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PROLEGOMENA TO THE ENIGMA OF THE JOHANNINE PROLOGUE: AN INQUIRY INTO ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL SYNCRETISM

The Johannine Prologue is "das größte Rätsel, das die Geschichte des ältesten Christentums bietet."

Augustine testifies to the laudatory acceptance that the striking beginning of the Fourth Gospel found among some (Neo)platonic circles. One such philosopher suggested its emphatic imprint on high places in all Churches:

Quod initium sancti Evangelii cui nomen est secundum Iohannem, quidam Plotonius, sicut a sancto seno Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi Ecclesiae prae sedit Episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis litteris conscribendum et per omnes Ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicerat.²

In fact Amelius, of the Plotinian group, commented on the Johannine Λόγος-doctrine (albeit referring to the Evangelist as "the barbarian"), giving a significant formulation of its content. The Amelian quotation runs as follows (a fairly orthodox exegetes except for the explicit Docetism of the Logos-incarnation):

Καὶ ὁ ὅντος ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ καὶ ὁ ὄντος δύναμιν ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ, καὶ ὁ ὅντος τῆς ὑπομονῆς καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ ἀληθείᾳ ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν. Καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ὁ ὃς ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ἐνίκησεν.

² Augustine, de Civ. Dix, X, 29, I, 480.33-481.5.
Eusebius mentions the passage in his account of the Second Principle of Reality, immediately after he has elaborated on Numenius’ position, and re-affirmed the presupposed affiliation of Platonic and Hebrew wisdom. It is very likely that Amelius himself connected his own analysis with Numenian theory and the Johannean doctrine. The point of the Evangelic attestation in Amelius must have been the identification of a particular entity in his system with the Heraclitean and the Johannean Logos: καί ὅτιος ἢ ὁ λόγος καθ’ ὄντι αἰτία τὰ γαλαξία τὰ ἃγαλμα, ὃς ἦν καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλείτης ἔξωσεν, καὶ κάθ’ ἰδίᾳ ὁ βάρβαρος ἀείος τοῦ ἢ ἡγενής ἡγενής ἡγενής. The world-creative function is to be explained. Cosmic Creativity belongs primarily to Intellence (Noi), for it presupposes a plan of the object to be produced; creation of a thing is the process whose reverse constitutes the thing’s real analysis, an objective understanding of its nature. Knowledge is the ground of Creation. The Platonic Timaeus provides a classic formulation of this insight. And indeed Proclus explains the Numenian and Amelian interpretations of the creative principle as differing construals of the Timaean statement (39E): ἦν οὖν οἷος ἄνωθεν ἓδεστα τὸ δ’ ἔστιν ἄνωθεν. καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἕνα καὶ ἕνου, καινότι, τοιούτα καὶ τοιούτα πάντα ἐν τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν κόσμον τὴν τὸν ζῷον (being in itself as an organic whole), ἄνωθεν ἡγεμονία (the aesthetic articulation of being) and ἐνεργός (the intellectual “seeing” of the ideas), i.e. Noi as pure being and intelligibility (of Being); as having the forms of being; and as seeing (intellecting) the ideal content of being. In this tricadic analysis of intelligibility and Intellence (being, possessing being as structured definite determination of being and seeing being; or being as an ultimate fact of existence, as being had as a definite determination of being, i.e. as being something, and finally as being seen), Amelius considered the first member as demiurgic par excellence (ibid.; OF Fr. 96 Kern).

3 Eusebius, Panarion Evangelic. XI, 18-19, 340 A sqq.
4 Amelius was a particularly close student of Numenius. He collected, edited and commented on the latter’s literary remains. Porphyry, Vita Plot, 3, 43-5, ἐπανθεόνυμος ἐν ἅγαλαξίαις ὁς καθ’ ἔστιν ἐν τέρματι τὸ τοῦ Νομίνου κατ’ ἄνωθεν καὶ ἀναφερόμενος καὶ σφαίρας τὸ κόσμου ἐκτός. He was in fact considered a specialist on Numenius. When in Athens there grew the notion that Plotinus was overly adapting Numenian views with the addition of mere platitudes and insignificant details. Amelius undertook to defend his friend with a work entitled: ἐπὶ τής κατι ἀκτην ἀπό τοῦ Παλαιοῦ πρὸς τὸν Νομίνου διαφοράς (ibid., 17). On the other hand, Numenius utilized in his theological speculations the wisdom, symbolization and sacred rites of the oriental eminent nations (among whom he mentioned, Brahman, Hebrews, Magians (Iranian) and Egyptians), so agreeing with the Platonic spirit. Fr. Ia (des Places), άναπλήρωσαν ἐν τῇ Μηθείᾳ φαντασματομοσύνης τοῦ λόγου, οὐδενελάτως, προκατάρατος, ἀπό τοῦ λόγου καὶ Αἰώνιον καὶ Μετάφορα καὶ Μεταφοράς Αἰωνίου. He employed the allegorical method (τροπολογία) in interpreting passages from the Old Testament (Fr. Ic, 1c and 9); Originals in fact commented favourably on these analyses, Fr. Ic,... καὶ οὖν ἀποθέτω, αὐτὸν προκατάρατον (sc. τὸν Νομίνου). Numenius allegorized even a story from the New Testament without mentioning the name of Jesus (Fr. 16a), just as Amelius referred to the Johannean Gospel by calling its author ὁ Μαθαύριος.
But in Neoplatonism λόγος is essentially associated to the psychic hypostasis, in contradiction to the noetic principle to which it is subordinated. And it is from the Universal hypercorpuscle that the particular psychic entities descend into the World according to Amelius Stoic, *Elenchos* 1, 49, 39, 1377f.1 Wachsmuth: ‘(Παρο διοφοράς καθάδει τῶν ψυχῶν ἀπὸ τὰς ἐμβλήματις) Παρο διοφοράς καθάδει τῶν ψυχῶν ἀπὸ τὰς ἐμβλήματις παρά τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμεῖς καὶ πάσης ἐκείνης εἰκονίζωσι εἰς τὰ σώματα. In fact Amelius held (or tended to hold) the singular doctrine that all psychic substance, all souls, are really at bottom not only essentially homogenous, but also numerically one (ibid. 1, 49, 37 372, 10-12; 25-6) differing only and simply in accordance with varying relations and positions (σχέσεις καὶ κατάστασις, I 376, 3-4). This fits nicely into the Amelian account of the Johannine prologue: everything that comes to be is a being and exists, has life and is living, by being in the Logos principle, ἐν ὧν ἐγένετο ζωή καὶ ζωὴν καὶ νεωτέρων ζωήν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅπως ἠμεῖς. It furthermore provides the foundation for an explanation of the Incarnation of the eternal Soul-Logos itself in an individual: all particular souls are identical with the Universal Soul; in that unique case the fullness of the hypercorpuscular powers was also actually preserved undiminished (τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος).

