

Piotr Nowak, Editorial Introduction.....	3
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**PRESENTATIONS**

Vladimir Varava, Philosophy Born from the Spirit of Literature: The Experience of Russian Culture .....	5
Natalia Rostova, Concept of Anthropological Chaos in Two Russian Philosophical Manifestos of the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	13
Piotr Nowak, The Adventures of the Russian Soul .....	23
Janusz Dobieszewski, Pushkin Through the Eyes of Vladimir Solovyov .....	34
Fedor Girenok, Vvedensky: The Poetry of Constructive Misunderstanding .....	41
Marina Savel'eva, Lev Shestov and Shakespeare Authorship Question .....	49
Anastasia Gacheva, Millennium and Apocatastasis in Russian Philosophy at the End of 19 <sup>th</sup> -First Third of 20 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	58
Irena Księżopolska, The Silent Malice of (In)animate Objects: Nabokov's Things .....	64

**ESSAYS**

Carl A. P. Ruck, Soma and the Greek Mysteries .....	78
John Uehersax, <i>Divinus Plato</i> : Is Plato a Religious Figure? .....	98
Peter Warnek, Platonic Displacements and the Strange Appearance of Socrates .....	111
Edward P. Butler, Plotinian Henadology .....	143
Apostolos L. Pierris, Prolegomena to the Enigma of the Johannine Prologue: An Inquiry into Ancient Philosophical Syncretism .....	160
Jeff Love, Alexandre Kojève and Emptiness .....	181
Svetozar Minkov, The Fortress of Faith, or the "Metrics" of Power: An Interpretation of Chapter X of Machiavelli's <i>The Prince</i> .....	198
Ivan Dimitrijević, The Announcement of the Kingdom and the Suspension of Politics .....	209

**ARCHIVE OF POLISH THOUGHT**

Czesław Miłosz, The Child of Europe .....	226
Piotr Nowak, The Living Against the Dead .....	230

**REDISCOVERED BOOKS**

Wawrzyniec Rymkiewicz, Time and Nation after the Collapse of World History .....	237
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Apostolos L. Pierris

## PROLEGOMENA TO THE ENIGMA OF THE JOHANNINE PROLOGUE: AN INQUIRY INTO ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL SYNCRETISM

*The Johannine Prologue is "das grösste Rätsel, das die Geschichte des ältesten Christentums bietet."*<sup>1</sup>

Augustine testifies to the laudatory acceptance that the striking beginning of the Fourth Gospel found among some (Neo)platonic circles. One such philosopher suggested its emphatic imprint on high places in all Churches:

Quod initium sancti Evangelii cui nomen est secundum Iohannem, quidam Platonici, sicut a sancto sene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensis Ecclesiae praesedit Episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis litteris conscribendum et per omnes Ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat.<sup>2</sup>

In fact Amelius, of the Plotinian group, commented on the Iohannine Λόγος-doctrine (albeit referring to the Evangelist as "the barbarian"), giving a significant formulation of its content. The Amelian quotation runs as follows (a fairly orthodox exegesis except for the explicit Docetism of the Logos-incarnation):

Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐγίνετο, ὥς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσει, καὶ νῆ Δί' ὃν ὁ βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξία καθεστηκότα πρὸς θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν εἶναι δι' οὗ πάνθ' ἀπλῶς γεγενῆσθαι ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζῶν καὶ ὃν πεφυκέναι, καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν (sc. τὸν Λόγον), καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον φαντάζεσθαι

<sup>1</sup> A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Bd. 1 (Tübingen: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1909), 108.

<sup>2</sup> Augustinus, *de Civ. Dei*, X, 29, I, 450.33-451.5.

ἄνθρωπον, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ τηνικαῦτα δεικνύειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον·  
ἀμέλει καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθεοῦσθαι, καὶ θεὸν εἶναι οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ  
εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν σάρκα καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καταχθῆναι.<sup>3</sup>

Eusebius mentions the passage in his account of the Second Principle of Reality, immediately after he has elaborated on Numenius' position, and re-affirmed the presumed affiliation of Platonic and Hebrew wisdom. It is very likely that Amelius himself connected his own analysis with Numenian theory and the Johannine doctrine.<sup>4</sup> The point of the Evangelic attestation in Amelius must have been the identification of a particular entity in his system with the Heracleitean and the Johannine Logos: καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐγένετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσειε, καὶ νῆ Δι' ὃν ὁ βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ etc. The world-creative function is to be explained. Cosmic Creativity belongs primarily to Intellection (Νοῦς), for it presupposes a *plan* of the object to be produced: creation of a thing is the process whose reverse constitutes the thing's real analysis, an objective understanding of its nature. Knowledge is the ground of Creation. The Platonic *Timaeus* provides a classic formulation of this insight. And indeed Proclus explains the Numenian and Amelian interpretations of the creative Principle as differing construals of the Timaeon statement (39E): ἥπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ζῶον, οἷα τε ἐνεῖσι καὶ ὄσαι, καθορᾷ, τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας διενόηθη δεῖν καὶ τότε (sc. this physican and sensible World-Animal) σχεῖν (*In Tim. Comm.* III, 103.18 sqq. Diehl). Now Amelius posited three demiurgic Νόες (Intellects), τὸν ὄντα, τὸν ἔχοντα, τὸν ὁρῶντα, corresponding to the ὃ ἔστιν ζῶον (being in itself as an organic whole), ἐνούσας ἰδέας (the eidetic articulation of being) and καθορᾷ (the intellectual "seeing" of the ideas), i.e. Νοῦς as pure *being* and intelligibility (of Being); as *having* the forms of being; and as *seeing* (intellecting) the ideal content of being. In this triadic analysis of intelligibility and intellection (being, possessing being as structured definite determination of being and seeing being; or being as an ultimate fact of existence, as being had as a definite determination of being, i.e. as being something, and finally as being seen), Amelius considered the first member as demiurgic par excellence (*ibid.*; OF Fr. 96 Kern).

<sup>3</sup> Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*. XI, 18-19, 540A sqq.

<sup>4</sup> Amelius was a particularly close student of Numenius. He collected, edited and commented on the latter's literary remains. Porphyrius, *Vita Plot.*, 3, 43-5: φιλοπονία δὲ ὑπερβαλλόμενος τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν πάντων διὰ τὸ καὶ σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ Νομηνίου καὶ γράψαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα ἐκμαθεῖν. He was in fact considered a specialist on Numenius. When in Athens there grew the notion that Plotinus was merely adapting Numenian views with the addition of mere platitudes and insignificant details, Amelius undertook to defend his friend with a work entitled: Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τοῦ Πλωτίνου πρὸς τὸν Νομήνιον διαφορᾶς (*Ibid.*, 17). On the other hand, Numenius utilized in his theological speculations the wisdom, symbolism and sacred rites of the oriental eminent nations (among whom he mentioned, Brahmins, Hebrews, Magians (Iranians) and Egyptians), as agreeing with the Platonic spirit. Fr. 1a (des Places): ...ἐπικαλέσασθαι δὲ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ εὐδοκμοῦντα, προσφερόμενον αὐτῶν τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰ δόγματα τὰς τε ἰδρύσεις συντελουμένας Πλάτωνι ὁμολογουμένως, ὁπόσας Βραχμᾶνες καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Μάγοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι διέθεντο. He employed the allegorical method (τροπολογῆσαι) in interpreting passages from the Old Testament (Frs. 1b, 1c and 9); Origenes in fact commented favourably on these analyses, Fr. 1c: ...καὶ οὐκ ἀπιθάνως αὐτὰ τροπολογῶντα (sc. τὸν Νομήνιον). Numenius allegorized even a story from the New Testament without mentioning the name of Jesus (Fr. 10a), just as Amelius referred to the Johannine Gospel by calling its author ὁ βάρβαρος.



But in Neoplatonism λόγος is essentially associated to the psychic hypostasis, in contradistinction to the noetic principle to which it is subordinated. And it is from the Universal hypercosmic Soul that the particular psychic entities *descend* into the World according to Amelius; Stobaeus, *Eclogae* I, 49, 39, I 377.11 Wachsmuth: (Περὶ διαφορᾶς καθόδου τῶν ψυχῶν from Iamblichus' Περὶ ψυχῆς) Πλωτῖνος μὲν καὶ Πορφύριος καὶ Ἀμέλιος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπὲρ τὸν οὐρανὸν ψυχῆς καὶ πάσας ἐπίσης εἰσοικίζουσιν εἰς τὰ σώματα. In fact Amelius held (or tended to hold) the singular doctrine that all psychic substance, all souls, are really at bottom not only essentially homogeneous, but also *numerically* one (*ibid.* I, 49, 37 372.10-12; 25-6) differing only and simply in accordance with varying relations and positions (σχέσεσι καὶ κατατάξεσιν, I 376. 3-4). This fits nicely into the Amelian account of the Johannine prologue: everything that comes to be is a being and exists, has life and is living, by being in the Logos principle; ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζῶν καὶ ὄν πεφυκέναι. It furthermore provides the foundation for an explanation of the Incarnation of the eternal Soul-Logos itself in an individual: all particular souls are *identical* with the Universal Soul; in that unique case the fullness of the hypercosmic powers was also actually preserved undiminished (τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος).

The likelihood is thus substantial that Amelius identified the Johannine Logos with his Universal Soul. That he invoked the Heracleitean (and, he might have added, as an elaborate version of divine immanent causality, the Stoic) Logos as ontological principle of reality points in the same direction: in Stoicism this Logos, the aboriginal pure active reality, produces, by its own tensional transformations according to its own law, the cosmic whole; everything has its existence grounded in Logos, is a tensional (τονικός) Logos-modification according to a spermatically pre-existing pattern in Logos itself, subsists therefore *in* Logos. This accounts for the ἐν ᾧ moment, which, significantly, from the Johannine ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶν ἦν etc. becomes the explicitly sweeping ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζῶν καὶ ὄν πεφυκέναι. The δι' οὗ would also, in the Neoplatonic setting, suggest instrumental efficiency rather than veritable creative causality. It is true that the καθ' ὃν mentioned in the beginning of the quotation suggests the archetypal principle, probably the second Amelian Demiurge (τὸν ἔχοντα, i.e. the divine Intellect qua possessing the ideal articulation of reality, the structured determinations of being); but the Heracleitean invocation in exemplification of this καθ' ὃν redresses the suggestion. Philo illustrates well the propositional Metaphysics in *De Cherubim*, 35 (§§124-127); 125: πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τινος γένεσιν πολλὰ δεῖ συνελθεῖν, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, τὸ ἐξ οὗ, τὸ δι' οὗ, τὸ δι' ὃ καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ὑφ' οὗ τὸ αἴτιον, ἐξ οὗ δὲ ἡ ὕλη, δι' οὗ δὲ τὸ ἐργαλεῖον, δι' ὃ δὲ ἡ αἰτία. In cosmic creation ὑφ' οὗ is God, δι' οὗ His Λόγος. Cf. Seneca *Epistulae*, 65, 8, where two more causes are introduced, *in quo* as the form and *ad quod* as the paradigmatic idea; while one is suppressed, the instrumental δι' οὗ. Finally, that this Logos is God connects with the view that all incorporeal substance from supreme Godhead to particular soulness, is homogeneous (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, 49, 32, I 365.7-21). According to Iamblichus, Amelius stands "unfastly" on this doctrine which in effect maintains that νοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν κρείττωνων γενῶν οὐδὲν ἢ ψυχῇ διενήνοχε κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν (especially therefore as Supramundane universal soul). The theory cannot be immediately reconciled with the strict Subordinationism in the derivation of reality (One-Mind-Soul), and Iamblichus brings emphatically to the surface the underlying tension in the Plotinian-centered position.

