-ness, which determinate could be described as $F$-ness-towards-B. (Notice that this description does not transform the said determinate into a relation: a thought or representation of B, is itself, on the present account, a monadic property).

Now provided that the above remarks could be taken as constituting a hypothetically correct analysis (an approximate also, but nonetheless structurally correct analysis) of simple love-affairs, we have also succeed in giving a similarly hypothetical example of how the appearance of impossibility on the part of (i) can be shown to be illusory, without having recourse to the expedience introduced by the transformation to (ii).

But enough of this for the time being. I must add that I do not propound the above remarks but with extreme reservation—only as explorative attempts, and of a restricted scope for that matter. Nevertheless, I may be permitted to continue using formulation (i), for convenience.)

Now the counterexample promised above would be provided by the remark that in case (ii), if $x$ is $R'$ then $x$ is $R$ to $y$ and $y$ is $R''$. And hence, the exemplification of a non-relational determinant by a given thing would entail, inter alia, the exemplification of a different (though connected) non-relational determinant by another (though related) concrete thing.

In replying, it is enough to deny this, by observing that from the circumstance that $x$ is $R'$, it does not follow necessarily that $y$ is $R''$ (nor that $x$ is $R$ to $y$). (Notice that this remark apply to case (ii) and not to case (i).)
proper to determinants) qua exemplified by concrete things, subsist
that is, in their connection to concrete things and in so far
as they are connected to concrete things; they do not subsist
dependently or dependently on concrete things, in their determining
them and in so far as they, concrete things are determined
by them.

But now, if this is possibly so for some determinants
(the exemplified ones, in case there are some such—and it
does not matter at all whether there are in fact some such; for
there could be), then it seems obligatory to assume that this is
so for every determinant exemplified or not. For if there may be
exemplified determinants, and given that their subsistence, in
case there are, would have to be quite independent of their deter-
mining function (if I may be permitted to speak thus), then on
what grounds could we suppose that the subsistence of the exem-
plified ones is just their being determining?

We come here to formulate a major difference be-
tween concrete and abstract things, in terms of the way of their
connection (that is, proper predication). Existence for concrete
things is their being determined. To say that a possible concrete
thing exists is just to say that it is actually determined.
But on the other hand, this, of course, does not in the least mean
that an existing concrete thing is just its (complete) determination.
Its existence is its being determined, but it itself is not its ex-
stistence, nor, consequently, its being determined by the (complete)
determination by which it is determined. Again its being determined
(and hence its existence) is not the (complete) determination
by which it is determined; nor is the thing itself its (complete)
determination, though its existence is its being determined by
that (complete) determination.

We may then say, that the notion of existence of
concrete things, just as perhaps, the notion of identity of concrete
things, is dependent on the notion of being determined.

II. See Essay II for a provisional analysis of
identity of concrete things along these lines.
or predicative being) or of proper predication. By which we mean that it is analysable (in a certain sense) in terms of the latter (though distinct from it) 12.

Quite otherwise with determinants. Their subsistence is not their being determining 13; indeed, it is quite independent of their being determining. Hence in general, determinants subsist independently of concrete things—separate from them—by which we mean that they need not the support of concrete things for their subsistence, in the sense in which, for example, an instance needs the support of a subject to sustain its existence by providing that in which the instance inheres—or in any comparable sense. (More precisely: no support is required, in the sense of a concrete thing's providing the one term in connection "effected" as we shall see by the respective tie) with which alone a determinant can subsist.

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I2. Aristotle's conception of (focal meaning) is relevant here.

I3. One may protest that what one should expect for determinants, on the analogy of what is the case with concrete things, in respect of existence, would be, at any rate, that the subsistence of determinants consists in their being determined, and not in their being determining. But this, though posing a genuine problem, is really irrelevant here; for the point is that the subsistence of determinants, whatever it might turn out to consist in (and that determinants exist after a fashion) nobody should dare think, really denies—the only, but great enough, trouble being the precise specification of that fashion or mode), is independent of their being connected with concrete things, i.e. is not their being determining.

Positively, I may remark that the notion of a determinant being determined has not been introduced or studied till now. Determinants have been considered only in their determining function, and not in respect of the problem concerning their being what they are (each one of them separately) And at any rate, it is intuitively initially plausible that even if determinants are what they are by some form of determination, this kind of determination must be a quite different one from the determination in which determinants function as determining concrete things, things determined through their "activity". But of this problem see next Essay.
8/ The thought may be now have occurred, that even if the subsistence of determinants is not their being determining, yet the notion of their subsistence is necessarily bound with that of their capability to determine. That is, though we can conceivably separate the notion of their subsistence from that of their being determining, nonetheless the notions of their subsistence and of their capability or potentiality of being determining are really inseparable. The latter is written in the first; and more than this; it exhausts the former; for that more do we mean in affirming the subsistence of a determinant, but that it can be exemplified by concrete things, even if it is not actually exemplified.

For such a conception of the matter, both the existence of concrete things and the subsistence of determinants are necessarily 14 connected with the nexus of proper predication or the determination so far studied. But the former is directly bound with determination, whereas the latter is directly bound only with the possibility of determination (and, of course, from the other end of it——so to speak).

9/ In of some neatness in the above indicated conception I am inclined to combat it. The charge I should like to urge against it is that it confounds the distinction between possible and actual being with another distinction between various kinds (which may well amount to categorical differences) of actual being (with exactly corresponding distinctions of the correlative kinds of potential being). And further, I should claim that the said conception violates a law 15 of the priority (in a certain sense) of actual over potential being.

14. Necessity here involved, is the categorial one——the root—necessity, so to speak.

15. The law is categorial——neither logical, nor simply metaphysical, nor (if it needs be added) natural.
10/ Regarding the first charge.

There are, inter alia, concrete things, determinants and facts. Their existence (or better: their mode of existence, their modus existendi) differs in kind (or rather: in category).

But now these differences are not coincident with the difference between actual and possible existence—though of course they can be connected with it. This has only to be entertained in order to be assented.

But then, the criticised view appears to confound the difference in mode of the existence of determinants as compared with the modi existendi of, say, facts or concrete things, with the difference of possible from actual, in respect of the actual obtaining of a determination and its possibility of obtaining.

But to proceed further. Facts exist in their proper mode or fashion; let us say that facts exist. To say that actual facts exist is a redundancy. Again, saying almost the same thing differently, possible facts qua possible, of course, do not exist; let us say that they potentially exist. Possible facts may involve as subjects (actually) existent concrete things.

Again concrete things exist in their proper mode or fashion of existence; let us say that concrete things exist. Possible concrete things qua possible do not exist; let us say that they potentially exist. Possible concrete things cannot be but the subjects of possible (and not actualised) facts.

We see in the above remarks the force of the initial observation: the distinction between actual and potential existence is quite different from the distinction between the

16. That Theaetetus flies, when Theaetetus is an existent concrete thing and does not fly, is such a possible fact with an existent (actually) subject.

17. In these contexts I use [possible] so that something possible is not actual. Yet this is not really necessary; it is enough, and perhaps better, that we should mean by it, something possible qua possible. But, perhaps, the trouble lies deeper than terminological distinctions alone can reach; is it that we have to introduce some kind of distinction between logical and ontological modalities?
various modi existendi. The difference is perspicuous in such combined expressions like 'potential existence' or 'potential existence in the mode of fact' or 'potential factual existence'.

But if we turn to the determinants we find that the situation is quite otherwise. For how can we distinguish among them between possible and actual existence? How could the conception be formed of a distinction between actual-existence-in-the-mode-of-determinants and potential-existence-in-the-mode-of-determinants? A possible fact is constituted by a possible exemplification of a determinant; and a possible concrete thing also corresponds to a possible joint exemplification of all determinants involved in a (possible) complete determination; but in both cases the existence of the determinants concerned seems to be required (and is taken for granted) just as much as in the case of actual factae and existing concrete things. The actual existence of determinants, one wants to say, is required to account both for what is the case and for what can be the case; it governs all possibility; it is the ground of all possibility and actuality.\[18\]

The view criticised agrees very well with this result; if it fails, it fails in another encounter. But before refuting it, let us introduce a closely connected view which would negate this result and assimilate the case of determinants with those of concrete things and facts, as regards the application of the actual/potential distinction.

So, it might seem, it is here where the force and the significance of the view exposed in \[8\] becomes more clearly felt. For that view points (though misleadingly and so to speak negatively) to the direction of drawing a distinction between actuality

The structural connection here with Tractarian objects is manifest. An additional reason for their interpretation as determinants (abstract things) rather than as particulars.
and existence as much in the case of determinants as in the cases of facts and concrete things (on this distinction is founded the newly introduced view). The alleged distinction would, on this account, be based on the distinction between an exemplified and an unexemplified determinant. The advocate of the view in question would propose that the existence of a determinant is its determining; so that an unexemplified determinant is a possible determinant, potentially existing-in-the-mode-of-determinants.

But this reformulation of the view will not do, for the following reason. Concerning an (existent) object, existing after its proper fashion, we may distinguish what it is, both from the "fact" that it exists and from its existence. Let us

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19. The reformulation consists in ascribing possible existence to unexemplified determinants, contrary to the initial view which admits their (actual) full existence.

20. Two explanations are needed here. Firstly, a "fact" is not a fact, i.e., a simple determination. It is existential in nature—in a sense corresponding to that in which a fact is predicative in nature. We may say that it is the meaning or sense of (or what corresponds in reality to) a traditional existential statement. I must hasten to add that I am not saying anything specific about the possibility of analysis or even reduction of such "facts" to proper facts, either in general or concerning certain categories of objects only. Needless to add, also, that the ambiguity between actual and potential being pertains as much to "facts" as to facts. Secondly, what an object is, must be thought quite abstractly. For example, the complete determination of a concrete thing is what such a thing is, i.e., the totality of its properties. But 'property' in our system is defined in the nexus of proper predication or the determination as far studied. Therefore, it is far from evident that determinants or abstract things have properties—in the sense that their being what they are is grounded on their connection, by a nexus structurally the same with that of proper predication and in which they function as determined things (the role of concrete things in proper predication),
term the "what it is" of an object, its *forma essendi* 21. In the case of concrete things their forma essendi is their complete determination, the totality of their properties. Now we have indeed not offered till now an analysis of the forma essendi of determinants 22; yet, so much can be gathered from what has been said, namely that their exemplification by concrete things is not part of their forma essendi 23. So much may be taken as self-evident.