The likelihood is thus substantial that Amelius identified the Johannine Logos with his Universal Soul. That he invoked the Heraclean (and, he might have added, as an elaborate version of divine immanent causality, the Stoic) Logos as ontological principle of reality points in the same direction: in Stoicism this Logos, the aboriginal pure active reality, produces, by its own tensional transformations according to its own law, the cosmic whole; everything has its existence grounded in Logos, is a tensional (συνεκριτός Logos) modification according to a schematically pre-existing pattern in Logos itself, subsists therefore in Logos. This accounts for the ἐν ὧν moment, which, significantly, from the Johannine ἐν σῳ τῷ ζωῆς ἐγενέτο etc. becomes the explicitly sweeping ἐν ὧν τὸ γενέτερον ζωήν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς. The δ' ὰν would also, in the Neoplatonic setting, signify instrumental efficiency rather than veritable creative causality. It is true that the καθή ὡς mentioned in the beginning of the quotation suggests the archetypal principle, probably the second Amelian Demiurge (τὸν ἐγενέτος, i.e. the divine intellect qua possessing the ideal articulation of reality, the structured determinations of being), but the Heraclean invocation in exemplification of this καθή ὡς redresses the suggestion. Philo illustrates well the prepositional metaphysics in *De Cherubim*, 35 (§§124-127): 125: πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τινος γενεσιν συνελθεῖν, τὸ ὦν, τὸ ὦν, τὸ ὦν, τὸ τῶν ὧν καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ ὦν ὄν τὸ ὄν, ὄν ὄν ὄν ὄν θεός ἐστι τὸ ὄν. In cosmic creation ὦν ὄν is God, δ' ὰν ὁ Παράγων. Cf. Seneca *Epistulae*, 65, 8, where two more causes are introduced, in quo as the form and ad quod as the paradigmatic idea; while one is suppressed, the instrumental δ' ὀ. Finally, that this Logos is God connects with the view that all incorporeal substance from supreme Godhead to particular soulness is homogenous (Stoic, *Elenchos* 1, 49, 32, 1365.7-21). According to lamblichus, Amelius stands “unfastly” on this doctrine which in effect maintains that ψυχή and ψυχή τῶν κρεπτόνων γενόν οὐδὲν ἡ ψυχή δυνάμει ἔφεσιν ἐγενέτο (especially therefore as Supranatural universal soul). The theory cannot be immediately reconciled with the strict Subordinationism in the derivation of reality (One-Mind-Soul), and lamblichus brings emphatically to the surface the underlying tension in the Plotinian-centered position.
The situation reproduces the then contemporary Trinitarian controversies (which however resolutely left the psychic factor outside the compass of essential divine spirituality). The εν θεῷ motive (the idea that all created existence is substantiated in a certain ontological principle) points in the first place to the Platonic cosmic soul, *Timaeus* 34b-c; esp. 36d-37a: ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνομολόγῳ πάσα η τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγέργει, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ συμμετεχόν ἄντον αὐτῆς ἐπεκτείνετο καὶ μέσῳ μέση συναγαγόν προσομοίοντο... καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σῶμα ἀρατὸν ἀφανὸν γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀφανός μὲν, λογισμὸν δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχῆς, τῶν νοητῶν ἕως τοῦ ἔκτιμον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀριστίου ἄριστῃ γενιμένῳ τόν γεννηθένταν. This would make the universal soul the first born of God, the Protoparous. On the other hand, in the Alexandrian Hellenizing Judaism there has been evolved the idea of divine Logos as τόπος ἰδεῶν and νοητός Κόσμος. Philo, *De opificio Mundi*, §20: εἰδώλιον τοῦ Κόσμου ἔλλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τόπον ἕν τινος Λόγον τῶν τύπων ἰδεάσεως; εἰς τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ ἀναπτύσσει, ἀναλαβήν τῆς τοῦτοις αὐτῶν τούτος ἐπέρχετο, ὡς γένοις ἐν καθένας ὑπὸ λεγόν νῦσσας ἑαυτὸν ἀρατόν ἐν τούτῳ ἐξελλοθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ τούτοις τοῦ νοητοῦ Κόσμου εἶναι ἡ Ἰδεὼν Λόγον ἢν ζωομονοοῦντος (an emphatic affirmation of the inherent creativity of the Logos, and His essential orientation towards creation, essentially in his capacity as comprising the archetypal articulation of all being, precisely as being τόπος ἰδεῶν). The divine Logos is the place of the Intelligibles, the incorporeal powers of God, *De Somnibus* 1, §62, III 218.12: (τόπος) ὁ θεοῦ λόγος, ἐν ἐκπεπλήρωσιν ὅλων ἕνωσα τούτων ἰδεῶν ἑνώμενος ἐνυπόμενος αὐτοῦ ὁ θεός. The Logos is the House of God; *De Migracione Abrahami* §4: καὶ γὰρ τῶν τῶν ὅλων νομῶν, τῶν θεῶν, ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτῆς τοῦ λόγου. (Cf. Job XXVIII. 23: ὁ θεὸς εὐ φοινίκισαν αὐτῆς (οὐ, τῆς Σοφίας τῆς ἡμῶν, ἡ τοῦτος δὲ ἀφανός τὸν τόπον αὐτῆς). In the last Philoridian quotation there clearly emerges the underlying ontological pattern of divinity: God is the universal Nous of all existence; His Logos is the House of His ideas of reality. The ontological In-being requires inherence of the διὰ ἑαυτῆς εἰς τὸν τοῦ αὐτῆς. When Seneca enumerates the types of cause, adding the Platonic paradigmatic to the Aristotelian four, he distinguishes the (immanent) formal from the (transcendent) archetypal by calling them id in quo and id ad quod correspondingly; *Epistulae Morales* 65, §8. There has been a shift in the emphasis and a reversal of the direction in the relationship between the formal principle of a thing and the thing itself: still the form is in the thing in a certain sense, but the constitutive connection is that the thing is in its formal principle. That X is in Y accordingly represents the other side of the fact that Y permeates

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1 Presented or postulated homogeneity of the incorporeal realm blurs the essential distinctions between divinity, monadon, and psycholatry. The inner conduction of spiritual reality must then be in consistency accounted for by varied degrees and kinds of affinity of the pleromatic perfection of absolute existence. Such was typically the Origenistic position. *De Principis I*, 1, 1, II, 8, 3, 1, 8, 1 Koetscha. The theory, by emphasizing Logos as πρωτότοκος πάσης κτάσεως, involved an Azilianizing tendency. Catholic Christianity affirmed an unbridgeable gap between divinity (to which Logos and Holy Spirit were included) and the rest of existence; while post-Platonic Neoplatonism insisted on the distinct self-contained subsistence of all discernible ontological steps in reality connected by a metaphysical chain of being.

2 Here the basic demarcation line between eternal being and engendered existence is drawn in the psychic subsistence.
X, constitutes and holds it together. The immanence of the Stoic divine Spirit in the World may be also formulated as the in-being of the Cosmic Whole in Spirit.

In the Sapientia Salomonis (an Alexandrian Judaic tract, probably from the second half of the 2nd century B.C., belonging to the Greek Canon of the Old Testament) divine Wisdom functions similarly to the Stoic universal Spirit. The divine Spirit blows everywhere, is omnipresent (XI, 1), it fills the Universe and keeps the whole of existence integrated (I. 7); this omnipotent, omniscient, intellectual, hypershable, active spirit of sacred purity constitutes the substance of Wisdom, the only-begotten of its kind from God; VII 22-3: ἐπει δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ Σοφίᾳ) Πνεῦμα νοήμον, θεόν, μοναγενές, πολυμερής, λεπτός, εὐκίνητος, εραυνόν, άκολούθον, σοφός, ἀκτισμαντος, φωλύασθην, ὄμη, ἀκολούθον, ενεργειακόν, φωλύασθην, εραυνόν, ἀκτισμαντος, παντοδόντος, πανεπιστήμης, και διὰ πάντων χαράνων πνεύματων νοερῶν καθόρων λεπτότατον. (The form of the recitation coincides with that at the ritual Orphic hymns; a multiform description of the elusive essence of the reality involved). The Wisdom is the universal Artificer (VII, 22), present when God created the World she knows the ways and works of God (IX, 9), which are her own as well (XIV, 5, 2), principle of their generation and leader of their existence (VII, 12) under God’s guidance (15). Wisdom is of holy and unsullied substance, most volatile, she pervades and penetrates everything, being as an exhalation of God’s Power and an overflow of omnipotent glory unadulterated and chaste, a radiant eternal light, image of divine Goodness and spotless mirror of divine Activity (VII 24-26). Wisdom is one but able to do everything, self-contained, self-residing and yet effecting all change everywhere (27), she permeates the Universe and governs all existence to the best end (VIII, 1). Wisdom is the prophetic Spirit (e.g. VII, 27; cf. Job, XXXII, 8); she is further associated with God’s Logos (IX, 1-2). Θεός ἡ πνεύματος τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τής σοφίας κατασκευασμένος ἄνθρωπον. The expression ἐν λόγῳ corresponds systematically to ἐν κόσμῳ, ἐν σωμάτι, as in Jeremiah, LI, 15: κοσμοὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτῶν, ἐκμνίκουσιν ὠκενφέλιν ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ αὐτῶν, ἐν τῇ σωμάτι αὐτῶν εξητείνεις τὸν κύριον (the same in X, 12). In Proverbs III, 19-20, the organic dative is employed of, and together with, the ἐν-formula: ὁ Θεὸς τής σοφίας ἐκμνίκουσιν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἐκμνίκουσιν ὠκενφέλιν ἐν τῇ σωμάτι. The divine instrument of creation is that in which created being is substantiated.

The pre-eternal existence and instrumental, harmonizing creative function of Sophia is manifested in her self-declaration. Proverbs VIII, 22-31 (notice §30: ἡμῖν παρ’ αὐτῷ άμπος). Her omnipresence is also attested there, §2. In Sapientia, however, Wisdom is virtually identified with the Stoic World Soul, the divine Spirit permeating all universe. (The Stoic influence promoted also the explicit identification of Wisdom with Logos). The position of Sapientia may be described as a coupling of the Stoic Logos – Old Testament Sophia with a transcendent God; or, alternatively, seen from the other end, as a Stoic divine spirit-cosmic soul construal of the instrumental cause in Old Testament Creation. The Stoic world-structure adapted readily itself to the requirements of a philosophical Old Testament exegesis: one had only, in effect, to interpret the God – Spirit – Logos – Cosmic Soul – Active Principle of Stoicism as divine Sophia, God’s noetic Logos and creative Power substantiating in itself all created existence. In fact, the Stoicisation of the Sapientia went so far as to assume a pre-existing formless matter out of which (62 §6b)
God fashioned the World; XI, 17: οὕς γαρ ἡμών ἡ παντοδυνάμως σου χείρ / καὶ κτίσασθαι τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου θάνατος. This matter would correspond to the absolutely passive principle of the Stoic System. The idea answered nicely to the watery abyss over which the spirit of God brooded in the beginning of things (Genesis 1, 2).