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The situation reproduces the then contemporary Trinitarian controversies (which however resolutely left the psychic factor outside the compass of essential divine spirituality).<sup>5</sup>

The ἐν ᾧ motive (the idea that all created existence is substantiated in a certain ontological principle) points in the first place to the Platonic cosmic soul; *Timaeus* 34b-c; esp. 36d-37a: ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεκταίνετο καὶ μέσον μέση συναγαγὼν προσήρμοσεν... καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μὲν, λογισμῷ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἀρμονίας ψυχῇ, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεὶ τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων.<sup>6</sup> This would make the universal soul the first-born of God, the Πρωτόγονος. On the other hand, in the Alexandrian Hellenizing Judaism there has been evolved the idea of divine Logos as τόπος ἰδεῶν and νοητὸς Κόσμος. Philo, *De opificio Mundi*, §20: οὐδ' ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν Κόσμος ἄλλον ἂν ἔχει τόπον ἢ τὸν θεῖον λόγον τὸν ταῦτα διακοσμήσαντα· ἐπεὶ τίς ἂν εἴη τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτοῦ τόπος ἕτερος, ὃς γένοιτο ἂν ἱκανὸς οὐ λέγω πάσας ἀλλὰ μίαν ἄκρατον ἡγνινοῦν δέξασθαι τε καὶ χωρῆσαι; §36, I 11.5 Cohn; §25, I 8.2: ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς, ὃν φαμεν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὁ Θεοῦ Λόγος; §24: οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν Κόσμον εἶναι ἢ Θεοῦ Λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος (an emphatic affirmation of the inherent creativity of Λόγος, and His essential orientation towards creation, essentially in his capacity as comprising the archetypal articulation of all being, precisely as being τόπος ἰδεῶν). The divine Λόγος is the *place* of the Intelligibles, the incorporeal powers of God; *De Somniis* I, §62, III 218.12: (τόπος) ὁ Θεῖος Λόγος, ὃν ἐκπεπλήρωκεν ὅλον δι' ὧν ἄσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν αὐτὸς ὁ Θεός. The Λόγος is the House of God; *De Migratione Abrahami* §4: καὶ γὰρ τὸν τῶν ὧν νοῦν, τὸν Θεόν, οἶκον ἔχειν φησι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον. (Cf. *Job* XXVIII, 23: ὁ Θεὸς εὐ συνέστησεν αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς Σοφίας) τὴν ὁδόν, / αὐτὸς δὲ οἶδεν τὸν τόπον αὐτῆς). In the last Philonian quotation there clearly emerges the underlying ontological pattern of divinity: God is the universal Nous of all existence; His Logos is the House of His ideas of reality.

The ontological *In-being* requires *inherence* of the ὃ ἔστιν ἐν τινὶ in τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν τι. When Seneca enumerates the types of cause, adding the Platonic paradigmatic to the Aristotelian four, he distinguishes the (immanent) formal from the (transcendent) archetypal by calling them *id in quo* and *id ad quod* correspondingly; *Epistulae Morales* 65, §8. There has been a shift in the emphasis and a reversal of the direction in the relationship between the formal principle of a thing and the thing itself: still the form is in the thing in a certain sense, but the constitutive connection is that the thing is in its formal principle. That X is in Y accordingly represents the other side of the fact that Y permeates

<sup>5</sup> Presumed or postulated homogeneity of the incorporeal realm blurs the essential distinctions between *divinity*, *noeticity* and *psychicality*. The inner gradation of spiritual reality must then be in consistency accounted for by varied degrees and kinds of *failure*, of *defection* from the pleromatic perfection of absolute existence. Such was typically the Origenistic position; *De Principiis* II, 1, 1; II, 8, 3; I, 8, 1 Koetschau. The theory, by emphasizing Logos as πρωτόκοκός πάσης κτίσεως, involved an Areianizing tendency. Catholic Christianity affirmed an unbridgeable gap between divinity (to which Logos and Holy Spirit were included) and the rest of existence, while post-Plotinian Neoplatonism insisted on the distinct self-contained subsistence of all discernible ontological steps in reality connected by a metaphysical chain of being.

<sup>6</sup> Here the basic demarcation line between eternal being and engendered existence is drawn in the psychic subsistence.

X, constitutes and holds it together. The immanence of the Stoic divine Spirit in the World may be also formulated as the In-being of the Cosmic Whole in Spirit.

In the *Sapientia Salomonis* (an Alexandrian Judaic tract, probably from the second half of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C., belonging to the Greek Canon of the Old Testament) divine Wisdom functions similarly to the Stoic universal Spirit. The divine Spirit blows everywhere, is omnipresent (XII, 1), it fills the Universe and keeps the whole of existence integrated (I, 7); this omnipotent, omniscient, intellectual, hypersubtle, active spirit of sacred purity constitutes the substance of Wisdom, the only-begotten of its kind from God; VII 22-3: ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ Σοφίᾳ) Πνεῦμα νοερὸν, ἅγιον, μονογενές, πολυμερές, λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον, τρανόν, ἀμόλυντον, σαφές, ἀπήμαντον, φιλάγαθον, ὄξύ, ἀκόλυτον, εὐεργετικόν, φιλάνθρωπον, βέβαιον, ἀσφαλές, ἀμέριμον, παντοδύναμον, πανεπίσκοπον, καὶ διὰ πάντων χωρῶν πνευμάτων νοερῶν καθαρῶν λεπτότατων. (The form of the recitation coincides with that at the ritual Orphic hymns; a multiform description of the elusive essence of the reality involved). The Wisdom is the universal Artificer (VII, 22), present when God created the World she knows the ways and works of God (IX, 9), which are her own as well (XIV, 5; 2), principle of their generation and leader of their existence (VII, 12) under God's guidance (15). Wisdom is of holy and unsullied substance, most volatile, she pervades and penetrates everything, being as an exhalation of God's Power and an overflow of omnipotent glory unadulterated and chaste, a radiance of eternal light, image of divine Goodness and spotless mirror of divine Activity (VII 24-26). Wisdom is one but able to do everything, self-contained, self-residing and yet effecting all change everywhere (27), she permeates the Universe and governs all existence to the best end (VIII, 1). Wisdom is the prophetic Spirit (e.g. VII, 27; cf. *Job*, XXXII, 8); she is further associated with God's Λόγος (IX, 1-2): Θεὸς... ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ σου καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ σου κατασκευάσας ἄνθρωπον. The expression ἐν λόγῳ corresponds systematically to ἐν ἰσχύι, ἐν σοφίᾳ, ἐν συνέσει, as in *Jeremias*, LI, 15: ποιῶν γῆν ἐν τῇ ἰσχύι αὐτοῦ, ἐτοιμάζων οἰκουμένην ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἐν τῇ συνέσει αὐτοῦ ἐξέτεινεν τὸν οὐρανόν (the same in X, 12). In *Proverbs* III, 19-20, the organic dative is employed instead of, and together with, the ἐν-formula: ὁ Θεὸς τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐθεμελίωσεν τὴν γῆν, ἡτοίμασεν δὲ οὐρανοὺς φρονήσας ἐν αἰσθήσει ἄβυσσοι ἐρράγησαν etc. *The divine instrument of creation is that in which created being is substantiated.*

The pre-eternal existence and instrumental, harmonizing creative function of Σοφία is manifested in her self-declaration, *Proverbs* VIII, 22-31 (notice §30: ἤμην παρ' αὐτῷ ἀρμόζουσα). Her omnipresence is also attested there, §2. In *Sapientia*, however, Wisdom is virtually identified with the Stoic World Soul, the divine Spirit permeating all universe. (The Stoic influence promoted also the explicit identification of Wisdom with Logos). The position of *Sapientia* may be described as a coupling of the Stoic Logos – Old Testament Sophia with a transcendent God; or, alternatively, seen from the other end, as a Stoic divine spirit-cosmic soul construal of the instrumental cause in Old Testament Creation. The Stoic world-structure adapted readily itself to the requirements of a philosophical Old Testament exegesis: one had only, in effect, to interpret the God – Spirit – Logos – Cosmic Soul – Active Principle of Stoicism as divine Sophia, God's noetic Logos and creative Power substantiating in itself all created existence. In fact, the Stoicisation of the *Sapientia* went so far as to assume a pre-existing formless matter out of which (ἐξ οὗ)

God fashioned the World; XI, 17: οὐ γὰρ ἡπόρει ἡ παντοδύναμός σου χεὶρ / καὶ κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης etc. This matter would correspond to the absolutely passive principle of the Stoic System. The idea answered nicely to the watery abyss over which the spirit of God brooded in the beginning of things (Genesis I, 2).

\* \* \*

The Stoic predominance in theological speculation of the Hellenistic Age was challenged in the first century B.C. by the reemergence of Platonic thought in the fourth (Philo Larisaeus) and fifth (Antiochus from Ascalon) Academies, of Aristotelianism (Andronicus) and of Neopythagoreanism. The new tendency had also repercussions on Middle Stoicism (esp. Poseidonius). Seneca (*Epistulae Morales*, 65) distinguishes two theories of Causes, one orthodox Stoic (§§2-3), the other standard Aristotelian (§§4-6) to which it is added the Platonic archetypal idea (§7). This latter complex of Aristotelian physics and Platonic metaphysics (the quintocausal theory) is ascribed to Plato [§8: "quinque ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: id ex quo (matter), id a quo (efficient cause), id in quo (form), id ad quod (idea), id propter quod (final cause): novissime id quod ex his est"], although considered as common or conjoint opinion of Plato and Aristotle (§11). The theory is criticised from a Stoic point of view (§§11-14).<sup>7</sup> Significantly, it is associated to:

- 1) A thoroughly pantheistic doctrine: the general cause of everything is the World-totality itself. §14: "illud vero non pro solita ipsis subtilitate dixerunt, totum mundum et consummatum opus causam esse: multum enim interest inter opus et causam operis."
- 2) The so-called "Middle Platonic" view of the paradigmatic ideas as thoughts in (the mind of) God; §7: "haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt, et modos mente complexus est: plenus his figuris est, quas Plato ideas appellat, immortales, inmutabiles, infatigabiles."