 Granted the immediately above mentioned negative result, we are entitled to conclude that the forma essendi, at least 24, of determinants is not dependent in any way on concrete things and on their connection to them, that is, on proper predication or exemplification or the determination so far studied. But this "at least", this minimal result, is strong enough: the existence of a determinant is its being what it is, that is, it is its having actually the forma essendi which defines it (or it is the actuality of its forma essendi); therefore, if the forma

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20. (previous page)

with some objects serving in this nexus according to the way determinants function in proper predication. The apparent absence of accidental characterisations from abstract things points indeed to some such fundamental difference between the ways they, on the one hand, and concrete things on the other, are what they are.

21. The selection of the term has something to do with the requirement of utter generality, or rather of complete "scepticity" as regards the various types of construction of the different categories of objects. See, in respect of this requirement, the second remark of n. 20. It is for this reason that I decline to avail myself, for example, of the scholastic term 'forma substantialis': it is mainly used in respect of concrete things. And indeed, in my use of the terms, the forma substantialis is the forma essendi of concrete things.

22. And one must not assume that this analysis will be similar, even structurally similar, to the analysis of the properties of concrete things.

23. See, for an incomplete discussion of this point Essay II.

24. I mean, this is so, even if the existence of determinants is not so independent—according to the express contention of the advocate of the here criticised view.
essendi is independent from something, the existence of the
determinants are is also essentially independent from it; but
the forma essendi is independent of the exemplification
(actual or possible) of the determinant; hence, the existence of
the determinants is equally independent from it.

The point of the above argument simply put, is that
the existence of an object is just its (actually) being what
it is; or at least it is necessarily connected with its being so
alone. So that what is not even included in what an object is
(what is not included in its forma essendi— in terms of the
above introduced jargon), cannot possibly constitute its existence
by its being somehow attached to it (not properly possessed by it,
by the object). This is the case with exemplification.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I must emph-
sise that what is said above does not in the least oppose a
proposal to define a notion of existence of determinants, according
to which an existent determinant is an exemplified determinant
—and a purely potentially existing one is an exemplifiable deter-
minant or a determinant capable of being exemplified (but unexem-
plified as a matter of fact). What I am claiming mainly, amounts
only to the observation that the existence (in this sense) of a
determinant is the being exemplified of an existing (in another
proper sense) determinant; and similarly that the actual nonex-
istence (though potential existence) (in this the proposed sense)
of a determinant, is just the not being exemplified of an equally
and actually existing (in the same proper sense, as in the previous

25. I say 'essentially independent' (not using 'essentially' technically but commonsensically) to
cover the irrelevant to my cause case, in which there
is after all some sort of "connection" between the
existence of the determinant and its exemplification.
Any kind of such connection which leaves unharmed the
independence of the forma essendi from the exempli-
fication of the determinant concerned, is plainly
consistent with my point.
case) determinant. To say the same thing in slightly different terms: both the exemplification and the non-exemplification of a determinant presuppose its actual existence; hence the proposed definition is subordinate to the one explicating the proper sense of 'existence' in respect of determinants—— the general form of such explication being, as in the case of any object whatsoever, that its existence is its (actually) being what it is.

II/ We can elaborate the remarks made in the previous chapter in various ways.

In one way, we may bring to bear the principle according to which what is related (or things which are related) must exist in order to be related. And more generally, that objects connected in any way (by means of either relations or 'relations' or ties) must exist in order to be connected; that, in other words, the holding of a connection presupposes the existence of the objects connected (existence in their proper modes, of course). And what is more: even the possibility of a particular

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26. multiplicity and variation of formulation being sometimes felt as more reasonably persuasive than the bare content of the idea expressed.

27. Not that this is very informative, indeed, if one has in mind empirical informativeness, or a requirement (which may well not be explicit or even consciously held as a requirement) of reduction (in some way) to such informativeness. Yet understanding need not be necessarily bound to empirical informativeness. For example, grasping the meaning of a proposition contained in an 'organic' fashion in a philosophical system may be more connected with understanding the articulation of the system—or the lack of such articulation—and the 'place' occupied by the proposition in that articulation.

28. Needless to say, I mean to claim only that if the objects are really related, then they really exist. Not that anything we would ordinarily think or say that it is a relation-nexus is really such a relation-nexus. And similarly with connections, below. Notice that 'really' does not mean actually.

connection presupposes the existence (in their respective, proper modes of existence) of the items connected. Thus the possibility of a fact like, say, that \( aRb \), requires the prior (in a metaphysical sense) actual existence of \( a \) and \( P \)-ness and \( b \); and similarly the possibility of the fact that, for example, \( a \) is \( P \), presupposes the "prior", actual existence of \( a \) and \( P \)-ness. That \( a \) and \( P \)-ness are not connected (the metaphysically pseudo-fact \(^{30}\) that \( a \) is not \( P \)) though they can be connected by a predicative tie of the proper type, presupposes that \( a \) and \( P \)-ness (actually) exist. \(^{31}\).

For the reluctance to admit in a metaphysical sense negative facts, see Essay IV. Roughly, we can dispense with them by construing an allegedly negative fact as an unactualised positive (possible) fact.

One might think that in the case where we have a concrete thing and the set of all determinants involved in its complete determination, the above claim does not hold good; for if the concrete thing is not predicatively actually connected with that set, it does not exist actually; it is a possible, yet unactualised concrete thing (Essays III and VI).

There is indeed ample field for distinctions here:

A possible concrete thing is not actually connected predicatively with any determinant. But it is somehow "connected" with them. On the other hand, it corresponds in a certain way to one or more existing concrete things. (Compare this with the notion of incompatibility in existence among concrete things [possible ones] introduced in Essays III and VI). Thus, in principle, an improper non-determination with a possible concrete thing as subject is equivalent to some determinations and non-determinations (proper ones, this time) with existing things as subjects predicatively connected or non-connected with certain determinants.

To provide some hints for the working out of that 'in principle':

Let a be an actual concrete thing, e a possible one and '\( P \)-ness' and '\( Q \)-ness' signify determinants. Suppose that \( P \)-ness is involved in the complete determination of both a and e, and that \( Q \)-ness is not involved in the complete determination of either a or e.
Secondly, we may indicate the lines for the deve-

We face now two rather straightforward and two problematic cases. a is (actually) P; a is not (actually) Q; but a is-potentially Q (assuming that there is no impossibility of any kind involved in a's being Q); these are the rather straightforward cases. But what in respect of e? It is, of course, intuitive to hold that though it is all right to distinguish between possible and actual determinations of actual concrete things, it is apparently nonsensical to distinguish similarly in the case of possible concrete things. Possible things simply do not enter actually into connections with determinants; hence no distinction can be drawn among cases between actual and possible connections with determinants. But is it the case that possible things do not enter actually into connections with determinants because they are restricted to be only potentially connected with determinants (in the sense in which actual concrete things are also potentially connected with determinants)—or is it rather that their “connection” with determinants is quite peculiar?

There lingers indeed here the prima facie similarity between ‘a is-potentially Q’ and ‘e is somehow (potentially?) P’. But the phenomena are here only half-deceptive. For on the one hand, indeed the ‘is-potentially’ as applied to an existent (actual) concrete thing signifies something quite different from what is signified by ‘is somehow’ or even from ‘is-potentially’ (if we choose to use this expression in the present case, too) as applied to possible concrete things. In the first case it signifies the possibility of a tie; in the second a pseudo-tie; and notice that the possible or potential connection of the former has nothing to do with the pseudo-connection of the latter. On the other hand ‘has nothing to do’ is an emphatic overstatement; for, at the same time, the dependent (dependent on the proper connection) character of this pseudo-connection is made manifest when we consider that, corresponding to ‘a is-potentially Q’, there is at least one possible thing e, which is “defined” by introducing the determination that it is Q to the complete determination of a, and making the minimum possible amount of the changes required in order that the new set of determinations be a
development of a theory of the relationship between Existence and

complete determination, leaving everything else as it was previously now, in respect of that possible thing e, we may say that it is somehow (potentially?) Q. And the same could be said in respect of any possible thing e, incompatible in existence with a, whose complete determination includes, at the same time, the determination that it is Q (a determination lacking from the complete determination of e). It is then evident, that with regard to the ontological level, 'a is-potentially Q' and 'a is somehow (potentially?) Q' are "connected" through the same objective circumstance (which is seen, as it were, from two different points of view), though, of course, they differ in "epistemological" or cognitive meaning, as it is clear from observing that the former is about a, whereas the latter is about e, and also that one may very well know that e is somehow Q without knowing that a is-potentially Q, or indeed without at all knowing which one of a set of mutually incompatible in existence possible things (some of which are somehow Q) has been actually realised. (But again, he might know that e is somehow Q, in these circumstances, but not that e qua a is so, i.e., he could not know that e is a possible thing incompatible in existence with the actual thing a, and such that its complete determination involves Q-ness (a determinant not involved in the complete determination of a), and know all this without so ipso knowing that a is not actually but potentially Q.)

To speak then more precisely, we may analyse

1/ (a possible unactualised concrete thing) e is somehow P

as following:

Consider the set S of possible things which are incompatible in existence with e. Then (1) says that:

1/ the possible thing belonging to S which has been actualised, is, as an actual thing, at least potentially P (it may be actually P).

(I shall not discuss here the law according to which someone of the things belonging to S must be realised).

The pseudo-connection of (1) has been made to elicit its dependence on the possible but proper connection of (1'). And indeed it was my contention that this must be done and that it can be done rather than to insist on any particular way of doing it.
and Predication (predicative being) as following:

A category of objects has its own and proper modus existendi and its own and proper kind of forma essendi.
We have also indicated above that the actuality of an object's forma essendi is one and the same with its existence, and the latter, in its turn, is nothing but the object's being what it is, as distinct from "what it is", or that totality which it is.
In this way, the supposed gulf between Existence and Predicative Being is bridged; the "bridging" formula being: an object's being what it is, is its existence.