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The Stoic predominance in theological speculation of the Hellenistic Age was challenged in the first century B.C. by the reemergence of Platonic thought in the fourth (Philo Larissaeus) and fifth (Antiochus from Ascalon) Academies, of Aristotelianism (Andronico) and of Neoplatonicism. The new tendency had also repercussions on Middle Stoicism (esp. Poseidonius). Seneca (Epistulae Morales, 65) distinguishes two theories of Causes, one orthodox Stoic (§§2-3), the other standard Aristotelian (§§4-6) to which it is added the Platonic archetypal idea (§7). This latter complex of Aristotelian physics and Platonic metaphysics (the quintocausal theory) is ascribed to Plato [§8: “quincugue ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: id ex quo (matter), id a quo (efficient cause), id in quo (form), id ad quod (idea), id propter quod (final cause); novissime id quod ex his est”], although considered as common or conjoint opinion of Plato and Aristotle (§1). The theory is criticised from a Stoic point of view (§§11-14). Significantly, it is associated to:

1) A thoroughly pantheistic doctrine: the general cause of everything is the World- totality itself. §14: “quid vero non pro soluta ipsis substitutae disserat, totum mundum et consummationem opus causam esse: multum enim inter inter opus et causam operis.”

2) The so-called “Middle Platonic” view of the paradigmatic ideas as thoughts in (the mind of) God; §7: “haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intrae se habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt, et modos monte complexus est: piemus his figuris est, quas Plato ideam appellant, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles.”

The cardinal point of the criticism is the distinction between true cause and necessary condition. The latter includes time, place, movement and a host of circumstances that are required or must obtain in order for the effect to be realized. True causality on the other hand resides in the creative faculty, the power to effect something: ultimately the real, universal cause is God as the efficient reason, προορισμὸς, λόγος, ratio faciens (§12). All else contributory factors are dependences of the genuine power which makes things: the form is rather part of the cause: the archetypal instrument of it: the purpose supervening efficiency (§§13-14).

In Clemens Alexsandrius (Stromata, VIII, 9) and in Cicero (Tusculanae, §§56-64, e.g. R.E. Wirt, Albinus and the Philosophy of Middle Platonism, 39-41) there occur basically Stoic identical analyses in the Theory of Causality which bear directly on the issue at stake. In Tusculanae §58 there are distinguished two general kinds of cause, that which possesses in itself the power to constitute a certain effect, and that which, although it lacks such efficient nature, is indispensable in the origination of the effect (aliter quo non loco esse praeint): such are the immediate material substrate, space, time, instruments, preparatory or attendant causes, fato (§59). The former type of real efficiency is also subdivided into self-sufficient effective causality with no need of subservient factors on the one hand (independent causa, causa efficiens), and adjusting causes, fato (inventae). See Stromata, VIII, 25, 1-4 (cf. SVF II 346-356). 28, 2-6. In the latter Clementian passage there is a confusion of the Aristotelian quadruple causality with the Stoic schema: strictly oinoncausae and oinoncausae has is the efficient cause, while the material belongs to the dhn oinoncausae or at most (ascribing a positive predisposition in material potentaility to assume its producing form) to the same with oinoncausae. Cf. SVF II 331. — The source of the Senecan inquiry is pre-Ciceroian; probably this also holds for the Clementine interfusion of the two opposed doctrines in Seneca.
3) Characteristic habitual dialectical refinement: *solita substitutio* (§14).
4) Possibly, a *probabilissimae* account of evidence; §10: “*Per ergo iudex sententiam et pronuntia, quis ibi videatur verissimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat: id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas.***

The idea of the universal All, self-subsistent, all-inclusive totality of existence organized as a living whole, which is the ultimate cause of the being, conservation and (relative) self-subsistence of everything, is expressed in Ocellus Lucanus, *De universa natura*, §§1 sqq. see esp. §§1: 6 δε γε κόσμοι αὐτῶν ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὸν ἐναντιόν τοῦ σαφέστερα καὶ τοῦ αὐτότελης εἶναι αὐτῆς ἄρα ἐξ ἐκείνου ἀδύνατο ἔστι καὶ αὐτότελης καὶ διαμένειν τοῦ πάντα αἰῶνα, καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο [τοῖς ἄλλοις] παραπλέον γνώμενος τῆς διακολούθης τῶν ὀλιγών. The doctrine can be found expressly in the Peripatetic Critolaus from Phaselis (2nd century B.C.); fr. 12 Wehrli = Philo, *De determinate mundi*, 9, VI, 94 Cohn: τὸ αἰὲνα αὐτῷ τῶν ὑπαρχον ἀνέστη ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἰὲνα αὐτῷ τῶν ἀγαθών ἀγριοτέρων ἐστὶν εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰὲνα αὐτῷ τῶν ἄρετων ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν: αἰὲνα δὲ αὐτῶν κόσμος αὐτῷ τῶν ὑπάρχον, εἰ γε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἀγαθόν. The World is a self-subsistent cause of the existence of all that exists.

Ocellus Lucanus and Critolaus share also the same theory on World-constitution: there are two realms of reality, the celestial one of immutable, eternal being, consisting in quintessential aether, the fifth element; and the sublunary region of transient becoming, built from the four elements. Of and from pure impassable aether proceeds mental existence, divine intellect, godhead: Critolaus Frs. 15-18; Ocellus §§18-9; 36-7. The upper realm acts, and the lower suffers the influence of the former; the superior is causally empowered to effect the changes that constitute the perpetual becoming of the inferior (Ocellus §§18-9). In the peripatetic De Mente the same notions are encountered and led into systematic theological integration. The World, as the system of all that is included in and between Heaven and Earth (39b9-10 — a Stoic formula with impeccable Aristotelian pedigree) is organized into a Whole by a harmonizing Power pervading all existence (396b23-34): this is the cosmic cohesive cause (*συνεκτικόν αἰτία*, 397b9-10). The World in toto is the all-powerful generator of everything (397a 4-6: τοῦ κάτων γένεσις καὶ παρακολουθητού κόσμου, τις γὰρ ἐν οἷς φύσις τοῦτο κρέατος ἄν γέρων ἐν ἀπίσθη τῆς μέρους ἔστιν αὐτοῦ). But in fact the source of all sublunary influence lies in the celestial realms (397a 8-88: τις δὲ τῶν ἔμερ χόρους δύναται ἐν ἐξουσιασθείν τῇ κατ’ χρόνουν τάξει καὶ ὁρᾶτι τῶν ζωτόν τούτον εἰτε). In the uppermost heaven God is enthroned, the efficient cause