<sup>7</sup> The cardinal point of the criticism is the distinction between *true cause* and *necessary condition*. The latter includes time, place, movement and a host of circumstances that are required or must obtain in order for the effect to be realized. True causality on the other hand resides in the creative faculty, the power to effect something; ultimately the real, universal cause is God as the efficient reason, ποιητικὸς λόγος, *ratio faciens* (§12). All else contributory factors are dependencies of the genuine potency which makes things: the form is rather part of the cause; the archetype instrument of it; the purpose supervening efficiency (§§13-14).

In Clemens Alexandrinus (*Stromata*, VIII, 9) and in Cicero (*Topica*, §§58-64; cf. R.E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, 39-41) there occur basically Stoic identical analyses in the Theory of Causality which bear directly on the issue at stake. In *Topica* §58 there are distinguished two general kinds of causes, that which possesses in itself the power to constitute a certain effect, and that which, although it lacks such efficient nature, is indispensable in the origination of the effect (*sine quo non*, ὃν οὐκ ἄνευ); such are the immediate material substrate, space, time, instruments, preparatory or antecedent causes, fate (§59). The former type of real efficiency is also subdivided into self-sufficient effective causality with no need of subservient factors on the one hand (αὐτοτελὴ, συνεκτικὰ αἰτία), and adjuvating causes, §60 (συναίτια). See *Stromata*, VIII, 25, 1-4 (= SVF II 346); 28, 2-6. In the latter Clementine passage there is a conflation of the Aristotelian quadruple causality with the Stoic schema: strictly συνεκτικὸν and αὐτοτελὲς αἰτίον is the efficient cause, while the material belongs to the ὃν οὐκ ἄνευ or at most (ascribing a positive predisposition in material potentiality to assume its perfecting form) to the συναίτια αἰτία. Cf. SVF II 351. — The source of the Senecan inquiry is pre-Ciceronian; probably this also holds for the Clementine interfusion of the two opposed doctrines in Seneca.



3) Characteristic habitual dialectical refinement: *solita subtilitate* (§14).

4) Possibly, a *probabilistic* account of evidence; §10: "Fer ergo iudex sententiam et pronuntia, quis tibi videatur verissimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat: id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas."

The idea of the universal All, self-subsistent, all-inclusive totality of existence organized as a living whole, which is the ultimate cause of the being, conservation and (relative) self-subsistence of everything, is expressed in Ocellus Lucanus, *De universi natura*, §§1 sqq., see esp. §11: ὁ δὲ γε κόσμος αἰτίος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ σφύζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ αὐτοτελεῖν εἶναι αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αἰδῖος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ διαμένων τὸν πάντα αἰῶνα, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο [τοῖς ἄλλοις] παραίτιος γινόμενος τῆς διαμονῆς τῶν ὄλων. The doctrine can be found expressly in the Peripatetic Critolaus from Phaselis (2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C.); fr. 12 Wehrli = Philo, *De determinate Mundi*, 9, VI, 94 Cohn: τὸ αἰτίον αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἄνοσόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἰτίον αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγρυπνεῖν ἀγρυπνόν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰτίον αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν αἰδῖόν ἐστιν· αἰτίος δ' ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, εἴ γε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν· αἰδῖος ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν. The World is a self-subsistent cause of the existence of all that exists.

Ocellus Lucanus and Critolaus share also the same theory on World-constitution: there are two realms of reality, the celestial one of immutable, eternal being, consisting in quintessential aether, the fifth element; and the sublunary region of transient becoming, built from the four elements. Of and from pure impassable aether proceeds mental existence, divine intellect, godhead: Critolaus Frs. 15-18<sup>8</sup>; Ocellus §§18-9; 36-7. The upper realm acts, and the lower suffers the influence of the former; the superior is causally empowered to effect the changes that constitute the perpetual becoming of the inferior (Ocellus §§18-9). In the peripatetic *De Mundo* the same notions are encountered and led into systematic theological integration. The World, as the system of all that is included in and between Heaven and Earth (391b9-10 – a Stoic formula with impeccable Aristotelian pedigree) is organized into a Whole by a *harmonizing Power* pervading all existence (396b23-34); this is the cosmic *cohesive cause* (συνεκτική αἰτία, 397b9-10). The World *in toto* is the all-powerful generator of everything (397a 4-6: ...τοῦ πάντων γενετήρος καὶ περικαλλεστάτου κόσμου, τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴη φύσις τοῦδε κρείττων; ἦν γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τις μέρος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ). But in fact the source of all sublunary influence lies in the celestial realms (397a 8-b8: τίς δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους δύναιτ' ἂν ἐξισωθῆναι τῇ κατ' οὐρανὸν τάξει τε καὶ φορᾷ τῶν ἄστρον etc.). In the uppermost heaven God is enthroned, the efficient cause

<sup>8</sup> In Fr. 15 (from Epiphanius) the theories described are ascribed to Aristotle (and affirmed to be common with Critolaus); the formulations display Christian bias (e.g.: εἶναι δὲ λέγει – sc. Aristotle – δύο κόσμους, τὸν ἄνω καὶ τὸν κάτω, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄνω ἀφθαρτον, τὸν δὲ κάτω φθαρτόν (meaning that things in the lower realm are continuously coming to be and passing away. In the same way we must take the statement that things in the sublunary region are proceeding unprovidentially, carried by an irrational impetus in a fortuitous course. For example Fortune is the principle of events whose causes are ignored by human mind; Antiochus (see e.g. Cicero, *Academicorum Posteriorum*, I, 29: "non numquam quidem eandem (sc. fatal series of determination) fortunam, quo efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignoracionemque caussarum." Cf. Cicero, *Topica*, 63; Seneca *Ben.*, 4,8,3 etc. In Ocellus the formulations are more accurate: the celestial region is where the *cause of becoming* (αἰτία γενέσεως) resides, the *perpetuum mobile* (τὸ ἀεικίνητον); the sublunary districts belong to becoming, they form the perpetually passible (τὸ ἀειπαθέες) part of the World (§§18-19). To this lower region belong the four elements (§§20 sqq.); hence the upper realm must consist of the Aristotelian aether.

(ἐξ οὗ, 397b 14) of all things, who effects them through the instrumentality of his divine Power (δι' οὗ, *ibid.*): σωτήρ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ἀπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν ὁπωσδήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ Θεός, οὐ μὴν αὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου ζῶου κάματον ὑπομένων, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει χρώμενος ἀτρίτω, δι' ἧς καὶ τῶν πόρρω δοκούντων εἶναι περιγίνεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτην ἔδραν αὐτὸς ἔλαχεν, ὑπατός τε διὰ τοῦτο ὠνόμασται etc. (397b 20 sqq.).<sup>9</sup> Proportional to the distance from his supremest seat is the receptibility of the divine benefits (397b30-398a1).<sup>10</sup> In fact, by a simple motion of the first heavenly sphere the divine power is transmitted to all things, imparting in them according to their essence their severally appropriate functioning: thus the complicated movements that constitute the cosmic becoming are effected, as in an enormously articulate mechanism (398b10-399a30). Hence, 399a30-35, ὅταν οὖν ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών τε καὶ γενέτωρ, ἀόρατος ὢν ἄλλω πλὴν λογισμῷ σημήνη πάσῃ φύσει μεταξὺ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς φερομένη, κινεῖται πᾶσα ἐνδελεχῶς ἐν κύκλοις καὶ πέρασιν ἰδίοις, ποτὲ μὲν ἀφανιζομένη ποτὲ δὲ φαινόμενη, μυρίας ιδέας ἀναφαίνουσά τε καὶ πάλιν ἀποκρύπτουσα ἐκ μίας ἀρχῆς. God and his first effect are invisible and unmanifested, revealed and seen in his works (399b10-19). Thus, ταῦτα χρὴ καὶ περὶ Θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι, δυνάμει μὲν ὄντος ἰσχυροτάτου, κάλλει δὲ εὐπρεπεστάτου, ζωῇ δὲ ἀθανάτου, ἀρετῇ δὲ κρατίστου, διότι πάσῃ θνητῇ φύσει γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται. τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καὶ τὰ δι' ἀέρος ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγονται ἂν ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος (399b 19-25). Zeus is the World-Whole as the Orphic text reveals (OF 168.1-32, quoted vv. 1-5 and 31-32 (with variants) in *de Mundo* 401a28-67; cf. OF 169.1-12), but his Intellect is pure, sublimest aether (OF 168.17). The parts of the World are parts of his body, which have him as his truest self (Mind) for cause; 401a25-27: ὥς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, οὐράνιος τε καὶ χθόνιος (sc. ὁ Θεός ἐστιν), πάσης ἐπώνυμος ὢν φύσεώς τε καὶ τύχης ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὢν.<sup>11</sup> This idea of the Cosmic Whole as ultimate principle of existence (in the World as we know it) and supremest divinity (in the present world-order) has a remarkable and illustrious descent. It existed in earliest Orphism, as we know from the Derveni Papyrus. It had been articulated at least in late Presocratic Anaxagorean circles (Archelaus). It probably stemmed philosophically from Pythagorean speculations. And it commanded a significant Iranian, Zoroastrian connection.

<sup>9</sup> This is more in tune with God's perfection, than the idea that he *essentially* permeates the world-whole (398a1-6, and notice the following illustration drawn from Persian kingship, with the conclusion 398b4-10). Cf. 400b6-15, etc.

<sup>10</sup> The idea is repeated and elaborated in Ocellus Lucanus §§14-16. §14: ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅλη δι' ὅλης ἢ φύσεως θεωρουμένη τὸ συνεχές ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τιμωτάτων (the aethereal, celestial region) ἀφαίρει κατὰ λόγον (i.e. proportionately) ἀπομαραινόμενη καὶ προσάγουσα ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν (cf. τὸ θνητὸν in Critolaus, Fr. 15) καὶ διέζοδον ἐπιτεχόμενον τῆς ἰδίας συστάσεως.