Consequently we may provisionally conclude that (1) should be better formulated as 'a "is" P', in order to be emphasised that the "connection" here is peculiar, being neither actual nor potential predicative connection proper. And then, reverting to the circumstances described towards the beginning of this long note, we may say that a "is" (actually) P, while it "is" not Q; and this is all: the actual/potential distinction does not pertain to this kind of "being".

Concluding then, we solve the problem stated right at the beginning of the present note, by saying that admittedly, if a concrete thing is not (actually) connected with the totality of the determinants involved in the complete determination corresponding to it (and "defining" it), then it does not (actually) exist; but neither is it, in such a case, really and properly connected (either actually or potentially) with those determinants (with their totality as a whole or with each one of them separately); it is only pseudo-connected with them. Or, better (to avoid the harshness of 'pseudo'), it is "connected" with them in a fundamentally different (though thoroughly analogous) way from that of the proper connection of actual concrete things with determinants; and further that this different way is a dependent and derivative way; dependent on, and derivative from, precisely the potential but proper connection of actual concrete things to subsisting determinants.
We can now understand both why, in the case of a particular fact like the one that a is P, a’s being P is not its existence, and why this presupposes its existence. Being P is simultaneously more and less than is required in the notion of the existence of a. Less, because, as we have explained, a’s being what it is in its “unabridged” totality or a’s having no less than its formae essendi in its entirety (the whole of it) is what its existence amounts to. On the other hand, it is, also, more—because only its being what it is is required for the notion of its existence, without specification of what it is that which it is, or rather in abstraction from what it is that which it is; its having the corresponding formae essendi is its existence—not its having such and such a formae essendi. To put it in other words, by the ‘existence’ of an object, its being what it is is meant, whatever it, in fact, is.

Consequently, being P, by being less and at the same time more than what is required for the notion of existence, does not coincide with the existence of a. Yet, a’s being P can only be part of its being everything that it is (this I trust to be self-evident), hence it presupposes (as a part presupposes its whole) a’s being so and so (the whole of its formae essendi is meant to be included in this ‘so and so’), and therefore it presupposes a’s being so and so, and hence, a’s being what it is (irrespective of what it is) — that is, a’s existence.

We can then summarise: Being is either Being-Something or Being simpliciter; Being simpliciter is Existence; the Being-Something of concrete things (as determined by determinants)

31. Of course the modus existendi by itself delimits the kind of the corresponding formae essendi, by determining the category to which the object concerned belongs.

32. The above analysis, in spite of the selection of the letters ‘a’ and ‘P’ which are regularly appropriated to signify concrete things and their properties respectively, is quite general—applicable to any entity or object. Of course then it can also be applied to the determination of concrete things.
is the connective being of proper predication; the distinguishing characteristic of the latter (as contrasted with the Being-Something of other categories of object) being the circumstance that in the case of concrete things, their being what they are is grounded on their being connected by way of determination or proper predication with the determinants. Finally Existence and Being-Something (and, hence, a fortiori Existence and Connective or proper Predicative Being) are systematically connected, in the way above outlined.

In the third place, we may perhaps account somehow for the special status of determinants as regards the distinction between actual and potential existence. I mean the circumstance that this distinction does not seem to apply to them in respect of its second part. 35.

For let us observe that in respect of Being-Something the second part of the distinction is indeed not applicable; a determinant's being something or having a certain nature is not susceptible of potential existence. There is apparently no sense in which we can speak of a determinant's being potentially, though not actually so and so. 34. Determinants or abstract things can be what they are only actually.

But if the Being-Something of determinants is solely actual and not meaningfully or rather possibly potential, then they are actually what they are—and not potentially. There can only be a question of the actuality of the forma essendi of determinants, not any question of possible actuality. But the actuality of an object's forma essendi, or its being what it is, is indeed its existence. Hence if we cannot meaningfully speak

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35. See p. 15. The reformulation (of the view exposed in 28) effected in that page and contending the opposite of our claim, has been refuted in the preceding pages.

34. For example it is plain nonsense to say that redness (assumed that it is a determinant) is potentially a sound and actually a colour.
of the possible actuality of that forms essendi, or of the object’s being potentially what it is, then we cannot equally speak about possible existence concerning such an object. Therefore, determinants exist only actually. They are either actual existents—or absolute Non-beings; there cannot be a possible determinant, as there are possible concrete things; and there cannot be a potential character of an existing determinant. They are actually what they are—and their being what they are (that is, their existence) is actual. 35.

36. One may protest that the form of the above argument only requires that either potential existence alone or actual existence alone (to the exclusion of each other) pertains to determinants—and not that only actual existence pertains to them. And truly the form does indeed require simply that, but it depends on the premise supplied which conclusion does this form in each case yields. So that if we only premise the thesis that the Being-Something of determinants is homogeneous in respect of the actual/potential distinction, then of course our conclusions do not follow; but if we grant, as we have done, that the being in question is specifically actual and not simply homogeneous (its homogeneity consisting, so to speak, in the circumstance that it is solely actual), then our conclusion regarding the existence does follow. Now if the objector really wants to say that the premise should be the weaker one rather than the stronger actually used, then, I ask, what is the alternative which should not be excluded, and whose inclusion requires us to weaken the strength of our premise? Presumably, the potential character of all being in determinants. But is there a real alternative at stake to begin with here? To say nothing of the priority of actuality over potentiality in general of which more in the sequel, I may mention the law of the actual existence of objects actually (or even potentially) connected (in our case through the exemplifying tie in the nexus of determination) (See pp. 17–18). But the view criticised is really without point and counterintuitive. Still, should we care to treat it seriously and to want a formal refutation of it, we may dispose of it by noticing that potential being involves the possibility of actual being; hence in ascribing only potential being to determinants, we affirm the possibility of actual being in respect of them, and therefore we introduce the distinction of actual/potential being as pertaining to them—a distinction banned from their sphere by the argument in the text.
Fourthly, we may deduce from the lack of any potentiality or potential "determination" in the part of determinants, their immutability. For indeed, a change of a subject $s$ from its being $a$ to its being $a'$, or its coming to be $a'$, involves both the possibility that it should be $a'$ and the fact that it actually was not $a'$ before its becoming to be so. Therefore, the possibility of change presupposes the applicability of the distinction between actual and potential being in respect of the objects or subjects concerned. Conversely then, the inapplicability of this distinction entails unchangeability. Hence, the determinants are what they are actually and immutably. They also entertain an actual and immutable existence; for coming to exist and passing out of existence being a certain kind of change, the same argument applies in these cases as in the others above (not to invoke again the dependence of existence on Being something).

Fifthly, it is to be noted that if this our fourth remark is correct, what is denied from determinants is not simply change of whatever kind, but even the possibility of change.

Now the notion of a thing's not changing as a matter of fact, or of its remaining unchanged as a matter of fact, is the notion of a thing's persevering exactly or identically the same through time, a thing's persisting without change through time; in other words it is the notion of a thing's remaining the same or identical with itself (and exactly the same and identical in every respect).

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I put 'determination' in double inverted commas in order to emphasize that I do not mean to imply an analysis of what the determinants are, comparable to the analysis of what the concrete things are. In the latter case we speak of properties, and analyse them by means of the notion of the determination of concrete things by abstract determinants. In the former case, I am not at all prepared to regard without further investigation a determinate's having a certain nature as its being determined by an external to it determinant of determinates; this is one reason why I feel also reluctant to speak of properties of determinants. But after all words are (or should be) at our disposal, so we may avail ourselves, for simplicity's sake, of the use of words like 'property' and 'determination', provided we dissociate them from the meanings attached till now as a result of our analysis of proper predication of abstract things to concrete things.
in the past, present and future. Here we have the notion of something which was, is and will be exactly or identically the same, or without change. We may speak in this case of a **temporal** being enduring unchanged through time— or, with the qualifications and reservations expressed in Essay V, we may perhaps choose to speak of the **infinite duration** of a **temporal** being, either absolutely (existentially) or relatively to some determinations of it (predicatively).

Not so, with a thing of which the possibility of change itself is denied. It is, of course, **changeless**, but its character of being changeless is of a radically different sort from the foregoing one; we have rather to do with its being **unchangeable** than with its remaining **unchanged**. The two elements of the underlined antithesis point to the twofold difference between the two cases. The difference, I mean, on the one hand between lack of change "as a matter of fact" 38 and lack of change due to the impossibility 39 of change in respect of the thing concerned, and on the other hand, between lack of change of a **temporal** and of an **atemporal** or **eternal** thing. Really, the two elements of the difference seem to be no more separate than two facets of one and the same thing, if not than two differing in respect of viewpoint formulations of one and the same point.

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37. Including coming to be and passing away as one kind of change in general.

38. Or, rather, as a matter of the natural (as opposed to, say, the metaphysical) constitution of the actual World.

39. At least metaphysical impossibility is here meant.
So we have to distinguish *eternity* or *timelessness* from *infinite temporal duration*. And the sense in which determinants have been shown to be immutable, is that involving their eternally being the same or absolutely identical—not that resting on a thing's remaining the same (exactly the same) even for the whole span of time, as it were.

In the sixth place, we may deduce from the foregoing points, that the intuitive and highly plausible contention that the distinction between essential and accidental is not applicable to determinants. For it is impossible that a determinant should be (or have) at a time something which it may lack at another time because of its imutability; hence determinants cannot be accidentally something that they are. But perhaps more importantly, neither can they be essentially something that they are; for S's being essentially s is to be impossible for S to have s at one time and lack it at another time; but it makes no sense at all to speak of a temporal being in respect of determinants, as they lie beyond time (so to speak). Therefore neither determinants are essentially what they are, nor accidentally; they transcend this distinction or the distinction is inapplicable to them.

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40. "As it were": because we refuse (as in Essay V) to countenance the positing of an infinity, actual or possible, as an accomplished totality.