*In Fr. 15 (from Epiphanian) the theories described are ascribed to Aristotle (and affirmed to be common with Climaciasthe the formulations display Christian bias (e.g.  εἵνεκεν δὲ λαβεῖν — cf. Aristotle — όν κέρδον, τὸν ἡμέραν τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ τὴν τούτον ἀρκομένην, τὸν δὲ κατὰ ὀφθαλμὸν meaning that things in the lower realm are continuously coming to and passing away. In the same way we must take the statement that things in the sublunary region are proceeding un providently, carried by an irrational impulse in a fortuitous course. For example Fortune is the principle of events whose causes are ignored by human mind: Antichus (see e.g. Cicero, *Academicorum Posteriorum*, 1, 29: "non omnium quidem quidem iudicem (ex fatal series of determination) fortunam, quo efficit multa improvidi ac necopinata nobis proper obscuratum ignoranceanque causamnam.") Cf. Cicero, *Epist. 55; Seneca Epist. 48.3* etc. In Ocellus the formulations are more accurate: the celestial region is where the cause of becoming (ἐλεκτρισμος) resides, the perduratum mobile (to ἑκάστηρον), the sublunary districts belong to becoming, they form the perpetually possible (to δυνατόν) part of the World (§18-19) To this lower region belong the four elements (§§20 sqq.), hence the upper realm must consist of the Aristotelian aether.*
(ἐκ οὖ, 397b 14) of all things, who affects them through the instrumentality of his divine Power (ὅτι, 397a, ibid.); so that when one of them is present it is reason and reason of the world's ordinances a kind of the kûmos suntheîmenon ὁ θεός, who μὴ οὐσίαν and κῆπον ὕμων, all of whom have received an aptitude, δι’ ἃ τοί καὶ τὸν ἄριστον διακοινοῦν εἰσὶν παρεχόμενοι. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀναφέρει καὶ πρῶτον ἔβαλεν αὐτὸς ἔξω, υπαρκτίκας τε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνάφυσισθαι ἐκ. (397b 20 sqq.) Proportional to the distance from his supreme seat is the receptibility of the divine benefits (397b30-398a1). In fact, by a simple motion of the first heaven the divine power is transmitted to all beings according to their essence their severally appropriate functioning: thus the complicated movements that constitute the cosmic becoming are affected, as in an enormously articulate mechanism (398b10-399a30). Hence, 399a30-35, ἓνας οὐ κἄντα ἡμῶν τε καὶ γενέτωρ ἁπλοῦς ἡμῶν ἄλλων πάντων λοιπῶν συνήθη πάσης φύσεως ὑπέρ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ ἐφ’ ἐγκάλεσιν ἑαυτοῦ, μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπαρκτίκου τοῦ ἀναφέρειται. In his works (399b-19). Thus, πάντα συνηθή καὶ πρὸς Θεόν διακοινοῦται, διαφέρει μὲν ὄντων ἐγερθηκότων, καλλίτοτε ὑπ’ ὑπερεπτοτότων, μόνον δὲ ἐδυνατότε, ἀρέτης δὲ κράτοστος, ἀποτελεί τοῦ παύσαι θυσίας γένεσιν ἀνίκητος ἀξίν· αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεολέγεται τὰ γὰρ πάντα, καὶ τὰ ἂν ἔργων ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν ὅπλα, τοῦ λόγου ἐν ὄντως ἐφ’ ἐν τῶν κόσμων ἐπέχουσας (399b 19-25). Zeus is the World-Whole as the Orphic text reveals (OF 168.1-32, quoted vv. 1-5 and 31-32 (with variants) in de Mundo 401a28-67; cf. OF 169.1-12), but his intellect is pure, sublimest aether (OF 168.17). The parts of the World are parts of his body, which he has as his true self (Mind) for cause: 401a25-27, ὡς δὲ τὸ πάντα εἰστὶ σύμφωνον, καὶ ἐπάνω τοῦ καὶ χών τοῦ (ὅταν θεός ἀπεστάλη), πᾶσας ἐπάνων ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐπὶ καὶ τούτης ἡ πάνως αὐτῆς καὶ τούτου ἐπετάλιος αὐτῆς ὁ θεός. This idea of the Cosmic Whole as ultimate principle of existence (in the World as we know it) and supreme divinity (in the present world-order) has a remarkable and illustrious descent. It existed in earliest Orphism, as we know from the Derveni Papyrus. It had been articulated at least in late Pre-Socratic Anaxagorean circles (Archeaia). It probably stemmed philosophically from Pythagorean speculations. And it commanded a significant Iranian, Zoroastrian connection.

6 This is more in tune with God’s perfection, than the idea that he essentially permeates the world-whole (398a1-6, and notice the following illustration drawn from Persian kingship, with the conclusion 398b-10). Cf. 406b-15, etc.

7 The idea is repeated and elaborated in Oedipus Tyrannus §§114-16, §16. Fr. 111. δέ καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκπέμπει τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ τοῦ ἐνικήτου ἐναλλάξεως (i.e. proportionately) ἀπαντακόμην καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἔρχεται πάντων τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. τὸ θεοῦ in Citius, Fr. 15) καὶ τὸ ἐξομολογεῖται τῆς θεοῦ συνώνυμος.

8 There is a remarkable parallelism between De Mundo and Oedipus Tyrannus, Fr. 1 (Harder). The World is “permeated” through harmony (ἀναφέρει ὑμᾶς ἐν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων παραμετρεῖ, ἀναφέρει τὸ ἀναφέρει τὸ κάθετο, ἐκτὸς ἧς ἕρμαν Λατρευμίμης τὴν ἐν εἰκόνα τοῦ πρῶτου ἀναφέρει τὸ ἐνεκτέρα τὸ καὶ τῆς ἐπάνω χωρὶς τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐπάνως ἐνεκτέρας τοῦ τῶν συμμετέχειν δημορραγηθέρατον, etc., §27-31). This Power belongs to God who is distinct hypostatically from it, as explained above. Similarly God is the cause of harmony, which keeps together the world in Oedipus (26.5 Harder): τὸν δὲ κάθετον ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου (αὐτού ἐκείνου) ἐκπεμπεῖ, τούτοις ἐπικύρωσεν ὁ θεός. Another example in Oedipus is house and city held together by4...5. In de Mundo (401b13-26) also the analogy occurs (ὁ θεός for the World is like Νόμος for the city). For other correspondences e.g. the argument that no part of the World can be stronger than the whole; Oedipus §13, De Mundo 397a5-6.
In Peripatetic and peripateticising Neo-Pythagorean sources of the Hellenistic times (not unlikely all from the 2nd century b.C.) the view is expressed of the World as a living whole whose cause is God (pure intellect located at the aetherial uppermost heavenly sphere, but which by virtue of his causal agency constitutive of the entire Cosmos is also identified to it). The immanent instrumental cause of the cosmic constitution and preservation is God's Power pervading everything. The nexus of the idea can be summarized thus: God is the World Whole, the entire Cosmos; His divine Nous, and so God in a special sense, resides in the most extreme celestial orbit, His power permeates all existence, every part of the divine body, the Cosmic Whole.

The Aristotelian ancestry of the conception is indicated by the insistence on the bifurcation between celestial and sublunar realms, as well as by the aetherial quintessential (extra-elemental) nature of the former region, foundation of intellect. The crucial deviation from the Aristotelian system lies in the suppression of the absolutely transcendent God, the pure Intelllection consisting in νοήμα νοητόν. But this elimination of divine transcendency renders possible the structural assimilation to Stoic Metaphysics or Theory of Principles or Theology (excepting the doctrine of palingenesis, of absolute cosmic periodicity in closed cycles): God resides in the sublunary, aetherial fire, yet the spirit in which he consists permeates the entire material substance of the World; this was utilized in Sapientia Salomonis. The divine Spirit of the one system (Stoic) corresponds to the divine Power of the other (Orphic – Pythagorean – Peripatetic). Syncretistic processes were well under way in the 2nd century B.C.

The Aristotelian (and Old Academic but un-Stoic) sharp distinction between the celestial and the sublunar parts of the World (characteristically manifested in the postulation and assumption of the fifth element and corresponding to religious Astralism) was blended with Stoic Activism in Physics (exemplified in the immanent causality of the active principle and corresponding to Pantheism). Stoic Physics attracted and assimilated Aristotelian Physics, as is highlighted in the Theory of Causes. Real causality implies primarily ability to do things; it consists in the faculty to effectuate its effect. The basic dichotomy in the working factors of the causal nexus is that between activity and passivity, the power to exercise influence and the capability to undergo it. The Stoic active principle corresponds to, but does not coincide with, the formal principle as existing in the efficient cause of the Aristotelian analysis. The fundamental difference of the two systems lies in that the Stoic Physics is dynamic, whereas the Aristotelian is teleological: according to the former, the World is the unfolding in time of the spermatic principle, whereas in the latter it is the ontological structuring of reality between the two poles of pure Intellect and bare matter, of which absolute Intellect exists separately

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5 The spirit of wisdom in Sapientia is, strictly, ὁ ἅγιος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Δύναμις (VII, 25), not the Δύναμις itself, just as it is ἁγίασας ἁγία καὶ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Ῥηματικόν (26). It is elsewhere in the Old Testament that ἁγία is equivalent to οἶκος (cf. Jeremiah LI, 15). This does not alter the observed structural correspondence; it means, however, that in Sapientia the movement has taken place towards the sharper hypostatization distinction between God (and his Δύναμις) and divine Wisdom (with its Spirit). On the other hand πνεῦμα in de mundo is associated (apart from blowing air or wind) to the fertile, enervated substance permeating plants, animals and all things (398B-1). The peripatetic character of the work precludes the explicit identification of this Aristotelian spirit with the Stoic spirit, whose tension (nēvēs) constitutes all entities in their essential peculiarity. But the structural pressure is operating in this direction.
in itself, but Matter subsists always in some form or other, however elementary, and is intrinsically craving for in-formation. The desire of matter for form, an ontological arrow from a thing to its completion and perfection, is the organizing principle of reality according to Aristotelianism. In effect this plenipotent teleology is the philosophical rendering of cosmogonical Eros in Orphic and other logico-mythical speculations. The articulation of reality consists in varying, orderly proceeding degrees of perfection in a hierarchy of ends the subordinate ones subserving the higher, in a stepwise, atemporal raising of matter through successive grades towards intellectuation, the supreme perfection in which being becomes totally transparent, intelligible. The ultimate causality in the Aristotelian System is final; in the Stoic drastic. In the Stoic-peripatetic context, the suppression of the final causality in the Hellenistic syncretistic theories goes hand in hand with the abandonment of a clearly transcendent God. And in fact he was needed as the necessary, ultimate pole of attraction sustaining teleologically the world order. Without absolute teleology, a cosmic god was more suitable for the cosmic function in world formation and preservation. With the Scepticism of the Middle and New Academy there was no other contender to uphold the claims of metaphysical transcendance. On the other hand, to balance this Stoic preponderance, the temporal World-development in closed cycles (a powerful corollary of the immanent, activity of the causal principle as spermatic unfolding) was abandoned in favour of Aristotelian Cosmic Eternalism. (Mere beginning in time without evolution and repetition was occasionally attempted later, but it represented a particular Platonic interpretation). This syncretistic tendency reacted on Stoicism itself in the Middle Stoa.