<sup>11</sup> There is a remarkable parallelism between *De Mundo* and Ocellus Lucanus, Fr. 1 (Harder). The World is "ornamented" through harmony (οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων σύστασιν... μία διεκόσμησεν ἁρμονία, 396b23-4); the divine power constitutes this cosmic harmony (...γῆν τε πᾶσαν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀέρα (pro αἰθέρα) τε καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν διεκόσμησεν μία ἢ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις... τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον δημιουργήσασα etc., b27-31). This Power belongs to God who is distinct hypostatically from it, as explained above. Similarly God is the *cause* of harmony, which keeps together the world in Ocellus (26.5 Harder): τὸν δὲ κόσμον (sc. συνέχει) ἁρμονία, ταῦτα δ' αἴτιος ὁ θεός. Another example in Ocellus is house and city held together by concord whose cause is Law (26.5-6). In *de Mundo* (400b13-28) also the analogy occurs (Θεός for the World is like Νόμος for the city). For other correspondences cf. e.g. the argument that no part of the World can be stronger than the whole; Ocellus §13; *De Mundo* 397a5-6.

In Peripatetic and peripateticising Neo-Pythagorean sources of the Hellenistic times (not unlikely all from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C.) the view is expressed of the World as a living whole whose cause is God (pure intellection located at the aethereal uppermost heavenly sphere, but which by virtue of his causal agency constitutive of the entire Cosmos is also identified to it). The immanent instrumental cause of the cosmic constitution and preservation is God's Power pervading everything. The nexus of the idea can be summarized thus: God is the World Whole, the entire Cosmos; His divine Nous, and so God in a special sense, resides in the most extreme celestial orbit; His power permeates all existence, every part of the divine body, the Cosmic Whole.

The Aristotelian ancestry of the conception is indicated by the insistence on the bifurcation between celestial and sublunary realms, as well as by the aethereal quintessential (extra-elemental) nature of the former region, foundation of intellection. The crucial deviation from the Aristotelian system lies in the suppression of the absolutely transcendent God, the pure Intellection consisting in νόσις νοήσεως. But this elimination of divine transcendence renders possible the structural assimilation to Stoic Metaphysics or Theory of Principles or Theology (excepting the doctrine of palingenesia, of absolute cosmic periodicity in closed cycles): God resides in the sublimest, celestial, aethereal fire, yet the spirit in which he consists permeates the entire material substance of the World; this was utilized in *Sapientia Salomonis*. *The divine Spirit of the one system (Stoic) corresponds to the divine Power of the other (Orphic – Pythagorean – Peripatetic).*<sup>12</sup> Syncretistic processes were well under way in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C.

The Aristotelian (and Old Academic but un-Stoic) sharp distinctness between the celestial and the sublunary parts of the World (characteristically manifested in the postulation and assumption of the fifth element and corresponding to religious Astralism) was blended with Stoic Activism in Physics (exemplified in the immanent causality of the active principle and corresponding to Pantheism). Stoic Physics attracted and assimilated Aristotelian Physics, as is highlighted in the Theory of Causes. Real causality implies primarily ability to do things; it consists in the faculty to effectuate its effect. The basic dichotomy in the working factors of the causal nexus is that between activity and passivity, the power to exercise influence and the capability to undergo it. The Stoic active principle corresponds to, but does not coincide with, the formal principle *as existing in the efficient cause* of the Aristotelian analysis. The fundamental difference of the two systems lies in that the Stoic Physics is *dynamic*, whereas the Aristotelian is *teleological*: according to the former, the World is the unfolding in time of the spermatic principle, whereas in the latter it is the ontological structuring of reality between the two poles of pure Intellect and bare matter, of which absolute Intellect exists separately

<sup>12</sup> The spirit of wisdom in *Sapientia* is, strictly, ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Δυνάμεως (VII, 25), not the Δύναμις itself, just as it is ἐσοπτρον ἀκηλίδετον τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Ἐνεργείας (26). It is elsewhere in the Old Testament that ἰσχύς is equivalent to Σοφία (cf. *Jeremias* LI, 15). This does not alter the observed structural correspondence; it means, however, that in *Sapientia* the movement has taken place towards the sharper hypostatical distinction between God (and his Δύναμις) and divine Wisdom (with its Spirit). On the other hand πνεῦμα in *de Mundo* is associated (apart from blowing air or wind) to the fertile, ensouled substance permeating plants, animals and all things (394b9-11). The peripatetic character of the work prohibits the explicit identification of this Aristotelian spirit with the Stoic spirit, whose tension (τόνος) constitutes all entities in their essential peculiarity. But the structural pressure is operating in this direction.



in itself, but Matter subsists always in some form or other, however elementary, and is intrinsically craving for in-formation. The desire of matter for form, an ontological arrow from a thing to its completion and perfection, is the organizing principle of reality according to Aristotelianism. In effect this plenipotential teleology is the philosophical rendering of cosmogonical Eros in Orphic and other logicomithical speculations. The articulation of reality consists in varying, orderly proceeding degrees of perfection in a hierarchy of ends the subordinate ones subserving the higher, in a stepwise, atemporal raising of matter through successive grades towards intellection, the supreme perfection in which being becomes totally transparent, intelligible. The ultimate causality in the Aristotelian System is *final*; in the Stoic *drastic*. In the Stoico-peripatetic context, the suppression of the final causality in the Hellenistic syncretistic theories goes hand in hand with the abandonment of a clearly transcendent God. And in fact he was needed as the necessary, ultimate pole of attraction sustaining teleologically the world order. Without absolute teleology, a cosmic god was more suitable for the drastic function in world formation and preservation. With the Scepticism of the Middle and New Academy there was no other contender to uphold the claims of metaphysical transcendence. On the other hand, to balance this Stoic preponderance, the temporal World-development in closed cycles (a powerful corollary of the immanent, activity of the causal principle as spermatic unfolding) was abandoned in favour of Aristotelian Cosmic Eternalism. (Mere beginning in time without evolution and repetition was occasionally attempted later, but it represented a particular Platonic interpretation). This syncretistic tendency reacted on Stoicism itself in the Middle Stoa.

The demand for an ultimate first Principle of Reality (not only as its absolute beginning, but pre-eminently as its absolute ground), and celestialism (the divine nature and efficacy of the aethereal region) were both operating in different forms in both first syncretised systems. The immanence of cosmic causality (religiously expressed as Pantheism) and its dynamic, drastic nature, combined with that demand and emphasis resulted in the *reduplication of divinity*: there is the absolute Cause of the World's being (existence and essence) subsisting separately in itself, and a radiation, so to speak, from it permeating the entire universe; a truly efficient and an instrumental ultimate cause of things: God on the one hand and God's Spirit, Wisdom or Power on the other. God in one sense is the Totality of Existence, the World itself, since there is nothing more potent than this Allness. But as a cause of the World, it must be – if not transcendent – a part of the cosmic Whole. God thus resides in the uppermost celestial region, while the divine *nature* (adopting the Aristotelian lunar borderline) extends to the entire heavenly realm.

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In the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C. Platonism was drawn more resolutely into the prevailing Syncretistic modality, with the abandonment in the (Philonian fourth and, primarily, the Antiochean fifth) Academy of its sceptical posture and the reversion to positive doctrine (Theory of Reality). Antiochus from Ascalon presented a unified system which he considered to be the common Platonicoaristotelian heritage, with Stoicism in real agreement with it, although

verbally innovative.<sup>13</sup> The account of Antiochean Physics presented by Varro in Cicero *Acad. Post.* I, §§24-29 is thoroughly Stoic; characteristic Aristotelian influence may be discerned in the emphatic bifurcation (presumably also localized) of the Universe into two portions (§24), and the corresponding equally emphatic mention of Aristotle's fifth element (§26), with no definite view however as to its acceptance or otherwise. Nature is divided into two realms one efficient, the other available to the former (offering itself to it for effectuation), *out of which* latter, things are constituted (ἐξ οὗ, *ex eaque*). In the efficient entities, that which is effective is *force*; in the ones being effected, that which is passive is *matter*. Force and matter exist never separately, but always in interpenetration: in the efficient things force prevails, while in things "offerable" or "actionable," presenting themselves to the exercise of influence and activity upon them, matter is more prominent (it is subdued and kept together by a laxer spiritual tone<sup>14</sup> (§24)). The former category involves fire and air (and aether as a separate principal quality, if Antiochus accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of the fifth element), while the latter consists in earth and water (§26). These are naturally localized (upper and lower-central parts of the World), but, apparently, not in the strict Aristotelian sense of a lunar-sphere borderline division of the world into two fundamentally distinct regions. In this respect Antiochus is rather more Stoic than Ocellus Lucanus, §§18-19; 36-37; although, however, he seemed to have emphasized the preeminent providential government exercised by God on the celestial spheres; §29: "...quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam quandam, *procurantem caelestia maxime*, deinde in terribus ea, quae pertinent ad homines." Furthermore, Antiochus contradicted the basic Stoic doctrine that spirit (= *vis*, force) and matter are corporeal even in themselves as principles (although not existing separately the one from the other *realiter*).<sup>15</sup> He maintained that corporeality and quality pertain to the composition of *vis* and matter (§24). Hence the first bodies are the elements which are matter essentially characterized by a definite quality (cf. §26).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Cicero, *Acad. Post.* I, 37 (Varro expounding Antiochus speaks of Zeno's "innovations"): "haec non tam rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat (sc. Zeno)." *Acad. Pr.* II 15 (Leucollus speaks from Antiochus' point of view): (Plato was not a scepticist) "quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt." Cf. Cicero, speaking on his own person about Stoicism, *de finibus Mal. et Bon.*, IV, *passim*, esp. §§72, 73; III, 5; V 74; *Tusc.*, 5, 34: Zeno *ignobilis verborum opifex*; etc. The idea originally was (believed to have been) propounded by Polemo of the Old Academy; upon noticing that Zeno was attending his lectures, Polemo commented on Zeno's Phoenician appropriation and transformation of Old-Academic doctrines: οὐ λανθάνεις, ὦ Ζήνων, τὰς κηλαίας παρεισρέων θύραις καὶ τὰ δόγματα κλέπτων, Φοινικικῶς μεταμορφιεννῶς (Diogenes Laertius VII, 25). Φοινικικῶς is a *mot à triple entente*: allusion (1) to the Cypriot descent of Zeno, (2) to the furtive practices of the Phoenician merchant traders and (3) to the Semitic undertones in crucial formulations of Stoic positions. — On the other hand, Cicero also holds the incompatibility between on the one hand Old Academic-Aristotelian and on the other Stoic Ethical theory on fundamental issues (like how is the wise man constituted), *Acad. Pr.* II §132. — Cicero's own opinion concerning Antiochus was that he taught a slightly modified Stoic doctrine, *ibid.*: (Antiochus) "qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus" (cf. *ibid.* §137: "sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens"). The context of all these remarks is problems in Moral Philosophy.