41. For this distinction, which we use here without restating, see Essay III.

42. And, of course, the circumstance that we can deduce from a system a thoroughly intuitive result, cannot but count strongly in favour of the system.

43. Here we find another reason for claiming a radical disparity between the way concrete things are what they are (have the properties they have) and the way determinants are what they are (have the natures they have). The analysis in terms of determination given to the former way is, therefore, not so ipso adequate or even appropriate for the task of correctly construing the latter.
I2/ Recapitulating then, we may claim that we have shown:

1/ that the Being of determinants (both their Being-Something and their absolute being, or, in other words, both their "predicative"\(^{44}\) and their existential being) is independent of actual and possible exemplification. Both their \(\text{formae essendi and their existence(\text{and , of course, their modus existendi}) are independent of exemplification completely.}\)

ii/ that to the Being\(^{45}\) of determinants does not pertain potentiality in any way; they are, and they are what they are, actually alone.

iii/ that the Being of determinants is \textit{immutable}.

iv/ that their Being is \textit{timeless} or that they are eternally— that they are in eternity and not in time

v/ that their Being is neither accidental nor essential, or that the distinction essential/accidental is not applicable to it.

In summary, we may briefly state that the Being of determinants is \textit{independent} of their exemplification, \textit{actual, immutable, eternal and transcending} the essential/accidental distinction.

I3/ It remains then, in respect of the present issue, to say a few things concerning the second point indicated in \(\xi 9\) above.

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\(^{44}\) It is not 'predicative' but '"predicative"'; that enters in the text, because proper predication is confined to the connection between concrete and abstract things.

\(^{45}\) In the present enumeration of results, we mean by 'Being' both kinds of Being discerned above.
We may begin by drawing attention to a certain priority of actuality over potentiality. And one could perhaps define the relevant sense of 'priority' by noticing that potential being is a possibly or potentially actual being, or that possible being involves the possibility of its being actual. Possible or potential is something possibly or potentially actual. But it is not correct to say that the actual is something actually potential or possible. Similarly, the possibility or potentiality of, say, a state of affairs is a possibility or potentiality for its actuality or of its being actual—but the actuality of a state of affairs is signally (and despite appearances) not the actuality for its potentiality or of its being possible.

One may think that he can discern in the last chosen formulation, a point against our claim. For, he may object, there is just a two-way dependence of actuality and potentiality on each other; the two concepts are in fact conjugate and none is prior in any interesting sense from the other.

This objection is a non sequitur. For of course the two concepts are conjugate in a neutral sense of 'conjugate'. Just as in an aseptic enough sense of 'conjugate' the concepts, say, of truth and of fact may be held to be conjugate, still, and in spite of the circumstance that 'p' is true if and only if p (i.e. if and only if the fact that p obtains or exists), it is that 'p' is true "because" of, in virtue of, or by reason of the obtaining of the fact that p, and not that the fact obtains "because"

46. Of course we may use one or both of those latter locutions to mean that it is "really" potential or possible, i.e. that it is indeed potential, or possible. But this is obviously beside the point here. It is also irrelevant, though less so, to use these locutions to signify the general exact correspondence of the notions of potency and actuality, the one being conjugate to the other, for which see below in the text, as well as their exact correspondence in every particular application of them to state of affairs.

47. Note 46 applies equally here, too.
etc. 'p' is true. So that the circumstance that two concepts are conjugate has not by itself the least tendency to disprove the existence of an order of priority between them.\footnote{48}

Having said this, we may dispose of the objection entirely by observing that when in respect of, for example, a state of affairs we maintain that its possibility "refers" to (or is the possibility of) its actuality, we mean to affirm something more than (or rather something different from) the mere mutual correspondence and interdependence of the two concepts (their conjugate character), wishing indeed to claim that its possibility is tantamount to its possible actuality or that its possibility is the possibility of its being actual in a sense which forbids us from construing similarly the correlative affirmation in respect of the state of affairs concerned (an affirmation to the effect that its actuality "refers" to or is the actuality of its possibility) as maintaining the equivalence of the actuality with the actual possibility of the state of affairs in question or as maintaining that its actuality is the actuality of its being possible.\footnote{49} and that the said way prevents us from similarly construing the later affirmation, simply by rendering such a construal meaningless.\footnote{50}

To put it simply. 'It is possible that p' is equivalent to 'it is possible that the state of affairs that p is actual (actually obtains)', whereas 'it is actually the case

\footnote{48} Some more, but rather unsystematic remarks concerning the difference between logical priority (precedence in respect of entailment) and ontological priority, may be seen in Essay V, pp. 9-12.

\footnote{49} Its actuality is again (as in the former case) the actuality of its being actual, just as its possibility is the potentiality of its being actual.

\footnote{50} The misleading for the present purposes senses, which we may give to locutions like 'actual possibility' or, with equally unnatural pressure, like 'actuality of a state of affairs's being possible or potential', in accordance with the hints in n. 48, are again quite irrelevant.
that p' is not equivalent to 'it is actually the case that the
state of affairs that p is possible or potential'--- the
latter sentence lacking even relevant sense. And mutatis
mutandis with the pair 'possibility/actuality'.

The idea is that possibility or potentiality is
a modality of (actual) being, and not (actual) being a modality
of possibility. This may sound cryptic without further analysis,
and this is one of the reasons for which I have been content to
rest my point solely on the simple observation (threateningly
near a linguistic remark) provided in the preceding paragraph
(which admittedly does not cut deep). Yet, it may be worthwhile
to develop the conception of modalities being "focused" on the
notion of actual being. 51

14/ Having established (in so far as the provis-
ional and inadequate attempt was successful) one
sense in
which actuality is prior over potentiality, we may now turn to the
second point of 50, considering it, firstly, in the context of
its surroundings.

51. I have in mind metaphysical developments
mainly, and not some such developments in modern Modal
Logic.

52. I emphasise the circumstance of this priority
obtaining only in a certain sense. For an example of
another sense in which the direction of the priority
is reversed, we may notice that anything actual must
be "previously" (in a certain sense) possible just in
order to be "able" (so to speak) to be actual, whereas
it is obviously not the case that something possible
must be "previously" (in the same sense) actual in
order for it to be "able" to be possible. The sense
of 'previous' required has, at least, a logical component;
precedence in entailment, but it may well have an onto-
logical superstructure erected on that logical sense
(Compare with Pociclus's metaphysical deductions). The
priority of possible over actual in the present sense,
is well expressed by the medieval formulae: ab esse ad
esse valet consequentia, whereas a posse ad esse non
valet consequentia.

I abstain from investigating here the notion of
a required subject to support, as it were, all possible-
ties. In effect this requirement is met by our determinants,
as it is met by the Tractarian objects.
In § 7 we have developed an argument aiming at the establishment of the separate existence of the determinants independently of their being exemplified. The argument was based on the possibility of there being unexemplified determinants. The objection was then urged in § 8, that what the argument really supports, is the independence of the existence of determinants from their actual exemplification; and that still one is not forced to disconnect entirely their existence from these exemplification-nexus, because he can accept the validity of the argument and yet insist on connecting the existence of determinants with their possibility of exemplification, to be for them is, on this view, to be exemplifiable.

We have in the sequel produced considerations showing that the Being of determinants (and, a fortiori, their existence) is wholly independent of the nexus of exemplification—whether actual or possible. In this way we have refuted both the modified view expounded in § 10, pp. 13-14, and the initial view stated in § 8. But lest it be thought that the argument propounded in § 7 is not by itself sufficient to establish the complete independence of the being of determinants from their exemplification both actual and potential against the challenge offered by the initial view in § 8, and also in order to exhibit some peculiarities of the former view as opposed to the modified one—I should provide the following remarks:

1/ If the actual existence of determinants consists in their being exemplifiable, then what of their

53. A fortiori, because existence is a kind of Being.

54. It is indeed the virtual identification of the actual existence of determinants with their exemplifiability which is contested here—the correlation of their potential existence with exemplifiability being the claim of the modified view of § 8, not of the initial one.
being actually exemplified? I mean that, given that being exemplifiable and being exemplified are connected conjugately as the potential to its corresponding actual, and granted that we accept the proposed virtual identification of the former with the determinants' actual existence, then how are we to construe the latter in the face and in terms of that identification? Are we not forced to correlate to the latter something like the actual actual (sic) existence of determinants—a pure nonsense?

Notice that the upholder of the criticised view cannot have recourse to the intuitive claim that in the case of actual exemplification determinants exist not only in themselves but also in actual connection with concrete things, because this claim, valid as it is, amounts only to correlating an actual existence of determinants in themselves with an equally actual existence in connection with concrete things, whereas he needs a correlation of a potentiality to its conjugate actuality, and not of an actuality to another actuality.

ii/ Besides, if the actual existence of determinants consists in their being exemplifiable—then what of their potential existence? Is it constituted by their being possibly exemplifiable? And what sense could we ascribe to this reiteration of possibilities? (to leave aside the regressus ad infinitum involved here).

iii/ In case that the adherent of the view criticised attempts to answer remark (ii) by agreeing with us in that potentiality does not pertain at all to determinants and their existence, then he is left with the unresolved tension (if not flagrant inconsistency) within his views, between on the one hand denying that potentiality or possibility pertains to the being of determinants, and on the other hand finding the ground of their existence (if not their existence itself) in their possibility of exemplification.
iv/ And anyway, the insuperable difficulty would always remain of accomplishing the impossible task of conceiving an actuality as actuality as being constituted by a sheer potentiality qua potentiality.

v/ Finally, it would seem that by taking the actual existence of determinants as being constituted by their possibility of exemplification, one violates the above sustained principle of the primacy of actuality over potentiality ---and in the sense in which it was sustained. For, the notion of possibility requiring the notion of something actual whose actuality possibility the possibility is the possibility of, the possibility constitutive of the existence of determinants here discussed must be, consequently, the possibility of something (considered as) actual; it must be essentially referring, so to speak, to something (considered as) actual, which would be the actuality co-ordinate, and "prior", to the potentiality in question. But if the actual existence were to be virtually identified with the possibility of exemplification, what could be the connection between this actual existence and the actuality co-ordinated by way of priority to the possibility (of exemplification) concerned? There must be an essential co-ordination involved here; hence, we would have to answer the foregoing question with something like 'actual existence of the actual existence' which is unmeaning; or say that it was not after all actual existence which meant, but rather a potential one, corresponding to the really actual in the way the possibility of exemplification corresponds to its actuality. But then, we would have deserted the criticised view, having already been transposed to the modified view of pp. 13-14.