The demand for an ultimate first Principle of Reality (not only as its absolute beginning, but pre-eminently as its absolute ground), and celestialism (the divine nature and efficacy of the aetherial region) were both operating in different forms in both first synthesised systems. The immanence of cosmic causality (religiously expressed as Pantheism and its dynamic, drastic nature, combined with that demand and emphasis resulted in the reduplication of divinity: there is the absolute Cause of the World's being (existence and essence) subsisting separately in itself, and a radiation, so to speak, from it permeating the entire universe; a truly efficient and an instrumental ultimate cause of things: God on the one hand and God's Spirit, Wisdom or Power on the other. God in one sense is the Totality of Existence, the World itself, since there is nothing more potent than this Allness. But as a cause of the World, it must be – if not transcendent – a part of the cosmic Whole. God thus resides in the uppermost celestial region, while the divine nature (adopting the Aristotelian lunar borderline) extends to the entire heavenly realm.

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In the 1st century B.C. Platonism was drawn more resolutely into the prevailing Syncretistic modality, with the abandonment in the (Philonian fourth and, primarily, the Antiochean fifth) Academy of its sceptical posture and the reversion to positive doctrine (Theory of Reality). Antiochus from Ascalon presented a unified system which he considered to be the common Platonic-Aristotelian heritage, with Stoicism in real agreement with it, although
verbally innovative.13 The account of Antiochene Physics presented by Varro in Cicero, *Acad. Post.* I, §§24-29 is thoroughly Stoic; characteristic Aristotelian influence may be discerned in the emphatic bifurcation (presumably also localized) of the Universe into two portions (§24), and the corresponding equally emphatic mention of Aristotle’s fifth element (§26), with no definite view however as to its acceptance or otherwise. Nature is divided into two realms one efficient, the other available to the former (offering itself to it for effectuation), *out of which latter, things are constituted* (τοις οὖν, *ex eaque*). In the efficient entities, which is effective is *force* in the ones being effected, that which is passive is *matter*. Force and matter exist never separately, but always in interpenetration: in the efficient things force prevails, while in things “offearable” or “actionable,” presenting themselves to the exercise of influence and activity upon them, matter is more prominent (it is subdued and kept together by a laser spiritual tone14 (§24). The former category involves fire and air (and aether as a separate principal quality, if Antiochus accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of the fifth element), while the latter consists in earth and water (§26). These are naturally localized (upper and lower-central parts of the World), but, apparently, not in the strict Aristotelian sense of a lunar-sphere borderline division of the world into two fundamentally distinct regions. In this respect Antiochus is rather more Stoic than Ocellus Lucanus, §§18-19; 36-37; although, however, he seemed to have emphasized the preeminent providential government exercised by God on the celestial spheres; §29: “...quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt et subjectae, quasi prudensiam quandam, *procurum sancti maximo*, deinde in terris ea, quae pertinent ad homines.” Furthermore, Antiochus contradicted the basic Stoic doctrine that spirit (vis, force) and matter are corporeal even in themselves as principles (although not existing separately the one from the other realiter).15 He maintained that corporeality and quality pertain to the composition of vis and matter (§24). Hence the first bodies are the elements which are matter essentially characterized by a definite quality (cf. §26).16

13 Cicero, *Acad. Post.*, I, 37 (Varro expounding Antiochus speaks of Zenos’s “innovations”): “haec non tam refrigia quam vocabulis committentur (ex Zeno).” *Acad. Pr.*, II 15 (Lucanus speaks from Antiochus’ point of view: “Plato was not a scepticist” “quia relictit perfectissimam disciplinam. Peripateticès et Academicós, nominibus differentibus, re congruentibus, a quibus Stoiki ipsi verbis magnam quam sententiam discernere.” Cf. Cicero, speaking in his own person about Stoicans, *de finibus Nat. et Bon.*, IV, passim, esp. §§72; 73; III, 5, V, 74; *Tusc.*, 5, 34: Zenos *ipse prohibet verborum casum*; etc. The idea originally was (believed to have been) pronounced by Pelomylos of the Old Academy: upon noticing that Zeno was attending his lectures, Pelomylos commented on Zeno’s Phoenician appropriation and transformation of Old-Academic doctrines: οὐ λατρεύς, ὁ Ζήνων, τὸν, καθαρόν, καθαρότατον, θεόν, καὶ τόξων κλάπων, φυσικάς μεταφημονὰς (Diogenes Laertius VII, 25). Φυσικαίς is a *nēt a trope exterrane*; allusion (1) to the Cynic descent of Zeno, (2) to the Humean mercantile philosophy and (3) to the Semitic undertones of crucial formulations of Stoic positions. – On the other hand, Cicero also holds the incompatibility between the one hand Old Academic-Aristotelian and on the other Stoic Ethical theory on fundamental issues (like how is the wise man constituted). *Acad. Pr.*, II §132. – Cicero’s own opinion concerning Antiochus was that he taught a slightly modified Stoic doctrine, *ibid.* (*Antiochus*) “cui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem si persuasive materia, germanissimus Stoicus” (cf. *ibid.*, §137; “sed ille, noster est princeps, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perspicua balaurum”). The context of all these remarks is problems in Moral Philosophy.


16 Much has been occasionally made out of Cicero’s (rather than Varro’s) apparent confusion between *quiditas* and *qualitas*, *κωδικίς* and *χωδικίς* in §§24 and 26. According to standard Stoic theory, *κωδικίς* is *corporate* but...
Prolegomena to the Enigma of the Johannine Prologue: An Inquiry into Ancient Philosophical Syncretism

Antiochus no doubt incorporated the Platonic reception-theory of matter into his Metaphysics. In general, it is inconceivable to even attempt an Academic Eclecticism in the theory of physical reality without taking seriously the Platonic Timaeus into account, indeed on building the unifying, integrative enterprise on this very foundation. There are signs for a conflation in the Ciceronian exposition of the previously worked out synthesis of Stoic and Aristotelian basic Physics with Platonic Matter-theory.

1) The looser use of *quaestio* and *quaestiones*, as noticed in the preceding note, may point in this direction.

2) The peculiarity of ultimate matter in §27 is suggested by the expression "materiam quamquam." The formula for matter, "quae tota omnia accipere possit," points to the Platonic (Timaeus 51A) τοι τα μόνα πάντων ήλιο το δύτην κατα πάντα τα τριών πλανήτων καιρομορφίας καλος μέλλοντι δέσποσις. Accipere refers to the μονόγενης. Infinite divisibility of matter must also relate intrinsically to extension, especially as it is accompanied by an argument for the explanation of movement without supposition of intrascalar vacuum (systematic and accumulated as in the Atomists, or minute and dispersed as with Strato); "quae autem movens, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervallis item infiniti divide possit." Movement in a total plenum is rendered possible by the infinitesimal displacement of one substance by another, by one thing yielding up its place to another in a continuous way, by a gradual removal of some quality from one place to another.

3) Cicero (in the Varroian summary, Acad. Post. 1, §24) remarks that *vis* and *materia* never subsist in separation from each other, viewing the necessary...
Immanence of vis in the context of the general thesis affirming the localization of every real being. Hence, it is copulatio with matter that localizes the power. And this notion corresponds neatly to the Timaeus description of gēra as the receptacle of, and standing basis for, the changing sensible qualities, of tōn as the localizer of becoming. 52a-b. τρίτην δὲ αὖ γένος ἐν τῷ τῆς χώρας ἕνεκα, φθορὰν οὐ προεξεξόμενον, ἐδραον δὲ παρέχον δην ἔχει γένεσιν πάσον, εἰσὶ δὲ μετ᾽ ἀναπληρωτέας ἀπὸν λογισμὸς τινὸς νοεῖσθαι, μόνης πιστῶν, πρὸς ὅ δε καὶ ἐναρτοποιοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαινομένον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ποιῶ ὅ ἐν ὑπὸ τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τυποῦ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῖς κατέχοντας αὐτόν ὅδε ἐν ὑπὸ πάντα ἕν τούτῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τυποῦ. In fact, it is this precisely conjunction of vis and matter that constitute body and quality: “Neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineatur, neque vina sine alia materia nihil est enim quod non aliquid esse coagatur. Sed quod ex utroque id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quondam nominabant.” The deviation from standard Stoic doctrine involved in the last statement is probably significant. The interference of matter and vis localizes being and constitutes corporeality just because it consists in the nexus of space and vis; to be somewhere belongs primarily to corporeality, and necessarily follows from having space as substrate on which spiritual force (vis) exercises its cohesive and structuring function.