<sup>14</sup> For a development of the Stoic theory of spiritual tension cf. A. L. Pierris, "First Principles and the Beginning of World-Formation in Stoicism," in K. Boudouris (ed.) *Hellenistic Philosophy*, vol. II (Athens: International Association For Greek Philosophy, 1994), 149-176 (esp. Excursus III: *On Spirit and Tension*; 170-5).

<sup>15</sup> See A. L. Pierris, "First Principles," Excursus I: *Matter, Body, Incorporeals and Concepts*, 159-165.

<sup>16</sup> Much has been occasionally made out of Cicero's (rather than Varro's) apparent confusion between *qualia* and *qualitates*, ποιὰ and ποιότητες in §§24 and 26. According to standard Stoic theory, ποιότης is *corporeal* but

Antiochus no doubt incorporated the Platonic receptacle-theory of matter into his Metaphysics. In general, it is inconceivable to even attempt an Academic Eclecticism in the theory of physical reality without taking seriously the Platonic *Timaeus* into account, indeed on building the unificatory, integrative enterprise on this very foundation. There are signs for a conflation in the Ciceronian exposition of the previously worked out syncretism of Stoic and Aristotelian basic Physics with Platonic Matter-theory.

- 1) The looser use of *qualia* and *qualitates*, as noticed in the preceding note, may point in this direction.
- 2) The peculiarity of ultimate matter in §27 is suggested by the expression "materiam quandam." The formula for matter, "quae tota omnia accipere possit" points to the Platonic (*Timaeus* 51A) τῇ τὰ τῶν πάντων ἀεὶ τε ὄντων κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ πολλακίς ἀφομοιωμάτα καλῶς μέλλοντι δέχεσθαι. *Accipere* refers to the πανδεχέας. Infinite divisibility of matter must also relate intrinsically to extension, especially as it is accompanied by an argument for the explanation of movement without supposition of intracosmic vacuum (systematic and accumulated as in the Atomists, or minute and dispersed as with Strato): "quae autem moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite divide possint." Movement in a total plenum is rendered possible by the infinitesimal displacement of one substance by another, by one thing yielding up its place to another in a continuous way, by a gradual removal of some quality from one place to another.
- 3) Cicero (in the Varronian summary, *Acad. Post.* I, §24) remarks that *vis* and *materia* never subsist in separation from each other, viewing the necessary

unsubstantial, a certain spiritual tension and *vis* defining a character, while ποῖόν is matter (substance) informed and held together by such tension. And thus Cicero makes Varro correctly equate *vis* and *qualitas*, while *qualia* are the combinations of that qualitative spiritual force with matter (§28). On the other hand, in §24, he maintains that such a combination, *id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant*. This is incorrect on both counts: bodies are not only the compounds, but *vis* and matter as well; while a quality has no matter, but is corporeal. In §26 the four basic qualities (heat, coldness, dryness, moisture) seem to be confounded with the four elements (fire, air, earth, water), although there obtains in Stoicism a one-to-one correspondence between the two groups. It should however be noted that the Platonic *space*-theory of matter leaves little point to the distinction between *qualia* and *qualitates*: a certain place assumes now this and now that quality; conversely, *qualia* are qualities extended, localised. Thus the primary qualification of a certain space constitutes a primary body, i.e. a primary quality in *extenso*, and so on for secondary and following formations. When fire moves from one place to another, what really happens is that it is extinguished in the first place and kindled in the second; similarly a quality-complex may disappear from place A and reappear in place B: this ontological cancellation and manifestation of the quality-complex is equivalent to the translation in space of the corresponding body (which is merely the extended quality-complex). The identity of the body during such transposition signifies the identity of the same extended quality-complex. Identity of some non-formal and non-spatial component involved in the thing is an illusion. Thus things are in flux; they are river-like. The explicit foundation of this view goes back to *Timaeus*; 49d: καὶ ὁ καθορώμενος ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνώμενος, ὥς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ: ...49e: καὶ ὁ δὲ ἐγγιγνώμενος ἀεὶ ἑκάστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκείθεν ἀπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τόδε προσχωμένους ὀνόματι... 50b: ταῦτόν αὐτὴν (sc. τὸ πανδεχέας) ἀεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ παρίπαντος οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμειος ...φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνα (sc. τὰ εἰσιόντα) ἄλλοις ἄλλοις. See 52a-b: there are three things to be distinguished: first, the idea; second, the homonym visible quality: τὸ δὲ ὁμιονύμων ὁμοίων τε ἐκείνῳ δευτέρου, αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν, πεφορημένον ἀεὶ, γιγνώμενον τε ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκείθεν ἀπολλύμενον; third, χώρα which is incorruptible. The Platonic τοιοῦτον of the sensible, extended forms, corresponds to the Stoic *such-ness* (τοιοῦτότης) as *principium individuationis*.



immanence of *vis* in the context of the general thesis affirming the localization of every real being. Hence, it is copulation with matter that localizes the power. And this notion corresponds neatly to the *Timaeon* description of *χώρα* as the receptacle of, and standing basis for, the changing sensible qualities, of *τόπος* as the localizer of becoming. 52a-b: τρίτον δὲ αὐτὸ γένος ὄν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀπὸ φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτόν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πού τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ' ἐν γῇ μήτε πού κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι. In fact, it is this precisely conjunction of *vis* and *matter* that constitute body and quality: "Neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quondam nominabant." The deviation from standard Stoic doctrine involved in the last statement is probably significant. The interference of *matter* and *vis* localizes being and constitutes corporeality just because it consists in the nexus of *space* and *vis*; to be somewhere belongs primarily to corporeality, and necessarily follows from having space as substrate on which spiritual force (*vis*) exercises its cohesive and structuring function.

If primal matter is not space, then how can the complex of idea or form and matter be extended and in space? To reply that form involves eidetic or mathematical quantification (and extension) does not solve the problem: it cannot explain real, physical extension. One has to suppose therefore that matter is extended and in space, but this poses the definitive question what over and above extendedness is after all involved in matter. Passivity seems to be intrinsically characteristic of spatial extension, and whatever else may be thought constitutive of matter, seems to consist in positive ideal-formal determination, something that is extraneous to first matter.

That is not, however, the Stoic line of thought. In Stoicism both spirit and matter are, taken in themselves, bodies and thus extended beings, although spirit is not, as such, substance. Space is incorporeal, and, therefore, *non-being*. The crux of the difference lies consequently in the degree of reality of space. Construing space as real, concrete being must lead either to its identification with matter, or to its complementarity with it as parallel principles of reality. The first is *Timaeon* Platonism, the second is represented by Potamon of Alexandria, the eclectic from around the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C., according to whom (Diogenes Laertius, *Proem.* 21): ἀρχάς τε τῶν ὄλων τὴν τε ὕλην καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, ποιότητάς τε καὶ τόπον· ἐξ οὗ γὰρ καὶ ὕψ' οὗ καὶ ποίω καὶ ἐν ᾧ. Place here is distinguished from matter, and quality (*vis*, spirit) from the efficient cause. The Stoic (matter-ποιοῦν) and the Platonic (space-idea or idea exemplified as such-ness in place) system of principles are simply combined the one by the side of the other, with bridging piece the ποιοῦν which is transformed in the ποιότητες for Stoicism, and co-ordinated to the World of Ideas as prototypes of sensible (extended) qualities in Platonism. Potamon is a nicely characteristic example of Propositional Syncretism in metaphysics.

The Potamonian quadruplism in first Principles makes clear how far the Timaeon theory of space-matter was at the centre of system-building in 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C. Antiochus must have been instrumental in the growth of such speculations. But of course a simple reversal to the Timaeon position was no more definitive. In translocation, not only a quality or quality-complex is transferred from one place to another, but matter is also involved. When a bronze sphere rolls on a surface, it is not only sphericity that is manifested at different places along the path, but a particular sphericity, *this* one (τόδε τι), which involves its own particular concrete bronzeness as well. In the end of the analysis however, there is prime matter and an organized quality-complex; what makes *such* an organized quality-complex *this* one, seems to be, as Plato indicated, the fact that it is manifested *here*, in *this* particular *place*. *Space* appears to be the ultimate source of *this*-ness, as being capable of concrete deictic particularization: *this* place. In locomotion, consequently, after all, what moves is a *such*, not a *this*: although the proximate matter (bronze) moves along with the sphere, the prime one (space) does not. The counter-intuitiveness of this result is illusory; for thisness in space, here and there and distance, can operate when extendedness is structured, which can only be done by form: bodies in effect, as structured places, organize the space.

But then, after all, it is being-determinations that particularize: singularity is absolute determinateness, a quality-complex that is unrepeatable. The *principium individuationis* is absolutely determinate such-ness; the foundation of individuality is the non-existence in *rerum natura* of indistinguishability (the Stoic doctrine of ἀπαρλλαξία). Thus, there is no this-ness in space as such, apart from the reference to this-creating determinacies (qualities). Hence this space is ultimately the space occupied by this entity, rather than vice-versa. And as an entity in movement occupies *different spaces* in succession, its *own places* are different at different times, and there is no identical this-space associated with the identical this-entity. Consequently (adopting the Antiochean construal of the space-matter doctrine), the notion of a *particular prime matter* (the *prime* matter of *this* thing) is *self-contradictory*. Prime Matter is substrate for the entire cosmic formation, the polar complement of *Vis* in general. Changes within the World, seen from the point of view of the universal Whole, are really internal *reallocations* of qualities in the total space-matter continuum, which admits of parts at all only in the context of its *structuring* through *qualification*. The Ciceronian formulations are revealing in their emphasis on the *totalitarian* inherent relationship between *Vis* (quality) and *Matter*; §27: "sed subiectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie atque carenten omni illa qualitate... materiam quandam, ea qua omnia expressa atque effecta sint, quae tota (πᾶσα) omnia (πάντα) accipere posit omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte etc."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> The spatial order and arrangement in an entity's structure, the mutual adaptation of its parts and, in general the organized distribution of its quality-complex, constitutes its intrinsic τόπος. The idea was expounded already by Theophrastus (Fr. 22 Wimmer = Simplicius *Corollarium de Loco, Comm. In Arist. Phys.* 639.15-22: μήποτε οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὐτὸν οὐσία τις τόπος, ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν εἴτε ἐμφύγων εἴτε ἀψύγων, ἐμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξεις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρα λέγεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιτοθήσειεν ἂν καὶ