It must also be emphasised that both criticised views would incur the gravest consequences by being obliged to dissociate completely existence from predicative being (or rather Being-Something). For, I trust, they would not go as far as to claim that even the natures of determinants, their being what they are, depend, just as their existence does according to their contention, on their exemplification.
The being of determinants, that is both their existence and nature, is completely independent of the nexus of exemplification, actual or possible. This is of the utmost importance, especially as it is quite otherwise with concrete things: their being, that is both their existence and their forma essendi depends, and depends almost exclusively, on their actual determination by the determinants.

The importance of the above result is greatly enhanced by a historic-structural reflection. I mean the circumstance that it provides a plausible construal, or rather that it fits very well with, the Theory of Ideas as separately existing entities, entities, that is, existing in themselves and wholly independent of the things, events and processes in this world of particularity, and also independent of their determining those worldly particulars—— a determination and connection which, while leaving entirely untouched the former, constitutes the being of the latter, those last, on their turn, existing and being what they are dependently on the former (in their connection with them or their determination by them). Such a theory of Ideas is, of course a salient feature of Platonic and Neoplatonic Metaphysics; and I do not count as the least important result of the programme pursued in this series of Essays (in the eventuality of course of its being really, though remotely, achieved) that such a platonically orientated system of metaphysics is not necessarily doomed to consist in "poetic metaphors and meaningless talk" as Aristotle would apparently have it (at least in one or two vehement moments)—— a predicament which exasperated even such an able platonic scholar as Zeller.

I qualify by 'almost' only in order to keep entirely open the door leading to an investigation of the notion of matter (in its metaphysical aspects).
PART B

16/ But now the following problem naturally emerges. We have claimed that a concrete thing's having a certain property is to be analysed or accounted for by a certain

meaning of course to exclude, for example, negative and privative pseudo-properties, and in general any kind of improper "property", in the spirit of Essay IV.

We have repeatedly remarked that not all subject-predicate sentences of a natural language express proper predications or the assignment of a property to a subject (or subjects). There may be expressed sortal predications like 'Socrates is a philosopher'; they may express predications in the category of substance subsuming concrete things under their species and genera; they may express "predications" of various kinds (even categorically different in some cases) in the mode of "what-it-is" in respect of various entities or objects in general. Besides all these successful expressions of predications, sentences of the said kind may purport and fail to express them, and fail either by way of falsity or by way of illegitimacy. Further, what is much more, their apparent, surface structure may not indicate the real structure of the objective circumstance expressed by them (in so far as their divergent phenomenal structure permits them to express that objective circumstance, from whose real structure their own apparent ones diverge). And this has nothing to do. I strongly insist on this particular - with their ordinary linguistic propriety or even with their correctness in so far as ordinary thinking extends
connection of the said concrete thing with a corresponding to the

(considerations, that is, and more or less subjective estimations about plausibility in the sense of what is commonly accepted or at least acceptable—when in the samples constituting the 'commons' even untutored philosophically persons may be allowed to intrude). Notice that this attitude does not "object" (if this formidable thing could possibly be objected!) to the ordinary thinking or to Common Sense. Far from it, but while fully acknowledging its correctness (or rather that it has an immanent—not dependent on external authority—principle of correctness), it limits this validity to its proper field. Hence it comes to question certain uses in which ordinary thinking is put, and certain interpretations and constructions of it, which are really philosophical and not commonsensical (though they also usually keep the 'commons'-element and abandoned the 'sense'-element), however strongly the disavowal of their specifically philosophical character is made by their exponents. What is problematic is not Common Sense (in the sense of ordinary thinking), if you like, confined to its proper limits (which it is to be noted, never transgresses by itself), but the way and the extent in which it can be properly used in philosophy. And further, even these people who think that they can remain within the sphere of Common Sense while philosophizing, in so far as they philosophize (in so far, for example, as they oppose certain metaphysical theses— to allude, among others, to Moore) they provide a philosophical use and interpretation of Common Sense and not Common Sense itself, against their opponents, for otherwise they would not really even oppose them. A metaphysical (or generally philosophical) claim can be opposed by a metaphysical (or the corresponding philosophical) counterclaim and not by an ordinarily correct claim as such—a seant where we put in the ordinarily correct claim our metaphysical counterclaim. And even this can of course be done but then we must not pretend to believe that its correctness necessarily persists unharmed; at least it becomes for philosophical purposes as much open to question as the claim opposed, however plausible there may be at its proper level.

To give to my point some sanction from time; Sallustius formulates as follows the notion of "common notions" (or common conceptions), broadly in use by the
property determinant—a connection constituting a determination of the former by the latter. We have also said that the fact that the concrete thing is connected by way of determination with the determinant constitutes the circumstance that the concrete thing has the property it has.

But before proceeding, it might prove rewarding to fix somehow more rigidly the contents and boundaries of the notions concerned.

A concrete thing a is P; that is, a has the property of being P.

The above sentences express sententially (so we use them) a particular proper predication; proper predications are expressed by this kind of sentences.

A proper predication with a concrete thing as subject having the property predicated of it can be analysed.

Neoplatonists:
"common notions are those, to which all people, when correctly questioned, will assent". (De diis I, p. 2, 4-5, ed. Nock).

Part of the whole point is summarised in this 'correctly!' The rest of it is brought into relief with our additional remark that even after having cared for the correct interrogation in establishing those common conceptions, there still remains the further problem of the philosophical use of those established.

Having made the above digression, we may say, returning to the discussion at the beginning of this note, that we frankly acknowledge the need of extra-linguistic remarks in making distinctions of a philosophical nature even in the domain of language itself. So we can explain genuine subject-predicate sentences of the proper kind as those expressing (actual or possible) proper predications ontologically understood (and analysed along the lines pursued in our series of Essays). And we may leave open (as of no very great usefulness or even relevance in metaphysical investigations) the severity of the restrictions to be imposed on that "expressing". In general, the minimally necessary conditions for the expression of such proper predications, are part of the subject-matter of that quite special department of philosophy, which could be called 'philosophy of language' (and which, obviously, is very far from covering the whole ground of philosophy, or even the only important department of it—-not to question its fundamentality).

The 'with...predicated of it' clause is really superfluous; it is a redundant addition to 'proper predication'.
This can be done because it is a kind of complex: it has a structure. The description of the structure is the analysis of proper predication.

A proper predication considered as a whole (including, that is, subject and property) is a (simple) fact (so we shall use the term). Hence, a fact has a structure and therefore is analysable. A fact is a complex whole.

But a fact is not its complexity or its structure. Hence the complexity or the structure of a fact is not a fact (in our sense); or it is a fact by ambiguity (in another, connected sense) 58.

Now for the analysis of a fact. What mainly constitutes a fact is the special connection of a concrete thing (the ontological subject of the proper predication) with an abstract determinant which we have called 'determination' or 'exemplification' (depending on whether one sees the whole affair from the one or the other of its poles). This determination brings about, secondarily, inherence in the involved concrete thing of an instance of the abstract thing involved. So that a fact has two dimensions, so to speak: one transcendent and one immanent in respect of the concrete thing concerned; the transcendent relating to its determination by the abstract thing and the immanent consisting in an instance's inhering in it.

One might choose, of course, to call each "dimension" a sub-fact of the master-fact. He might say, for example, that the fact that a is connected with P-ness (in our particular case) by way of determination, brings about the fact that a particular instance of P-ness inheres in a, and so both the main and the subsidiary facts constitute the fact of a's being P (or the fact that a has the property of being P).

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58. Presently we shall see the full significance of this remark.
There is nothing wrong with the above way of speaking as a way of speaking. Provided, of course, one takes sufficient notice of the categorial difference in respect of the degree between the three recognized kinds of fact and also acknowledges the difference in respect of the degree of theoretic technicality (if I may be permitted to speak thus) between the third and the former two uses of 'fact' above. For, though even the third use is already far enough from the ordinary use, yet it is evidently less theory-laden than the other two which "explain" or analyse it; this it owes to its relative scepticism or theoretic neutrality. That difference in the degree of technicality is one reason why we prefer to keep 'fact' in its third signification alone, grouping the other two uses together, and referring to them usually by 'circumstance' (which we reserve as a neutral term for a variety of cases).

It is to be stressed that philosophical importance does not attach to ways of allocating terms (or meaningful signs) as such—though of course a systematic allocation of terms can be criticised on grounds of felicity, simplicity, facility, coherence etc. of the selected expressions. Even consistency in the application of a highly developed technical vocabulary is a didactic matter. What is philosophically important and significant is the call for signification (the call of allocating terms) in respect of items discriminated as a result of exact philosophical investigations.

A failure to pay proper heed to these differences may be betrayed by other means also, than an open disavowal of the validity or the importance of them. For example, such a betrayal occurs when someone, after agreeing with us nominally, goes on to ask how is the fact of the determination itself (of a concrete thing by a determinant) or the inference (of an instance in a concrete thing) itself to be analysed.

It is in the light of these remarks, I believe, in which most of the notorious "inconsistencies" of, for example, Aristotle should be seen.
17/ Now let us restrict ourselves for simplicity's sake to the above noticed transcendent dimension of a fact (the connection of the concrete thing with the abstract determinant), and consider for the sake of argument that dimension as exhausting the constitution of the fact (i.e., not taking account of the inherence of instances).