If primal matter is not space, then how can the complex of idea or form and matter be extended and in space? To reply that form involves edifico or mathematical quantification (and extension) does not solve the problem: it cannot explain real, physical extension. One has to suppose therefore that matter is extended and in space, but this poses the definitive question what over and above extendedness is after all involved in matter. Passivity seems to be intrinsically characteristic of spatial extension, and whatever else may be thought constitutive of matter, seems to consist in positive ideal-formal determination, something that is extraneous to first matter.

That is not, however, the Stoic line of thought. In Stoicism both spirit and matter are, taken in themselves, bodies and thus extended beings, although spirit is not, as such, substance. Space is incorporeal, and, therefore, non-being. The crux of the difference lies consequently in the degree of reality of space. Construing space as real, concrete being must lead either to its identification with matter, or to its complementarity with it as parallel principles of reality. The first is Timaeus Platonism, the second is represented by Potamon of Alexandria, the eclectic from around the end of the 1st century B.C., according to whom (Diogenes Laertius, Prov. 21): ἄρχει τού δύναμιν τῆς ὄρασιν καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς κατανοήσεως τῆς κατανοήσεως τοῖς τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ τῶν ἀνάμικρον καὶ τῶν ἀκατανοησικῶν. Place here is distinguished from matter, and quality (vis, spirit) from the efficient cause. The Stoic (mater-πνεύμα) and the Platonic (space-idea or idea exemplified as such-ness in place) system of principles are simply combined the one by the side of the other, with bridging piece the πνεύμα to which is transformed in the ποιητήριος for Stoicism, and co-ordinated to the World of Ideas as prototypes of sensible (extended) qualities in Platonism. Potamon is a nicely characteristic example of Prepositional Syncretism in metaphysics.
The Platonic quadruplingism in first Principles makes clear how far the Timaean theory of space-matter was at the centre of system-building in 1st century B.C. Antiochus must have been instrumental in the growth of such speculations. But of course a simple reversal to the Timaean position was no more definitive. In translocation, not only a quality or quality-complex is transferred from one place to another, but matter is also involved. When a bronze sphere rolls on a surface, it is not only sphericity that is manifested at different places along the path, but a particular sphericity, *this* one (τόσον τόσον), which involves its own particular concrete bronzeness as well. In the end of the analysis however, there is prime matter and an organized quality-complex, what makes such an organized quality-complex *this* one, seems to be, as Plato indicated, the fact that it is constituted here, in *this* particular place. Space appears to be the ultimate source of *this*-ness, as being capable of concrete deictic particularization: *this* place. In locomotion, consequently, after all, what moves is a *such*, not a *this*: although the proximate matter (bronze) moves along with the sphere, the prime one (space) does not. The counter-intuitiveness of this result is illusory; for thisness in space, here and there and distance, can only be extended once structuredness is structure, which can only be done by bodies in effect, as structured places, organize the space.

But then, after all, it is being-determinations that particularize: singularity is absolute determinateness, a quality-complex that is unrepeatable. The *principium individuationis* is absolutely determine such-ness; the foundation of individuality is the non-existence in rem ex natura of indistinguishability (the Stoic doctrine of *μικραισία*). Thus, there is no this-ness in space as such, apart from the reference to this-creating determinacies (qualities). Hence this space is ultimately the space occupied by this entity, rather than vice-versa. And as an entity in movement occupies different spaces in succession, its own places are different at different times, and there is no identical this-space associated with the identical this-entity. Consequently (adopting the Antiochene construal of the space-matter doctrine), the notion of a particular prime matter (the prime matter of this thing) is self-contradictory. Prime Matter is substrate for the entire cosmic formation, the polar complement of *spatium* in general. Changes within the World, seen from the point of view of the universal Whole, are really internal reallocations of qualities in the total space-matter continuum, which admits of parts at all only in the context of its structuring through qualification. The Ciceronian formulations are revealing in their emphasis on the *totalitarian* inherent relationship between *spatium* (quality) and Matter, §27: "sed subiectam putavi omnibus sine ulla specie atque aerenitatem omni illa qualitate... materiam quandam, ea qua omnibus expressa atque emissa sint, quae tecto (τεκτό) omnna (τρίβερο) adipiscit posse omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte et...".\(^{[7]}\)

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\(^{[7]}\) The special order and arrangement in an entity's structure, the mutual adaptation of its parts and, in general the organized distribution of its quality-complex, constitutes its intrinsic *τόσον*. The idea was expanded already by Theophrastus (Fr. 22 Winneke = Simplicius *Corollarium de Loco*, Comm. In Aris Phys. 630.22: *οὔπων διά τῆς ταύτης τῆς ποτα...* ἀλλ' ὀποίες τάξεις οἵτινες τοῖς χρήσιμοις καθέτοις τοῖς φύσεωι καὶ δυνάμεις, *δύνας δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸν οὕτως καὶ τοιοῦτος ποταίς τῶν αὐτοματον κατάκρινον εὐθέρετον ἐκφράζοντο ἔργα, ἐμφανοῦς δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ἀρχήν καὶ τῆς τόσον ταύτης τις καὶ ὡς εἰς τὸ μεταμόρφωσις ἄνευ ὑπερδυνάμεις δηλ. καὶ δεικνύειν τοις ἀπ' ἀυτῆς διὰ τάς ἡπείρους..."
Of course all this is also perfectly Stoic; the clue to the underlying difference lies in what is reported for Antiochus concerning the non-corporeality of matter and vis taken in themselves. In Stoicism extensibility (three-dimensionality) endowed with the potency to act or suffer (exercise or undergo an action) constitutes beingness as corporeality; so matter is in itself tòion oúk proteron, sheer extensibility (the void) is a non-being. But if matter is incorporeal (as in Antiochus), it must either be sheer extensibility (space as such) or an ideal entity (something subsisting somehow in space, although not as a separate existence, and even if also pervading, directly or by proxy, bodily substance). Evidently, it cannot be the latter; it must therefore be space. Correspondingly, vis in general must be a sort of ideal reality, even though existing inseparably from material substance, being always in the corporeal nexus, where it assumes specificity of determination, i.e. particular quality. This complementary ideality of the system emerges thus naturally from the space-matter doctrine.11

11 The re-emphasis on the spatial construal of matter was already operational in Hellenistic Peripatetic. A finite World matter as space involves the non-extensibility of existence outside the cosmic Whole. And this precisely was Strato's theory, which further, significantly, is brought into connection with the views of the Platonists. The Void is considered to subsist in itself, only by abstraction in thought, in remote nature it is always filled with bodies, which is how it co-exists with the Cosmic body as a whole. Pr. 60 Wehrli: 0 δὲ οὐκομένην τοῦτον ὡς τὸ σκιερόν τῇ κατάστασις τῆς οὐσίας, ὡς ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὑπολογίων μεταφέροντας διὰ τοῦ μετάνοια φύσεως τόπου καὶ ματιῶν τής θεωρήσεως ἑσόδους (Pr. 55.45 sqq.). Void is space without body, and as such it is naturally nonextensive. Space as extension is always occupied by body, and in fact is adapted for all sensible appearances. Pr. 59 (again from Simplicius) τῆς δὲ διαστάσεως λειτουργίας (καὶ τῆς κατανόησις) εἰς τὸν συμμετεχόντα πάντως τῆς κατανόησις τῆς σιβύδως (Simplicius testudo). Void is space without body, and as such it is naturally nonextensive. Space as extension is always occupied by body, and in fact is adapted for all sensible appearances. Pr. 59 (again from Simplicius) τῆς δὲ διαστάσεως λειτουργίας (καὶ τῆς κατανόησις) εἰς τὸν συμμετεχόντα πάντως τῆς κατανόησις τῆς σιβύδως (Simplicius testudo). Void is space without body, and as such it is naturally nonextensive. Space as extension is always occupied by body, and in fact is adapted for all sensible appearances. Pr. 59 (again from Simplicius) τῆς δὲ διαστάσεως λειτουργίας (καὶ τῆς κατανόησις) εἰς τὸν συμμετεχόντα πάντως τῆς κατανόησις τῆς σιβύδως (Simplicius testudo).
Constructing the general harmony between Stoicism, Aristotelianism and Platonism in the framework of the 5th Academy presented two fundamental issues that have to be coped with: one was the space-matter theory, the other ideas as paradigmatic essences. The two cardinal Timaean doctrines had to be integrated within the preworked Stoica Aristotelian accord.