Of course all this is also perfectly Stoic: the clue to the underlying difference lies in what is reported for Antiochus concerning the non-corporeality of matter and *vis* taken in themselves. In Stoicism extensionality (three-dimensionality) endowed with the potency to act or suffer (exercise or undergo an action) constitutes beingness as corporeality; so matter is in itself *ἄποιον σώμα*; sheer extensionality (the void) is a non-being. But if matter is incorporeal (as in Antiochus), it must either be sheer extensionality (space as such) or an ideal entity (something subsisting somehow not in space, although not as a separate existence, and even if also pervading, directly or by proxy, bodily substance). Evidently, it cannot be the latter; it must therefore be space. Correspondingly, *vis* in general must be a sort of ideal reality, even though existing inseparably from material substance, being always in the corporeal nexus, where it assumes specificity of determination, i.e. particular quality. This complementary ideality of the system emerges thus naturally from the space-matter doctrine.<sup>18</sup>

ἀπαιτήσαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν. The idea was highly developed in later Athenian Neoplatonism; e.g. Damascius (in Simplicius, *ibid.*, 625.13 sqq.): ἡ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ ὄγκον (sc. τῆς οὐσίας διάστασις) ἐν θέσει γέγονεν εὐθὺς διὰ τὴν ἄλλου ἀλλαγῶν τῶν μορίων διάρρινιν. διττὴ δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ· ἡ μὲν σύμφυτος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἑμοῦ σώματος τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἄνω εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πόδας κάτω, ἡ δὲ ἐκείνου, ὡς ποτὲ μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ τὴν θέσιν ἔχει... κείσθαι δὲ λέγομεν ἐκεῖνα κυρίως, ὧν τὰ μέρη παρατέταται καὶ διέστικεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων... (27) τούτων οὖν τῶν διαστάσεων, ἵνα <μὴ> παντελῶς εἰς τὸ ἀόριστον ὑπενεχθῶσι, μέτρα συναγωγὰ ὑπέστη... τῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς θέσεως διάρρινιν ὁ τόπος. Such οἰκεῖος τόπος consists in the εὐθετισμός of parts vis-à-vis the whole (cf. 626.5 sqq.). This structure is of course preserved in the main during movement, but the place within the Cosmic Whole which the thing occupied at a particular moment of the movement is not. – As a general account of space this relational theory presupposes extension as spatial alienation and distancing of parts (διάρρινις μερῶν) within a whole. We are thus back to where we began.

<sup>18</sup> The re-emphasis on the spatial construal of matter was already operational in Hellenistic Peripatos. A finite World with matter as space involves the non-existence of extension outside the cosmic Whole. And this precisely was Strato's theory, which further, significantly, is brought into connection with the views of the Platonists. The Void is considered to subsist in itself, only by abstraction in thought; in *rerum natura* it is always filled with bodies; thus it is co-extensive with the Cosmic body as a whole. Fr. 60 Wehrli: οἱ δὲ ἰσόμετρον αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ κενόν) τῷ κοσμικῷ σώματι ποιοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ φύσει κενὸν εἶναι λέγουσι, πεπληρωσθαι δὲ αὐτὸ σώματων ἀεί, καὶ μόνῃ γε τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι ὡς καθ' αὐτὸ ὕφεστώς, οἷόν τινες οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων γενόνασι. τὸν Στράτωνα δὲ οἶμαι τὸν Λαμψακηνὸν ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς δόξης (Simplicius testifies). Void is space without body, and as such it is naturally nonexistent. Space as extension is always occupied by body, and in fact is adapted for all sensible appearances. Fr. 59 (again from Simplicius): τῶν δὲ διαστατῶν λεγόντων (sc. τὸν τόπον) οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ δύο διεστώς ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Περίπατος ἄπας, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τρία, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν πάντῃ ἀδιάφορον καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ἄνευ σώματος μένον ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον, οἱ δὲ διάστημα καὶ ἀεί σώμα ἔχον καὶ ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς ἕκαστον ὡς οἱ κλεινοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν καὶ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων. This suitability (ἐπιτηδειότης) to every corporeal form clearly corresponds to the Platonic πανδεχέες. Strato, on the other hand, postulated the existence of vacuum within the World (Frs. 54-55), but as a remainder left over from the occupation of space by bodies, since their parts do not touch among themselves through their entire boundaries, but little vacancies are formed at the interstices, which vacancies constitute the existence of void, never κατὰ φύσιν accumulated, so to speak, in close order, but always dispersed in tiny segments throughout the cosmic substance. Fr. 57: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν διατείνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄθρουν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, παρεσπαρμένον δὲ κατὰ μικρὰ μέρη τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τῷ ὕγρῳ καὶ τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν, οἷς μάλιστα συμφέρεσθαι προσήκει (Hero Alexandrinus). Cf. Frs. 56; 64; 66. Strato's mediation towards syncretistic approaches is evident also in the emphatic employment of the power-vocabulary in the theory of first principles. Principles of nature are the qualities (Frs. 42-44), and, accordingly, first principles are the primary qualities (warmth etc.); these are δυνάμεις which in fact are corporeal (σωματικαί). Fr. 65a-b: ...τὸ φῶς οὐδὲ ἡ θερμότης οὐδ' ἄλλη δύναμις οὐδεμία σωματική. Fr. 89: "huius (sc. Strato) tale decretum est: frigidum et calidum semper in contraria abeunt, una esse non possunt; eo frigidum confluit, unde vis calidi discessit... cum vis maior frigidi illata in cavernis est etc." Fr. 94: ...Στράτων καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τὴν δυνάμιν σώμα· πνευματικὴ γάρ (with reference to the Stoic spiritual tension). Θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης αἱ δυνάμεις; fire and water are the substances of the corresponding powers, οὐσίαι τῶν δυνάμεων

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Constructing the general harmony between Stoicism, Aristotelianism and Platonism in the framework of the 5<sup>th</sup> Academy presented two fundamental issues that have to be coped with: one was the space-matter theory, the other Ideas as paradigmatic essences. *The two cardinal Timaeian doctrines had to be integrated within the preworked Stoicoaristotelian accord.*

Antiochus accepted the existence of ideas as unchangeable being, discernible only as such by the mental faculty; Mind is at bottom the sole trustworthy judge of reality; it constitutes the criterion of truth in involving the conception of unalterable, perennial self-identical being which establishes unmistakable perception in the natural World of change. *Acad. Poster.* I, 30: "Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod simplex esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi ἰδέαν appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere" (cf. *Tusc. Disput.*, I, 58; *Orator*, §10).<sup>19</sup>

Ideas are objects of intellection. Objects of sensation ("res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur," *Acad. Post.* I, 31, ὑποκείμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι) constitute the sensible World, which is in continuous flux: this cosmic reality is therefore called *opinabilis*, δοξαστή. Science on the other hand resides in the concepts and reasonings of mind; "scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus" (§32), ἐννοίαι and λόγοι.

For Antiochus ideas and conceptions or intellections are fundamentally the same; or, more accurately, he concentrated on the fact that the idea as intelligible (νοητόν) is the object and content of the intellection (νόησις) as the mental act of comprehension. This is evident from the flow of the argument in §§31-2. In *Acad. Prior.* II, 30, again in a statement of Antiochean position, the genetic account of these intellections is given. Mind has the power to repose and store sense-perceptions, building on whose similarities it effects mental notions or conceptual perceptions of things: it sees them intellectually, in their ideal content. "Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipse sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut eis statim

(Fr. 49). Full Stoicism is evident both in the fact of the non-Aristotelian one-to-one correspondence between primary qualities and basic elements, and in the understanding of qualities as tonic forces informing material substance. The latter distinction between δυνάμεις as the qualitative contraries and οὐσίαι as the substances whose powers the qualities are (between e.g. warmth and fire, with a third entity the corporeal substance) appears also in Ocellus Lucanus §20-23. Fundamental qualities as δυνάμεις are attested already for Alcmaion (DK 24B4). Aristotle conceptualized the general import of the meaning of power as principle of change in something else or in itself taken as something else (*Metaph.* 1046a10; 1020a5: ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς – or μεταβλητική – ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ); and this included e.g. ἡ τοῦ θερμοῦ δύναμις, *De part. Anim.*, 650a5. But the analysis of quality in *Categ.* 8 shows however no particular awareness of, or relevance to, the later problem-structure. In *Probl.* Γ 14, 873a11-2, σώματα are distinguished from the αἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δυνάμεις; this is the Peripatetic rendering of the Stoic distinction between οὐσία and ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ δύναμις; for Stoicism matter is the substance of things and powers are corporeal, while for Peripatos, powers are immaterial and, therefore, incorporeal, since bodies necessarily involve matter. The characteristic doctrine of a power permeating and fashioning the World appears in Peripatetic circles with *De Mundo*, 396b 29.

<sup>19</sup> The intellectual conception of man, e.g., controls the καταληπτική φαντασία of this thing as a man; in this way the supposed discrepancy in the report of the Antiochean doctrine between *Acad. Post.*, I 30-2 and *Acad. Prior.*, II, 30 is eliminated.

utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus constructa, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας, tum προλήψεις vocant.<sup>20</sup>

That the Platonic ideas are νοήματα was entertained already in the (middle of the) 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C. Alcimos<sup>21</sup> wrote, 560F6 §13 Jacobi = Diogenes Laertius, III, 13: ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἑκάστων αἰδιόν τε καὶ νόημα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀπαθές, διὸ καὶ φησιν (sc. Plato, *Parm.*, 132d) ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰς ιδέας ἐστάναι καθάπερ παραδείγματα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ταύταις εἰκέναι τούτων ὁμοιώματα καθεστῶτα. Νόημα is related to νόησις and νοητόν in the way that conception as concept is related to conception as conceiving and to the conceived, or thought is related to the thinking of thought and to the thing thought of. In the intellectual act νόησις emphasizes the activity-aspect, νόημα the intellection itself as an achieved datum, while νοητόν refers to the content of the intellection. In fundamentalist Intellectualism as in Parmenides, thinking (to think) is identical with the object thought: ταῦτόν (...) νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα (28B8.34); in fact thinking is identical with being: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι (B3). For thinking involves being, in which it is being thought: οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἐστίν, εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν (B8.35-6). Conversely, the idea is expressed by the saying of Metrodorus of Chios: πάντα ἐστίν, ὃ ἂν τις νοήσῃ (B2); thinking and being are co-implicated. Or rather, thinking is ingrained in being; it is its luminosity, its self-revealingness, its order. In fact, being thinks (itself) rather than it is being thought of (by something extraneous).<sup>22</sup> The intelligibility of being (its effulgence, its order that constitutes it and makes it transparent and luminous) constitutes intelligence, i.e. the conception of being. The mental act is grounded in being. In this perspective, Being is identical with Mind. Mind absolutely taken is the radiance of Being (its intelligibility) considered as illuminating that out of which it proceeds. *Mind is therefore Being's revelation*. When the soul receives such unveiling, it is *enlightened* by mental vision: it becomes intellectual. The light proceeds from the objective reality to the thinking subject. Even better: the eye that sees being is being's own. Even more: the eye is being itself. Mind is the light of being, the order of existence.