We observe then, that even working under the imposed limitation, a fact cannot by any means be considered as being constituted by just two elements: the concrete thing and the abstract determinant. For these two elements might equally well exist (in their proper modes) independently of the nexus of the particular fact in question. So that they could not be conceived as solely by themselves constituting this fact—because their existence is compatible with the fact's non-existence. Something more must be added to the mechanical, as it were, juxtaposition (or placing the one beside the other in an agglomerative way) of these two elements, in order to make them constituents of the organisational, so to speak, unity of the nexus of the fact. It goes without saying, that the third "element" or better constituent needs must be categorically different from both mentioned elements, themselves already differing in category. Let us call this further needed third "element" or, if you like, component, a 'tie'.

18/ I take the above argument to be conclusive. But of course there remains the dialectical task of accounting in some way or another for an almost natural resistance or even aversion (in some quarters at least) to accept its conclusion (apparently acceptable on other grounds, too): the existence of ties. We may classify such a resistance under some one of the following headings (or possibly, in some cases, under more than one of

61. And indeed, the determinant in any case, exists independently of any of its exemplifications by concrete things. Here is the main point where we use the accumulated results of the first part of the present Essay.
them—a joint influence), but without claims to exhaustiveness.

I/ One source of resistance is the fear that by admitting the existence of ties, one runs the danger of being committed to count among things, such queer, evanescent objects (of thought) as sheer connections conceived in abstracto from the things connected, and without any content. But no such worry is justifiable: ties exist in the mode of ties and certainly not in the mode of things (concrete or abstract). We have already insisted on the categorical difference of ties from concrete things, determinants and facts.

II/ Ockham's razor presents another possible source of misgivings. But this unhappy principle has sometimes been burdened with immeasurably more weight than it can be reasonably expected to bear. For in a sense, it is an evident triviality: the demand that in our construction of a philosophical system, we must pose (or, generally, claim) such objects (or propositions, respectively) and so, as the necessity of things and thought authorizes us to pose (or claim). No more—and indeed no less. But the trouble lies in the problem that the orders of that authority really are in each case. On the other hand, not rarely the razor is taken as a principle of parsimony in a narrow sense, serving the purposes of a shortsighted understanding; and this is the real vexation; though we must also beware of the opposite danger of a superabundant philosophical imagination.

Be that as it may, we have claimed that we must acknowledge the existence of ties—and we mean to say that this is so in accordance with the necessity of things and thought. Therefore, in so far as we have succeeded, we are in conformity with the true meaning of Ockham's much misused principle.

III/ But to move to more serious business.

It is, I conceive, very important to be noted that one cannot admit the necessity of there being indeed something more beside the concrete and abstract things in cases of
the one being actually connected (by way of determination) to the other, and simultaneously try to avoid our conclusion as to the necessity of positing a third object (the tie) to fill the bill in the required way, by claiming that the further component or constituent needed is nothing else than the fact itself of their connection. And this cannot be done simply because, on this account, it follows that facts have themselves as proper constituents of themselves; something manifestly absurd. The fact that the two involved things (one concrete, one abstract) are connected by way of determination, cannot be identical with their determinative connection itself, save by ambiguity. For indeed, either 'connection' does suffer, or it can easily be made to suffer, the repeatedly noticed in the course of our Essays ambiguity of 'determination': signifying, I mean, either the whole complex of entities-connected-in-a-certain-way, or the way (or connection) in which they are connected. In such a case, evidently, the connection-as-the-way is a constituent (component) of the connection-as-the-whole (i.e., as the whole complex of the things-connected-in-a-particular-way). Similarly 'fact' may precipitate towards the same ambiguity, in the present context.

The point 62 is that in a complex whole we must distinguish 63 it both from its elements and from the way in which the elements are connected in order to yield it. The circumstance that some words (like 'configuration', 'composition', 'determination', 'formation', 'combination' etc., and even perhaps, in a lesser degree, 'structure', 'connection', 'arrangement', 'constitution', 'disposition' etc.) may be used (or can be made to be so used— even ordinarily, in special situations) may show the one, now in the

62. Already clearly used by Aristotle. See Metaphysics, Z 17.1041b12-33 and H 3.1043b4-12. But Aristotle's point there is not so clear, and at any rate is other than an exposition of the distinctions in question.

63. See Essay III, p.3 for this theme, and Essay V, pp.5-6 for an analysis of whole as an analogue for determination.
other signification, or even that they may be left floating in between the two (now leaning towards the one, now towards the other end) — this circumstance must by no means mislead us.

And whether by such an inadvertence or for another reason, we can be misled by not clearly distinguishing elements and structure and structured whole. Let me to try to substantiate this contention by a single, but striking instance.

Consider the following propositions in Tractatus:

2.04 Die Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte ist die Welt.

1.1. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen...

2. ... die Tatsache ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.

2.01 Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenstanden (Sachen, Dingern).

Now from 2.01 and 1.1, there follows that:

A/ The World is the totality of the existences of combinations of objects.

But 2.04 finds the World in the totality of the existent combinations of objects — something quite different, and really inconsistent, as it seems to be meant.

Now the difference of an existing combination as a whole (including the combined objects) from its existence, is, I submit, perspicuous enough to be able to mislead. The difference between the existence of a structure (without the structured elements) and an existent structure is again rather strong enough in order to be easily overlooked; and this is due, I conceive, to the circumstance that the notion of such a structure has a certain more or less specific content (it is not a bare link, but a link of such and such specific kind), so that it itself existing is separated so to speak from its existence by that content. (By 'content' I am not, of course, referring to the elements).

But if we now arrive at the highest level of abstraction, at the notion of a bare combination, at the bare form as it were (in the Tractarian sense of 'form') common to all combination, at the abstract idea of a combining divorced from all definite, or even general, or even indefinite reference to combinings in such and such ways, if we achieve a complete separation of this common form from any content whatsoever definite, general or indefinite — then, what would keep distinct such an existing 'Verbindung überhaupt' from its existence? They converge to the same thing — the difference disappears, or at least eludes us.
Anyway, we have used 'fact' to signify the whole determination, including as elements of it both the concrete and the abstract things. Hence the tie cannot possibly be virtually identical with the fact so understood. And hence the attempt mentioned in the last paragraph but one of by-passing our conclusions is not successful.

It is in this way also, that we cannot abolish the intended distinction by simply claiming that the determining of a concrete thing by a determinant is just the nominalisation of 'the fact that the determinant determines the concrete thing' (and similarly for similar expressions). It is only in one of the above discerned senses of 'fact' (and similar expressions) that we can say this correctly— and not in the other (the intended one).

Now if the Tractarian Verbindung was meant to be such an object (approaching our notion of tie), considered in abstraction both from the elements connected and of specific forms of connection (these latter having been "hypostatised" in abstract things — as in our scheme), then much could be said for the identity of an existing Verbindung with its existence. But then no one I trust, would wish to hold that the World is (the totality of) the existences of such Verbindungen or the totality of such existing Verbindungen. For the inclination to say so depends on the force of conceiving Verbindungen as complex wholes. And indeed there is much in Tractatus to support the contention that this is the prevalent conception of Verbindung and related notions there. But if so, then clearly an existing Verbindung is quite another object from its existence.

If the above analysis is approximately correct, we have established a structural connection between confounding (A) with 2.04 on the one hand, and not noticing the lurking ambiguity of 'fact', 'combination' etc. on the other.

{(I have implied above that ties have no content; they are represented in the abstract idea of connection pure and bare itself. But still, one might wonder, the determinative tie connecting concrete with abstract things is quite different from the "inheritive" (permit me the barbarism) tie connecting instances to concrete things — to mention one example. But the difference, I should say, is accounted not by a difference in specific or generic content, but by a difference in mode, which but reflects the categorical difference of the connected objects. Yet the distinction calls for further elaboration.)}
attempt

19/ IV/ The above mentioned and rejected is an attempt of explaining away the tie by conceiving it as virtually identical (at the level of reality; the difference being linguistic) with the fact itself, whose constituent component really it is. Another attempt is to try to absorb the tie into the determinant.\footnote{This point, of course, is Frege—inter alia. The point has already been hinted at, in Essay V, pp. 86-89 and note 2, p. 89. See also below pp. 54-57.}

Yet, this is doomed to failure, too. For we may indeed form the conception of the determinant qua determining (i.e. qua exemplified) in abstraction only from the concrete thing determined (or exemplifying it); and further this conception is certainly a congruous and valid one. Yet this our discretionary power proves nothing ontologically relevant to the issue at stake; for a determinant qua determining is indeed a complex "object" but still an "object" constituted by the combination of two categorically different and completely independent (in so far as the one at least of them, I mean the determinant, exists in itself and separate) of each other objects.

We may develop this point, aiming at locating that second attempt in the wider perspective of our apparently fuller (i.e. more articulated) view, in order to exhibit clearly the attempt's simplificatory shortcomings. I shall first propound the general formulation, and then provide an example.

We have the fact, the nexus of the determination as a whole. We distinguish its constituents, or its elements and components. But of course the whole presents a variety of aspects,

\footnote{I do not wish to raise here the problem of whether there is really one something corresponding to our conception in question. (This connects with the most difficult problem of the relationship between oneness and being). Notice that this remark has not very much to do with the circumspection of putting double inverted commas round 'object', since the latter expresses reservation as to the extension of the technical concept of object provisionally adopted in Essay V (p. 37, n. 1) and context, in order for it to cover combinations (well formed but nevertheless combinations) of categorically different proper objects, as in the present case. (Roughly, the referred concept of objects covers (simple) facts, concrete things, determinants, instances and ties). The combinatorial texture of the "objects" in
much exceeding in number the number of its constituents. These aspects can be viewed as articulated patterns of the fact. Again, these patterns, in their turn, are centered so to speak round some focal points (such points being possibly complex). In other words, the said aspects are the structure of the fact patterned round a focus. Now, we can abstract from any such pattern its focus, that is, subtract from it everything but its focal point; we arrive in this way at a point of viewing the fact, which is considered in abstraction from its "environment", that is from the nexus into which it is in reality embedded. Let us call in general the conceptions of such focal points 'abstractions' or 'abstract concepts'. Evidently, such an abstract concept does not correspond necessarily to a real (categorially simple) constituent of the fact—that is, to an object. Some of them must correspond to real (and proper in our sense) objects, but generally, we can only say that they may or may not so correspond. So that we must sharply distinguish between those of our abstract concepts which correspond to real, categorially simple constituents of a fact, and such abstractions as can be formed (even validly formed) from it, but corresponding to categorical combinations (or complexes out) of the simple constituents.