Antiochus accepted the existence of ideas as unchangeable being, discernible only as such by the mental faculty; Mind is at bottom the sole trustworthy judge of reality; it constitutes the criterion of truth in involving the conception of unalterable, perennial self-identical being which establishes unmistakeable perception in the natural World of change. Acad. Post. I, 30: "Mentem volebant rerum esse indicem: solanum censebant idoneam cui credendarum, quia sola cernentem id, quid simper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quae esset. Hanc illi bōxan appellat, im a Platonita nominatum, nos recte speciem possimus dicere" (cf. These. Disput. I, 58; Orator, §10)."9

Ideas are objects of induction. Objects of sensation ("res eae, quae subjectae sensibi sensibus viderentur"); Acad. Post. I, 31, ἐπιστήμην ταῖς εἴδησις τοῦ πάντοτε) constitute the sensible World, which is in continuous flux; this cosmic reality is therefore called opinabili, διάφορος, Science on the other hand resides in the concepts and reasonings of mind; "Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animo notionibus atque rationibus" (§32), ἐξοντες καὶ λόγοι.

For Antiochus ideas and conceptions; or intelllections are fundamentally the same; or, more accurately, he concentrated on the fact that the idea as intelligible (vonōn) is the object and content of the intellation (vōnēti as the mental act of comprehension. This is evident from the flow of the argument in §§31-2. In Acad. Prior. I, 30, again in a statement of Antiochian position, the genetic account of these intelllections is given. Mind has the power to reposition and store sense-perceptions, building on whose similarities it effects mental notions or conceptual perceptions of things; it sees them intellectually, in their ideal content. "Mens enim ipsa, quae sensum sensus est atque etiam ipse sensus est, naturalem viam habet, quem intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque, alia visa sic adiript, ut eis statim..." (Fr. 49). Full Stoicism is evident both in the fact of the non-Aristotelian one-to-one correspondence between primary qualities and basic elements, and in the understanding of qualities as tonic forces inferring material substance. The latter distinction between δύναμες as the qualitative contributions and ousias as the substances whose qualities are (between e.g. warmth and fire, with a third entity the corporated substance) appears also in Oecles. Laconius §20-23. Fundamental qualities as δύναμες are attested already for Aknaunon (DK 2484). Aristotle conceptualized the general impart of the meaning of power as principle of change in something else or in itself taken as something else (Metaph. 1046a19, 10202b: ἰσόχρονος ἐκτός - or ἰσόχρονος - ἐν ἰδίᾳ ἔσχε at ἰσόχρονος - ἐν ἰδίᾳ ἔσχε); this included e.g. ἱδρυμανής δύναμις, De part. Anim., 650b5. But for analysis of quality in Categ. B shows however no particular awareness of, or relevance to, the later problem-structure. In Probl., Γ 14, 871a1-2, δύναμες are distinguished from the ἰσόχρονος δύναμις: this is the Peripatetic rendering of the Stoic distinction between ἰδίᾳ and ἐν ἰδίᾳ δύναμις: for Stoicism matter is the substance of things and powers are corporal, while for Peripatetics, powers are immaterial and, therefore, incorporeal, since bodies necessarily involve matter. The characteristic doctrine of a power permeating and fashioning the World appears in Peripatetic circles with De Mund., 396b 20.

9 The intellectual conception of man, e.g., controls the conspectus φορτίον of this thing as a main, in this way the supposed discrepancy in the report of the Antiochian doctrine between Acad. Post. I, 30-2 and Acad. Prior. I, 30 is eliminated.
utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similium librorum construct.
ex quibus efficientur notitiae rerum, quae Græci tum in vivis, tum prooimia vocant.\(^{29}\)

That the Platonic ideas are νοηματα was entertained already in the middle of the 4\(^{th}\) century B.C. Alcimos\(^{3}\) wrote, \(560 F 6\)  § 13 Jacobi = Diogenes Laertius, III, 13: ἄστη δὲ τῶν έλε̊ων ἐν ἑαυτῷ μεν ἔστη τε καὶ νοημα καὶ πρὸς τούς ἀπαθεῖς, διὸ καὶ ὑποτις (sc. Plato, Parm., 132d) ἐν τῇ φρασί τῆς ἢδες ἔσται καθὸ ἃ προσδίδομα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τούτων ἕσσενον τούτων ὑμεῖς καθολικῶς. Νόημα is related to νόησις and νοητόν in the way that conception as concept is related to conception as conceiving and to the conceived, or thought is related to the thinking of thought and to the thing thought of. In the intellectual act νοημα emphasizes the activity-aspect, νοησιμα the intellect itself as an achieved datum, while νοητον refers to the content of the intellect. In fundamentalist Intellectualism as in Parmenides, thinking (to think) is identical with the object thought to; i.e., νοημα is of νοηματα (2B8.34); in fact thinking is identical with being: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοηματα ἔστη τε καὶ ἐν οἷον (B3). For thinking involves being, in which it is being thought: οὗ γὰρ ἔνεν τοῦ ἡδεν, ἐν τούτῳ καθό ἡ ρουσιμουν ἔσται, ὑποτις τὸ νοημα (B8.35-6). Conversely, the idea is expressed by the saying of Metrodorus of Chios: παντα ἐστίν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς νοηματα (B2); thinking and being are co-implied. Or rather, thinking is ingressed in being: it is its luminosity, its self-disclosingness, its order. In fact, being thinks itself rather than it is being thought of (by something extraneous).\(^{30}\) The intelligibility of being (its efficience, its order that constitutes it and makes it transparent and luminous) constitutes intelligence, i.e., the conception of being. The mental act is grounded in being. In this perspective, Being is identical with Mind. Mind absolutely taken is the radiance of Being (its intelligibility) considered as illuminating that out of which it proceeds. Mind is therefore Being’s revelation. When the soul receives such unveiling, it is enlightened by mental vision; it becomes intellectual. The light proceeds from the objective reality to the thinking subject. Even better: the eye that sees being is being’s own. Even more: the eye is being itself. Mind is the light of being, the order of existence.

Plato’s speculations must have been construed in such a sense by his contemporaries, \^\(^{30}\) whether or not explicitly formulated by him in these terms. Alcimos bears testimony to this. Ideas are νοηματα (Diog. Laert. III, 13), but also νοητα (§ 10): they are exemplars standing in Nature (§ 15), they exist as real beings (§ 15). Individual minds (of men but also of all animals) identify themselves with these ideas in thinking them, and this makes the animal being in contact with the idea: τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀγνώμον νοην, διαφέρει τοι̊ ἢν μὴ τῆς ἢδος δηπεράςκει καὶ πρὸς τούτο τὸ νοημα φανερος εἶναι. The argument is that every animal instinctively recognizes the individuals of its own species as well as those appropriate for food, and this could not obtain without an awareness of essential

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\(^{29}\) Notitia for ἄντον occurs in §22; de Fin. Bon. Et Mal. V. 59-60; Topica, 31. Leg., 1, 24. Notio is commoner, esp. in Cicero’s philosophical works, e.g. Acad. Post. I, 32; 42; Acad. Prince., II, 53, 85; de Fin. exp. III, 33; Inveniuntur further appears occasionally, as in de Fin. Exp. III, 21, Leg. I, 26; 27, 44: 59.

\(^{30}\) The Sicilian historian (Στικλιδάκο) and renowned orator who was attracted to Sipilo (Diog. Laertius, II, 114). He argued elaborately in four books To Anonymas that Plato took over from Epicurus the cardinal tenets of his Theory of Ideas.

similarities among sense-objects, which implies discernment of ideal identity (§§15-6).

Recognition of the same presupposes reference to an ideal exemplar or archetype of the essence in common by the same things.