Plato's speculations must have been construed in such a sense by his contemporaries, whether or not explicitly formulated by him in these terms. Alcimos bears testimony to this. Ideas are νοήματα (*Diog. Laert.* III, 13), but also νοητά (§10); they are exemplars standing in Nature (§13), they exist as real beings (§15). Individual minds (of men but also of all animals) identify themselves with these ideas in intellecting them, and this makes the animal being in contact with the idea: τίνα γὰρ ἂν τρόπον, φησί, διεσφύζετο τὰ ζῷα μὴ τῆς ιδέας ἐφαπτόμενα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸν νοῦν φυσικῶς εἰληφότα; The argument is that every animal instinctively recognizes the individuals of its own species as well as those appropriate for food, and this could not obtain without an awareness of essential

<sup>20</sup> *Notitia* for ἐννοία occurs in §22; *de Fin. Bon. Et Mal.*, V, 59-60; *Topica*, 31; *Leg.*, I, 24. *Notio* is commoner, esp. in Cicero's philosophical works, e.g. *Acad. Post.*, I, 32; 42; *Acad. Prior.*, II, 33; 85; *de Fin. etc.*, III, 33. *Intelligentia* further appears occasionally, as in *de Fin. Etc.*, III, 21; *Leg.*, I, 26; 27; 44; 59.

<sup>21</sup> The Sicilian historian (Σικελικά) and renowned orator who was attracted to Stilpo (*Diog. Laertius*, II, 114). He argued elaborately in four books *To Anyntas* that Plato took over from Epicharmus the cardinal tenets of his Theory of Ideas.

<sup>22</sup> The idea is worked out in A. L. Pierris, "Logos as Ontological Principle of Being," in K. Boudouris (ed.), *The Philosophy of Logos*, Vol. II (Athens: International Association For Greek Philosophy, 1996), 156-162.

similarity among sense-objects, which implies discernment of ideal identity (§§15-6).<sup>23</sup> Recognition of the same presupposes reference to an ideal exemplar or archetype of the essence in common by the same things.

If ideas are severally thought-contents and thoughts, precisely by virtue of their being archetypes of true being, the question arises, what do they constitute in their totality as existing in *rerum natura*? Again the inner tendency of the Platonic System points to the identification of the *World of Ideas* with divine, absolute *Mind*. The multiplicity of Ideas on the other hand requires the postulation of a second principle by the side of absolute Goodness (τὸ Ἀγαθόν): a sort of intelligible "matter" is needed, whose relationship to space-matter is left obscure and which would be essentially Evil in its dualism to the First Principle.<sup>24</sup> And indeed Speusippus adopted different pairs of principles for each successive stratum of reality starting from (1) the unitary Αὐτοέν and descending to the World of (2) Numbers, (3) of Magnitudes, (4) of Soul, and finally of (5) sensible things (Fr. 33a-e Lang = 29-30 Tarán). In the different levels of reality, there are different but corresponding principles, corresponding dualisms. Thus, e.g. just as numbers are produced from the One and the Multitude (πλῆθος), so extensional magnitudes are generated from the pair of the Point (*like the one*) and amorphous continuous extensionality (*like the discreet Multitude*); Aristotle *Metaph.* 1085a 32: ἕτεροι δὲ (sc. τὰ μεγέθη γεννῶσι) ἐκ τῆς στιγμῆς (ἢ δὲ στιγμῇ αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐχ ἓν ἀλλ' οἷον τὸ ἐν) καὶ ἄλλης ὕλης οἷας τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οὐ πλῆθους. Cf. *Metaph.*, 1044a7-8; *Topica* 108b23-31. He distinguished Goodness from Oneness and posited the former "late" in the ontological hierarchy, attached essentially to the psychic realm.<sup>25</sup> In this way, multiplicity and (mathematical) extension can exist

<sup>23</sup> Alcimos' emphasis on the spontaneous recognition of *similarities* as conclusive argument for the existence of paradigmatic ideas, is probably connected with the fact that Speusippus wrote extensively (in 10 books) on *Similar* (Diog. Laert., IV 5: τῆς περὶ τὰ ὁμοία πραγματείας α'-ι'); Frs. 5-26 Lang = 6-27 Tarán.

<sup>24</sup> Aristotle emphasized the point from a different point of view. He observed that in *Timaeus* Plato equates the Participating Principle (τὸ μεταληπτικόν or μεθεκτικόν), hence, matter, with space; he further remarks that in his *Αἰαράφῃ Δόγματι*, Plato identified the μεταληπτικόν with the Great and Small (τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν). In either case, the second principle is of the nature of Place (τόπος), as it must consist in *extensionality*. Accordingly, the Platonic theory must needs face the problem why Ideas and (ideal) numbers are not then in place. *Physica* 209b11-16: διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταῦτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῇ Τιμαίῳ· τὸ γὰρ μεταληπτικόν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικόν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγματι, ὁμοῦ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεφάνητο. And 210b33-a2: Πλάτωνι μέντοι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ παρεκβάντας εἰπεῖν, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τὰ εἶδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί, εἴπερ τὸ μεθεκτικόν ὁ τόπος, εἴτε τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεθεκτικοῦ, εἴτε τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Τιμαίῳ γέγραπεν. To the problem posed by Aristotle, it may be added that there is the further question as to the relationship between the intelligible (*Resp.*, 508c1; 527b5), supracosmic (*Phaedr.*, 247c3) *place* (τόπος), which generates multiplicity *incorporeal* (κόσμος ἀσώματος, *Philebus* 64b), and the Timaeac cosmic place (the space-matter) in which the physical World is constituted.

<sup>25</sup> For Speusippus, perfection, beauty and goodness appear "late" in the procession of reality from the Supreme Principle, the Αὐτοέν. Aristotle *Metaph.*, 1091a33 sqq. (Fr. 34f Lang = 44 Tarán): ...ἀλλὰ προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι. Cf. Frs. 34a-f Lang = 43-46 Tarán. In fact there is gradation in the derivation process: beauty precedes goodness; Iamblichus *De Comm. math. Scientia* IV, 16.10 sqq. Festa: τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐτε καλὸν οὐτε ἀγαθὸν ἀξίον καλεῖν, διὰ τὸ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑπεράνω εἶναι προϊούσης γὰρ πορωτέρω ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φύσεως, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἐφάνη, δεῦτερον δὲ καὶ μακροτέραν ἀπόστασιν ἔχονταν τῶν στοιχείων τάγαθον. The view may be probably related to Speusippus (as in H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin* (Amsterdam: P. Schippers, 1964), 213). Perfection (and beauty) pertains preeminently to the realm of numbers (and geometrical structures), to the μαθηματικά. Goodness on the other hand refers primarily to action and presupposes possibility of (some) change, as in Aristotle *Metaph.* 1078a31: ...τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν



without involving error and evil. And indeed how could the One as the absolutely first principle be the Good, goodness itself, without the Other Ultimate Principle becoming Evil itself? Mind furthermore is the World of organized extension (geometrical realities), distinct both from the First Principle (Αὐτόεν) and the universal soul (τὸ Ἀγαθόν).<sup>26</sup> In this way, the Speusippean hierarchy of reality prefigures Neoplatonic developments under a stricter, late (but classical) Pythagorean, *mathematical* construal: (1) Ἐν – (2) Νοητὸν (Numbers) – (3) Νοερὸν (Magnitudes) – (4) Ψυχὴ – (5) Αἰσθητὸς Κόσμος.

In opposition to Speusippus, the Xenocratean system was more compact.<sup>27</sup> There are two ultimate principles, the One and the (indefinite) Dyad. The second Principle informed by the One generates the ideas-numbers, which exist primarily in soul.<sup>28</sup>

πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. The difficulty that may be thought to emerge from the *divine creative activity*, which then should be considered as good (*Timaeus*), is in the Speusippean context only apparent: cosmic creation is a subjective mode of presentation, διδασκαλίας χάριν; in fact there is an atemporal constitution of the physical World just as in the derivation of each “successive” stratum of reality. The ontological hierarchy is eternal, not a development in time. Thus there can be little doubt that God for Speusippus is beyond goodness, which *first* “appears” in the psychic substance, and *secondarily* in the sensible World through its animate part (cf. Fr. 55 Lang-Tarān: οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας (sc. ἀπαθανατίζουσιν), ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος etc. All animals have *immortal* souls). Soul and Nature are the 4th and 5th respectively orders of Speusippean reality. And this fits nicely with the report in Iamblichus, *ibid.*, 18.1-12 Festa: τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἀριθμοὶ, οὐδέπω ὑπάρχει οὔτε καλὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ· ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους αἰτίας ὅλης ὀφίσταται μὲν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, πρῶτοις δὲ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ὄν φαίνεται καὶ κάλλος, ἐφεξῆς ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν γραμμῶν τῆς γεωμετρικῆς οὐσίας φανείσης, ἐν ᾗ ὡσαύτως τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ καλόν, ἐν οἷς [οὔτε] οὐδὲν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακόν· ἐπ’ ἐσχάτῳ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τετάρτοις καὶ πέμπτοις τοῖς συντιθεμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν τελευταίων κακίαν γενέσθαι etc. Cf. Krämer, *Ibidem*.