Before drawing corollaries and commenting, let me give some flesh to the above general formulation. Take for simplicity's sake a monadic fact; for instance, that a is P. This fact presents a number of aspects (i.e., of articulated patterns woven round a focal point), some of which can be perhaps expressed,

question, if adopted, would be quite different from the complexity of determinants, from the whole-ness of concrete things and of the truth-functional compoundability of some alleged characters.

67.

The notion of abstract concept has no special connection with the notion of abstract thing.
if I am not mistaken, with some propriety, by the following sentences. (I underline the expression intended to designate the focal center in each pattern, to indicate where the emphasis of the whole sentence is to be put).

i/ the concrete thing a is determined by the abstract determinant F-ness.

ii/ the determinant F-ness is exemplified by a.

iii/ A connection (by way of determination) obtains between a and F-ness; or perhaps better: a is determined by F-ness.

iv/ a and F-ness are connected by way of determination.

v/ a's being determined by F-ness obtains or occurs; or: a is determined by F-ness.

vi/ F-ness's being exemplified by a obtains or occurs; or F-ness is exemplified by a; or F-ness determines a.

Corresponding then to the above indicated focal centres, we thus have at our disposal six abstract concepts, involved in the concept of fact; namely those, respectively, of the concrete thing, the abstract thing, the tie, the couple of concrete and abstract things, the concrete thing qua determined and the determinant qua determining. But only the first three of them correspond to real categorically simple constituents of the fact in question, to existing objects—the other being abstractions corresponding at best to combinations (well formed) of the former ones, to "objects".

The above list could be, of course, extended and made more complicated by the introduction of instances, thus taking full account (the fullness achieved till now) of the complexity of

68. Better formulations could, I suppose, be found. Still, I believe, what is meant can be gathered from them.
the structure of the (simple) fact. But because I trust that even as it stands, it sufficiently clarifies the general formulation preceding it (in the way, that is, that examples can clarify), I shall only represent schematically what was said above, including the complication due to instances, before concluding with one or two remarks.

Suppose again that $a$ is $P$. The complete assay of this simple (ex hypothesi) fact would run somehow as follows:

The concrete thing $a$ is connected by the determination-tie to the abstract thing $P$-ness, and so an instance of $P$-ness, call it $i_P$, inheres in $a$.

Diagrammatically, this could be represented by the following figure:

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\[
\begin{array}{c}
P\text{-ness} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{instan} \\
\downarrow \\
i_P \\
\end{array}
\]

The diagram has the form of a triangle. Thus, speaking figuratively, we may say that an aspect of this fact is represented by the selfsame figure, but with some of the apaxes and/or the sides of the diagram being somehow marked out, or brought into relief (say by encircling or bold-typing them).

For example in this way:
(F2) represents the fact from the point of view, so to speak, of the determinant qua determining, or, if you prefer, of the exemplification-of-the-determinant involved. If we ignore instances, (F2) visually represents the aspect of the fact expressed by (vi) above.

20/ And now the promised remarks.

I/ There is a simplifying tendency already noticed, to retain from the intricate structure of even a simple fact, only aspects (i) and (vi). But it is one thing to accept the complication of the case and to disagree in respect of which among its (more or less, explicitly or implicitly acknowledged) constituents are the fundamental ones (and in what sense) — and this is what we have been confronted with till now (or so we have supposed). It is a quite different thing, and (from our point of view) a far graver error, to refuse to see or to admit the said complexity; and this is the defect of the view which would insist on recognising in any given proper predication or simple fact only two constituents — and nothing else. To save words, let us have recourse to the above introduced figures. In place of (F1), the here described thesis, substitutes something like:
Now this view, in such a strong form as I conceive, evidently and profoundly inadequate to the complexity of the case (unequal, so to speak, to it). My point here is that it is also bound to be indefinite, with "floating" content. Such an indeterminateness of meaning is significantly reflected in the vagueness of the above figure (I mean the vagueness which would result if we were to put this figure into words), which in its turn is a clear and certain sign of the inarticulation of the view exposed. For what does 'P' signify in the above scheme? Not surely an independently existing, separate entity; for this would simply open the way of rendering (F3) an *incomplete* (F1) (something that it really is after all)---indeed, (F3) would be made (after a few steps) to correspond exactly to aspect (vi) above, and consequently, the present view would tend to coincide with the former simplifying tendency referred to at the beginning of the present remark, in that it would tend to accept (more or less of) the real complexity of the fact and contend only for the constituents, or rather of the focuses of it to be accepted as fundamental. Hence, usually, the second, non-particular constituent of the fact is taken to be the property of being P---or rather just being P. But this is bound to result sooner or later to incoherence---the predicament of the unrecognized operating ambiguity. For if the adherent of the criticized view proceeds to offer his analysis of facts (i.e., of concrete things's having
properties of being such and such)—and he must proceed to do so since it is taken for granted that he intends to propose a philosophical theory concerning the subject matter in question... otherwise he could not even succeed to oppose our theory and, therefore, can be dismissed at once as irrelevant—he will of necessity find himself in the awkward position of trying, in effect, to handle satisfactorily two distinct strands (or "reins", to speak figuratively) as if they were one, simply because, ex hypothesi, he does not notice the complication of the case; the two mentioned strands being the two dimensions of the essentially bifurcated fact: the a/p-nature direction (or the transcendent dimension) and the a/i₂ direction (or the immanent dimension) (compare with VI). The hypothetical adherent would then be strongly inclined (and indeed he cannot resist this inclination save by recognising the complexity denied by him—in which case he would naturally cease to be adherent of the criticised view) to transfer to his properties both the shareability or partisability of the determinants and the inhering character of instances; and therefore he would be almost bound to end with the monstrosity of something, an entity (even an abstract one), capable of being present (immanently) as a whole (i.e., in its entirety) in more than one concrete thing (and in such concrete things which are not necessarily part the one of the other). The notion of such unnatural abortion is patently incongruous within our scheme; and this is the mentioned incongruity, to which the criticised position leads—one among its serious defects.

It is to be emphasised once again that the above strictures (monstrosity, abortion) do not regard the philosophically inarticulated ordinary way of speaking and thinking. But they do regard some simple transcriptions of this way to philosophy.

But then, one may object, the inconsistency claimed against the criticised view is only a result of our manufacturing it through the sharpened, technical senses given to "inhere", "share" or "participate" etc. And in a sense, this is true enough, but it fails to
2/ A second natural consequence of such

constitute a fair and viable objection. For one thing, you cannot pretend to use as an objection against a system professedly systematic the fact that it is systematic; if it indeed succeeds in being systematic as it attempts to be and alleges that it is, this cannot be considered but as a merit of it, and a ground for praising, not for blaming it. For another thing, according to the contention of the system it is precisely the lack of systematic articulation which might render understandable how an incognizant notion could be seriously entertained at all; so that one cannot reasonably protest against such an articulation on the ground that it itself "creates" the incognizant which it claims to have "discovered" for why would not the exponent of the system reply, among other things, that what there was not and was really "created" is the philosophical awareness of the incognizant, the incognizant itself being (in a sense) all the same always there?

Technical senses and system-construction go together. A system, in its systematic character, is liable to the accusation that it is not enough articulated and developed, that it is not systematic enough — not to the accusation that it is (very) systematic. Yet, verify, this is not the whole of the affair: for there is indeed valid content in the hostile attitude towards system-construction; only this may not be the apparent content. Criticizing a system for its technicality may be a misguided accusation against its artificiality which is, of course, a completely different matter.

This is not the place to investigate the principles of valid system-criticism. Yet, I cannot abstain from expressing briefly some very general and rough remarks, just in order to provide a context for the above contentions, which might otherwise appear extremely dogmatic.

A system may validly, I submit, be criticized on the following scores:

I/ Because it is not sufficiently developed or articulated.

II/ Because it is not enough grounded on intuitive or self-evident truths, or because it is at points even counterintuitive or violating self-evident
simplifying and inadequate attitudes as the one described in the
previous remark, may be pointed out here. And this provides also,
an example of that blameworthy kind of technicality in a philo-
sophical system which was spoken of in the note 59 as 'artificiality'.

Suppose one is bound (or rather fettered) to the
two-constituents view of (simple) facts (indeed, he may be very
undiscriminative as to the various kinds of 'facts'). He calls
the two constituents 'object' and 'concept' (or 'function').

truly.

(But we must notice in this connection, that
as one and the same idea may be more or less arti-
culated, so an intuition may be subjected to a more
or less degree of a quality which we may term
'transparency' or 'perspicuity'. And further, it would
seem the two fields of variation are correlative so
that the more articulated is an idea or a system, the
more transparent the intuitions allegedly supporting it
must be.)

IX/ Because of the artificiality in its
articulation.

The idea here is that of not following in
each case the 'natural', as it were, 'limbs' and articu-
lations, the natural divisions of the subject matter in
question, but unskillfully 'breaking bones', imposing
arbitrary groupings or disconnections of one's own
on it. (The thought is as old as Plato; see, for example,
Phaedrus 265e).

These are (at least some of the) headings
under which a valid criticism against a given system
(either in general or in respect of particulars points
in it) may be exercised. We may also add a different
sort of criticism consisting in:

iv/ objections to a certain thesis (or
theses) of the system more direct and external than the
above (external as to the system).

In such a case, the criticism itself must be
systematic, and it can be criticised under the headings
(i)-(iii) for failing to be genuinely so. In other words,
the counterthesis must be provided with enough systematic
surroundings in order to acquire precise content and
significance, and indeed in order to be able to oppose at
all philosophically the thesis it attempts to oppose.
(If it is true that most philosophical claims and argu-
ments acquire precise meaning by being organically
incorporated within a system).
Suppose further that, in articulating his system, he is obliged (perhaps as a response to challenging, urged objections against parts of it) to acknowledge a kind of entity which threatens to be a third kind of entity, besides objects and concepts (or functions). This last kind has obvious and strong affinities with the second kind, with functions; indeed for every function there corresponds one such entity of the latter kind (and presumably, vice versa); the connections are essential.