If ideas are severally thought-contents and thoughts, precisely by virtue of their being archetypes of true being, the question arises, what do they constitute in their totality as existing in *vorum natural*? Again the inner tendency of the Platonic System points to the identification of the *World of Ideas* with divine, absolute *Mind*. The multiplicity of Ideas on the other hand requires the postulation of a second principle by the side of absolute Goodness (τὸ ἀγαθόν) a sort of intelligible “matter” is needed, whose relationship to space-matter is left obscure and which would be essentially Evil in its dualism to the First Principle. And indeed Speusippus adapted different pairs of principles for each successive stratum of reality starting from (1) the unitary *Abron* and descending to the *World of Numbers*, (2) of Magnitudes, (4) of Soul, and finally of (5) sensible things (Fr. 33a-e Lang = 29-30 Taran). In the different levels of reality, there are different but corresponding principles, corresponding dualisms. Thus, e.g., just as numbers are produced from the One and the Multiplicity (*πλῆθος*), so extensional magnitudes are generated from the pair of the Point (like the one) and amorphous continuous extensionality (like the discreet Multitude). Aristotle *Metaph.* 1085a 32: ἢ ἀπό τοῦ (τὸ μέγα τὸ μικρόν) εἶναι οὐκ ἢ τὸ μέγα ἢ ἢ τὸ μικρόν ἢ τὸ μέγα ἢ τὸ μικρόν. Cf. *Metaph.*, 1044a 7-8; *Topica* 108b 23-31. He distinguished Goodness from Oneness and posited the former “late” in the ontological hierarchy, attached essentially to the psychic realm. In this way, multiplicity and (mathematical) extension can exist...
without involving error and evil. And indeed how could the One as the absolutely first principle be the Good, goodness itself, without the Other Ultimate Principle becoming Evil itself? Mind furthermore is the World of organized extension (geometrical realities), distinct both from the First Principle (Αὐτότος) and the universal soul (τὸ Λογικόν). In this way, the Speusippian hierarchy of reality prefigures Neoplatonic developments under a stricter, late (but classical) Pythagorean, *mathematical* construal: (1) "Ev - (2) Numbers (Numbers) - (3) Magnitudes (Magnitudes) - (4) Soul - (5) Matter. The Xenocratemus system was more complex. There are two ultimate principles, the One and the (indefinite) Dyad. The second Principle informed by the One generates the ideas-numbers, which exist primarily in soul.

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Xenocrates interpreted the Timaean psychogony as eternal generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The Principle of Infinity enters into the Platonic mixture as divisibility (τὸ μετατετοιμαζόμενον), which combined with the indivisible Oneness (τὸ ἀμετατοποιητόν), produces the number-system. The Second Principle enters again into the mixture as otherness (τὸ ἕτερον) opposed to the self-identity of the One (τὸ αὐτόν), and this synthesis constitutes self-movement, change-in-identity; for otherness is the principle of movement, just as identity is the principle of permanence. Thus the Xenocraterian definition of soul is reached: self-moving number (or vital idea), ἀμετατοποιητὸς νοικὸς ἀνατόμον. Fr. 68; cf. Frs. 60-65.96

Tying up the reported formulations in Fr. 15 it may be stated that the Indefinite Dyad is amorphous Soulness, the underlying principle of psychicality. When acted upon by the One, it generates the intelligible World of number-ideas (τὸ νοημερον) and simultaneously the living, intellected psychic essence (νοεῖν, νοημον, νοητόν), which are but two aspects of the same reality, distinguishable in thought as subject and object of thinking: this reality is, in its totality, the Cosmic Soul, formed in harmony, of the Timaeus.97

First numbers acting on the material Principle (the Indefinite Dyad, principle of divisibility, otherness and movement) generate organized extension. Dyad and matter give one-dimensional magnitude, Triad and matter create surfaces, Tetrad and matter produce three-dimensionality (mathematical solids). Thus the geometrical objects are framed as the intermediate grade of reality between the supracosmic intelligible realm and physical existence, they constitute the celestial region (Fr. 5; cf. Fr. 34; for the triple division of reality see Fr. 55). Other numbers (as ideal entities and paradigmatic causes, Fr. 30; cf. Fr. 34) form with matter the variegated physical existence. As the numerically eidetic essence becomes more complex, the resulting configurations are less able to maintain themselves permanently in their self-identity vis-à-vis the material otherness and mobility, and this instability makes them thus changeful. In this last function, matter is appositely called to ἄδοξον by Xenocrates (Fr. 28), to highlight its unceasing, ever-flowing essential character.98

96 For Fr. 15: Συνεκρατεῖς... τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυαδὰ Θεὸς, τὴν μόνον ἄρημαν, παρόντος ἔργων τάτις ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀνεκτόνοισιν, ἀποτελοῦντος τὰς γένεσιν καὶ παράγοντος καὶ νοτίον, διότι δέντι ὁ πρῶτος ἱερὸς τῆς ἐκ τῶν συνών τέκνων φυσώναι, ἕνεκεν οὗτος θεοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος. Χαῖρε Σύνεκρατε (τίμειος Ζεύς) ἦν οὐκ Ἐνεκρατεῖς (Fr. 18) the first Principle of the unalterable, self-identical realm (ἐν τοῖς καθένας τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀρχαιοτέρων ἑρωτήματι), i.e. in the World of Ideas-numbers. Hence the Monas of Fr. 15 is the absolute Principle, the One. Correspondingly the second Principle is the Indefinite Dyad. As formed by the One, this constitutes the Universal Soul governing the entire World; οὐρανός in the passage refers to the outermost celestial sphere, and constitutes the cosmic Whole.
97 Fr. 15: Συνεκρατεῖς... τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυαδὰ Θεὸς, τὴν μόνον ἄρημαν, παρόντος ἔργων τάτις ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀνεκτόνοισιν, ἀποτελοῦντος τὰς γένεσιν καὶ παράγοντος καὶ νοτίον, διότι δέντι ὁ πρῶτος ἱερὸς τῆς ἐκ τῶν συνών τέκνων φυσώναι, ἕνεκεν οὗτος θεοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος. Χαῖρε Σύνεκρατε (τίμειος Ζεύς) ἦν οὐκ Ἐνεκρατεῖς (Fr. 18) the first Principle of the unalterable, self-identical realm (ἐν τοῖς καθένας τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀρχαιοτέρων ἑρωτήματι), i.e. in the World of Ideas-numbers. Hence the Monas of Fr. 15 is the absolute Principle, the One. Correspondingly the second Principle is the Indefinite Dyad. As formed by the One, this constitutes the Universal Soul governing the entire World; οὐρανός in the passage refers to the outermost celestial sphere, and constitutes the cosmic Whole.
98 To ἄδοξον is the same with the ἄνωτον θέως, the Second absolute Principle. The structural identification is confirmed by the ekphorical lemma ἄνωτον τὴν ὅλην ἄνωτόνας (ἐν Χαῖρες) διὰ τοῦ ἐπάνω (Fr. 28,
Mind as supreme God and ultimate Principle of reality (= the One) is beyond even eidetic-numerical multiplicity. It is the cosmic Soul, not the extreme divine Mind, that contains the World of Ideas-Numbers.12 This universal Soul on the other hand, permeates the physical, sensible World (see Fr. 71; cf. Fr. 73). Since the Xenocratean supreme Mind in itself is above all being-determination (being itself the first principle of eidetic-numerical articulation), it cannot think to all of any such being-determinations and eidetic-numbers. Consequently, it points backwards to the Parmenidean self-intellection of differenceless absolute being (where pure intellection coalesces with pure being, and vista is identified with énnos); and also forward to the Aristotelian God who is pure νόης νοητός, because he is pure actuality, i.e. actuality without any admixture of potentiality, and the only thing that can exist separately from any material substrate, and thus free from any tincture of contingency and potentiality, and thus necessary and eternal, is thought, intellection, pure mental activity. This now intellection, in order to remain necessarily existing and eternal, without any complication of contingency that would compromise such a unique status, must think of nothing that would be so compromised by consisting in a being-determination which necessarily involves form-in-matter. Therefore the divine mind must think of nothing but itself, being thus an intellection of pure intellection, or in other words, pure actuality by and in itself.13

160,23 (Heine). It is not variation in the material, but difference in the informative principle, that accounts for the diversity in the orders of reality. The entire process may be schematized as follows: One -> Number (soul) Numbers -> Matter -> Mathematical Extension -> Celestial Objects (other) Numbers -> Matter -> Mathematical Extension -> Sublunary (physical) realm Numbers and souls are not in themselves extended and corporeal (Fr. 66-7). The allegorical interpretation of Homer, *Herm., A.,* 40 (fr. 55) indicates that for Xenocrates the same matter underlies his trichic division of reality. Describing Agamemnon’s shield, Homer refers to its silver are (νεκρωτική δέντα θεοῦ, κόροις, πάντον δέντα), and similarly “ιάτρος” is a synonym for the *νοητός* of Parmenides. The Scholia to *Iliad* have: τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ηιρεῖται μήμα τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ εἶναι. (The “correction” of Kranz is totally unwarranted and adilectmic). This feature gives substantial compactness to the Xenocratean System. On the other hand (and under the assumption of the identity of One with Goodness), the involvement of the same matter in the constitution of the very first order of being, admits for the existence of evil very “early” in the generation of reality (Fr. 76; cf. evil determants Fr. 23-5).

12 God-Mind as a solitary intellection without differentiated content is a doctrinal common ground between Xenocrates and Aristotle (God as νόης νοητός). Cf. supra.