<sup>26</sup> Fr. 58 Tarān: Σπεύσιππος τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυὴ δέ (sc. τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι). God is absolute Mind, distinct from both the Ἐν and the cosmic Soul. This God is a living force, governor of the Universe; Fr. 56a Tarān: “(Speusippus) *vim* quandam (sc. *esse deum*) *dicens* qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem” (cf. Fr. 56b). He is the creator who fashions (an educative mode of expression) the World according to the absolute Archetype, the Decad, the all-encompassing entity of numbers-ideas. Fr. 28 Tarān, ll. 10-14: (Speusippus writes extensively on the Decad) φυσικωτάτην αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνων καὶ τελεστικωτάτην τῶν ὄντων, οἷον εἰδὸς τι τοῖς κοσμοῖς ἀποτελέσματος τεχνικόν, ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡμῶν νομοσάντων ἢ ὡς ἔτυχε θεμένων ὑπάρχουσιν καὶ παρόδειγμα παντελέστατον τῷ τοῦ παντός ποιητῇ θεῷ προεκκεκμημένη. This Decad is the foundation of the number-system, the essential totality of the World of Numbers-Ideas and its condensed reality. It relates to the God-Mind as the Intelligible relates to the Intelligence intellecting it. Absolute Mind must therefore be systematically equated with the organized system of extension and magnitudes (geometrical) as receptacle and place (ὑποδοχή and τόπος) of number-ideas, corresponding to the Platonic τόπος νοητός. The Speusippean God-Noῦς is thus the proximate principle of psychic and sensible reality, as in *Timaeus*. It is significant that according to this analysis life or vital force “precedes” soul in the order of reality: it pertains primarily to Mind and to pure extensional structuring. Such abstract mathematization of powerful ideas, of which feature Aristotle complained severely as unduly dominating Old-Academic thought, detracted from their relevance, occasioned the Stoic reaction, and caused more than two centuries of immanent Theology and physical Metaphysics.

<sup>27</sup> This is the point of Theophrastus’ eulogy in *Metaph.* 6b6 sqq. = Fr. 26 Heinze. All other mathematizing Metaphysicians articulate in detail the derivation of numbers and magnitudes from first principles, but treat in a markedly cavalier fashion physical reality. To such treatment Xenocrates presents an exemption: οὗτος γὰρ ἅπαντὰ πῶς περιτίθῃσιν περὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὁμοίως αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητὰ καὶ μαθηματικά καὶ ἐτι δὴ τὰ θεῖα. His generations aptly reflect the way the principles constitute and order this World.

<sup>28</sup> Fr. 65 (Philoponus, In *Arist. De Anima* 408b32): ἔλεγεν οὖν (sc. Xenocrates) ἀριθμὸν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα εἰδὸν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λόγον· ἐκ τῶν λόγων πάντων γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς λόγους ἔχει, ὡς εἰπομεν· ἀριθμοὺς δὲ τὰ εἶδη ἐκάλουν ὡς εἰρηται, καὶ αὐτὸς γοῦν (sc. Aristotle) ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς φησὶν «καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδὸν» (*De Anima* 429a27). Aristotle must be in this passage chiefly referring to a characteristic singular doctrine, like the Xenocratean – see *Number, godhead and soul is the same essential reality*; Fr. 16: “estque numerus, ut Xenocrates censuit, animus ac deus, etc.” *Daemons*, good or bad, belong to the same substance; Frs. 23-25. Daemon for each man is his soul; Frs. 81; 83. It follows, that the Dyad (= Mother of Gods) of Fr. 15 is the

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<sup>29</sup> Fr. 68  
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<sup>30</sup> Fr. 15  
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Xenocrates interpreted the Timaeon psychogony as eternal generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The Principle of Infinity enters into the Platonic mixture as divisibility (τὸ μεριστόν), which combined with the indivisible Oneness (τὸ ἀμέριστον), produces the number-system. The Second Principle enters again into the mixture as otherness (τὸ ἕτερον) opposed to the self-identity of the One (ταυτόν), and this synthesis constitutes self-movement, change-in-identity; for otherness is the principle of movement, just as identity is the principle of permanence. Thus the Xenocratean definition of soul is reached: self-moving number (or vital idea), ἀριθμὸς κινεῖν ἑαυτόν. Fr. 68; cf. Frs. 60-65.<sup>29</sup> Tidying up the reported formulations in Fr. 15 it may be stated that the Indefinite Dyad is amorphous Soulness, the underlying principle of psychicality. When acted upon by the One, it generates the intelligible World of number-ideas (τὸ νοητόν) and simultaneously the living, intellecting psychic essence (νοῦς, νοερόν, ψυχή), which are but two aspects of the same reality, distinguishable in thought as subject and object of thinking: this reality is, in its totality, the *Cosmic Soul*, formed in harmony, of the *Timaeus*.<sup>30</sup>

First numbers acting on the material Principle (the Indefinite Dyad, principle of divisibility, otherness and movement) generate organized extension. Dyad and matter give one-dimensional magnitude, Triad and matter create surfaces, Tetrad and matter produce three-dimensionality (mathematical solids). Thus the geometrical objects are framed as the intermediate grade of reality between the supracosmic intelligible realm and physical existence, they constitute the celestial region; (Fr. 5; cf. Fr. 34; for the triple division of reality see Fr. 55). Other numbers (as ideal entities and paradigmatic causes, Fr. 30; cf. Fr. 34) form with matter the variegated physical existence. As the numerical eidetic essence becomes more complex, the resulting configurations are less able to maintain themselves permanently in their self-identity vis-à-vis the material otherness and mobility, and this instability makes them thus changeful. In this last function, matter is appositely called τὸ ἀέναον by Xenocrates (Fr. 28), to highlight its unceasing, ever-flowing essential character.<sup>31</sup>

second ultimate Principle, the *Indefinite Dyad*, contrary to a widespread misperception occasioned by the loose doxographical formulation; for the Indefinite Dyad is not in itself the universal soul but its principle.

<sup>29</sup> Fr. 68: οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. Xenocrates' followers) οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μερίστης οὐσίας: ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν, μεριστόν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γενέσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέμενος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. καὶ Ζαράτας (sc. Zoroaster), ὁ Πυθαγόρου διδάσκαλος, ταύτην μὲν ἐκάλει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μητέρα, τὸ δὲ ἓν πατέρα: διὸ καὶ βελτίονας εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὅσοι τῇ μονάδι προσεοικασί (i.e. even numbers. Cf. Fr. 15: Ξενοκράτης... τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυάδα θεοῦς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατρός ἔχουσιν τάξιν... ἦντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττόν καὶ νοῦν... τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν, μητρός θεῶν δίκην etc.). τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι: τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδέχιν αὐτῶ: τοῦ δὲ ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγνέμενον, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγενῆσθαι, μηδὲν ἦντο τοῦ ἰστένου καὶ ἰστιάσθαι δύνυναι ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὐσαν.

<sup>30</sup> Fr. 15: Ξενοκράτης... τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυάδα θεοῦς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα, πατρός ἔχουσιν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσιν, ἦντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττόν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός: τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν, μητρός θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἣτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. Zeus Supreme (ὑπάτος Ζεὺς) was for Xenocrates (Fr. 18) the first Principle of the unalterable, self-identical realm (ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσι), i.e. in the World of ideas-numbers. Hence the Monad of Fr. 15 is the absolute Principle, the One. Correspondingly the second Principle is the *indefinite* Dyad. As formed by the One, this constitutes the Universal Soul governing the entire World; οὐρανός in the passage refers to the outermost celestial sphere, and connotes the cosmic Whole.

<sup>31</sup> Τὸ ἀέναον is the same with the Ἀόριστος Διάς, the Second absolute Principle. The structural identification is confirmed by the doxographical lemma ἀέναον τὴν ὅλην αἰνιττόμενος (sc. Xenocrates) διὰ τοῦ πλῆθους (Fr. 28,

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Mind as supreme God and ultimate Principle of reality (= the One) is beyond even eidetic-numerical multiplicity. It is the cosmic Soul, not the extreme divine Mind, that contains the World of Ideas-Numbers.<sup>32</sup> This universal Soul on the other hand, permeates the physical, sensible World (see Fr. 71; cf. Fr. 73). Since the Xenocratean supreme Mind in itself is above all being-determination (being itself the first principle of eidetic-numerical articulation), it cannot think of any such being-determinations and eidetic-numbers. Consequently, it points backwards to the Parmenidean self-intellection of differenceless absolute being (where pure intellection coincides with pure being, and νοεῖν is identified with εἶναι); and also forward to the Aristotelian God who is pure νόησις νοήσεως, because he is pure actuality, i.e. actuality without any admixture of potentiality, and the only thing that can exist separately from any material substrate, and thus free from any tincture of contingency and potentiality, and thus necessary and eternal, is thought, intellection, pure mental activity. This now intellection, in order to remain necessarily existing and eternal, without any complication of contingency that would compromise such a unique status, must think of nothing that would be so compromised by consisting in a being-determination which necessarily involves form-in-matter. Therefore the divine mind must think of nothing but itself, being thus an intellection of pure intellection, or in other words, pure actuality by and in itself.<sup>33</sup>

169.23 Heinze). It is not variation in the *material*, but difference in the *informative* principle, that accounts for the diversity in the orders of reality. The entire process may be schematized as follows: One + Matter → Numbers (souls) Numbers + Matter → Mathematical Extension – Celestial Objects (other) Numbers + Matter → Mathematical Extension – Sublunary physical realm Numbers and souls are not in themselves extended and corporeal (Frs. 66-7). The allegorical interpretation of Homer, *Ilias*, A, 40 (fr. 55) indicates that for Xenocrates the same matter underlies his triple division of reality. Describing Agamemnon's shield, Homer refers to its silver strap, where (v. 38) αὐτὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ / κυάνεος ἐλέλιτο δῖα κων, κεφαλὰ δὲ οἱ ἦσαν / τρεῖς ἀμφιστραφεῖς, ἐνὸς αὐχένος ἐκπεφυκυῖαι. The Scholia T *ad loc.* have: ταύτην Ξενοκράτης μίμημα τοῦ κόσμου φησὶν εἶναι. (The "correction" ὁ Κράτης is totally unwarranted and unidiomatic). This feature gives substantial compactness to the Xenocratean System. On the other hand (and under the assumption of the identity of Oneness with Goodness), the involvement of the same matter in the constitution of the very first order of being, admits for the existence of evil very "early" in the generation of reality (Fr. 76; cf. evil demons Frs. 23-5).

<sup>32</sup> God-Mind as a solitary intellection without differentiated content is a doctrinal common ground between Xenocrates and Aristotle (God as νόησις νοήσεως). Cf. *supra*.

<sup>33</sup> For the Platonic Theory of First Principles see: A. L. Pierris, *The Other Platonic Principle*, in A. L. Pierris (ed.), *Aristotle on Plato: The Metaphysical Question, Proceedings of the Symposium Philosophiae Antiquae Secundum Thersense* (June 30-July 7, 2002, 2004), 239-91.