On the here proposed as correct view, this is to be explained by the circumstance that his concepts are not categorically simple objects, but categorically mixed "objects", combinations of the genuine third object-category with a further fourth one (on his reckonings) totally unacknowledged by him.

But this view is not his view! Hence, bound as he is to the two-constituents view, he must classify that third kind of entity, not as a separate category, but under the one or the other fundamental kinds admitted in his system, refusing to it its proper independence.

Now the said person aggravates his position, let us suppose, by a rather unconscious and indiscriminate, no more than curious and peculiar intermingling of linguistic and ontological considerations. (In this, he is quite unique, he may, on the one hand, denounce as entirely beside the point criticisms directed against the linguistic propriety, and even the ordinary plausibility [I mean plausibility as a matter of ordinary thinking] of some of the claims to which he is led; and on the other hand, he may base sweeping doctrines on observations concerning the linguistic behaviour of expressions). How then, will a person like the above described one, naturally respond to the problem posed by that "new", and perhaps unwelcome, kind of entity? He may firstly observe that the kind in question, though essentially connected with his concepts, yet is such that the expressions designating it do not "function" linguistically (he perhaps says: 'logically')
like concept-expressions; he may also observe that those expressions "function" linguistically like (but here the similarity is mainly superficial even at the linguistic and the ordinary level; well, here the selective application of the principle of the im-
exactness of the ordinary thought and language could again save him) common object-expressions. Therefore, under the spell of the two-constituents theory, and given his peculiar, selective addiction to linguistic investigations as ontologically relevant, he does not hesitate to subsume all entities belonging to the "new" kind under the category of objects, in spite of their profound and even prima facie intuitive difference from it. And he does so, not simply as a matter of terminology (like our calling both concrete things and determinants 'things' while fully acknowledging their categorial difference) but substantially, as it is apparent from his treating propositions like 4 'Julius Caesar is realised' 70 as false but meaningful, in the sense of meaningful in which it is also meaningful to say that, for example, the concept square root of 4 is realised 71.

The above may serve as a good example of a gain in articulation on the part of a system, which is at the same time an artificial development of it. (Its artificiality being also betrayed, inter alia, by the counterintuitive claims to which sooner or later it leads).

70. In our system this proposition is also meaningfully construed in a certain way (in relationship with possible concrete things. Only that so construed, it happens to be true (roughly speaking).

71. In this piece, I am of course attempting to outline a (partial) structural anatomy of Frege's basic ontology. So the quotations at the end are from his "On Concept and Object" (p. 50 of Black's and Geach's book of English translations).

Far from me the claim of providing a complete in its main lines account of Frege's motivations in the development of his rather restricted system. And anyway I am proposing the above rough analysis as an interesting direction which might have been followed, even if it actually contributed very little to the formation of Frege's curious doctrines.
A further lesson that should be gained from the above story (especially if Frege could be recognised in the above portrayed person) is (what anyway ought to be a priori clear) that a realistic tendency in itself is not enough; it is surely not the panacea of our metaphysical troubles, just as itsurely is not the source of evil and should not, consequently, pointed as the scapegoat of responsible for all metaphysical absurdities. Frege's example anyway, whether the above story is (partially) true of him or not, displayed the mentioned lesson clearly enough, I dare think."

Seeing now the impasse pointed out in the proceeding two remarks in the light of our many-constituents theory of determination (or rather proper predication), and observing how well do all these variations and complexities (both of subject matter and of the theories about this subject matter) fit (find their proper place) in it and are expressible in terms of it in a clear and natural way, we may be allowed to conclude firstly that a two-constituents account of proper predication is an underdeveloped and confounded theory of predication, and secondly that our own view is at least more articulated and adequate in respect of the studied subject matter (doing better justice to it, as it were).

Let it be said, by the way, that Frege also exhibited, I think, clearly enough the peculiar "ring" of artificiality which one recurrently finds in so many of the scientists' attempts to philosophise. (This is different from the "ring" of the artificiality of a through and through philosopher's mishandlings). The chasm between philosophy and (positive) science seems to be even idiosyncratic! But casts of mind aside, there remains another explaining factor; one cannot easily command sufficient mastery over two vastly different disciplines. (So that the root-problem is again the puristic conception of philosophy. See Essay V, pp. 30-32). In order to philosophise (well or badly) one must have been philosophically disciplined. His natural abilities or his scientific training are not in themselves enough.
Yet, it would be meet to end with a remark on one of the incompletenesses left in the doctrine here exposed. We must undoubtedly emphasize the difference between really proper constituents, i.e. categorically simple objects, and categorial complexes constituted by them in various combinations, i.e. categorially "mixed" "objects". But the difference must be worked out much more fully. We may provisionally point towards the direction of expressing the difference in terms of a certain incompleteness (Russell) or of a certain unsaturated-ness (Frege) of the latter as contrasted with some kind of self-subsistence on the part of the former. But this is obviously nothing more than a rough announcement.

Meanwhile, we may perhaps make use, if we like, of "empirical" marks or criteria of differentiation:

In order to explain somehow (but extremely roughly) the intended import of this denomination, I may be permitted to adduce the following sketchy remarks.

It is perhaps not very far from the truth, as well as useful, to distinguish two main, very general attitudes towards the way philosophy should be exercised, and, ultimately, two very general metaphilosophical conceptions of philosophy. Let us call them 'generalised Empiricism' and 'generalised Rationalism'. The first refuses to make a distinction, which the second full-heartedly uses. I mean the distinction between the meaning of expressions and sentences and the criteria or conditions of their correct application or truth, respectively, in respect to the world of our experience; criteria enabling us, in principle and setting aside "practical" difficulties and obstacles, to judge regarding their correct application and truth in any particular case, by simple or complicated yet immediate means, recourse to our experience.

The above formulation sees the issue from the point of view of, let us say, the theory of meaning. Turning the emphasis of the formulation to fall on the side of things, we may say that, at bottom, the principle contested is whether the correct application or non-application of any meaningful expression and the truth or falsity of any meaningful sentence, must make (or rather...
correspond to) some difference to the World of our experience, a difference in principle (apart, that is, from "practical" difficulties) observable non-mediately and empirically; and, further, that to know the meaning of at the expression or sentence is to know the difference made or corresponding.

Notice firstly, that the second formulation in terms of the principle contested is in fact weaker than the preceding one. For a difference may exist, and indeed such an one as is required by the principle, and yet, possibly, may not be explicitly formable in criteria or conditions. But let us construe 'criterion' so as not to imply the necessity for such an explicit formulation.

Notice secondly that I am not formulating the issue so that, according to the principle, the meaning is the difference in question. Nor is, also, even required to identify knowing the meaning with knowing the difference; it will suffice for the purpose at hand if the second knowing is thought as essentially involved in the first.

So we may concentrate on the principle itself above expounded. In its formulation I have underlined two phrases in order to pinpoint a major source of variations and sometimes of confusion.

Firstly, if instead of 'to the World of our experience' we substitute 'to the World' simply and in place of 'observable empirically' we put 'apprehensible' or 'knowable' or 'which may be an object of some (proper to them) kind of awareness', then the generalised Rationalism would agree.

Secondly, there always remain acute for every form of Empiricism problem of interpreting 'experience' and 'empirical'—problems not really parallel and comparable to the corresponding ones for "Rationalism". What is to count as empirically observable? Is a mystic's "experience" a proper experience? Are his findings observable empirically? Or should we impose some limitations, say, a restriction to kinds of experience which most people have?—or, indeed a restriction to publicly observable matters? And if so, how are we supposed to make (to achieve within) the assumed framework which, being presumably empirical, is expected to be defined by such restrictions, and, what is immensely more difficult, to justify these limitations? By means of empirically observable differences? Of what sort?

Thirdly, there may substituted various expressions in the place of the underlined ones. Why not 'to the World of our feelings and sentiments' and '(emotionally) felt', respectively? Yet, such substitution is particularly interesting for various reasons: put 'our ordinary linguistic (and thinking)—if this is recognised as essentially different) dispositions and behaviour'.
objects are those only focuses\(^7\) (in the above explained sense) which taken together suffice to constitute by combination all other possible focuses distinguishable within (simple) facts, and which further satisfy certain other conditions, as, for example, intuitively apprehensible (not technically articulated) categorial simplicity and unity, or minimal number sufficient for the reconstruction of all the rest.

It goes without saying that in a system like the present one, the above empirical conditions are far from the Last Word; they are indeed scarcely the Second Word. For two, mainly, kinds of reason:

\[\text{('our'? Who 'we'?) and 'inseparable(by the speakers of the language in which the expression or the sentence in question is formulated) and perhaps even (at least implicitly) known respectively.}\]

\[\text{In this perspective(provided only that it is fully worked out) generalised Rationalism may begin to look less antiquated than it may be prima facie felt to be.}\]

\[\text{The sense of 'empirical' in the text, is one congenial to a kind of refined and mild generalised Empiricism—-with no commitment to specific and narrow interpretations of the discussed clauses, and with very relaxed requirements of contact with our World of experience (or rather of general applicability to this World of our conceptual constructions).}\]

\[\text{Or what corresponds by way of signification to the focuses—-depending on the level on which we move.}\]
i/ Even if it were shown that objects are those and only those items which satisfy the above conditions (or an enlarged and improved series of suchlike conditions), even then it would not follow that to be an object just is to satisfy this series of conditions. For it is, I conceive, incomprehensible that objecthood itself consists in minimal sufficiency or something of the sort. But of course it may entail it.

ii/ The conditions, even qua conditions, stand in need of improvement by theoretical elaboration and articulation of the notions involved in their formulation. For example the required "unity" is manifestly inarticulate; even the intuitive (but not necessarily articulate) apprehension is so, too.

And with this call for further elaboration, let me conclude the present Essay, which was mainly occupied with the establishment of an independent, special existence for the determinants (Part A), and with the necessity of recognising ties as further constituents (but not elements) of (simple) facts.